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WASHINGTON

## SECRET/NODIS/XGDS

## MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:

Allan Mac Eachen, Secretary of State for External Affairs, Canada

One Aide

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary

of State

Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor for

the Department of State

Peter W. Rodman, National Security

Council Staff

DATE AND TIME:

Saturday, January 24, 1976 9:20 - 9:31 a.m.

PLACE:

Secretary's Suite Brussels Hilton

Brussels

SUBJECTS:

Middle East; ROK Nuclear Reactor.

Mac Eachen: Thank you very much for seeing Done, FRANK WISNER

Middle East

SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF EMECUTIVE ORDER 11652 AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED AT TWO-

Kissinger: What countries did you visit INTERVALS AND DECLASSIFIED ON DECEMBER 31,

Mac Eachen: Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Jordan and Israel. It was my first visit to the Middle East.

Kissinger: Pretty bleak, isn't it?

Mac Eachen: Yes.

Kissinger: The Israelis might as well live on the moon. They have no idea of what's happening 50 miles away.

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Mac Eachen: Exactly. After seeing it, I take my hat off to you for going in to that -- I won't say jungle -- but that is a difficult area.

I had a long talk with Rabin. I'd say he'd be pretty difficult to negotiate with.

Kissinger: Totally rigid.

Mac Eachen: He's given to detail.

<u>Kissinger:</u> And he's the best of them. Peres talks with the most eloquence, but. . .

Mac Eachen: What about Allon?

Kissinger: He's well meaning but incompetent.

Mac Eachen: He seems the most willing to give.

Kissinger: But he can't do anything.

Mac Eachen: My impression was that the Arab leaders were keen on doing something, to settle.

Kissinger: Oh yes. Though not the Iraq is. That's the tragedy.

Mac Eachen: They see it as a propitious moment.

Kissinger: Sadat would settle for any halfway honorable answer. And Hussein. That would bring the Syrians along.

Well see Rabin this week.

Mac Eachen: On the PLO, there was no give there. On withdrawal, they were pretty tough. Maybe it's a negotiating position. I said to them I had heard on my trip that the U.S. Government would be initiating a dialogue with the Palestinians.

Kissinger: You said that to Rabin?

Mac Eachen: Yes.

Kissinger: I appreciate that. You've just unleashed the American Jewish Community on me!

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Mac Eachen: He said "But you know something that I don't know." Then he reiterated what you said yesterday.

Kissinger: Where did you hear it?

Mac Eachen: In Egypt.

Kissinger: They're very eloquent on that in Egypt.

## ROK Nuclear Reactor

Mac Eachen: I wanted to talk briefly about the ROK and the nuclear business. Thank you for giving us the information you said you would in Paris, and also for your reply to my message.

We are working with the ROK to soften them up, but I don't know if we can deliver a knockout blow.


Kissinger: They've made it conditional on some cooperation, which is facesaving for them. I think it's safe to say we've delivered the knockout blow.

Mac Eachen: We'll be signing our nuclear cooperation agreement on Monday. If we don't sign by Monday, the financial arrangements and therefore the whole deal will be off. We said we would sign if they state publicly that they won't build a reprocessing plant and that they will shelve it. They haven't said this is gone forever and ever. When we proposed this to the Foreign Minister, he had to go the Cabinet. We have no answer yet from him. If we get a yes, to both questions, we'll sign.

This is going to be tough presentationally in Canada, but I have some words here that I might say in the House of Commons, regarding the U.S. [He reads from a prepared statement:] "We have reason to believe the United States shares with us the long-term objective of making available to developing countries such as the ROK the benefits of nuclear energy to be used only for peaceful purposes, and that the United States will continue to use their influence for this objective."

Kissinger: That's fine.

Mac Eachen: If they say yes, and we sign, we'll tell them if there is any evidence that they are proceeding to acquire a reprocessing plant, we will review our participation in the project.



Kissinger: I think that's a good solution.

Mac Eachen: I'm glad to hear your confidence that you've delivered a knock-out blow.

Kissinger: I think we have.

Sonnenfeldt: They won't use the word "cancel," but it amounts to the same thing.

Kissinger: But the end result is, there will be no reprocessing plant.

Mac Eachen: Yes. In the short-term we've taken care of it. So I can say that.

Kissinger: That's fine.

Mac Eachen: I won't go beyond that.

[ The Foreign Secretary and the Secretary got up to the door.]

Mac Eachen: It was encouraging to hear your report [to the North Atlantic Council.] You should know you have many supporters in Canada.

Kissinger: Thank you very much.

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