

~~TOP SECRET~~

ADMIRAL MOORER'S DIARY

MONDAY 20 SEPTEMBER 1971

- 0758 Arrived at the Pentagon.
- 0804 Called SECDEF on the telephone and told him that I had the message extending the authorization for the strikes through today and am sending it up for his chop. He thought that it had gone out and I said for all practical purposes it had, but this was the official confirmation. SECDEF said that when he had called Dr. Kissinger last night to tell him that he had extended it he damn near went through the roof and stated "you people over there don't you have an Air Force, we don't give a damn about the military results. Can't you even send a message in the name of the President?" I said he gave me the same bit when I talked to him. Laird said Henry called him back and apologized later. I asked Laird if he gave him the same pitch about only being able to operate in the desert. Laird said he had really apologized. (SECDEF was mad at Kissinger last night.)
- I told him that we could not just do these strikes at random and he said he did not care what we hit just as long as we got some publicity which is certainly a new twist. Laird asked if the weather would be about the same today and I said yes -- but we will have to talk about this a little bit.
- 0832 Chairman's Briefing - NMCC
- 0902 Met with LTGEN Vogt, LTGEN Knowles and BGEN Pauly. I told them that I was afraid the field was holding out to be able to conduct a "balls out" effort in PRIZE BULL. There is no question that we are going to have to go today or not at all. Vogt concurred. Today is our last chance, tomorrow is very questionable. When I talked to Dr. Kissinger last night he asked "can you only fight in the desert?". I do not think the White House understands that they can not just arbitrarily pick a 35 mile strip on a given day and have good weather, good results, etc.. I directed General Vogt and Pauly to stay in very close touch with MACV and to go on a limited basis in any event today.
- 0907 Met with Admiral Zumwalt and VADM Minter concerning my forthcoming testimony at the MSC/MTMTS hearing today. They gave me their last minute views and showed me the break down of some of the events that had transpired and some of the opinions that had been proposed. Admiral Minter indicated that he would be in attendance at my hearing.
- 0920 Met with Captain Valentine and we discussed the details of the statement and set up the game plan for my testimony. We also discussed the back-up information, sequence of events that had occurred since the initial Packard memo and determined that the statement was alright, however, it was not cleared with SECDEF at this point.
- 0933 Received a telephone call from Rady Johnson concerning the MSC/MTMTS testimony. Rady pointed

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out that the general opinion upstairs was that my testimony was a little harder than they might have liked it. Although Secretary Laird was firm that I should face the committee alone, he said there is one instance in my statement which is contrary to the original Packard memo. I asked him what part he was talking about and Rady indicated it was in general and not any specific part. It is the best of both worlds type of thing.

Rady asked, before I give my statement, that I include the fact that the statement has not been cleared by OSD. However, I still had been sanctioned to go ahead and give it anyway. I asked him what part he wanted me to take out. Rady said he would have to delete so much in view of the overall statement that maybe I could just tone it down a bit and make it softer as they had suggested Admiral Gralla do. He said it is not a question of censorship and nobody is trying to make you change your statement (not much), but they do not want you to get into a controversy between the Chiefs and OSD in front of the committee. I responded that if they ask me what the Chiefs position is I would have to give it to them, but I did not want to go over at all. Rady said even though it was in executive session they did not want to get any flap generated. I still have to tell the truth, I told him. I could muddy the water a bit and I explained to him that we can make the thing work if you want me to say that this has really not been approved. Rady re-emphasized again he wanted me to make it a little lighter. I said how -- by my saying that I am authorized to give the statement, but it has not been cleared by SECDEF? Rady said do not say "SECDEF" he did not want to get him in the middle. We both agreed this has risen to a pretty spectacular level. I said I do not have time to do stuff like this and Rady said they have a proposed subpoena you know.

0939

Called SECDEF on the telephone and told him that I had been in touch with MACV and I understand that you want us to go this time for some of the targets regardless of the weather situation. Secretary Laird asked if it looked bad for tomorrow also? I said the same thing as today likely the typhoon moving near Okinawa is causing some effect. The coastal targets may still be open and we can use the F-4s with the LORAN capability. SECDEF felt we could wait until after the security council meeting and he could talk to the President.

He thinks we should hit something because Henry gets all excited and says this is a diplomatic thing. Henry apparently asked the Secretary "don't tell me you don't have any airplanes that can fly". I said of course we have airplanes that will fly, but do not know exactly what he is up to yet. Laird asked if they have the word to go tonight? I said that Vogt has been talking to Lavelle and he says he will have the planes up there regardless of the weather. I just want them to recognize over in the White House that this is not necessarily going to come up with very good BDA. As long as they recognize this there is no problem. Laird said let's just keep with it a while. I said I was just taking a sounding with him and he said he thinks this is a lousy way to operate, but we are stuck with it.

