

SECRET

DDI- 2430-82/1

82-4381/9

14 APR 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Director


ATTENTION : Planning Staff

FROM : Robert M. Gates
Deputy Director for Intelligence

SUBJECT : DDI Participation in NINES LIVES IV and IVY LEAGUE 82 Exercises

1. The DDI was represented by 11 officers in the NINE LIVES exercise:

Senior Officers:




25X1

[Redacted] (CRES) was the ODI rep for IVY LEAGUE 82.

25X1

2. Attached are Memcons written following participation in these exercises. In addition, [Redacted] Chief of the Operations Center has provided some general comments putting Agency participation in these exercises into perspective.

25X1



25X1

Robert M. Gates

Attachments: a/s

SECRET

L279

~~SECRET~~

14 April 1982

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: CIA Participation in IVY LEAGUE and NINE LIVES IV Exercises

A portion or all of the JCS and FEMA exercise accounts have been lodged in the Operations Center since 1964, the year we established our representative in the National Military Command Center. The military exercise program involving CIA participation has had an uneven history. In recent years, particularly since 1978, our commitment to JCS exercises has been low key and ineffectual. We do considerable arm-twisting to get CIA players--usually about four officers. Currently, these players support the JCS exercise apparatus as civilian intelligence officers, but not as independent action officers for the DCI. By our default, the JCS procedures do not permit unilateral activities by these officers.

FEMA's continuity of government program--NINE LIVES--is new and moves the emergency planning community into a new era with significant budget and resource implications, e.g., the National Intelligence Emergency Planning Staff. This Staff performs a Community role but does not plan for, much less implement, an Agency doctrine or capability for nuclear emergencies.

In the context of either the JCS or FEMA programs, DDI officers, in theory, represent the best substantive skills available. Exercises are incomplete without their presence. Moreover, there are not many opportunities for civilian analysts to observe and cope with the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP)--the crux of military contingency planning. If for no other reason, CIA analysts should be assigned to JCS exercises to witness the SIOP environment. A SIOP clearance is not necessary to gain an appreciation of this aspect of command and control.

25X1

As for FEMA, the new concepts have made it possible to shed obsolete sites and communications in order to address presidential successor survival, not survival of some 30-odd departments and agencies. Presidential Directives enforce our obligation to FEMA. There are no such instruments to enforce our JCS role.

25X1

SECRET

SECRET

In summary, the Operations Center may no longer be an adequate referent for the DDI on these matters. Substantive analysts are required in scenario preparation, be it for JCS or FEMA, and most important, analysts rather than watchstanders should be enmeshed in the intelligence tasks to support exercise principals. The higher priorities given these exercises impact on DOI resources. Without making a value judgment on the direction or realism of these programs, the ODI undoubtedly will encounter more requests and justifications for our participation than anytime in the past. As a minimum, SOVA and EURA plus CPAS are the most likely offices from which to select the substantive skills. The Directorate as a whole, however, will be asked to respond to the Agency's new Emergency Coordinator and D/NIEPS as these two come to grips in formulating an Agency-wide contingency plan.


Chief, Operations Center

25X1

-2-

SECRET

SECRET

DDI- 2430-8

Executive Registry
83-43815

24 MAR 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Administration
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Deputy Director for Operations

FROM: John N. McMahon
Executive Director

SUBJECT: CIA Participation in the NINE LIVES IV
AND IVY LEAGUE 82 Exercises

REFERENCE: TS 82-0183, 21 January 1982

1. In the referenced request for Agency participation in NINE LIVES IV, I asked for a critique of our participation by the players. The IVY LEAGUE/PETITE LEAGUE/REX ALPHA/NINE LIVES exercises emerged as a connected set of contingency exercises and the Agency was called upon to participate in all four. We did so, but in accordance with procedures and relationships arrived at separately with the JCS, FEMA, and NIEPS. Before we are called upon to participate in future such exercises, we will need to review these arrangements and consider whether they are the most efficient and effective means of participation. I request, therefore, that your officers who participated provide me, through my Planning Staff, with an evaluation of their participation, and suggestions for improvement in the nature of Agency participation.

