

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508



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ACTION

February 22, 1986

SYSTEM II

90138

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM:

BOB LINHARD / RON LEHMAN

SUBJECT:

Additional INF Options

Ned Sec Advisor

Per instructions, we have brainstormed additional options. You had asked for an option which is between Option A and Option C and which meets certain criteria. The criteria applied were:

- 1. Options should represent a firm plan to get to zero-zero globally, as soon as possible, with clear intermediate points (2 or 3).
- 2. Rationale for intermediate points needs to be publicly presentable.
- 3. Needs to be perceived as "fair" in the public eye in that we should not demand Soviet reductions with no explainable, comparable US LRINF reductions.
- 4. There should be no direct commitment to a European zero-zero.
- 5. Should be a "Gramm-Rudman-like" approach to the problem.

At $\underline{\text{Tab A}}$ you will find a description of our recommended solution to the above tasking, $\underline{\text{Option G}}$. We feel that this effectively takes the existing $\underline{\text{Options}}$ A, C and $\underline{\text{F}}$ and modifies them to meet the criteria above.


At $\underline{\text{Tab B}}$ is a short paper which provides to you the range of options that we developed last night. This paper includes a numerical description of our current $\underline{\text{Options C}}$ and $\underline{\text{F}}$, our new (recommended) $\underline{\text{Option G}}$, and one additional option ($\underline{\text{Option H}}$).

The additional new Option H is the most direct option in that, working from a baseline for the US of planned NATO deployments and for the Soviet Union their current deployments, each side would reduce within 6 or so years to zero, with steps involving 1/3rd reductions in LRINF launchers at 2 year intervals. The problem that we have with it is that it is not tied directly to our current 1 November 1985 INF position, is most susceptable to causing us a real problem if we cannot sustain the use of the planned NATO deployment (572 warheads/missiles on 224 launchers) as the baseline and would leave us at the greatest net disadvantage in residual forces if the agreement collapses before achieving zero-zero.

In all options, we feel strongly that the common elements cited at the top of the paper at Tab B are critical.

- -- We certainly want to support a short overall reduction period, but we must protect against having this used against the Dutch and other follow-on basing should the Soviets string us out by neither accepting or rejecting.
- -- We have to maintain the US <u>right</u> to equal global warhead limits, even during an unequal balance in Europe/Asia. Whether we exercise that right and maintain warheads in the CONUS would be our choice.

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-- We must insist on the NATO's planned deployments (572 warheads on 224 launchers) as the US baseline or we will undercut our current LRINF position and, in effect, concede a freeze. We can rapidly move from this to a reduction that roughly equates to our current position.

NSC Staff View. We would strongly recommend the following additional considerations.

- While public diplomacy aspects are important, we can't allow the pursuit of these aspects to impair our ability to achieve our negotiating goals. It is very important that the US be innovative, but at the same time, we must not be perceived as jumping randomly from position to position. It is for this reason that we feel that a firm link to our 1 November 1985 position be maintained. This protects us from the perception of random movement. It also protects us should the Soviets reject this flat.
- -- We need to be concerned that we don't surprize the allies. At the same time, we need to have an out for those allies (especially the FRG) that are now "out front" on a European zero-zero. The additional language added in our recommended option does this.
- -- Timing is critical. Party Congres opens on next Tuesday. The last INF negotiating group meeting is next Thursday. If we are going to move this round, then we need to move quickly.

Recommendation

That you approve the approach suggested in $\underline{\text{Tab A}}$ as a baseline for our continued preparations. We will then turn this into a draft NSDD.

Approve

Disapprove

Concurrence:

Wright, Mahley, Kraemer

Attachments:

Tab A -- Recommended Options

Tab B -- Alternative Options Paper

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Option G. If the Soviet Union will agree to a date certain for the elimination of LRINF missiles globally, the United States proposes the following concrete plan to achieve this aim.

- [Step I, by 1987] The United States would be prepared to fully implement its 1 November 1985 proposal within one year. Both the United States and the Soviet Union would initially limit LRINF missile deployments in Europe to 140 launchers each, with the Soviet Union making concurrent proportionate reductions in Asia, accomplishing this by the end of 1987.
- [Step II, by 1990] Subsequently, the US would propose moving beyond this position, and within the next 3 years, sooner if the Soviets prefer, both sides would further reduce the numbers of these LRINF missile launchers by an additional 50%. [FYI: The "these" is a critical word in that we are referring to reductions of US LRINF launchers retained in Europe or Asia only.]
- -- [Step III, by 1992] Finally, both sides would move to the total elimination of this category of weapons no later than 1992, and sooner if the Soviets perfer.

Associated with this, the United States would also propose global LRINF missile warhead ceilings under which the U.S. retains the right to global equality. U.S. systems based in Europe could be withdrawn to the U.S. unless, or until, they were in excess of the equal global warhead ceiling associated with the launcher reductions, in which case they could be destroyed (while protecting a right to convert Pershing II missiles to Pershing I missiles).

Also, under this plan, we would demand that unless otherwise agreed, Soviet reductions in both Europe and Asia would be concurrent and proportional. However, in the context of such a far reaching agreement (i.e. an agreed date for global elimination of LRINF missiles and the achievement of deep reductions in LRINF missiles globally without regard to the forces of other nations), the United States would also be prepared to consider proposals which would result in the elimination of LRINF missiles in both Europe and in the Far East together somewhat ahead of the schedule for their elimination globally.

These reductions and limits would involve U.S. and Soviet systems only. There would be no agreed constraints on the forces of the United Kingdom or France.

These reductions would also be associated with an equal Shorter-range INF (SRINF) ceiling at current Soviet levels or to freeze SRINF at both sides

December 31, 1982, levels.

Finally, the United States will be proposing specific verification procedures tailored to the specific weaponry limits we seek. These details will be presented in the context of a comprehensive verification regime which includes the use of national technical means of verification and cooperative measures between the two governments such as on-site monitoring/inspection and data exchanges.

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F99-060/1 #306 3/12/16 FYI: Because the Soviet Union has far more such missiles than does the United States, the United States recognizes that this would maintain a Soviet advantage in LRINF missiles well into the reductions period. Therefore, the United States would insist that it have the right to choose its mix of Pershing II and GLCM during the reductions period and would insist that the level of weapons on launchers possessed by the Soviet Union during the reductions constitute also a global ceiling. This would permit retention of some US LRINF outside Europe upto the declining global ceiling.

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