

Message Text

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ORIGIN SS-30

INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 SSO-00 /030 R

DRAFTED BY OES/NEP:RDEMING:DJR
APPROVED BY OES:LBROWN
S/S:SSTAPLETON

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EXDIS

E.O. 12065 RDS-1 11/15/99 (LES BROWN) OES

TAGS: ENRG, TECH, PARM, JA

SUBJECT: US-JAPAN CONSULTATIONS ON NON-PROLIFERATION:
NON-INFCE SUBJECTS

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. IN ADDITION TO DISCUSSION ON POST-INFCE ISSUES REPORTED SEPTEL, US AND JAPANESE DELEGATIONS LED BY ASSISTANT SECRETARY PICKERING AND DIRECTOR GENERAL YATABE RESPECTIVELY DISCUSSED FOLLOWING TOPICS:

A. PACIFIC BASIN SPENT FUEL STORAGE: THE US SIDE HANDED OVER A DRAFT OF AN AGREEMENT FOR A JOINT FEASIBILITY STUDY. PICKERING EMPHASIZED THAT THE DRAFT WAS INFORMAL AND THAT WE STILL HAD TO OBTAIN AUTHORIZATION TO ENTER AND CONCLUDE NEGOTIATIONS (CIRCULAR 175), BUT THAT HE HOPED TO BE ABLE TO ENTER NEGOTIATIONS ON IT DURING HIS STOPS IN TOKYO IN JANUARY. YATABE SAID THAT THE GOJ WAS STILL STUDYING THE

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MATERIAL THE US HANDED OVER IN SEPTEMBER, BUT WILL BE PREPARED FOR DISCUSSIONS IN JANUARY, LOOKING TO CONCLUSION OF AN AGREEMENT IN THE SPRING.

B. TOKAI MURA: PICKERING SAID THAT OUR EXPERTS WERE STUDYING THE MATERIAL MADE AVAILABLE DURING THE TECHNICAL

TALKS IN OCTOBER BUT THAT WE CONTINUED TO HOPE THAT THE MAIN PLANT WOULD BE CONVERTED TO FULL SCALE COPROCESSING AS CALLED FOR IN THE TOKAI COMMUNIQUE. HE SUGGESTED THAT ONE POSSIBILITY WOULD BE TO EXTEND AGAIN THE COMMUNIQUE SINCE IT WAS HIGHLY UNLIKELY THAT JAPAN WOULD BE ABLE TO REPROCESS THE AUTHORIZED 99 TONS BY APRIL 30, 1980, AND PERHAPS INCORPORATE THE NEW ARRANGEMENTS FOR TOKAI IN A RENEGOTIATED US-JAPAN AGREEMENT FOR COOPERATION. YATABE RESPONDED THAT THE GOJ HAD EXPLAINED IN THE OCTOBER TECHNICAL DISCUSSIONS THAT THERE WAS A GOOD DEAL OF DIFFICULTY IN CONVERTING THE MAIN PLANT TO COPROCESSING AND THAT IN ANY EVENT CONSIDERABLE TIME WOULD BE NEEDED TO SCALE UP FROM THE EXPERIMENTAL WORK AT THE OTL TO COPROCESSING AT THE MAIN PLANT. AS FOR THE POSSIBILITY OF INCORPORATING A NEW ARRANGEMENT FOR TOKAI IN A RENEGOTIATED AGREEMENT, YATABE SAID THAT THIS WAS A "NEW ELEMENT" ON WHICH HE COULD NOT COMMENT AT THIS POINT.

C. KEMENY REPORT ON THREE MILE ISLAND: PICKERING NOTED THAT WE HAD MADE THE REPORT AVAILABLE TO THE GOJ. THE MITI REPRESENTATIVE (KODAMA) SAID THAT HE HOPED THE US WOULD TAKE INTO ACCOUNT INTERNATIONAL REPERCUSSIONS AS WELL AS THE US DOMESTIC SITUATION IN ANY DECISIONS IT MADE ON THE BASIS OF THIS REPORT. THE US SIDE RESPONDBD THAT WE WOULD BE MINDFUL OF THIS.