2. As you can see from my comments (attached), I believe that it is important for the Agency to participate and that we can bring an added measure of realism to these exercises by our participation.

[Redacted Signature Block]
John N. McMahon

25X1
25X1

Attachment:
as stated

cc: C/EXDIR/PS
D/NIEPS

[Redacted Box]

25X1

SECRET

~~SECRET~~ATTACHMENT
Executive Registry

82-4551/4

20 March 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence
Director, National Intelligence Emergency
Planning Staff
EXDIR/Planning Staff

FROM: John N. McMahon
Executive Director

SUBJECT: IVY LEAGUE 82

1. On 19 March I attended a session at the National Military Command Center with all the players in the IVY LEAGUE 82 exercise to review lessons learned by the services and JCS during the exercise, as well as offer any comments that the players may have.

2. My comments centered around the intelligence contribution and the role CIA played in the exercise. I praised the scenario; noted that the scenario devised for PETITE LEAGUE, which preceded the outbreak of war in Europe, was extremely authentic--in fact disturbingly so. Noted that the scenario reflected a great deal of our present day worldwide intelligence brief, and in the course of the exercise with that as a basis the situation deteriorated into eventual war. I suggested that in delaying to bring State and CIA participation into the exercise in the early stages, the intelligence during that period was somewhat artificial. It seemed strange to me that we could have war in Europe, yet the intelligence reflected only military developments with no reference to the political and civilian sector. I also noted that the intelligence offered took the form of outright reporting of facts with no assessment provided the President as to what those facts meant. I urged that for the next scenario the Agency be brought in in the beginning and commended the JCS' own desire to have greater participation by other national agencies. I noted parenthetically that CIA would mourn the requirement to provide analytical assistance in developing the scenario but I felt it was essential to bring more realism to the program.

3. I also noted that as the war went on, with increased nuclear threat, even to the extent of some use of nuclear weapons, the intelligence reporting was extremely heavy and no filter was placed upon the informational flow to the President. As a result he was inundated with information which should not qualify for his threshold of attention during such a serious situation.

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

-2-

4. I also noted that [redacted] was used without any appreciation or understanding, and for that matter care as to what personalities were on the other end answering the message.

25X1

5. Finally I observed, as had the critique itself, that the communications with the CINCs became saturated simply through the weight of the number of messages and as a result during the exercise as it heated up routine and priority messages were never received. I contended that when it comes to a national security situation such as a nuclear holocaust, we should have communications second to none. I commented that the attempt to provide a video link between the NMCC, the White House Situation Room and FEMA headquarters between the fallouts and snow made the attempt somewhat frustrating. I urge continued effort to improve that link; at least bring it up to modern-day commercial standards. Noted that while any President would want his key advisors with him during such a serious situation, there may be circumstances which would preclude their presence and an adequate substitute would be a video link to the various Cabinet members, where they could dialogue with the President over a voice video secure system.

6. The next exercise the JCS plans to conduct is a mobilization exercise from 25 October through 5 November under the title PROUD SABER.

[redacted] [redacted]
JOHN N. MCMAHON

25X1
25X1**SECRET**

Distribution:

EXDIR

DDA

DDI

DDO

Chief, Planning Staff

Planning Staff Chrono

D/NIEPS

Ex Reg

O/EXDIR/PS



1r 24 March 1982

25X1

28 January 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: [Redacted] Chief, Planning Staff, O/Ex. Director
FROM : Chief, CIA Operations Center
SUBJECT : DDI Players for NINE LIVES IV

25X1

1. In his memorandum to you on 30 December, D/NIEPS requested that eleven DDI officers be assigned to participate in Exercise NINE LIVES IV. Their names, areas of specialization, offices, and grey line numbers are as follows:

SENIOR OFFICERS

[Redacted] (185)

[Redacted] *5

OCO
OCO
SOVA

EUR
OEA
OEA
OCR
OGI
SOVA
SOVA
SOVA

[Redacted]

Bill Rindoff
25X1

67 (R)

2. All have been informed of their selection to participate in the exercise and that they will be contacted shortly by a member of the NIEPS, who will provide details.

