

OWL 20: Responding to Gorbachev's January Proposals (S)

NOTE: This is the final "record" copy of the OWL 20 paper. Changes from the version reviewed by the SACG on January 23 are indicated by sidebars. Based upon that discussion, the thrust of this paper was captured in a much shorter options paper, OWL 21. In the process, the options discussed in this basic paper have evolved to some degree as indicated below:

OWL 20 Options	SACG Options	OWL 21 Options	
Framework Option A →	Framework Option A →	Option 1	
	Framework Option A+ →	Option 2 ²	
Framework Option B →	Framework Option B →	Option 3 ³	
	Framework Option B+ →		
Framework Option C →	deleted		(C/O)

Purpose: This paper has been generated by the Arms Control Support Group for consideration by the Senior Arms Control Group in their deliberations on a correct U. S. response to the January 14, Soviet initiative involving, inter alia, a plan for the elimination of nuclear weapons by the year 2000. (S/O)

I. Summary of the Nuclear Aspects of the Soviet Proposal (U)

General Secretary Gorbachev proposed a three-stage approach leading to the elimination of all nuclear weapons by 2000. (U)

First Stage: (Lasting 5-8 years) (U)

Reduction by 50 percent in systems capable of reaching the territory of the other side resulting in no more than 6000 nuclear "charges" (i.e., the current Soviet START position). (U)

A ban on development, testing, and deployment of space strike arms. (U)

Implementation of a decision on the complete liquidation of US and Soviet medium-range missiles in European zone. No transfer of US strategic and medium-range missiles to other countries and no build-up of corresponding British and French nuclear arms. (C)

Cessation of all US and Soviet nuclear explosions and a call on other states to join this moratorium. (U)

Second Stage: (Begins by 1990, lasting 5-7 years) (U)

UK, France and PRC start to join reductions. Soviets suggest they could freeze their nuclear forces and commit not to deploy their nuclear arms on the territories of other countries. (C)

1. Option A+ is described at Annex A of this paper. (U)
2. The final points associated with Option 2 are provided at Annex C of this paper. (U)
3. The changes to the current US NST position recommended under Option B+ (and, subsequently, Option 3) are described at Annex B of this paper. (U)

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32

Continuation of US and Soviet first-stage reductions and carry out "further measures to liquidate medium-range nuclear weapons and freeze tactical systems." (C)

Once US/Soviets reach 50% reductions in strategic systems, elimination of all tactical nuclear weapons (up to 1000 kms range) by all nuclear powers. (C)

Multilateral extension of the US-Soviet ban on space-strike arms, now including all leading industrial states. (U)

Cessation of nuclear testing by all nuclear powers. (U)

Ban on the creation of non-nuclear arms based on new physical principles which approximate nuclear capabilities in terms of casualty producing capacity. (C)

Third Stage: (Begins by 1995) (U)

Elimination of all remaining nuclear weapons by 1999. (U)

Additional Provisions: (C)

Special procedures for destruction of nuclear weapons and for the dismantlement, conversion or destruction of their delivery vehicles. (U)

Agreement on the quantity of weapons to be destroyed at each stage, place of destruction, etc. (C)

A three month unilateral extension on their nuclear testing moratorium. (U)

Verification procedures to include other measures beyond NIM, including on-site inspection. (U)

II. Intelligence Assessment: (U)

Gorbachev's statement was intended to regain the initiative in arms control that had been captured by the US NST initiative of November, 1985, and to undercut the US effort to broaden the agenda for the East-West security dialogue beyond arms control negotiations. His comprehensive repackaging of earlier Soviet positions, together with a few new elements, borrows from previous high-level US discussions of possible phased approaches to offensive force reductions and is presumably intended in part to counter the US concept of a transition from an offense-dominant world to one relying more heavily on defenses. (S/O)

Gorbachev has skillfully mixed hints of flexibility on key issues with propositions known to be unacceptable to the US (counting of FBS in strategic weapon aggregates) and deliberate ambiguities (omission of explicit reference to a ban on research on space strike weapons, although the Soviet NST delegation subsequently stated that the research ban still holds) in an effort to complicate US decision making and to create a variety of political pressures on the President. He has also, by packaging these elements in a comprehensive political concept, created a variety of potential linkages that could be exploited by the Soviets in an attempt to dictate the pace of progress at several ongoing negotiations. (S/O)

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Gorbachev has thus continued a general strategy of combining toughness and conciliation that was in evidence prior to the Geneva summit. His objectives — then and now — evidently have been to sow confusion and dissension within the US, between the US and its major allies, and among governments, opposition parties and electorates in key countries; to prod the US into revealing any areas of negotiating flexibility; and to convey an image of willingness to negotiate, in contrast to the Soviet propaganda image of the US Administration as being opposed to progress. (S/O)

The timing of Gorbachev's initiative took advantage of both external and domestic events. This particular initiative probably was formulated in the weeks after the summit meeting to build on the image of intelligence and flexibility that Gorbachev tried to create there. The nearly coincident resumption of NST, CD and MBFR negotiations provided a convenient opportunity for a comprehensive arms control package and for trying to place the US at a tactical disadvantage as new rounds of talks began. (S/O)

Elucidating his "peace program" now ensures prominence on the agendas of the republic-level congresses to be held over the next three weeks in preparation for the upcoming Party Congress. This will give him the opportunity to elicit support for this element of his political program and to identify, and deal with, those who might oppose his strategy on East-West relations. (S/O)

While the initiative contains a mixture of considerable propaganda and some hints at flexibility, Gorbachev's ultimate objectives and expectations are, as yet, unclear. He certainly would like to have progress on arms control, but on his own terms. Some reliable sources allege that he believes it is possible to achieve agreements that are in the Soviet interest with this President, while others claim that Gorbachev has resolved to wait for a new administration. (S/O)

The latest initiative could represent the beginnings of a major effort to put us on the defensive and probe for flexibility in US positions, possibly leading to a more explicit joint agreement on several key arms control issues at the next summit. Should an agreement in the Soviet interest not appear to be in the offing, the Soviets would hope to reap a major propaganda and political advantage by placing the onus for failure on the President. (S/O)

If these are indeed the Soviet intentions, they are likely to supplement this latest initiative with a series of tactical moves leading up to the summit. These will be carefully orchestrated to combine hints of possible changes in position with signals of toughness. With the US, they may hint at or introduce additional proposals designed to portray flexibility on key issues such as heavy missiles, expanded limits on strategic defenses, or Asian SS-20 deployments. (S/O)

They will continue their probes to other governments through letters to heads of state, regularized briefings on Soviet proposals and, where possible, direct bilateral discussions. Principal targets include the UK, France, China, Japan, the FRG, the Netherlands, Norway, as well as major non-aligned powers like India. These approaches will be specifically tailored to appear responsive to the special concerns of the target countries or to exploit domestic political stresses. Examples include the UK TRIDENT program, Japanese concerns about Asian nuclear forces, German and Scandinavian fears of being held hostage to short-range nuclear systems, and Third World interest in linking disarmament and development. (S/O)

In multilateral negotiations the Soviets are likely to adopt a cooperative and businesslike demeanor and to compromise on procedural issues to bolster their image as serious proponents of arms control. Specifically, at the CD they are likely to emphasize their nuclear testing moratorium proposal and stated willingness to accept some additional verification measures for both nuclear and chemical weapon limitations. (S/O)

