Synergising Network Analysis Tradecraft

Network Tradecraft Advancement Team (NTAT)

DSD GCHQ GCSB NSA

Overview

* What is the NTAT?
* 2011 – 2012 work and accomplishments



Tradecraft?

Tradecraft

- "The development of methods, techniques, algorithms and processes in order to generate Intelligence, and developing the ability to apply this knowledge either manually or through automation. Tradecraft is developed from experience, research, intuition and by the reapplication and redefinition of existing techniques. **Industrial-Scale Tradecraft** involves data on a large scale."

Network Tradecraft

- Usable knowledge about how to acquire intelligence FROM the network

The NTAT

* Create **repeatable**, **sustainable** & **shareable** tradecraft to enable network analysis

* Facilitate knowledge collaboration and interchange across the 5-Eyes SIGDEV community



The Process

Stage 1 = Fact Finding

Stage 2 = Define Focus (based on Fact Finding)

Stage 3 = Develop Tradecraft

Stage 4 = Document Tradecraft

Stage 5 = Test Documented Tradecraft and Refine

Network Convergence Tradecraft

* Technological convergence – where voice and data services interact with each other on a single device

* Tradecraft to enable the targeting of handsets in telephony space and CNE exploitation in IP space

* Improved algorithms for mobile gateway identification and implementation of these algorithms

DSD Workshop
November 2011

* 2 weeks
  * CSE, DSD, GCHQ
  * Virtually, via chat room, NSA & GCSB
* Focus on data, techniques & analytic outcomes

https://wiki.dsd/twiki/[redacted]

DSD Workshop Outcomes

Technique developed to identify wide variety of potential converged data, unique for specific country or mobile network operator

- ***potentially lead to convergence correlation dataset to help profile targets on-line activity***

Documentation of techniques to identify specific components of raw HTTP activity that alludes to the browsing, downloading and installation of smartphone applications

- ***identified the presence of application servers for mobile network operators and geographical areas***

DSD implementation of mobile gateway identification analytic based on FRETTING YETI

- ***three agencies now running the same analytic provides a richer dataset of mobile gateways***

CRAFTY SHACK trial

- ***NTAT now using CRAFTY SHACK for tradecraft documentation***

XKS Microplugin: Samsung Protocol



State	ID	Csc	Device_Model	HTTP_User_Agent	Imei	Latest_Mcc	Mcc	Message_Id	Message_Type	Mnc	Network_Ty	Odc_Versio	Preloaded_apps	Version	Active User?	Caseroflation
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2	366	AUT	GT-P7500	SAMSUNG-Android			250	2306-0	checkAppUpgrade Request	01	0	3.0.021	com.sec.android.app.samsungapp	1.0		ESOHL000000/0000
3	648	AUT	GT-P7500	SAMSUNG-Android			250	2306-1	checkAppUpgrade Request	01	0	3.0.021	com.sec.android.app.samsungapp	1.0		ESOHL000000/0000
4	649	AUT	GT-P7500	SAMSUNG-Android			250	2306-0	checkAppUpgrade Request	01	0	3.0.021	com.sec.android.app.samsungapp	1.0		ESOHL000000/0000
5	1260	AUT	GT-P7500	SAMSUNG-Android			250	2306-3	checkAppUpgrade Request	01	0	3.0.021	com.sec.android.app.samsungapp	1.0		ESOHL000000/0000
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7	1262	AUT	GT-P7500	SAMSUNG-Android			250	2306-5	checkAppUpgrade Request	01	0	3.0.021	com.sec.android.app.samsungapp	1.0		ESOHL000000/0000
8	1274	AUT	GT-P7500	SAMSUNG-Android			250	2306-0	checkAppUpgrade Request	01	0	3.0.021	com.sec.android.app.samsungapp	1.0a		ESOHL000000/0000
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11	433	SKZ	GT-I9100	SAMSUNG-Android			412	2306-0	checkAppUpgrade Request	20	0	2.6.148		3.0		ESOHL000000/0000
12	863	XSG	GT-I9100				412	2350-0	getPushNotificationMessage Re	20	0			3.0		ESOHL000000/0000
13	1074	XSG	GT-I9100				412	2350-0	getPushNotificationMessage Re	20	0			3.0		ESOHL000000/0000
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16	864	XSG	GT-I9100				412	2301-0	getUpgradeNKillCount Request	20	0		com.sec.android.app.samsungapp	1.0a		ESOHL000000/0000
17	260											cn.wpa.mv 173	android@2.3.5@@android:ttx@2.3.	1.0a		ESOHL000000/0000
18	362	XSG	GT-I9100				412	2301-0	getUpgradeNKillCount Request	20	0			1.0a		ESOHL000000/0000
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21	961	XEU	GT-I9100				412	2306-5	checkAppUpgrade Request	40	0	2.6.122		1.0a		ESOHL000000/0000
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29	457	TOP SECRET//SI	2012-05-13 02:33:35		2012-05-13 02:33:35				2200-1	countrySearch Request		111		1.0		ESOHL000000/0000
30	688	TOP SECRET//SI	2012-05-11 09:32:28		2012-05-11 09:32:28		412		3000-1	termsInformation Request	20	0	2.6.048	1.0		ESOHL000000/0000