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D. PAKISTAN: PICKERING THANKED THE GOJ FOR ITS EFFORTS TO CURTAIL SUPPLIES TO PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM AND REVIEWED OUR RECENT CONVERSATIONS WITH THE GOP. HE SAID THAT WE HAD TOLD FOREIGN AFFAIRS ADVISOR AGHA SHAHI THAT A NUCLEAR TEST BY PAKISTAN WOULD HAVE "A DRASTIC EFFECT" ON US-PAKISTAN RELATIONS. YATABE ASKED FOR A DEFINITION OF "DRASTIC EFFECT". PICKERING RESPONDED THAT WE DID NOT SPELL THIS OUT BUT NOTED THAT IN THE FIRST INSTANCE WE HAD A NUMBER OF LEGAL REQUIREMENTS THAT WOULD COME INTO EFFECT. YATABE SAID THAT WHILE INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION MIGHT DELAY A STATE FROM DETONATION OF A NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE THE PROBLEM WAS FINDING AN EFFECTIVE MEANS TO DETER A COUNTRY SUCH AS PAKISTAN FROM PURSUING ITS CHOSEN COURSE. HE WONDERED WHETHER IT WAS REALLY POSSIBLE TO MAKE DRASTIC CHANGES IN ONE'S RELATIONSHIP WITH PAKISTAN AFTER AN EXPLOSION OCCURRED IN A MANNER THAT PRESERVED A BALANCE IN RELATIONS BETWEEN PAKISTAN AND INDIA. PICKERING RESPONDED THAT EACH GOVERNMENT HAD TO DECIDE FOR ITSELF WHAT IT WAS PREPARED TO DO IN SUCH AN EVENT, BUT IN THE US THERE WOULD BE A STRONG REACTION. YATABE ASKED IF WE WERE PROPOSING CONCERTED INTERNATIONAL ACTION TO CONVINCING PAKISTAN THAT IT WOULD FIND IT DISADVANTAGEOUS TO CONDUCT

A TEST. PICKERING RESPONDED THAT WE WERE NOT MAKING SUCH A PROPOSAL BUT WANTED EACH STATE TO CONSIDER CAREFULLY WHAT STEPS IT MIGHT TAKE. YATABE SUGGESTED THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR CHINA AND THE SOVIETS TO BE INVOLVED ALSO. IF ONLY THE WEST TOOK ACTION, THE EFFORT WOULD FAIL.

E. SOUTH ATLANTIC EVENT: PICKERING SAID THAT DESPITE PRESS REPORTS OF ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE (FYI THIS WAS BEFORE REPORT FROM NEW ZEALAND ABOUT POSSIBLE FALLOUT IN RAIN WATER END FYI), WE HAD NO CORROBORATING EVIDENCE OF A NUCLEAR EXPLOSION AND OUR EXPERTS WERE CONTINUING TO STUDY THE DATA. HE NOTED THAT WE WOULD FACE A PROBLEM AT THE UN AND THAT WE WERE CONSIDERING THE POSITION WE WOULD TAKE
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ON ANY RESOLUTION DIRECTED AT SOUTH AFRICA.

F. NIGER: YATABE NOTED THAT AT US URGING THE GOJ HAD APPROACHED THE GOVERNMENT OF NIGER LAST SUMMER TO ASK THAT IT RATIFY THE NPT. YATABE SAID THAT THE GON HAD REACTED STRONGLY AND THAT THE TIMING OF THE JAPANESE APPROACH WAS CLEARLY POOR. HE ASKED IF THE US HAD HAD A SIMILAR REACTION FROM NIGER. PICKERING RESPONDED THAT NIGER DID APPARENTLY RESENT THIS OUTSIDE PRESSURE AND THAT WE WERE NOT NOW PLANNING FURTHER APPROACHES. HE EXPRESSED REGRET IF US SUGGESTION HAS CAUSED PROBLEMS FOR JAPAN BUT NOTED THE IMPORTANCE WE ATTACHED TO NIGER'S ADHERANCE TO TH NPT. VANCE

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