0945 Called Secretary Packard on the telephone and told him that I had received a call from Rady Johnson relative to the hearings. Before I left I wanted to check with him what he wanted me to say, and that my statement has not been cleared by OSD, but I have authority to give it. I thought that was a little strange, but I will say anything you like. I do not want them to ask me why it has not been cleared.

Secretary Packard said he did not think that everything I had in my statement was in support of the official policy they are proposing. I said I was trying to avoid the discussion that I did not support the policy, I was trying to zero in on the support necessary for the Merchant Marine in order to support the JSOP. This was approved by the security review people yesterday. They did take out other things that they thought I should not say, but as I see it my whole purpose of being there is to give the JCS position and all I am doing is more or less copying from the JCS papers. Packard said that is fine and timely, but we have not approved the JCS position. I can say I am here to give the JCS position and that, of course, the SECDEF has not approved the JCS position yet and that we will support whatever decision he makes. Packard agreed that would be fine. I said I did not want to go testify anyway and that I was caught in the middle of it. Packard said on the one hand you can say what you think because you know everybody is free to speak, but the only thing that needs to be said is that you want to present the JCS position and it has not been approved by the Secretary. I will also say whatever decision is made I will support.

0949 Departed the Pentagon for a 1000 testimony in the Rayburn House Office Building, room 2118, at the Meeting of the Sub-Committee on Transportation of the House Committee on Armed Services. The subject is MSC/MTMTS.

1000 Testified on the MSC/MTMTS hearing as noted above. (The transcript of this meeting will be attached when received.) NOTE: My basic problem was that I had not been informed of the proposal and read about it in the Baltimore Sun. I was giving a statement which SECDEF had not approved and that I did not want to be there in the first place. Somehow the committee had gotten ahold of all the JCS papers and left me no alternative and no flexibility so I was forced to say exactly what I thought whether the testimony was cleared or not.

1130 Arrived at the Pentagon.

1151 Called LTGEN Vogt on the telephone and told him I had the OPREP ONE message indicating that they were going regardless of weather and asked that the targets be plotted. He said that was already done and they will come up shortly. I asked where we would go under those circumstances and if we would still wait for the best window? He probably would, but if he can not he would use the regular birds and would use pathfinder aircraft using LORAN. I asked if the targets would be mainly POL storage and Vogt said yes and that is not a bad impact either.

I told John that I had a hell of a time this morning on the MSC/MTMTS. I hate to get caught

in the middle -- Laird is upset -- everybody is whizzed off -- but I think I handled it pretty well. I asked John to investigate how the hell they had gotten every single JCS paper. I had not released any of them to the committee. He said he had not released any either. They did not particularly like my statement, but knowing they had the papers I had no latitude left. Somebody gave them the papers and I never give JCS papers to Congress. Vogt said it is strictly prohibited by law.

I emphasized to them that we would support the decision of the SECDEF. I said that this was unique as a matter of fact because we are normally continuously consulted and I read it in the Baltimore Sun (I did not tell them that). They asked if the Secretaries were consulted and I said I did not know. I softened the statement a little by saying that I thought there was a better way of doing it, but this proposal would work. Then they asked if I had changed my mind since the JCS paper of 6 June and I told them no. I read my statement and tried to lead them around Robin Hood's barn to take up a little time and to put into perspective what the JCS planning function were with regard to the JSOP and JSCAP.

My only problem was the business of procurement. The one that does the procuring naturally gets more response from the people they were dealing with. I said I was primarily concerned about the Navy and the Merchant Marine in this thing.

They started quoting statutes and I said I had the laws reviewed by a lawyer and had Captain Valentine explain it to them. Hall asked why I did not take it to the President and I said this is not one of the major issues. I think you have to retain the identity of the Services and I was strongly opposed to a logistics command as such. SECDEF in his defense report said he did not intend to set up a logistics command. They were really trying to generate a confrontation. They are trying to get Secretary Packard on a legal technicality and statutes. I hope this has taught Packard a lesson. Vogt said Packard is really well meaning and trying to improve the efficiency, but he should listen to someone before he gets himself in trouble on these things.

Then they brought up the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel and asked if I read the part on transportation which I had and that SECDEF had chosen not to accept the complex structure proposed. I emphasized the service identity, the esprit de corps, loyalties, traditions, etc.. I was very much opposed to a logistics command which would break down the integrity of the services. I wanted to get this in just in case they asked me if in the future I saw a trans-world logistics command. I leaped and took them over the ledge and painted a hard case against any kind of single service which I may be able to use later, but still everyone up topside is upset. I hope they do not think that I would lie. Particularly when OSD is giving the committee JCS papers I had signed.