CSE Workshop February 2012

* 2 weeks
  * CSE, DSD, GCHQ, GCSB, NSA – everyone wanted to experience a Canadian winter!
  * Build on the work started at DSD

Winter Nirvana

The Reality!

CSE Workshop Outcomes

Refinement of XKS fingerprints to identify mobile bearers, Samsung and Android Marketplace servers

- ***17 XKS fingerprints deployed***

Documentation of analytics in CRAFTY SHACK

- ***These analytics are now being implemented across the 5 Eyes***

Proving the tradecraft actually works!

- ***Scenario to test the tradecraft and analytics – Op IRRITANT HORN***

Op IRRITANT HORN

Op IRRITANT HORN
Does the tradecraft work?

* Another Arab Spring (only this time, different countries)
* Goal: identify aggregation points for the mobile networks in the countries of interest using the tradecraft developed during the workshops
* Did it work? YES -> the team was able to identify connections from the countries to application and vendor servers in non 5-Eyes countries
* So what? We found some servers….
  - Ø Potential MiTM
  - Ø Effects
  - Ø Harvesting data at rest
  - Ø Harvesting data in transit

Finding mobile application & vendor update servers



Finding mobile application & vendor update servers




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france          android-market.l.google.com

cuba            store.cubava.cu
cuba            store.cubava.cu
senegal         srv_applis.sar.sn
     |

morocco         boungeontelephone.com
switzerland     download-force.com
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netherlands     mobile.ero-advertising.com
russia          lady.marketgid.info
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
Crafty Shack
Change view [redacted]@cse-cst.gc.ca
Search this wiki
Go
Search
Browse
Search
Create
Help
MediaWiki
Identify Servers communicating with a Mobile network
Page
Discussion
History
Edit
SECRET
Identify Servers communicating with a Mobile network
5 EYES
CSEC
DSD
GCHQ
GCSB
NSA
Factbox
Metadata
What does the tradecraft achieve?
This tradecraft will provide a list of servers that have been seen communicating with a mobile network.
In what situations would this tradecraft be most useful?
To identify mobile application servers for a specific network
To identify any server that may be useful for collection purposes
Describe any problems, caveats or things to watch out for
The list of servers returned depends on the the IP range and collection sources utilized. Success of this tradecraft may require additional research to identify other IP ranges or requesting other agencies to check their collecton to identify different servers.
Links that can help you to implement this tradecraft
Created by: [redacted]
Agency: NSA
Email Address: [redacted]
Difficulty:
Acceptance state: Limited
Input(s): Ontology/Network block, Ontology/Ip address
Output(s): Ontology/Ip address, Ontology/ASN, Ontology/Network block, Ontology/Hostname, Ontology/User Agent String, Ontology/Geographic selector
Invokes Tradecraft:
Find public IP space used by Mobile Devices and Related Servers on the Internet
Finding Mobile Internet Gateways
Alternatives:
Identify Servers communicating with a Mobile network
5 EYES Tradecraft Steps (document underlying analytic, do not include tools)
[edit]
The IP ranges utilized for the initial implementation of this tradecraft were the Inter PLMN Backbone IP ranges obtained from IR21 documents. For other methods of identifying mobile IP blocks, see the invoked tradecraft listed above.
Step 1) Take IP ranges or individual addresses identified as being related to mobile network communications.
Step 2) Obtain geolocation information and network ownership information for each IP address. This should include: Network Owner name, Carrier name, ASN, Continent, Country, Region, City, Lat/Long, and any other related details that your system can obtain.
Step 3) Obtain Internet communication events related to the IP addresses. These events should minimally include: source information, To IP, From IP, TCP Direction, and HTTP User-Agent
Step 4) Sort the results and dedup them. This step depends on your collection sources.
Step 5) Filter out server communications that have user-agents that aren't useful. Further analysis is needed to identify the non-useful user-agents (cheat sheet needed). Ex: friendly-scanner
Step 6) Check the TCP Direction field:
If Server to Client, grab the From IP information
If Client to Server, grab the To IP information
If Server to Server, grab both the To and From IP information
If Unknown, capture in an error log
Step 7) Sort and dedup again based on Server IP information. TCP Direction info is no longer needed.
Step 8) Obtain geolocation information and network ownership information for each Server IP. This is done for the servers that were not in the original IP Blocks.
Step 9) Remove any servers that are not useful. This may include 5-Eyes servers.
Step 10) Output:
List of Servers
List of related User Agents
List of related hostnames
Comments (2) | Show comments
Average article quality based on 1 rating(s):
Last updated: 24/2/2012 by [redacted]
Category: Tradecraft
CRAFTY SHACK - "It's not tradecraft until it's documented! - [redacted] CSEC"
[edit]