cc: [Redacted] SA/A/DDI
NIEPS

[Redacted] 25X1

[Redacted] 25X1

TOP SECRET

SECRET

82-4361/8

APR 8 1 52 PM '82

5 April 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Thoughts on Participation in Exercise Nine Lives #4

1. From 3-5 March 1982, I participated in Exercise Nine Lives #4 held at the [redacted]. Its objective was to test concepts for supporting possible Presidential successors dispersed from Washington during crisis periods. I was the senior Intelligence Community (IC) player and was assisted by [redacted] (CIA/CRS). The detailed scenario, logistics and administrative arrangements connected with the exercise are contained in the Exercise Nine Lives #4 Explan. This memorandum is intended to record some of the principal impressions gained from my involvement in the exercise. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

2. This was my first participation in an exercise of this sort. Participants who had been involved in earlier iterations told me that it represented a major improvement over Nine Lives #3. Given the operational, communications and other problems encountered (which I'm sure will be analyzed in great detail by the small army of exercise monitors [redacted]), however, it is clear the US (not surprisingly) still has a long way to go before it has developed [redacted]

25X1

25X1

3. As I anticipated, the exercise was a hodgepodge of both realistic and implausible play. The idea of some 30 people somehow managing a global conventional and nuclear conflict, complex foreign relations with innumerable countries, and a nation of 250 million people (although, as one wag pointed out, it became a country of considerably fewer people as the exercise progressed), is--to say the least--daunting. Characteristic of play that strained credulity was that shortly after a notional massive US-USSR nuclear missile exchange, and with both sides' bomber forces only 3 hours from their targets, the main focus of attention in the command post somehow came to center on how to reconstitute the US Congress! In fairness, however, much of the scenario seemed realistic--if overwhelming--and drove home many of the practical and substantive considerations which would impact in a real situation. That the [redacted] program has high-level support was demonstrated by President Reagan personally telephoning the exercise directors at the conclusion of the exercise to give them his appreciation and encouragement.

25X1

[redacted]

L-279

[redacted]

14 B-200

4)

SECRET

4. Since getting a successor command post operating as quickly and as smoothly as possible would be critically important, in my view maintaining dedicated teams thoroughly familiar with how they should operate is essential. With no prior experience in such exercises, and no formal briefings or preparations for the exercise (I was told I'd participate four working days beforehand), the IC team had to feel its way and scramble to integrate itself into the overall operation of the command center. Given the potential importance of the mission and the unique requirements of the task, serious consideration should be given to establishing a permanent cadre of specially trained individuals in the IC to support such command posts.

25X1

5. A clearer definition of the role of the IC team needs to be set out. What is its responsibility, for example, for monitoring and evaluating military developments? Once US forces are engaged, US theater commanders are likely to have the most timely and accurate information on the current military situation. What military analysis responsibilities, therefore, should the IC have--e.g., status of reserve units and of force reconstitution efforts in the USSR? Other areas worth exploring are the degree of IC control of national collection assets, management of covert action operations, and interface with diplomatic activities. I was really guessing at what matters would remain specifically under the direction of the DCI after a declaration of national emergency or war. The IC team was not alone in feeling its way.

25X1

6. The overall operation of the center was not precisely established prior to the exercise and consequently evolved based on the mix of personalities and institutional perspectives in the successor support team. In particular, the NSC rep emerged as the true team coordinator/chief of staff because he was used to interacting with the various national security agencies (see attached organization chart). He recognized the need for a "ramrod" to step in given the lack of experience of the Chief of Staff (a staffer of the Secretary) and the Team Coordinator (a FEMA official) in dealing with complex military and foreign policy matters. In fact, in the case of most successors, a good deal of educating in the complexities of national security will be required in very short order. Despite service on both the House and Senate Armed Services Committee, for example, Secretary Schweiker (our successor) had difficulty understanding the JCS SIOP briefing.

