



Effective Synchronization and Integration of Effects Through Cyberspace for the Joint Warfighter

14 AUG 12

BG George J. Franz, III

Director of Current Operations
United States Cyber Command

UNCLASSIFIED
Approved For Public Release



Agenda


- Joint Operations
- Joint Cyberspace Doctrine
 - Joint Warfighting Functions
 - Cyberspace Domain
- Command and Control (C2)
 - Transitional C2 Model
- Planning to Execution
- Considerations/Thoughts



Joint Operations

- “Joint operations doctrine is built on a sound base of warfighting philosophy, theory, and *practical experience*.” - JP 3-0
- United States Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) plans and executes operations in support of military objectives, and, in so doing, adheres to applicable Joint Doctrine, Execute Orders, and Presidential Directives.”

- Commander USCYBERCOM




Insights

- ***Effects must be synchronized to support the joint force commander’s tactical objectives, operational goals, and strategic endstate***
- ***Cyber Support Elements integrated into the supported Joint Forces Components planning and execution (Battle Rhythm)***
 - ***“Acts as staff advisor to the Director of Operations”***
 - ***Clear agreement as to the effects desired (CERF) and how they are delivered (JCSR)***



Ultimate Operational Goal

The ultimate goal of Situational Awareness (SA) and Indications and Warning (I&W) is to maintain strategic and tactical understanding of the military cyberspace domain that informs operational risk decision, supports current actions, and does not interfere with ongoing operations.



Continuous SA/IW enables informed, decisive actions


Goal is reached by holistically examining five factors:

1. Current and near-future **threat environment**
2. Identified global threat and significant **anomalous activity**
3. **Vulnerabilities** of Department of Defense (DoD) systems and the underlying infrastructure
4. Prioritized **key cyber terrain** that allows understanding of operational and technical risk to DoD operations and networks
5. Current **operational readiness** and capability of cyber forces and sensors



Joint Cyberspace Doctrine


Joint Warfighting Function





Joint Cyberspace Doctrine

Joint Cyberspace Domain





Key Terrain

- Key Terrain – Any locality, or area, the seizure or retention of which affords a marked advantage to either combatant. (JP 1-02)
- What does this mean in the cyber domain?
 - Key terrain applies to those physical and logical elements of the domain that enable mission essential warfighting functions.
 - Key terrain is temporal. It changes with the mission and adversary. In the absence of either, these elements may be critical infrastructure or a key resource, but not key terrain.
 - Key terrain can be decomposed into personal, logical, informational, and physical layers.
 - Key terrain is applicable across the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war.
 - Key terrain may be fiber optic cable, satellite communication (SATCOM) uplink/downlink, subnets, databases with usernames and passwords, even technicians themselves.



Joint Cyberspace Domain



Battle executed in minutes or seconds

Response must be immediate or mission failure (similar response for accident)



Attribution not required for a successful response

Retaliation is not a condition of successful defense



Crippling strategic effects if defensive preps are inadequate

Preparations (access & development) take years, effects take moments



Threats are inherently global and cross theaters

Effects are globally dispersed and 2nd & 3rd order effects may not be predictable



Challengers have the advantage

The architecture of the networks significantly give the aggressor the advantage



Command and Control

United States Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM)

USCYBERCOM is US Strategic Command's (USSTRATCOM) execution arm for cyberspace operations, and directs offensive cyberspace operations. USCYBERCOM is directed by USSTRATCOM as the focal point for military cyberspace operations, and is delegated Operational Control (OPCON) or Tactical Control (TACON) of designated forces

Joint Operations Center (JOC)

USCYBERCOM JOC coordinates, synchronizes, and directs operations, to include: (a) health and status of networks, (b) vulnerabilities and detected adversary activity, (c) priority event related tipping and cuing, (d) dissemination of orders, (e) adjusting countermeasures, (f) interface with external organizations/agencies.


Joint Cyber Center (JCC)

Functions as the nexus for the Combatant Command cyberspace enterprise. The JCC supported by USCYBERCOM serves as the staff/component for planning and oversight of Combatant Command Defensive Cyber Operations (DCO), DoD Global Information Grid Operations (DGO), and Offensive Cyber Operations (OCO).