I said something about Shillito not trying to carry out the wishes of the Blue Ribbon Defense

Panel. I am not sure Kaputo and Riley did not write the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel themselves and are trying to get what they can out of it. Vogt thought we should put it to bed for a while as we pretend to give it a very close new look. I said they could possibly use common computers and things like that to make it more cosmetically appealing.

Vogt said he would send the first draft of the Command and Control directive up for my OK and to release it to the Services before it gets turned green.

- 1200 Attended farewell ceremony and review in honor of the Undersecretary of the Army, Beal, River Entrance.
- 1244 Attended lunch in SECDEF's office with Secretary Laird and Secretary Packard. We discussed the items as indicated in my MFR.
- 1355 Received a telephone call from Dr. Kissinger. He said the President may ask me for a 10-minute presentation at the NSC meeting on the military situation in Vietnam. Then he asked about the operation for this evening (PRIZE BULL). I said I was going to bring over the charts showing the weather and a recommendation. Henry said we do not want to get flak for being ineffective, but on the other hand he asked how the weather would look 24 hours later. I said I would bring over the full weather forecast and we would talk later following the NSC meeting. He asked how late we could stop the operation. I said we could stop it late this afternoon, but we had plenty of time to discuss it. Henry said if the weather is really bad they should check with me for final clearance. I agreed. Henry said "the next time we would give them an operation in the desert on stationary targets in July". I said, "Come on Henry you are being unfair". "Let us go up to Hanoi it is wide open weather wise." He said the minute we authorized it the weather would close in.
- 1435 Met with BGEN Pauly and Col Davis to discuss the pictures and target description of the targets proposed in OPREP ONE for the PRIZE BULL strikes commencing tonight. The strikes will cover a period commencing about 0800 Saigon time to about 1700 their time. We discussed the POL targets and looked at the pictures and have a good feel now for both the all weather targets, and the VFR targets that will be hit if weather permits. They also provided me with a last minute weather forecast for the target area. Col Davis pointed out that during the month of September there are 7 days (average) with desirable weather conditions for this type of operation (24% of the time).
- 1445 Departed the Pentagon with DEPSECDEF Packard to attend the 1500 National Security Council Meeting in the Cabinet Room at the White House, subject -- current situation in South Vietnam. See attached MFR M-72-71.
- 1702 Arrived at the Pentagon.
- 1706 Called LTGEN Vogt on the telephone and asked him to get Mel Zais, John Pauly and company and have a council of war on how we are going to monitor this operation. I also asked for the latest weather report just before I leave

the building. I want a feel of where we stand, who is going to watch it, etc.. I said, I will be leaving the building about 1830 so let's get together in about 30 minutes. General Vogt said he just came from the NMCC and received a complete run-down on targeting and the whole operation. I said if it will be easier I will come to the NMCC. Vogt said OK we will meet in the SIT room in the NMCC.

1720

Called RADM Elliott Strauss (RET) on the phone and told him I had gotten a letter from Dickie Mountbatten and he was told by Lord Chamberlain to work up the plans for his funeral. I explained to Admiral Strauss the reason for this request. They had failed to plan for some previous funerals and wanted to make this a good one. Since he worked with Americans he thought they would want to participate. I committed you and J.P. McConnell who had worked with him and could not touch base before I committed. Strauss said he would be happy to do it and that Monty was his boys Godfather.

1728

Met with LTGEN Vogt, LTGEN Zais, LTGEN Knowles, BGEN Pauly, Col Davis and Col Coleman in the NMCC SIT room to receive a briefing on our status for the (PRIZE BULL) operation. General Vogt told me that with LORAN bombing the F4s could come within 200 feet CEP while bombing from 500' to 10,000'.

I asked about the SAMs and General Vogt indicated they would rely on the Iron Hand and the jamming to counter the SAMs. Most of the SAM sites are out of range and they should not be too much of a problem.

First target time is 2000 EDT tonight. If we have all weather operation there will be about 230 sorties if it becomes VFR we can increase to 400 plus. I asked about the possibility of the weather drying out and they are less optimistic. General Vogt said that the operation would go unless we call and cancel it. The only other thing that could stop it is if conditions are absolutely unsafe for the aircraft.

I said they will think we did this because of what they did at Phnom Penh today. Kissinger wants a very effective outcome now, but that is a little difficult to predict. That is why we cancelled it yesterday because we could not guarantee effective results. I think we should be able to work at least on the coast and maybe we can get some of the VFR strikes up near Dong Hoi.