At the same time, the Soviets will continue an energetic, if not harsh, propaganda campaign against US policies, and especially the SDI, that will include personal attacks on US officials (possibly excepting the President), as well as diplomatic pressures against key supporters of US policies and countries that have agreed to or are considering participation in SDI research. The goal will be to create an interrelated set of tempting hints and political pressures in hopes of inducing a US compromise on major issues—especially SDI—at the next summit. (S/O)

[Some believe that the Gorbachev initiative cannot be dismissed as a totally cynical exercise. It is the latest in a series of recent Soviet arms control proposals, including the Soviet proposal last September for 50% reductions in offensive weapons. The Soviet negotiators in Geneva are not treating the proposal as purely a propaganda ploy. Thus far in Round VI, they are focusing on the first stage of reductions, as proposed by Gorbachev, and they have not attempted to link a separate INF agreement to US steps on strategic defense. There are indications that Gorbachev personally supervised the development of the new initiative, without working level involvement. It has emerged just prior to what will be the most important Soviet party Congress in years. The new proposal could be a part of a larger strategy to redirect resources towards domestic priorities. Whether or not Gorbachev expects to get to zero weapons, he may see the concept of phasing — particularly deferring resolution of current obstacles such as third country forces to later stages — as a way to overcome objections of the Soviet military and others to an agreement now. Thus, in addition to its propaganda value, Gorbachev might see his plan as an instrument to help reach at least a significant first-stage agreement that would permit him to concentrate his resources on his domestic agenda. (S/O)]

III. Can We Accept the Soviet Framework? (C)

Issue. At the heart of the Soviet proposal is the "plan" for achieving the total elimination of all nuclear weapons by the end of the century. An immediate question is how should the US respond to this "plan" since this decision will channel options with respect to many aspects of our substantive and public response. The main issue is what should be the primary thrust of the US response? We have three general approaches available: (S)

Approach A. Make no immediate counter moves on either the general concept or specific issues. Express our reservations about the Soviet framework and those portions of the Gorbachev package we have previously identified as designed for propaganda purposes — not constructive negotiating. Explore the Soviet proposal within the relevant negotiating fora. (TS/O)

4. This insert was provided by the Department of State. It was not reviewed by the Intelligence Community who provided the remainder of the section. (U)

Approach B. Advance a US counter on the general concept, including certain objectives we have already supported, but not containing outyear details. Call for mutual focus on the first step (about which we both agree) by pressing them to negotiate on reductions and to demonstrate the sincerity of their proposal. (TS/O)

[Approach C. Advance "plan" of our own (in about the same level of detail as the Soviets)⁵ to show that the US has an equally comprehensive alternative. (TS/O)]

National Security Considerations. In evaluating the concept that the Soviet Union has proposed, we must keep in mind certain key national security considerations. (U)

Our current national strategy depends, to a great extent, on the contribution of offensive nuclear weapons (both strategic and non-strategic). While we are committed to the ultimate goal of the total elimination of nuclear weapons, we have always noted that translating this into reality will take a long time since we will either have to change the international situation to the point that the contribution of nuclear weapons is no longer needed (e.g., ideological and regional tensions resolved) or alternative means of maintaining security are in place (e.g., SDI, conventional forces imbalance corrected). Any commitment we make to a detailed plan for the elimination of nuclear weapons must be viewed as an extremely serious step which we must be sure we can execute and safely live with because, once made, it may generate pressures (budgetary, arms control, political) which could force the US unilaterally toward such a course. (TS/O)

We are equally committed to NATO strategy (14/3) which also depends heavily on the contribution of both strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons. NATO 14/3 is, in many respects, a somewhat fragile, political strategy — but absolutely essential to maintaining alliance cohesion. In the context of the SDI debate, for example, the FRG offered the principle (which we endorsed) that unless and until an alternative to current strategy is found and agreed upon, it is essential that full support be provided to 14/3. Any commitment to a plan/schedule such as that proposed by the Soviets would immediately call into question the future of 14/3. Once again, this would be a most serious step, and one that would require extensive Allied consultation. (TS/O)

Military Implications of Eliminating Nuclear Weapons. Elimination of nuclear weapons would reduce the direct and immediate military threat to the continental United States, but critically increases the importance of conventional forces. We fully recognize the contribution nuclear weapons make to deterring conventional aggression. We equally recognize the destructiveness of war by conventional and chemical means, and the need both to deter such conflict and to reduce the danger posed by the threat of aggression through such means. In this context the prospect of direct conventional aggression against vital US allies and interests could be dramatically increased by the elimination of nuclear weapons. Thus, the likelihood of major conflict requiring direct participation by US forces could be significantly greater in the absence of nuclear deterrence. (S)

⁵ Since not supported by any agency, the SACG directed this option be eliminated. (S)

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6

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36

If the current regional imbalances in conventional forces are not resolved, there would be little to deter hostile powers from pursuing their interests to the potential detriment of US interests. For example, European acceptance of political and military realities might result in the Finlandization of Europe. To prevent such circumstances, a massive buildup of US and Allied conventional forces would be required. Significant political, economic, and military commitment would be required to equal the deterrent potential of relatively inexpensive nuclear weapons. Furthermore, elimination of nuclear weapons by the current nuclear powers could place them at risk from those that have not acknowledged possession, but may in fact possess, or gain access to, such weapons. There could also be an increased emphasis on chemical/biological weapons as well as a substantial incentive to develop other means of mass destruction. (S/O)

The achievement of an effective elimination of all nuclear weapons holds three consequences for the United States. First, we would be forced to reassess the continued viability of our current global strategy and objectives. Second, the United States would also be forced to undertake a massive worldwide buildup and deployment of conventional forces in order to maintain at least the same deterrent capability as today. Third, the United States would be required to address the likely emergence of other weapons of mass destruction. Finally, verification would become even more critical since any suspicion of an adversary's cheating and retaining nuclear capabilities would severely and adversely affect our situation. (S/O)

The Soviet proposal to eliminate all tactical nuclear weapons during their second phase is self serving. Such a relatively near term potential elimination of these weapons would greatly reduce NATO's ability to continue current, much needed Western programs to modernize this force; i.e. there would be little incentive to modernize with the prospect of an agreement to eliminate these weapons soon. The Soviets have underway a full modernization of their tactical nuclear capabilities. The resultant effect would be to continue existing asymmetries in capability based on a future promise to eliminate these weapons. (S/O)

The President has committed the US ultimately to eliminating nuclear weapons. The above observations are not intended to undercut this goal. Rather, they are to point out the dangers we face if this goal is pursued in isolation as proposed by the Soviet "plan". Total elimination of nuclear weapons must be accompanied by actions which obviate the requirements for those weapons, including resolution of regional differences, the correction of military asymmetries, and a fundamental change in orientation and ambitions of the Soviet leadership. (S/O)

Potential Common Ground. Certain elements of this "plan" reflect positions offered by the U.S. to the Soviets over the past 5 years. For example, the US is on record as calling ultimately for the total elimination of nuclear weapons. Further, in response to questions about how the US would propose handling the issue of British and French forces, we suggested to the Soviets that we should take the first important steps bilaterally in moving to 50% reductions (as we define them) and then involve not only the British and French but the PRC as well. We have also repeatedly stressed the need to go beyond NIM as required for effective verification. (S/O)

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Specific Problems. On the other hand, the way that the Soviet proposal is framed poses certain immediate problems that must be considered. (S)