Identifying servers communicating with an MNO



TOP SECRET//SI

Profiling mobile application servers



Profiling mobile application servers



Profiling mobile application servers



* Results based on mobile application servers seen in CSE collection
* We have a list of the most popular smartphones for Warid Congo customers and their IMSIs

Success Stories

* UCWeb mobile browser identification
  * Discovered by GCHQ analyst during DSD workshop
  * Chinese mobile web browser – leaks IMSI, MSISDN, IMEI and device characteristics

UCWeb

* Led to discovery of active comms channel from [redacted]

(S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) The CONVERGENCE team helped discover an active communication channel originating from [redacted] that is associated with the [redacted] as they are known within the [redacted] hierarchy area of responsibility is for covert activities in Europe, North America, and South America. The customer [redacted] leveraged a ***Convergence Discovery capability that enabled the discovery of a covert channel associated with smart phone browser activity in passive collection****. The covert channel originates from users who use UCBrowser (mobile phone compact web browser).* ***The covert channel leaks the IMSI, MSISDN, Device Characteristics, and IMEI back to server(s) in*** *[redacted] Initial investigation has determined that perhaps malware can be associated when the covert channel is established. [redacted] covert exfil activity identifies SIGINT opportunity where potentially none may have existed before. Target offices that have access to X-KEYSCORE can search within this type of traffic based on their IMSI or IMEI to determine target presence*

UCWeb – XKS Microplugin


UCWeb

Help | Actions | Reports | View | Map View

	State	ID	Datetime	Highlights	Datetime End	Browser Version	Email Address	Handset Model	IMEI	IMSI	Global Title	Platform	Active User/T	Casenotation
1		1	2012-05-13 02:29:20		2012-05-13 02:29:23	8.0.3.107	[redacted]@123movies	nokiae90-1	[redacted]	[redacted]	9379900100	java		E9DHL00000M0000
2		3	2012-05-13 06:00:59		2012-05-13 06:01:00	8.0.3.107	[redacted]@123movies	nokiae90-1			9379900100	java		E9DHL00000M0000
3		4	2012-05-13 19:39:11		2012-05-13 19:39:11	7.9.3.103		HTC A510e				android		E9BDE00000M0000
4		2	2012-05-14 12:29:53		2012-05-14 12:29:53	8.0.4.121	[redacted]@djgol	NokiaE72-1				sis		E9DHL00000M0000
5		5	2012-05-14 17:46:46		2012-05-14 17:46:46	8.0.4.121	[redacted]@mobimasti	NokiaX6-00				sis		H5H125221450000
6		6	2012-05-15 18:28:19		2012-05-15 18:28:19	8.0.4.121	[redacted]@mobimasti	NokiaX6-00			93781090013	sis		H5H125221450000
7		7	2012-05-15 20:02:58		2012-05-15 20:02:58	8.0.4.121	[redacted]@mobimasti	NokiaX6-00			93781090013	sis		H5H12522145000

Vision of Success

* Shared convergence database with numerous different sources, methods & tradecraft feeding into it
* Ultimately correlating telephony and Internet TDIs with some degree of confidence