

RELEASED IN PART
1.4(B),B1,B5,1.4(D)

ACTION AF-00

INFO LOG-00 NP-00 AID-00 A-00 CCO-00 CG-00 CIAE-00
 COME-00 CTME-00 INL-00 USNW-00 DOEE-00 DOTE-00 PERC-00
 SRPP-00 DS-00 EAP-00 EB-00 EUR-00 FAAE-00 FBIE-00
 VC-00 H-00 TEDE-00 INR-00 INSE-00 IO-00 L-00
 CAC-00 VCE-00 M-00 AC-00 NEA-00 NRCE-00 NSAE-00
 OCS-00 OMB-00 PA-00 PM-00 PRS-00 ACE-00 P-00
 SCT-00 SP-00 IRM-00 SSO-00 SS-00 TRSE-00 T-00
 USIE-00 USSS-00 ASDS-00 DTC-00 EPAE-00 ECA-00 PMB-00
 DSCC-00 PRM-00 DRL-00 G-00 NFAT-00 SAS-00 /000W
 -----E0E8A6 221401Z /38

P R 220900Z JAN 04
 FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
 TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0075
 INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
 AMEMBASSY ASMARA
 AMEMBASSY BANGUI
 USEU BRUSSELS 0001
 AMEMBASSY CAIRO
 AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
 AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
 AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE
 AMEMBASSY LONDON
 AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
 AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
 NSC WASHDC
 AMEMBASSY OSLO
 AMEMBASSY PARIS
 SECDEF WASHDC
 AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
 USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
 USMISSION USUN N Y

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 000075

STATE FOR AF/SPG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 1/22/2009
 TAGS: SU, PREF, PREL, PTER, MASS, CD
 SUBJECT: NEXT STEPS ON DARFUR

REF: A. STATE 14168 (NOTAL): B. PARIS 0472 (NOTAL)

CLASSIFIED BY: GERARD GALLUCCI, COM, EMBASSY KHARTOUM, DOS.
 REASON: (B), (D)

1. (C) EMBASSY HAS BEEN WORKING THE DARFUR ISSUE FOR SOME MONTHS NOW AND HAS PROVIDED EXTENSIVE REPORTING ON THE INFORMATION WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO DEVELOP. WE UNDERSTAND THAT WASHINGTON IS DEVELOPING A STRATEGY FOR INCREASING US ENGAGEMENT ON DARFUR AND HAVE RECEIVED DANFORTH LETTER (REF A) FOR DELIVERY TO PRESIDENT BASHIR. THIS CABLE PROVIDES UPDATE ON DIPLOMATIC DEVELOPMENTS AND SUGGESTIONS ON HOW WE MIGHT FACTOR THEM INTO OUR THINKING OF

REVIEW AUTHORITY: Charles Daris, Senior Reviewer

Classified by DAS, A/GIS, DoS ~ Class: CONFIDENTIAL ~ Reason: 1.4(B), 1.4(D), B1 ~ Declassify on: 01/22/2024

OUR OWN APPROACH.

2. (C) THE EUROPEANS -- LED BY THE UK AND THE DUTCH -- HAVE BECOME QUITE ACTIVE ON DARFUR. THE EU AMBASSADORS HAVE INTRODUCED DARFUR -- AND SPECIFICALLY THE QUESTION OF HUMANITARIAN ACCESS -- INTO THEIR ONGOING HUMAN RIGHTS DISCUSSIONS WITH THE GOS AND HAVE MADE STATEMENTS ON, AND VISITS TO, DARFUR TO HIGHLIGHT THEIR CONCERN. (WE HAVE TAKEN SIMILAR STEPS, INCLUDING IN TANDEM WITH THE EU MEMBERS.) WE HAVE ALL BEEN DEVELOPING CONTACTS WITH DARFURIANS WHERE WE CAN FIND THEM, INCLUDING SOME LINKED TO THE SLM AND JEM AS WELL AS REPRESENTATIVES OF THE VARIOUS TRIBES.

