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DECAPTIONED

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E.O. 12065: RDS-2 4/30/02 (SHLAUDEMAN, HARRY W.) OR-M  
TAGS: PBOR, MILI, UK, FA, AR  
SUBJ: FALKLANDS CRISIS: PRESPECTIVE US MEASURES

REF: GILLESPIE/KING SECURE TELEPHONE CALL

1. SECRET ENTIRE TEXT.

2. FOLLOWING RECEIPT OF SUBJECT PHONE CALL, I ASKED TO SEE  
PRESIDENT GALTIERI AND WAS RECEIVED AT MIDNIGHT. ARMA  
ACCOMPANIED ME AS HE HAS THROUGHOUT THESE CRITICAL MEETINGS.

2. I TOLD GALTIERI THAT WE CAME WITHOUT INSTRUCTIONS  
AND WITH THE ONLY PRUPOSE OF SEEING WHAT WE COULD DO TO  
HEAD OFF A FATAL CONFRONTATION. I POINTED OUT TO THE  
PRESIDENT THAT WE HAD NOT RECEIVED AN ADEQUATE RESPONSE  
TO OUR PROPOSAL AND THAT WE WOULD ANNOUNCE TOMORROW  
SEVERAL MEASURES AGAINST ARGENTINA. DURING MORE THAN  
AN HOUR'S CONVERSATION, HE DEMONSTRATED NO GIVE WHATSOEVER  
ON THE PROPOSAL.

3. I REPEATEDLY ASKED HIM WHAT HE SAW AS A WAY OUT OF  
THIS IMPASSE. HIS RESPONSE WAS, AS MIGHT BE EXPECTED,  
THAT THERE SHOULD BE A STAND DOWN TO GIVE AN OPPORTUNITY  
FOR NEGOTIATIONS. I JUST AS REPEATEDLY POINTED OUT

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TO HIM THAT SUCH A BACK OFF WOULD GIVE ARGENTINA THE  
VICTORY IT SOUGHT.

4. AT THE END OF OUR CONVERSATION, AND ON MY OWN  
INITIATIVE, I SUGGESTED TO GALTIERI THAT THE GOA  
MIGHT ANNOUNCE UNILATERALLY A WITHDRAWAL OF ITS TROOPS  
FROM THE MALVINAS AS A FIRST STEP TOWARD A PEACEFUL

UNCLASSIFIED

SOLUTION AND AS A GESTURE OF GOOD FAITH. HE SEEMED TO TAKE THIS SUGGESTION SERIOUSLY, WROTE IT DOWN, BUT SAID AGAIN, AS HE HAD SEVERAL TIMES BEFORE, THAT HE WAS ONLY ONE OF THREE WHO MADE THESE DECISIONS.

5. I RECOMMEND MOST STRONGLY THAT WE NOT AT NOT ANNOUNCE THE MEASURES CONTEMPLATED UNTIL I HAVE HAD A CHANCE TO FOLLOW UP WITH GALTIERI TOMORROW MORNING. I THINK THERE IS STILL A CHANCE, ALTHOUGH A SLIGHT ONE, THAT WE CAN HOLD THESE PEOPLE OFF.

6. BOTH ARMA AND I (AND GALTIERI PARTICULARLY LISTENED TO THE FORMER) BORE DOWN VERY HEAVILY ON THE ABSOLUTE NECESSITY FOR ARGENTINA NOT REPEAT NOT TO TAKE THE FIRST OFFENSIVE ACTION. GALTIERI SAID THAT HE HAD ALREADY STOPPED SUCH ACTIONS THREE TIMES IN THE LAST FEW DAYS, BUT INDICATED THAT HE COULD NOT DO SO FOR MUCH LONGER. HE MADE A POINT, AS WE ALL KNOW, THAT THE NAVY IS HUNGRY FOR ACTION. HE ALSO SAID THAT THE ARGENTINES PLAN TO RE-SUPPLY THE ISLANDS TOMORROW (APRIL 30) BY AIR ESCORTED BY MILITARY AIR CRAFT.

7. GALTIERI SEEMED TO ME AND TO ARMA ANXIOUS TO FIND A WAY OUT WITHIN THE VERY TIGHT CONSTRAINTS IN WHICH HE OPERATES. HE SAID AGAIN THAT ARGENTINA

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WOULD NOT BE THE FIRST ONE TO FIRE AND EMPHASIZED TO US THAT HE HAS SPENT CONSIDERABLE POLITICAL CAPITAL IN PREVENTING THE ARGENTINE ARMED FORCES FROM GOING ON THE OFFENSIVE. HE CLOSED THE CONVERSATION BY PROMISING TO KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH ME, PARTICULARLY ON THE IDEA OF A UNILATERAL WITHDRAWAL FROM THE MALVINAS. I THINK THAT WE MAY HAVE GOTTEN THROUGH TO HIM AND IF WE ARE ABLE TO OFFER HIM A LITTLE TIME THAT WE MIGHT BE ABLE TO MOVE FORWARD.

SHLAUDEMANN

SECRET

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