In our message to the Ambassadors and to Paris we should specify that this was 9 retaliatory strikes and that all press reports will go from COMUSMACV. We decided that we would tell them after the operation actually is started -- the message will be released at that time.

Apparently State has not been cut in yet and the ~~the~~ question was raised as to who knows about it? At the moment probably only Secretary Rogers knows. We noted that Unger bitched considerably about not knowing on our previous operation.

Weather briefing showed that it was Northeast monsoon that the ceiling would be 3,000 feet 7/8

coverage with 7 miles in light rain from 0600 to 1100 the ceiling will consist of 3,000 bases and 7,000 tops, 1500 foot scattered, 3,000 broken, 1/8 coverage at 1500 feet. It may clear and to to 3/8 coverage from its present 7/8 later in the day. I told them to watch it close, to keep me posted, and not to hesitate to call.

1757

Met with LTGEN Vogt, LTGEN Zais and LTGEN Knowles concerning the Command and Control of the WWMCCS operation. I had discussed the Command and Control for WWMCCS with Secretary Packard today at our lunch with SECDEF. I said there are two parts to the WWMCCS -- the equipment and the operation of it.

Packard said well maybe he would form a council composed of himself, me, ASD(T) and ASD(I). ASD(T) should be relied on for technical advise only, he should coordinate with DDR&E and they should not be involved in the decision making process at all. I added they may want to shift some billets from the DDR&E to tele-communications only to fill their requirements not to make operational decisions. Packard mentioned the comptroller review, and this is no problem the comptroller is free to review any program. I said I thought we should be able to bring the budget directly to SECDEF for approval and not have to go through the regular service fight.

Packard said he thought he would get the Service Secretaries in with me and I said, no sir -- the Secretaries have absolutely no business in the operational end. SECDEF and DEPSECDEF are responsible for the system and the operation. The Service Secretaries and the Services meet the requirements levied upon them and I will not agree to the Service Secretaries being involved. McNamara used to screw things up by sending a problem on operations to the Service Secretaries, and one on logistics to the Joint Chiefs. The directive should be a simple straight forward spelling out who and what -- CJCS should be responsible for the operation, and the equipment under WWMCCS.

I told Packard the CINCs will not be a problem. The SIOP proper will require some authenticator changes and the procedures will change so that we can go direct to the forces if the CINCs are cut in simultaneously. We can control this by changing the message addressees. Zumwalt and Ryan both agree this is no problem. Packard agreed that he would shorten the directive and Laird picked it right up he said we should add wherever CJCS appears (or Acting CJCS). This is fine as long as he lets us handle the operations under J3. It restricts the dabblers to ASD(T) and ASD(I) which we can control. There will be no Service Secretaries involved and we will get our budget authorized so it is not competing with other requirements. The CJCS or the Acting CJCS can cover the relationships with the CINCs. The NMCC is the priority system and the CINCs and services must conform to this.

Vogt said one problem was in re-defining the NCA (National Command Authority). I said now it is set so the decision of the President should be transmitted via me. Vogt said Packard described the NCA as the President, and Secretary of Defense working through the CJCS, he has the President issuing broad strategic guidance and obviously

he is using the old description of the NCA without including the Chiefs. The problem arising is that since the Chairman will not command forces how can he be in the NCA. I am having counsel check the legality of this. In an exercise in semantics does the strategic director need to command. The law says that the Chain goes the President -- SECDEF -- CINCs. The Packard directive says that the NCA is the President and SECDEF. We can use the same language but we need to say something to include the Chiefs who act in my place and want a more cosmetic directive.

The whole operation depends on the Chairman and how he operates in the position. It is possible that a future Chairman may not cooperate as well. If the Chiefs are not in the Chain and SECDEF makes a decision the JCS can not do a thing about it. The NCA discusses the options pro and con, removes the Chiefs from the NCA and sends an execute via the Chairman or the Acting Chairman. The intent of the legislation was to remove the JCS from the chain of command. I said there is no written job description for the billet of Chairman, however, anyone observing would understand the problems. Laird wants to return to the law. I said the Chiefs as a corporate body do not make the decisions.

- 1835 Departed the Pentagon for Quarters SIX.
- 1900 Attended a reception followed by the Organization Day Ball hosted by the Third Infantry (The Old Guard) in the Koran Room, the Officers' Open Mess Fort Myer.
- 1930 Received word from Captain Knoizen that the 1st wave of PRIZE BULL was on target and the operation commenced on schedule in accordance with the OPREP ONE. The weather was still bad and expected to get worse.

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Phone: 202/994-7000, Fax: 202/994-7005, nsarchiv@gwu.edu