The Soviet "plan" does narrow the focus only on the total elimination of all nuclear weapons by 1999, making that a goal in itself. It does not address the corresponding reasons for the weapons and the associated mechanisms that will be needed either to eliminate the underlying security requirements or replace the contribution now made by the nuclear weapons. As a result, it offers no schedule for the resolution of existing regional conflicts and differences. It calls for scheduling the total elimination of tactical nuclear weapons, for example, but does not call for a corresponding schedule for the significant reduction of armored forces in central Europe. This one-sided focus puts maximum pressure on the West and avoids putting corresponding pressure on the East. In short, as the Soviets have often tried to do, this attempts to set an unfair public focus and agenda. Without a balanced and more comprehensive focus (which includes both a plan/schedule for the elimination of nuclear weapons and a plan/schedule for either eliminating or handling in some other way the security requirements for these weapons), it is questionable whether the US and NATO could go much beyond agreeing to the general concept. (TS/O)

The Soviet "plan" also calls for us to accept many unacceptable elements of the Soviet approach to reductions during the first phase, front-loading the deal, in order to get certain benefits in subsequent phases. Even then, many of the "benefits" (i.e. the total elimination of tactical weapons) promised in subsequent Soviet phases play more to public opinion than as real sweeteners to the pot for the US and its allies. (S)

The direct impact of some of the Soviet provisions would be to derail Western modernization. Moreover, some of these provisions, by simply being given the status of real "possibilities", could achieve the same result. For example, if the elimination of British and French systems is roughly 8 years away, why should the UK invest its limited resources on the Trident D-5 missile? Similarly, if tactical systems are also going to be gone in the same time frame, why should NATO pay the fiscal and political costs of modernizing these systems (like the W82, 155mm artillery fired atomic projectile)? And, closer to home, if all nuclear weapons are to be gone soon, why should the U.S. (or the U.S. and its allies) waste precious funds and take the political heat of continuing with SDI? And why pay for systems like MX, MIDGEIMAN and the TRIDENT D-5? (TS/O)

Other Considerations. We should also consider a number of other factors which involve the political situation in which our decision must be made. (U)

We face a serious problem in reconciling planned national security and defense spending (in the DoD, DoE and State budgets) with the realities of deficit reduction and Gramm-Rudman-Hollings. We must consider how our response to the Soviet "plan" will affect the debate in this area. (TS/O)

We must also consider the potential relationship to the upcoming summit. Some believe that we could use this Soviet proposal to reach some limited general agreement about the elimination of nuclear weapons, and if this agreement were framed in a manner so that it could be finally decided at the summit and protect our positions and interest in focusing on offensive

reductions, that this could be useful to the United States. Others believe that if we pursue this approach, it will cause the summit to constitute a deadline for reaching some agreement with the Soviets, and, therefore, it will be much more difficult to deal with the Soviet proposal, protect our interests, and pursue our agenda. (TS/O)

ALTERNATIVES: (U)

Framework Approach A (U)

Since Gorbachev's most recent proposal contains only repackaged, previously unacceptable positions, ill-defined phrases (e.g. a willingness to reach agreement on necessary verification arrangements), and new conditions, calculated to be unacceptable to the US and its allies, the most prudent response at the present time is for the US to use the next round in the various negotiating fora to probe the Soviet proposal. If, as some expect, it becomes readily apparent that there is no real flexibility or forward movement in any of the key areas, Soviet intransigence at the negotiating table will help us dismiss the Gorbachev package as a propaganda ploy. (S/O)

If, on the other hand (and contrary to present expectations), the Soviets prove able and willing to drop those elements of their proposals which are non-starters and work with us on equitable, verifiable accords, we will be in a better position to assess how our own positions might usefully be modified after the next round of negotiations. (S/O)

Consequently, under this approach, our strategy would be to establish in public and at the negotiating table those aspects of the Gorbachev package which appear intended for propaganda value and are unhelpful to reaching equitable, verifiable accords. We would not repackage or otherwise alter our own position -- revised only a month-and-a-half ago. Of course, should there be evidence of genuine Soviet flexibility in the various negotiating fora and the prospect of real movement towards equitable, verifiable accords, we would be able -- indeed, in a stronger position -- to modify our own proposals taking account of such considerations following the next round of talks. (S/O)

Framework Approach B (U)

Since the Soviet "plan" is partially a playing-back to us of previous US proposals, and because of the problems associated with rejecting these elements, what we need to do is to "find the common ground" contained in the idea, isolate and accept that common ground, dismiss or effectively counter those elements that are not in our interest and which are beyond the negotiating horizon anyway, and refocus on the business at hand. To do this, we should take the following approach: (S/O)

1. Agree with the general [concept] goal of moving to the total elimination of nuclear weapons when possible consistent with overall security and stability. (S/O)

2. Note that the U.S. has [long] advocated a process by which the US and the USSR would take the first step by implementing the principle of a 50% reduction in the nuclear forces of both sides appropriately applied and an

39

interim INF agreement. When US and Soviet forces are [in the process of being] reduced, and additional reductions are under discussion, we envision the next step would be to seek to involve the UK, France and the PRC so that all can move to zero nuclear weapons in a balanced manner. This approach was specifically proposed to the USSR by the US during the preparations for and during the recent summit. (S/O)

3. Therefore, we would welcome the Soviet Union's joining us in ~~[this important]~~ pursuing this general ~~[concept and intellectual framework provided our allies do not have strong objections]~~ goal. [FYI: Need to work this in advance with UK, France and the PRC.] (S/O)

4. There could be a benefit in ~~[setting a goal of]~~ completing this process ~~[if possible, by the end of this century]~~ as quickly as possible. (S/O)

[4. We see benefit in achieving this goal as soon as possible, under conditions that include moving to non-nuclear defenses and correcting of conventional force imbalances, Soviet compliance with existing and future agreements, peaceful resolution of regional conflicts and, in general, a fundamental change in the orientation and ambitions of the Soviet leadership. (S/O)

5. We also see benefit in ~~[setting a goal of 5-8 years for]~~ the prompt accomplishment of the first step of this process, the implementation of the principle of 50% reductions appropriately applied and an interim INF agreement. This is achievable with political commitment and serious, constructive negotiating on both sides. It is also clearly the foundation upon which both we and the Soviets agree all else must build. (S/O)

6. ~~[The first step]~~ to appropriately apply the principle of 50% reduction and to achieve a separate INF agreement, will require serious negotiation. There are significant differences on the elements of an equitable ~~[first stage]~~ outcome. The resolution of these differences and the finding of common ground is the area in which both sides must now focus their negotiating efforts if the goal for this step is to be achieved. It is an area in which real negotiations can take place at this time. We should both agree that this should be our focus. This is in keeping with the commitment to accelerate efforts to find common ground made at the most recent summit. (S/O)

7. We see benefit in pursuing Gorbachev's offer to come to terms on any necessary verification measures. (S/O)

8. The Soviet proposal on what specifically would be accomplished in its subsequent phases contains much with which we can not agree at this time. Commitment to subsequent phases as the Soviets propose would require extensive, detailed discussion to identify the real common ground here, in the process diverting time and talent from the immediate work at hand on this ~~[first]~~ step (upon which we both agree), likely adding additional potential

6. ACDA suggested this alternative formulation of point 4, but later withdrew it in favor of the addition of a new point 9 (next page). The conditions listed reflect the same conditions that the President laid out in the joint appearance with Gorbachev in Geneva. (U)

difficulties for that critical bilateral work, immediately involving additional sovereign nations in the process, and, once done, resulting in, at best, very tentative commitments which still depend upon the results of this [first] step. For this reason, we see no benefit in seeking agreement with the Soviets on a framework going beyond the points contained in 1-7 above. At the same time, we would continue to criticize the unacceptable parts of the overall Soviet "plan". (S/O)

[9. In explaining the commitments associated with points 1-7 above, the US would make it clear that, in its view, the total elimination of nuclear weapons requires conditions that include moving to non-nuclear defenses and correcting conventional force imbalances, Soviet compliance with their treaty obligations, peaceful resolution of regional conflicts in ways that allow free choice without outside interference, and a fundamental change in the orientation and ambitions of the Soviet leadership.]