25X1

7. The IC team was supported by two who had arranged to have computer data bases on Soviet strategic forces, biographic files, etc., set up in the command center. It was clear very early, however, that there would be little requirement for such static data since the highest premium was on up-to-the-minute information on the rapidly changing strategic and tactical situation. The greatest help in this regard would have been voice communications with Feedback, the IC support unit operating at This was deliberately not available in order to

25X1

25X1

25X1

insure that there was a complete written record of the interplay between the team in [redacted] directly supporting the potential successor and the support team at [redacted]. As a result, the NSC and OSD/JCS players, who did have telephone communications to their support teams, were generally more up-to-date on what was going on than the IC team. [redacted]

25X1
25X1
25X1

8. As [redacted] pointed out to me, the IC team displayed classic symptoms of becoming "cable junkies." That is, we tended to respond to cables rather than to events, or to try to anticipate events. This was partly expected, of course, since the team was strongly urged prior to the exercise to "keep the support team at [redacted] busy!" As a result, we tended to respond to cables with requests for additional information, clarification and analysis, or adjusted collection coverage. Because of communication and other problems, [redacted] failed to service a considerable number of our requests. (There were apparently some major organizational problems at [redacted] probably due primarily to the fact it was the first time such a support unit had been formed.) Clearly, in a real situation, [redacted] would have to be much more selective in what was transmitted to the IC successor team and should probably indicate on the messages the actions already undertaken to deal with the information. Three people were not adequate to process the volume of information encountered, and also handle the briefing and meeting attendance demands. This problem would have become more acute over an extended period. [redacted]

25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1

9. The OSD/JCS team members took with them nicely packaged "Exercise Kits" containing maps, overlay paper, grease pencils, etc., which would have been handy for the IC team to have. A word of thanks is due [redacted] the senior IC controller in [redacted] who was a source of much useful guidance and support. [redacted]

25X1
25X1
25X1


10. Overall, six individuals from SOVA* participated in various aspects of the Nine Lives #4 exercise. An informal survey of their reactions suggests that on balance it was a useful experience which provided them with valuable insights into intelligence support requirements, problems of interagency coordination, and organization for crisis operations. Most recommended that other SOVA managers and analysts be encouraged to benefit from participation in future exercises. As was true in my case, however, there was

25X1

* [redacted]

SECRET

acknowledgement of the very uneven character of the exercise, with much that was useful and interesting but a good deal that was strained or boring. There was broad agreement on the need for more advance preparation for these exercises. To reiterate a point made above, at a more advanced stage of COG system development, serious consideration should be given to assigning DDI dedicated teams to this very important support function, not necessarily all from SOVA.



25X1

SECRET

Page Denied


Distribution: Thoughts on Participation in Exercise Nine Lives #4

Copy:

1	[REDACTED]	25X1
1	Director, National Intelligence Emergency Planning Staff	
1	[REDACTED] NIEPS	25X1
1	[REDACTED] NIEPS	25X1
1	Deputy Director for Intelligence	
1	Associate Deputy Director for Intelligence	
1	Director of Soviet Analysis	
1	Deputy Director of Soviet Analysis	
1	Chief, Programs Staff, SOVA	
1	Chief, Policy Analysis Division, SOVA	
1	Chief, Theater Forces Division, SOVA	
1	Chief, Current Support Division, SOVA	
1	Director of Current Production and Analytic Support	
1	Deputy Director of Current Production and Analytic Support	
1	Director of Scientific and Weapons Research	
1	Deputy Director of Scientific and Weapons Research	
1	Chief, Offensive Systems Division, OSWR	
1	Chief, Defensive Systems Division, OSWR	
1	Chief, Collection, Requirements and Evaluation Staff, DDI	
1	Director of Imagery Analysis	
1	Deputy Director of Imagery Analysis	
1	Chief, Missile Systems Division, OIA	

SECRET

DDA 82-0175/11



1 APR 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Director

FROM: Harry E. Fitzwater
Deputy Director for Administration

SUBJECT: CIA Participation in NINE LIVES IV and IVY LEAGUE 82 Exercises

REFERENCE: Memo from EXDIR to Deputy Directors, dtd 24 Mar 82, same Subject

1. In response to your request, forwarded herewith are the critiques of employees from the Offices of Security and Communications who participated in the NINE LIVES IV exercise.