3. (C) IN OUR CONTACTS WITH THE GOS, WE HAVE ALL RAISED DARFUR TO NOTE OUR CONCERN OVER THE CIVILIAN CAUSALITIES FROM THE GOVERNMENT'S MILITARY RESPONSE TO THE DARFUR REBELLION, THE GOS'S USE OF AND SUPPORT FOR THE ARMED ARAB MILITIAS AND ITS DENIAL OF HUMANITARIAN ACCESS BECAUSE OF POLITICAL MOTIVES. IN RESPONSE TO THESE INTERVENTIONS, FOREIGN MINISTER ISMAEL OFFERED IN DECEMBER TO BRIEF US -- WESTERN AND OTHER INTERESTED COMS -- ON DARFUR. LETTING THE BRITISH KEEP THE LEAD ON THIS, THE UK AMBASSADOR HAS NOW ARRANGED WITH THE MINISTER TO HOLD THIS MEETING ON JANUARY 26TH. OUR IDEA IS TO USE THE MEETING AS AN OCCASION TO BRING THE NGO COMMUNITY INTO A DIRECT DIALOGUE WITH AUTHORITATIVE ELEMENTS OF THE GOS ON THE HUMANITARIAN ACCESS ISSUE. THE FOREIGN MINISTER (REPORTEDLY A MEMBER OF THE GOS "PEACE" FACTION) AGREED WITH THIS APPROACH AND WILL CONVOKE HAC AND OTHER GOS OFFICIALS FOR THE JANUARY 26TH MEETING. THE DUTCH CHARGE -- WHO HAS ALSO TAKEN AN PARTICULARLY ACTIVE APPROACH TO DARFUR -- WILL HOST A PRELIMINARY MEETING BETWEEN THE DONOR COMS AND THE NGOS FOR JANUARY 25. WE -- COM, USAID AND POL -- WILL TAKE PART IN BOTH MEETINGS. WE WILL USE THE OPPORTUNITY TO PRESS THE GOS TO ALLOW HUMANITARIAN ACCESS IN DARFUR IN ALL CASES AND PLACES WHEN/WHERE THE UN AND INVOLVED NGOS JUDGE IT SECURE ENOUGH TO CONDUCT FIELD OPERATIONS. (UP TO NOW THE GOS HAS BEEN DENYING ACCESS ON SECURITY GROUNDS EVEN WHEN THE UN AND NGO SECURITY PEOPLE BELIEVE IT IS SECURE FOR THEM TO CONDUCT OPERATIONS. UN SECURITY [PLEASE PROTECT] HAS DEVELOPED CONTACTS WITH COMMUNITIES AND THE REBELS AND NGOS BELIEVE THAT IN MANY AREAS IT IS ONLY THE GOS'S POLITICAL AGENDA THAT LEADS THEM TO DENY ACCESS.)

4. (C) AGENDAS OF THE VARIOUS DARFUR PLAYERS ARE COMPLEX AND CONFLICTING. AS FAR AS WE CAN TELL, THE SLM (SUDAN LIBERATION MOVEMENT) AND JEM (JUSTICE AND EQUALITY MOVEMENT) ARE COOPERATING IN THE FIELD BUT PERHAPS LESS SO AT THE POLITICAL LEVEL. (THOUGH WE HAVE HEARD RECENTLY THAT BOTH ARE NOW READY TO RETURN TO NEGOTIATIONS.) THE SLM WERE REPORTEDLY NEAR ACCEPTING A CHADIAN PROPOSAL TO REACH A BROAD AGREEMENT WITH THE GOS -- WITHIN THE ABEICHE CONTEXT -- LAST YEAR BUT WERE STOPPED BY EXTERNAL LEADERSHIP AND THE JEM, BOTH OF WHICH MAY HAVE BEEN OPERATING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ISLAMIST RADICAL HASAN AL TURABI. THERE ALSO SEEMS TO BE NO CLEAR REBEL POLITICAL AGENDA OTHER THAN TO GET A DEAL FROM THE GOS LIKE THAT BEING WORKED OUT BETWEEN THE GOS AND THE SPLM, I.E., LOCAL AUTONOMY AND WEALTH SHARING. ON THE GOVERNMENT SIDE, THE GOS MAY BE SPLIT BETWEEN

THOSE SEEKING A MILITARY SOLUTION IN ORDER TO AVOID A MACHAKOS-LIKE OUTCOME IN DARFUR AND THOSE READY TO FIND A POLITICAL ARRANGEMENT WITH THE REBELS ONCE THEY ARE DEFEATED. (THE GOVERNMENT APPEARS PARTICULARLY WORRIED THAT ANY ACCEPTANCE OF A REFERENDUM FOR ABYEI WOULD BE PICKED UP BY THE DARFUR REBELS AS WELL.) THE ARAB NOMAD MILITIAS ENLISTED BY THE GOS TO FIGHT THE REBELS HAVE THEIR OWN AGENDA, LARGELY CENTERED ON

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APPEARS CONCERNED THAT ITS NORTHERN OPPONENTS -- TURABI AND THOSE WITHIN THE GOS OPPOSED TO PEACE WITH THE SOUTH -- ARE USING DARFUR TO DESTABILIZE THE GOVERNMENT AND PERHAPS PROMPT A COUP.