In employing the approach suggested above, the US objectives are to: (U)

— Discredit the Soviet "plan" while co-opting elements of the Soviet proposal by indicating the degree to which it is, at its core and in its most significant dimension, a Soviet acceptance of some US principles. Therefore, the core concept (as we define it) is not a "move" to which the US must respond but simply a Soviet agreement that the core concept is the common ground upon which we can both immediately agree. (TS/O)

— Discredit the details of the Soviet subsequent phases, to the extent of indicating that we have no interest nor see any value in arguing over whether there should be 3 or more phases. This should be done to avoid both having these details be used against the modernization of US and NATO nuclear forces and to avoid being placed in the position of having the public appeal of these points (if generated by the Soviets) used as leverage to coerce concessions during the negotiations associated with the first step. (TS/O)

— Achieve Soviet agreement on the US argument for addressing only US and Soviet forces at this time. (TS/O)

— Stress the task mandated by the summit joint statement: seeking the common ground in current US and Soviet START and INF positions. Seeking common ground should remain our theme -- as it counters Soviet attempts at linkage and attempts to use SDI to lever other Soviet positions and allows us to use the 50% principle and the interim INF agreement to the maximum advantage. (TS/O)

— Make the point repeatedly that argument over the details of "outyear" activity -- beyond the general concept and the acceptance of a goal of ridding the world of nuclear weapons by the end of the century (if it can be done while maintaining security and stability) -- is an irrelevant, largely useless, and clearly diverting activity that will only delay and complicate progress in reaching successful completion of the first step/phase upon which we both can agree. (TS/O)

7. See footnote 6 on alternative point 4 on previous page.

Implementing this Approach. This approach is designed to avoid surrendering the field to the Soviets, to exploit apparent change in the Soviet position on British and French forces, to maintain the focus on the Geneva negotiations and the summit mandate to seek common ground, and to craft common ground on the general concept of a plan for the elimination of nuclear weapons which could form the basis for something that could be "agreed" and announced at the appropriate time. It is intended to protect options for both an agreement at the summit along these lines and for a pre-summit dialogue based on this approach. (TS/O)

The United States should seek to focus most attention and negotiating effort on a first step, bilateral agreement substantially reducing strategic and intermediate-range forces. This is the area of potential common ground referred to in the joint statement worked out at the Geneva summit, and the only obligations undertaken in an initial agreement will be to provisions to be implemented in the first stage. (S/O)

Our position could also include a statement that once an initial agreement, substantially reducing strategic and intermediate-range offensive forces is [being] implemented, we envision inviting the other nuclear powers to subsequent negotiations on further steps to reduce, and eventually eliminate, nuclear weapons. This position would tie our proposed reductions to our overall goal of the elimination of nuclear weapons, would reinforce the bilateral nature of the first step in which constraints on third-country forces are inappropriate, and would avoid ceding the public diplomacy high ground to the Soviets by demonstrating that our proposal is also part of a larger plan, whose ultimate goal is the elimination of nuclear weapons. (S/O)

At this time, there is no support for Approach C. (U)

IV. Substantive Areas of the Proposal (U)

A. START (U)

In Geneva, the Soviet delegation has said that the Gorbachev proposal does not involve any changes in their previous START position. The new position does however, present their START position as a component in the first stage of a three-stage framework. The Soviet position now is that if we agree to their current START and SDI positions as they are, they are prepared to negotiate a second phase on strategic weapons with the British, French and Chinese, to be followed by a third stage in which all nuclear weapons are eliminated. That concept is not entirely new for the Soviets. What is new is the compressed and explicit timetable. (S)

The new Soviet proposal stresses a prohibition on the transfer of "strategic missiles" to other countries and, in the INF context, Britain and France must not build up their corresponding weapons. The non-transfer language appears stronger than that agreed to in SALT II and may be aimed at the British TRIDENT program. (S)

The US and USSR would continue the reductions they had agreed to in the first stage into the second stage. Thus, it appears that US and USSR strategic weapons would not be reduced below the 6000 level agreed to in the first stage until the third stage. That is, in terms of ICEMs, SLBMs, and heavy

112

bombers, the second stage really aims at the British, French, and Chinese.
(S)

The October, 1985, Soviet START proposal, already encumbered by a non-negotiable "FBS" definition of strategic arms designed to make their deep reductions proposal unacceptable to the United States, has not been modified. Unless this is clarified in public, the concept of the elimination of all nuclear weapons -- a US initiative in these talks -- will be perceived as movement in START and the Soviets will press to suggest that the ball is in our court without any change in their START position. (S)

Recommendations. Since there was no change in the substance of the Soviet position in START, no specific elements have been introduced which can be pocketed as part of the "substantive" negotiations. The lack of Soviet movement in their START position, however, also might give us some leverage in that their failure to alter their position after the U. S. November proposal and after the call for acceleration and an emphasis on 50% reductions with a focus on common ground can be highlighted and public pressure placed upon them. (S)

While continuing to welcome the Soviet statement along our original lines, now is the time for the US to begin backgrounding on the negative aspects of the Soviet proposal highlighting the fact that the Soviets, despite our significant move in START on November 1, including a 1500 ALCM limit, and the guidelines of the Joint statement, have made absolutely no change in the substance of their START position. We should explain that the Soviet proposal would have us agree to the substance of their proposal now in exchange for high sounding promises for the future; they want us to trade hardware for rhetoric. (S)

We should agree on the desirability of creating the conditions which would make possible the elimination of nuclear weapons by 1999, but point out that the failure of the Soviet Union to provide any movement in their START position undermines our confidence that this is a serious proposal. (S)

We should challenge the Soviet Union to show their good faith and demonstrate that we can get on schedule for a 1999 date by dropping their onesided preconditions and getting down to serious negotiations on limiting ICBMs, SLEMs, and heavy bombers as they had promised earlier in the negotiations.
(S)

[Some believe that we should revisit the issue of mobile ICBMs in light of Congressional opposition to our proposed ban. They recommend it be modified to a ban on mobile MIRVed ICBMs.]

B. INF (U)

The Gorbachev package combines an important shift in INF that is both potentially encouraging and potentially troublesome with some familiar and unacceptable elements. (Their "interim" proposal -- allowing 100-120 U.S. GLCMs to remain in Europe -- is apparently still on the table, according to the Soviet NST Delegation). To the extent that the newest Soviet version of

8. This is further developed in Option B+/Option 3 described in Annex B of this paper. (U)

a "zero" INF solution (i.e., zero in Europe) is linked to Defense and Space issues it is a step back from the Summit joint statement. (S)

In comparison with past Soviet "zero" INF proposals, the new version: (U)

— Is silent on the first stage treatment of Soviet systems in Asia. In the past, the Soviets have offered a freeze on systems there. Shevardnadze reportedly said in Tokyo last week that the Soviet missiles in Asia would be reduced if the number of nuclear delivery vehicles in the Far East countering Soviet missiles were reduced. It is not yet clear how this fits into the Gorbachev program. (S)