CDRUSCYBERCOM deconflicts fires delivered in and through cyberspace



Transitional C2 Model




Organized from USCYBERCOM forces and stationed with Combatant Commanders (CCDR) for full integration with their staff. Provide subject matter experts for cyberspace operations, planning, and other related functions. Includes a forward-deployed element of USCYBERCOM (or service cyber component) personnel temporarily augmenting the CSE in CCDR designated locations during an operation



USCC Workflow for Integrated Priorities

- JIPCL**
Joint Integrated
Prioritized
Collection List
- JJPL**
Joint Integrated
Priority List
- JPG**
Joint Planning
Groups (J5)
- OPTs**
Operations
Planning Teams
- CMWG**
Collection
Management
Working Group
- JCMB**
Joint Collection
Management Board
- MMC**
Mission
Management Cell
- PWG**
Priorities Working
Group





CYBER EFFECTS REQUEST FORMAT (CERF)

Portion mark all fields

Section 1 -- Requesting Unit Information

Title *	<input type="text"/>	Unit	<input type="text"/>
CCMD *	<input type="text"/>	Classification	<input type="text"/>
POC Name *	<input type="text"/>	Control Marking	<input type="text"/>
POC Phone *	<input type="text"/>	Dissemination	<input type="text"/>
POC E-mail *	<input type="text"/>	<input type="radio"/> Specify your own value:	<input type="text"/>

Section 2 -- Supported Operation Information

Supported OPLAN/CONPLAN/ Order	Supported CONOP
Supported Mission Statement	Supported Objective(STRAT/OP/TACT)
Supported Commanders Intent	Supported Tactical Objective/Task
Supported Commanders Endstate	

Section 3 -- Computer Network Operations (CNO) Specific Operations

Schedule Type	Target Priority
<input type="text"/>	ROUTINE
Target Name	Target Location
<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
Target Description	
<input type="text"/>	

- Cyber Effects Request Format (CERF) Process initiates cyber effects planning across all lines of operation (LOOs)

- Links the desired effect with the tactical objective, operational goal, and strategic endstate

- Records, Tracks, and Manages requests from the supported Joint Forces Command (JFC)

- 24/7, subsequently assigned in accordance with time horizon and function


- Facilitates dialogue/Direct Line of Authority and transparency throughout the process

- Prioritizes requests and support through the MMC, reflects supported JFC prioritization




Collection – Analytical Drilldown

Requirements Development



Collaborative Steps and Processes



We would like to eventually incorporate Specific Information Requirements (SIRs) and Specific Observable Requirements (SORs)



Planning to Execution

Conceptual

- Guidance and Intent
- Goals & Objectives
- Courses of Action

Functional

- C2
- Intel
- Fires
- Maneuver
- Log
- Force Protection

Detailed

- Intel Collection Plan
- ISR Forces/Sensors
- OPORD/Plan
- ITOs
- Scheme of maneuver
- Fire support Plan
- Joint Targeting Cycle

Problem
Framing

COA
DEV

COA
Wargame


Comparison/
Decision

Orders
DEV

Transition




Targeting Process





Targeting Cycle In Support of a Joint Force Commander





Cyber Support Package

- Strike package consists of:
 - Required items:
 - Contingency Operations / Tab-E
 - Intel Gain Loss Assessment (National Security Agency lead-Combined Military Planning and Access Strategies (CoMPAS))
 - Political Military Assessment (Defense Intelligence Agency lead)
 - Operational Law Review (USCYBERCOM Staff Judge Advocate (SJA))
 - Collateral Effects Estimation (USCYBERCOM J3F Fires)
 - Blowback Assessment (USCYBERCOM J34 Counter Measures)
- Under exigent circumstances only these items are required:
 - Collateral Effects Estimate (USCYBERCOM Combined J3F Fires)
 - Operational Law Review (USCYBERCOM SJA)



Joint Cyber Strike Request

- Types of Fires
 - Scheduled
 - Planned targets against which cyber fires or other actions are scheduled for prosecution at a specific time
 - On-Call
 - Planned targets against which cyber fires or other actions are determined using deliberate targeting and are prosecuted based on a predetermined trigger

JCSR vs CERF

JCSR – Sets the timing and tempo to integrate cyber effects/fires with the supported Joint Force Commander's operation

CERF – Ensures desired effects meet the Combatant Commanders objectives



Cyber Domain Essentials

- Cyberspace is a Contested Domain
- Cyber is Commander's Business
- DoD Networks are a Warfighting Platform
- Unity of Effort and Unity of Command is Essential for Seamless Operations
 - Cyber Operations Must be Synchronized and De-conflicted Globally and Regionally
- Cyberspace Forces are High Demand/Low Density
- Highly trained people are the centerpiece of cyberspace operations



Considerations/Thoughts ?