5. (C) THE COMPLEXITIES OF DARFUR REQUIRE A POLITICAL SOLUTION AS WELL AS AN AGREEMENT FOR HUMANITARIAN ACCESS IF THE WAR IS TO BE ENDED. THEREFORE, WE -- EU MEMBERS AND US -- HAVE ALSO BEEN DISCUSSING HOW TO ENCOURAGE A RETURN TO NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT AND REBELS. THE EU COMS MET ON JANUARY 12 TO DEVELOP RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BRUSSELS ON NEXT STEPS ON BOTH HUMANITARIAN ACCESS AND NEGOTIATIONS. THEY DECIDED THAT A BALANCED APPROACH BUILDING ON THE ABEICHE PROCESS WOULD MAKE MOST SENSE. THE AIM WOULD BE TO REINVIGORATE THE CHADIAN EFFORT INTO AN ABEICHE PLUS FRAMEWORK THROUGH GRADUALLY ADDING FURTHER INTERNATIONAL ACTORS MUCH AS WE ADDED OURSELVES (AS THE TROIKA AND OTHERS) TO THE IGAD PROCESS ON SOUTHERN SUDAN. THE GOVERNMENT WOULD BE ENCOURAGED TO EXPLICITLY COMMIT ITSELF TO RETURNING TO NEGOTIATIONS AND ALSO TO ACCEPT SOME FORM OF INTERNATIONAL INVOLVEMENT IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A CEASEFIRE. (INTERNATIONAL INVOLVEMENT IS A KEY DEMAND OF THE REBELS.) THE EU WOULD REITERATE SUPPORT FOR THE CHADIAN EFFORT. (PRESIDENT DEBY IS REPORTED READY TO RE-ENGAGE IN THE ABEICHE PROCESS.) THE EU WOULD ALSO FIND WAYS TO ENGAGE WITH THE REBEL MOVEMENTS TO CONVEY THEIR MESSAGE THAT THEY MUST COMMIT TO NEGOTIATIONS WITHOUT POLITICAL PRECONDITIONS. ADDITIONALLY, THE EU WOULD MAKE A FACT FINDING MISSION TO DARFUR. THIS MISSION -- TO BE CONDUCTED BY THE EU COMS IN KHARTOUM -- WOULD USE THE OCCASION TO PUSH THE OVERALL NEGOTIATING APPROACH WITH THE GOS AND REBELS AS WELL KEEPING FOCUS ON THE HUMANITARIAN ISSUES. THE DUTCH CHARGE TELLS US THAT BRUSSELS APPROVAL OF THIS APPROACH IS EXPECTED.

6. (C) WE ARE WORKING WITH THE EU AND HAVE ASKED TO JOIN THEIR FACT FINDING MISSION AS OBSERVERS. WE HAVE BEEN WORKING INTO OUR OWN MESSAGE WITH DARFURIANS IN OR PASSING THROUGH KHARTOUM THAT THE REBELS MUST RECOMMIT THEMSELVES TO NEGOTIATIONS AND BE READY TO RESUME THEIR PLACE IN THE ABEICHE PROCESS WITH A CLEAR AND REALIZABLE POLITICAL AGENDA. WE ALSO ARE PULLING TOGETHER A REPRESENTATIVE MEETING OF TRIBAL FIGURES TO ENCOURAGE A DARFUR-BASED EFFORT TO ADDRESS THE GRASS ROOTS CAUSES OF THE TRIBAL CONFLICT.

7. (C) WE BELIEVE THAT THE ABOVE EFFORTS AMOUNT TO AN APPROACH THAT WE SHOULD GIVE TIME TO DEVELOP. THE ELEMENTS INCLUDE:

-- US PARTNERSHIP WITH THE EU AND OTHER INTERESTED DONOR COUNTRIES;

-- COMBINED DIRECT INVOLVEMENT WITH THE GOVERNMENT TO ALLOW HUMANITARIAN ACCESS AND TO COMMIT ITSELF TO RENEWED NEGOTIATIONS AND A POLITICAL SOLUTION;

-- CLEAR SIGNALS TO BOTH SIDES (GOVERNMENT AND REBELS) THAT WE HAVE NO POSITION ON THE POLITICAL ISSUES IN NEGOTIATIONS OTHER THAN THE NEED FOR A POLITICAL SOLUTION ACCEPTABLE TO ALL;

-- ENCOURAGEMENT OF TRIBAL RECONCILIATION THROUGH INTER-TRIBAL DIALOGUE;

-- ENCOURAGEMENT OF RENEWED CHADIAN ROLE PLUS EXPRESSION OF OUR WILLINGNESS TO ALL SIDE TO ACCOMPANY PROCESS AND TO ASSIST WITH QUESTION OF INTERNATIONAL MONITORING (PERHAPS THROUGH EXTENSION OF CPMT ACTIVITY);

-- ENCOURAGEMENT TO OUTSIDE ACTORS (SPLM, ERITREA, LIBYA, ETC) TO SUPPORT A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION (EU LEAD ON CONTACTS WITH LIBYA MIGHT MAKE MOST SENSE);

-- CONTINUED CLEAR SEPARATION BETWEEN THE IGAD PEACE PROCESS AND SUPPORTING A DARFUR PEACE PROCESS:

8. (C) WASHINGTON WILL NOTICE OUR PREFERENCE FOR WORKING WITH EU PARTNERS AND ALLOWING THEM TO PLAY A LEADING ROLE. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] THE

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E OF THAT. (INTERESTINGLY, THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR HERE [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] HE ADDED, HOWEVER, THAT FRANCE WILL SUPPORT THE EU EFFORT TO ENCOURAGE NEGOTIATIONS.) [REDACTED]

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