— Gives the appearance of dropping past Soviet insistence that UK and French strategic systems be aggregated with US LRINF systems in defining an equal balance in the European zone. However, it adds a new condition that there be no build-up of UK and French nuclear forces. The proposal accepts US-Soviet equality at zero, at least in Europe, but with collateral requirements of US non-transfer to its Allies and no increase in UK or French systems. (S)

— Has language on the verification of limits on nuclear systems (applying inter alia to INF) which appears to go further than past statements. OSI and other verification measures are specifically mentioned, without any stated requirement to show that NIM is insufficient. However, it is not clear at what stage these measures would come into effect or exactly how they would be implemented. (S)

The Soviet proposal not to increase UK and French forces, is a change from past Soviet INF positions, and gives us the opportunity to assert Soviet acceptance of the principle of US/Soviet equality. However, it is still unacceptable for us to limit Allied forces (and certainly objectionable to the UK and French as well.) It is essentially identical to the penultimate Soviet SALT I position on this issue in 1972; which we rejected. The Soviet move is designed to drive wedges between ourselves and our Allies, and we must continue to prevent this. (S)

Finally, the Soviets appear to continue to include US FBS as strategic systems, so that US (but not Soviet) non-missile (aircraft) INF systems would be double-counted in both strategic and INF balances. This is, however, a problem to be dealt with primarily in START. (S)

ALTERNATIVES: (U)

INF Approach 1 (U)

The USSR has more than offset the value of its "concession" on INF by adding new and wholly unacceptable conditions. By tying their INF proposal to termination of SDI, cessation of UK and French strategic modernization programs and prohibition of cooperation on the Trident/D-5 between the U.S. and United Kingdom, the Soviets have calculatedly made the price for zero-zero in Europe (should we conclude such an outcome is in our interest) unacceptably high. More worrisome, they have done so in a way intended to maximize pressure on the United States to pursue such an agreement. (S/O)

Were we to modify our proposal on INF so as to try to "pocket" the apparent Soviet concession on compensation for UK and French systems currently deployed, we would be playing into the Soviets' hands. In short order, the perception would take root in Europe and elsewhere that the impediment to concluding an agreement would be (singularly or collectively): the U.S. commitment to SDI, to its Asian allies, and/or to the necessary enhancement of British and French strategic forces. Unfortunately, each of these issues offers the Soviets abundant opportunities for sowing discord between the United States and its friends. (S/O)

Consequently, in keeping with the overall approach to the Soviet proposal outlined above (Alternative A), our best course of action in INF is to stand our ground with respect to our recently-tabled initiative. We should explore the Soviet proposal in this round but defer any consideration of further modification of our own positions until we have an opportunity to take the full measure of the Soviets' maneuvering. (S/O)

INF Approach 2 (U)

Since the Soviets appear to have moved more in INF than elsewhere, some believe a prompt US response should be considered. Such a response should be designed to:

1. Attempt to exploit apparent Soviet movement. Soviet acceptance of principle of US-Soviet LRINF equality; and acceptance of a role for OSI and other measures beyond NIM in verifying the agreement, and deferring UK/French participation until later. (S)
2. Press the Soviets to reach and implement an INF agreement consistent with US principles and objectives, without linkage to other areas and SDI. (S)
3. Press the Soviets on issues where they are silent, particularly the need for reduction of Soviet systems in Asia as part of an INF agreement (despite what Shevardnadze said in Tokyo). (S)
4. Prevent the Soviets from appearing more committed to deep reductions than is the US. Our zero-zero proposal has been on the table since 1981, and we may want to stress this. (S)

Those who hold this view believe a specific US INF counterproposal should be considered to accomplish these ends. It would differ substantially from our current position only by adopting zero-zero in Europe rather than give the Soviets that high ground, and be changing from "proportionate reductions" in Asia to "significant reductions (50 percent)" in Asia. It is recognized that if the Soviets relink INF to defense and space and if a US move leads closer to agreement, allied pressure on SDI might increase. However, those supporting this alternative believe that the alternative, which they feel would give the Soviets the high ground in Europe, is unacceptable, and that we can continue to insist on delinkage. Its key elements as part of a first step package could be as follows: (S)

- Elimination of US and Soviet LRINF in Europe west of Novosibirsk (and therefore, Barnaul); (S)

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/OWL~~

-- Significant" reduction in SS-20s in central and eastern Asia; at least 50 percent cuts (though the US would restate its "zero-zero" preference for their total elimination); (S)

-- A global LRINF missile warhead ceiling. The US would have a legal right to global equality, i.e., to match any Soviet SS-20 warheads remaining outside Europe with US systems in CONUS or elsewhere outside of Europe; (S)

-- Soviet LRINF systems which are reduced would be destroyed. US systems based in Europe could be withdrawn to the U.S. unless, or until, they were in excess of the equal global ceiling, in which case they would be destroyed (while protecting a right to convert the PIIs to PIBs). (S)

-- Equal SRINF ceiling at current Soviet level or freeze SRINF at both sides December 31, 1982, levels. (S)

-- The reductions and limits would involve US and Soviet systems only; there would be no agreed constraints on UK and French systems. (S)

-- Introduce key elements of verification regime as an integral part of this proposal. (S)

-- Reaffirm November (summit) joint statement to move ahead on INF agreement without linkage to Defense and Space issues. (S)

In the second step of an overall program we could envision the completion of LRINF reductions to zero-zero. (S)

C. DST (U)

Most of the elements of the Soviet proposal that deal with Defense and Space merely repeat earlier positions that they have taken. They continue to propose a ban on development, testing, and deployment of "space strike arms." In the DST in Geneva, the Soviets explain that the ban on development includes a ban on "directed" or "purposeful" research. This proposal remains unacceptable to the United States because it would prohibit the SDI program. The Soviets continue to link reductions in strategic systems to their proposed space ban; this also is unacceptable. Finally, they appear to have repeated the statement Gorbachev made in his press conference after his meeting with the President in Geneva, that relevant laboratories could be inspected as part of a means to verify the proposed space ban. (S/O)

There are two portions of the Soviet proposal that are new and have implications for DST. During the second stage of their proposed regime (early to mid-1990s), their space ban would have to become multilateral, with necessary participation in it by the leading industrial powers. This portion appears to make the long-term objective of "freeing the world of nuclear weapons within the next 15 years" contingent on complete participation of the industrialized world, and may be designed to ensure that the proposal would not succeed because of some other country's rejection. Their proposal also includes the new element to ban creation of non-nuclear arms based on new physical principles. This could be an additional attempt to focus on development of unconventional technologies, such as lasers, in SDI. In any case, this portion could focus particularly on US technical strengths, is very ambiguous, and is thus, unacceptable. (S/O)

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/OWL~~~~TOP SECRET~~

SENSITIVE

ALTERNATIVES: (U)

DST Approach 1 (U)

The parts of the new Soviet proposal that address matters in Defense and Space neither advance the negotiations nor offer anything positive to which we could respond. The Defense and Space Negotiating Group should continue to follow the agenda defined in the DST instructions for Round IV, and should indicate to the Soviets that, if anything, their new proposal is a demonstration of lack of seriousness on their part to pursue a businesslike dialogue. We should also turn some of the Soviet logic back on them noting that the obverse of their position is that some defenses will be required as long as nuclear weapons exist. At the same time, we should also note that defenses will still be necessary in a nuclear-free world to protect against cheating. (S/O)

DST Approach 2⁹ (U)

In addition to the items in Alternative 1, the U.S. delegation should begin discussions with the Soviets on the specific meaning of the ABM Treaty. (S/O)