2. I fully agree with your position that it is important for the Agency to participate in exercises of this nature. In that regard, we have not hesitated in providing Directorate of Administration support for these activities. At the same time, however, this support has resulted in a substantial drain of both manpower and funds at a time when our Directorate resources have been stretched dangerously thin. As you will note from the critiques, because of our shortage of Communications personnel, we were forced to take on a number of rehired annuitants to handle the requirements; as indicated in some of the attachments, it would have been most useful if they had had an opportunity to undergo refresher training. While a few of the reactions of our participants are somewhat negative, I am proud of the overall support rendered and the resourcefulness and dedication exhibited by our personnel under the extremely difficult circumstances reflected in the critiques.

Harry E. Fitzwater

Harry E. Fitzwater

Attachments

Distribution:

- 0 - Adse w/atts
- 1 - ER w/o atts
- 1 - D/OS w/o atts
- 1 - D/OC w/o atts

ALL PORTIONS SECRET



25X1

SECRET

L279
XF B206A

Exec: [redacted]
82-436113

20 March 1982

NOTE FOR: DDCI

Bob:

During the exercise IVY LEAGUE 82, all participants in the military as well as the White House players were advised in writing that the telephone would be monitored to determine if classified conversations were being carried out over unclassified lines. The JCS advised us that 9% of the IVY LEAGUE classified information exchange was conducted over non-secure telephone lines.

25X1

[redacted]

John N. McMahon

SECRET

B206A

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

Routing Slip


TO:

		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI				
2	DDCI				
3	EXDIR		✓		
4	D/ICS				
5	DDI				
6	DDA				
7	DDO				
8	DDS&T				
9	Chm/NIC				
10	GC				
11	IG				
12	Compt				
13	D/EED				
14	D/Pers				
15	D/OEA				
16	C/PAD/OEA				
17	SA/IA				
18	AO/DCI				
19	C/IPD/OIS				
20					
21					
22					

SUSPENSE

Date

Remarks:


 Secretary
3/4/82
 Date

3637 (10-81)

UNCLASSIFIED

McMahon
v 5824

MEMORANDUM

EXERCISE
THE WHITE HOUSE
EXERCISE
WASHINGTON

82-4387/1

EXERCISE IVY LEAGUE 82

THE EXERCISE PRESIDENT'S SCHEDULE

MARCH 4, 1982

UNCLASSIFIED

0900 - 1030	Morning Up-date	White House Situation Room
1030 - 1130	Personal Staff Time	Office
1130 - 1230	Meetings w/Ambassadors	Office (Simulated)
1230 - 1330	Lunch	White House Mess
1330 - 1430	Meetings w/Ambassadors	Office (Simulated)
1430 - 1500	Conference call to Successors	White House Situation Room
1500 - 1630	Afternoon Up-date	White House Situation Room
1630 - 1800	Personal Time	
1800 - 1900	NSC Meeting	• White House Situation Room

MAR 4 11 12 AM '82

UNCLASSIFIED

ER

L-279

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

Routing Slip

TO:		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI		X		
2	DDCI		X		
3	EXDIR	X			
4	D/ICS				
5	DDI				
6	DDA				
7	DDO				
8	DDS&T				
9	Chm/NIC				
10	GC				
11	IG				
12	Compt				
13	D/EEO				
14	D/Pers				
15	D/OEA				
16	C/PAD/OEA				
17	SA/IA				
18	AO/DCI				
19	C/IPD/OIS				
20	D/NIEPS		X		
21	ES		X		
22					

SUSPENSE

Date

Remarks:

19 Feb 82

[Signature]

D/Executive Secretary

12 Feb 82

Date

SECRET

82-4381

12 February 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Director
FROM: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Exercise "IVY LEAGUE"

1. There is an exercise called "IVY LEAGUE" scheduled sometime between the 1st and 5th of March. It concerns a post-nuclear attack and scenario of how the NSC would function, etc.

2. Jim Williams was over and told me something about it and he said that somehow the impression had been created at the Pentagon that I didn't want to participate. I hadn't heard about it at all. It appears that I should participate. Williams is sending over the papers on it. Will you follow through and see that I get appropriately briefed.


William J. Casey

L-279

	23x1
--	------

SECRET