D. Verification (U)

In Gorbachev's public statement, verification or related issues are addressed in ways that combine the appearance of flexibility with a lack of specificity about particular measures to supplement NIM or the circumstances under which they would apply. Relevant portions of the statement are quoted below (apparent or potential new positions are underlined): (S)

In the area of nuclear weapons limitations: 1. Special procedures for the destruction of nuclear weapons will be elaborated; 2. Special procedures for the dismantling, conversion, or destruction of delivery vehicles also will be elaborated; and, 3. Verification of the armaments liable to destruction and limitation would be implemented both via national technical means and via on-site inspections. The USSR is prepared to come to terms on any other additional verification measures. (S/O)

On nuclear testing: There are no grounds for possible references to verification as an obstacle to establishing a moratorium on nuclear explosions. We state quite categorically that verification is not a problem for us. If the United States embarks on ending all nuclear explosions on a reciprocal basis the proper verification of the observance of the moratorium will be fully ensured by national technical means and also with the help of international procedures -- with mutual on-site inspections where necessary. (S/O)

Regarding space strike weapons: And let there be the strictest verification in this case, which includes allowing inspections at the relevant laboratories. (U)

In the area of chemical weapons: And all this (i.e., limits set forth) would

9. This alternative has been expanded even further in Option B+/Option 3 which is described in full in Annex B of this paper. (U)

take place under strict control, including international on-site verifications. (C/O)

And with regard to MBFR: As for the observance of a commitment on freezing the numerical strength of troops, in addition to national technical means it would be possible to establish permanent monitoring points to monitor the entry (and some Soviet sources say the exit) of any troop contingents into the reduction zone. (C/O)

Some of these provisions, such as destruction of delivery vehicles, probably could be monitored with high confidence using NIMs; others, such as destruction of nuclear weapons, are vague and our monitoring ability would depend importantly on how supplementary measures were implemented. (S/O)

The references to verification in this most recent package, whether a reiteration of previous offers or a possible new development, could represent some form of Soviet attempt to address the long-standing U. S. concerns with arms control verification. If so, they could provide an opportunity to press the Soviets to make good on their Geneva commitment to agree on effective verification measures during negotiation of new agreements and to cease violations of past agreements that have impeded verification. But Gorbachev's statements may well represent no more than an effort to undercut US positions on verification and compliance by linking potential Soviet concessions on verification to changes in US requirements on weapon limits. They could also exploit a verification dialogue for information about US NIMs that could be used against us. (S/O)

In the area of verification, all agreed that we should test Soviet sincerity by taking Gorbachev at his word and proposing specific items as needed. In the multilateral arms control area, we have a number of such items on the table that we could point to and seek Soviet action based on Gorbachev's remarks. The problem is that in the NST area we are still working to finalize verification proposals. The issue is what to do until this work is complete. Some (Approach 1) would have us probe without specific proposals on the belief that this will quickly reveal Soviet insincerity. Others (Approach 2) would argue that doing this will likely reduce any possibility of the Soviets acting favorably on our specific proposals once our internal work is complete. They would argue we should not probe in general terms, but work to get specific verification proposals ready and table them as soon as possible. (S/O)

ALTERNATIVES:¹⁰ (U)

NST Verification Approach 1 (U)

The US should pursue discussions with the Soviets within the specific context of their offers to find out whether there are real measures they would be willing to undertake in verification. Under the presumption that the mildly positive U.S. reactions in public, so far, to the verification elements will build over time, we should press for substantive answers in the specific areas that have been suggested by the Soviets. In so doing, we should ask

10. A common solution which combines these two alternatives has been proposed and incorporated in OWL 21. It would permit probing, but only in ways that do not prejudice either US options or Soviet likely responses. (U)

them to explain how their proposals would apply to concrete provisions that are common to the approaches of both sides, such as counting ballistic missile RVs or monitoring mobile IREM deployments. We should ask them to be explicit about the circumstances and details of supplementary measures including such issues as degree and frequency of on-site access, use of technical devices and the mandatory or voluntary nature of inspections and other monitoring activities including geographic limitations and data exchanges. We should stress the security interest that both sides have in reducing uncertainty in a deep reductions regime, and not enter into discussions of the characteristics or capabilities of NIM. (S/O)

NST Verification Approach 2 (U)

In response to Gorbachev's offer to reach agreement on necessary NST verification measures, the US should propose specific measures which, as we deem necessary, designed to best verify elements of our proposal and press the Soviets to accept these or to come up with equally effective verification procedures. This will require decisions on specific proposals. (S)

E. Risk Reduction Centers (U)

The Joint Statement from the November Summit contained agreement by the sides "...to study the question at the expert level of centers to reduce nuclear risk taking into account the issues and developments in the Geneva negotiations." During the negotiation of this statement in Geneva, the US side specifically rejected a Soviet formulation which made NST the venue and explained clearly what we intended by the language. In the President's letter to Gorbachev of December 24, 1985, he proposed "...that we have our experts on this subject meet, here or in Moscow if you prefer, during the first week in February to begin this process." (S)

A follow-on demarche reiterating the President's offer was delivered on 13 January in Moscow to a mid-level official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs who recalled Gorbachev's position on the matter in Geneva, but had no immediate response to provide. The Soviets made no mention of a possible Geneva venue at that point, and the U. S. interlocutors did not employ their contingency points against burdening the NST negotiations with the additional responsibility of exploring the concept of risk reduction centers. (S)

In the Gorbachev letter to the President, dated 14 January, he responded with: "As to the question you raised of centers to reduce nuclear risk, it could become a subject for discussion at the upcoming round of the Soviet-American negotiations on nuclear and space weapons." There was no mention of risk reduction centers in the Gorbachev Statement appearing in the 16 January IZVESTIYA edition. It is possible that the letter response was sent without knowledge of the demarche and the tentative nature of the letter suggests that the Soviets had not reached a final decision on the venue, but were aware that time was running out on a reply. (S/O)

Recommendation. With regard to the venue, the NST Delegation should deflect any Soviet move to introduce the subject into the Geneva negotiations and reiterate our proposal for an early February meeting of experts in capitals. (S/O)

F. Chemical Weapons (U)

In parallel to a nuclear weapons-free world, Gorbachev's statement calls it "an entirely realistic task to totally eliminate those barbarous weapons of mass destruction, chemical weapons, during this century." When he asserts that the CD "talks have been dragged out impermissibly," he ignores the US draft treaty and the fact that the Soviets have refused to engage in a serious, detailed discussion of key verification procedures needed to implement such a comprehensive ban. (C)

Gorbachev calls for "a fresh look at things" and notes that the Soviet Union "stands up for the speediest, total elimination of these weapons and of the industrial base for their manufacture itself" He says he is ready to agree to "prompt declaration of the locations of enterprises for the production of chemical weapons and the cessation of production, to begin the elaboration of procedures for the destruction of the relevant production base, and also to embark, soon after the convention comes into force, on the elimination of chemical weapons stockpiles, and all of this would take place under strict control, including international on-site verifications." (S)

There are two new elements in these formulations: First, the reference to [the destruction of the industrial base] ["prompt" declaration of production facilities] (vice weapons stockpiles only), but [this is caveated by a subsequent reference to destruction of only the relevant production bases;] [but this could range anywhere from the 30 days proposed in the US draft treaty to the years proposed by the USSR] and, second, a reference to strict control, including international on-site verifications, for the destruction of the weapons and the ["relevant"] production base. No movement is indicated on the long-standing issues pressed by the US on [mandatory] challenge inspections for suspect activity at non-declared sites or on the precise nature of the verification mechanism. (S/O)

There may be opportunity in this statement to build on the Soviet movement, however small, toward greater verification stringency with respect to chemical weapons ban negotiations in Geneva and the bilateral dialogue on CW non-proliferation. (C)

The limited apparent movement in the statement is further circumscribed by the fact that Gorbachev clearly links "the radical solution of the problem" above to "certain interim steps," such as "not transferring chemical weapons to anyone and not deploying them on other states' territory," a policy claimed to be "always adhered strictly to" by the Soviet Union and with "the same restraint" demanded of the US. Gorbachev thus both denies Soviet use of CW in Afghanistan and CW transfers to its Vietnamese allies and, in effect, invokes the standard Soviet posture against US deployment of CW in NATO Europe thus, adding fuel to the heavily promoted Soviet proposal for a European-CW-Free-Zone. (S)

Recommendation. It appears worthwhile to press the Soviets on [the inclusion of the production base or industrial base, while also seeking definitions of "relevant" and] [what they mean by "prompt" and for specific] details on "on-site verifications." We should also press the Soviets on the point that they wish a complete (read universal) ban on chemical weapons, and thus should not divert attention and effort to regional bans. (S/O)

G. CDE (U)

Gorbachev's language, in emphasizing the Stockholm mandate to "ensure the creation of barriers in the path of the use of force and covert preparations for war" focuses on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures (CSBM), not, as the Soviets normally do, on a Non-Use of Force (NUF) declaration. (S)

His call for lowering the level of exercises requiring notification (i.e., 25,000 ground troops under the Helsinki Accords) [does not serve Western interests] [is ambiguous and could be ment as a constraint]. While Gorbachev's general statement on naval and air exercise notification: "Why not seek to solve them piece by piece?" appears encouraging at first, his next sentence deflates expectations by still combining "major exercises of ground and air forces," even though he at least postpones naval forces from an initial agreement. Since the USSR is already isolated in its call for notifications of both air and naval exercises at Stockholm, this may be a ploy to "rescue" air exercises from what appears to the Soviets to be a lost cause. (S)

Recommendation. We, therefore, should publicly welcome Gorbachev's statement but reject [~~continue to press for eliminating~~] reject both these elements from CSBMs, not just the naval "deferral" that Gorbachev offered. [~~We should also continue to ensure that concrete CSBM language is agreed before drafting NUF language, using Gorbachev's omission of any call for NUF language to buttress our position if necessary.~~] (S/O)

H. Nuclear Testing (U)

The proposal calls for an immediate moratorium on all US and Soviet nuclear explosions, to be followed by a discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests by all nuclear powers in the second stage. National Technical Means, with the help of international procedures, including on-site inspections where necessary, would provide "proper" verification of compliance. (S)

The proposal also announces: extension of the unilateral Soviet moratorium by three months -- until 31 March, 1986, and Soviet readiness to resume the trilateral negotiations or to start multilateral negotiations in the CD for a CTB. The Soviets also announced their support for the Delhi statement. (C)

The test ban-moratorium proposal contains nothing new and the position on verification also is not new. In the negotiations that began in 1958 as well as in the trilateral talks of 1977-1980, the Soviet Union claimed to support on-site inspection of suspect events by international teams. However, they always insisted on the right to veto any request for inspection. Therefore, the Soviet Union to date has supported voluntary verification only. In practice, they have refused to agree to any meaningful measures that will actually allow verification. (S/O)

The Soviet call for a halt in nuclear testing is unacceptable because the risks it would pose to national security would be serious. For the foreseeable future, we will depend on nuclear weapons to deter aggression. Given this dependence, nuclear testing will be required to ensure that our deterrent is credible and effective and that our nuclear weapons are safe and reliable. This position was recently reviewed by the ACSG and SACG, and

nothing in the recent Gorbachev proposal would cause a change in the assessments reached. (S/O)

We should position ourselves to respond to the Soviet proposal by educating our Allies on the reasons for our policy on nuclear test bans and on our need to test. We also should continue our efforts to engage the Soviets in technical discussions on the problems associated with verifying compliance with nuclear testing limitations, as recently proposed by the President. In particular, we should seek to advance our objectives with respect to improving verification of the TTBT/PNET. (S/O)

Recommendations: With respect to nuclear testing, we should make no new proposals at this time, but continue to press the Soviets for a positive response to the President's UN proposal of September 1984, invitation of July 1985, and recent proposal for a meeting of technical experts. At the same time, we should handle all approaches to the Soviet Union on nuclear testing matters in Washington. The US NST Delegation should be instructed to avoid the nuclear testing issue in Geneva. If the Soviets bring it up, the delegation should inform them that the matter is more appropriately handled in capitals. Finally, we must educate the public, the Congress, and our allies on the security implications of a CTB and why we must test, given our dependence on nuclear weapons. (S)

I. MBFR (U)

The new Western proposal presented at the end of the last round, incorporated several key elements of the Soviet position and represented a substantial Western concession. The initial Soviet reaction was negative and may reflect nothing more than the fact that the Soviets had little time to respond and had not received considered instructions. Gorbachev's more positive words about MBFR may show that the Soviets now appreciate the large extent to which we have moved toward their position. Gorbachev's acknowledgement for the requirement for "reasonable monitoring" should not be over-valued by the US. [To the extent that the Soviets have in the past rejected even the principle of non-NIM verification, it is a step forward that they now say the principle is valid.] Gorbachev has now agreed to permanent stationing of observers at entry points, [rather than on a temporary basis as] [in addition to the temporary exist points] the Soviets had earlier proposed. However, the Soviets have yet to show any willingness to [correct] [address] the really significant verification requirements for an MBFR agreement, [more importantly continuing] [such as] onsite inspection. The only kind of on-site measures they have been willing to discuss are [of a trivial nature in that they would allow the Soviets to violate the treaty easily, without detection] [wholly insufficient to detect or deter possible Soviet violations]. (S)

Recommendation. While we cannot agree that "national technical means (supplemented only by)...permanent [monitoring] [entry/exit] points to monitor [the entry of any troop contingents]" [all the provisions of an agreement] are sufficient, we should demonstrate the need for additional verification measures, which we propose to apply to both sides, [to] [and] explore whether Gorbachev's language means the USSR is prepared to be constructive in the negotiations. (S/O)

52

V. Substantive Response:¹¹ (U)

ALTERNATIVES: (U)

Framework Approach A & INF Approach 1 (U)

This combination would have the US take the stance that it has reservations about the "framework" and about those elements which have been surfaced previously and rejected. Where there are new elements which appear constructive at first glance, the U.S. will utilize the responsible negotiating fora to explore the extent to which those positions reflect significant new flexibility on the Soviets' part. (TS/O)

If this combination is chosen, the most immediate task would be to take action to explain the US assessment of the Soviet position as quickly and effectively as possible. The US objective would be to reestablish focus on achieving the goal of seeking common ground at the NST talks as mandated in the joint statement issued after the summit. Since there would be no change in the US position involved in this US response, the immediate requirement for substantive allied consultation would be minimized. However, we should consult within the SCG on our assessment of the Soviet INF position. With respect to the larger aspects of the Soviet "plan" we should also promptly notify our allies regarding how we intend to respond to what we would characterize as essentially a Soviet propaganda maneuver, and encourage them to join us in this stance. (TS/O)

Framework Approach B & INF Approach 2 (U)

This combination would have the US attempt to advance its own concept of a framework, redefined to meet US needs and limited to avoid the down-sides of making the details of the Soviet second and third phases appear to be real and feasible possibilities. It would also attempt to gain agreement on a zero-zero LRINF outcome in Europe matched by significant SS-20 reductions in Asia leading to zero there as well, and 50 percent reductions appropriately applied in START. If this combination were chosen, we would also have to consider alternative strategies on how to approach the framework concept with the Soviets (e.g., now, leading up to the summit, at the summit), and when it would be best to move in the INF area. Once decided, we would then have to carefully consult with our allies on all aspects before approaching the Soviets. Our public diplomacy approach would allow a general agreement on a framework as outlined in Approach B while making clear that the out-year details of the Soviet "plan" would not be considered. (TS/O)

-- Other Issues. There are also specific issues on defense and space (p. 14) and on verification (p. 16) which also require resolution. (C)

-- Summary Chart. Figure 1 summarizes the substantive issues pending decisions.¹² (U)

11. The two alternatives described above have been overcome by the SACG discussion of this paper (described on page 1) and by the subsequent OWL 21 paper. (U)

12. Given that OWL 21 provides a current summary chart, Figure 1 of OWL 20 has not been updated to reflect changes or SACG discussion. (U)

VI. Public Response: (U)

Until the substantive response issue is decided, the US public response must be framed to keep options open. Therefore, until this is resolved, our public response should avoid criticizing the general aspects of the Soviet "plan" that Framework Approach B would attempt to build upon. It should also avoid rejecting the Soviet phase one INF position. (TS/O)

On the other hand, our public response can immediately build upon the current publicly released material in areas common to both approaches outlined above. This includes directly attacking those aspects of the Soviet proposals which are carry-overs from previously rejected Soviet positions (e.g., the Soviet concept of "strategic systems" and associated counting rules). It can also highlight the difficulties that would be involved in attempting to gain agreement to some of the out-year details of the Soviet "plan", emphasizing how, even if resolved, the results would still be contingent on success in the immediate NST negotiations upon which both the US and USSR agree are the necessary first and next step. Finally, on a more positive note, our public themes should stress the need to focus our best talents and efforts on achieving success in finding the common ground in NST as mandated in the summit joint statement. (TS/O)

VII. Recommended Course of Action. (U)

Based upon the above, the ACSI would recommend the following course of action. (U)

1. The SACG should review this paper, direct modifications as needed, and move this issue to the NSC for discussion on a priority basis so that the President is in a position to decide any remaining substantive issues with the benefit of NSC discussion as soon as possible. (C)

2. Against the contingency that Framework Approach B is chosen, the ACSI should develop a short paper outlining the alternatives associated with the implementation of this option (addressing the who, when and where questions). This should be completed by COB Saturday, January 25. (C)

3. The Public Diplomacy IG should draft and circulate as quickly as possible improved public diplomacy materials for general use based upon the guidance outlined in section VI above. (C)

4. The Department of State should develop and circulate for ACSI/SACG review by COB Friday, January 24, alternative allied consultation plans which would address the requirements for consultation/notification associated with each of the substantive responses listed in section V. (C)

5. The ACDA should develop and circulate for ACSI/SACG review by COB Friday, January 24, draft cables providing additional instructions as needed to each of the NST negotiating groups. Where appropriate, these cables should include bracketed language reflecting the substantive alternatives still undecided. The Backstopping group should assume that the framework issue will not be an immediate subject of negotiation by the NST delegation in Geneva. (C)

54

6. The Department of Defense should develop and circulate for ACSI/SACG review of COB Saturday, January 25, a set of talking points for use in briefing selected members of Congress on the US assessment of the Soviet proposal. Where appropriate, these talking points should include alternative bracketed language reflecting the substantive alternatives as yet undecided. These points should cover the entire range of negotiations addressed in the OWL 20 paper, and not simply focus on the general Framework issue and NST. (C)

7. The Department of State should develop and circulate for ACSI/SACG review by COB Saturday, January 25, a similar set of talking point for use in briefing and consulting with allies. (C)

In accomplishing the tasks identified above, the OWL 20 paper itself will remain in OWL channels and OWL cleared personnel in agencies will share with non-cleared personnel only the information needed drawn from this paper to permit the efficient accomplishment of these tasks. (C)

Results of SACG Discussion. The SACG discussed OWL 20 on January 23. As a result, the ACSI was directed to redo the paper (for historical purposes) and to include two new options (A+, provided by the OJCS, and B+, provided by State). Attached at Annexes A and B are the inputs provided to describe these two new options in detail. (C)

Subsequent ACSI Work. Rather than attempt to rework completely OWL 20, the ACSI decided to shift to a very short summary paper (OWL 21) that attempted to narrow the range of options and present these options in a crisp manner drawing on OWL 20 for more detailed description. The annexes of this paper are intended to provide the more detailed descriptions of the options contained in OWL 21. (C)

-- The specific detail of the enhancements to our current NST position which are called for in Option 3 of OWL 21 are listed in Annex B of this paper as associated with Option B+. (C)

-- The detailed points which are the treatment of the concept issue common to both Options 2 and 3 of OWL 21 are listed in their final form in Annex C of this paper. (C)

ATTACHMENTS:

Figure 1 (TS/O)

Annex A -- OJCS Input on Option A+ (S/O)

Annex B -- State Input on Option B+ (S/S)

Annex C -- Final Points for Concept Issue Common to Options 2 and 3 of OWL 21 (TS/O)

55

<u>FRAMEWORK ISSUE</u>	
<p><u>Alternative 1:</u> Express reservations about the Soviet "plan". Explore new elements of the Soviet proposal in the appropriate negotiating fora. Make no commitment to a future approach along the lines of the concept proposed in Alternative 2.</p>	<p><u>Alternative 2:</u> Commit to advance, at the appropriate time, a US concept which reframes the core of the Soviet plan accepting some basic elements, but rejecting any discussion of subsequent phases or the details associated with such out-year phases. The timing of when this limited counter would be made is yet to be decided. This is a limited concept, with the specific details and limitations provided on pages 8 and 9.</p>
<p>Both approaches would immediately criticize elements of the Soviet proposal that have been previously been offered and rejected by the US and the unrealistic details proposed in Soviet phases 2 and 3. Both would also attempt to maintain the focus on keeping priority on executing the mandate given at the last summit to pursue areas of common ground -- 50% reduction in nuclear arms appropriately applied, and an INF agreement.</p>	
<p><u>START:</u> No issue. The US would continue to press forward seeking common ground based on our November 1, 1985, proposal.</p>	
<u>INF</u>	
<p><u>Alternative 1:</u> Make no counter move. Press forward seeking common ground based on our November 1 position and probe the new elements of the Soviet position.</p>	<p><u>Alternative 2:</u> Propose zero-zero LRINF US and Soviet missiles in range of Europe and reductions of SS-20s in Asia initially to 50%, subsequently also to zero. <u>Do it this round.</u></p>
<u>Defense & Space</u>	
<p><u>Alternative 1:</u> Make no counter move. Probe the Soviet position. In any case, do not attempt to negotiate an understanding on the interpretation of the ABM Treaty with the Soviets.</p>	<p><u>Alternative 2;</u> In addition to our current position, the US delegation begin discussions with the Soviets on the specific meaning of the ABM Treaty's restrictions.</p>
<u>Verification</u>	
<p><u>Alternative 1:</u> <u>Immediately</u> probe the Soviets on the nature of Gorbachev's commitment to work out NST verification problems.</p>	<p><u>Alternative 2:</u> Do not probe the Soviets on NST verification <u>until</u> the US has specific verification measures that it wishes to propose.</p>

3/12/12
F99-26061#261

FIGURE 1: Substantive Issues Summary (U)