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E44

ACTION AF-00

RELEASED IN PART  
B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D)

INFO	LOG-00	MFA-00	NP-00	AID-00	CIAE-00	SRPP-00	EB-00
	EUR-00	VC-00	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	L-00	VCE-00
	MMP-00	AC-00	NEA-00	NSAE-00	OES-00	OIC-00	OMB-00
	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00	SCT-00	SP-00
	SS-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	SA-00	PME-00
	PRM-00	DRL-00	G-00	SAS-00	/000W		

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O P 240917Z MAY 04  
 FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM  
 TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0729  
 INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA  
 AMEMBASSY ASMARA  
 AMEMBASSY BERLIN  
 USEU BRUSSELS 0125  
 AMEMBASSY CAIRO  
 CJTF HOA  
 HQ USCENCOM MACDILL AFB FL  
 AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM  
 AMEMBASSY LONDON  
 AMEMBASSY NAIROBI PRIORITY  
 AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA  
 NSC WASHDC  
 AMEMBASSY OSLO  
 AMEMBASSY PARIS  
 AMEMBASSY ROME  
 SECDEF WASHDC  
 AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE  
 USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

C O N F I D E N T I A L KHARTOUM 000550

Department also for AF/SPG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/21/2009  
 TAGS: PREL, PHUM, PREF, EAID, SU  
 SUBJECT: GOS ANNOUNCES SUSPENSION OF PERMITS FOR DARFUR AND OTHER  
 MEASURES - RETRANSMISSION OF KHARTOUM 546

REF: Khartoum 530

CLASSIFIED BY: Gerard Gallucci, COM, Embassy Khartoum, DOS.  
 REASON: 1.5 (B), (D)

1. (SBU) The government of Sudan announced on May 20 a number of  
 measures to will take to facilitate humanitarian assistance to  
 Darfur. As of May 24, the GOS said the following measures will

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go into effect:

-- The government will give humanitarian aid workers of the UN, donors, Red Cross and other NGOs visas valid for three months. The visas will be available from Sudanese embassies abroad (as opposed to only from Khartoum) and will be granted within 48 hours.

-- The requirement for travel permits for these humanitarian aid workers to go to Darfur will be suspended for three months. (The Foreign Minister told us this period will be renewable.) In lieu of the permit, the entry visa and simple notification to the Humanitarian Affairs Ministry of the name of the traveler and the visitor's program will be all that is required. (The Minister told us that there will be no need to wait for a reply.)

-- The government will open offices at airports with Customs for clearance of equipment and vehicles for humanitarian work in Darfur. (We asked our other interlocutors -- see below -- to take special measures to clear up the backlog of equipment and vehicles quickly.)

2. (U) The Foreign Minister also reportedly called the monitoring of the Darfur ceasefire "essential" in order to provide security for people to return to their homes before the coming rainy season.

3. (C) Mission team including Charge, DCM, USAID, DLO and RAO spent the better part of May 20 in meetings with the GOS to help prepare the way for the government's announcement. We had prepared for the meetings by talking with various government and other officials over the last several days about the absolute urgency for the GOS to change its approach to Darfur. On May 17, we passed [redacted] the points in refel. He subsequently told us that he had discussed them with Foreign Minister Mustafa Osman Ismael who had found them "reasonable." [redacted] also emphasized the importance of accompanying humanitarian efforts with a political process to end the conflict.) [redacted]

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4. (C) We met first on the 20th with GOS team led by [redacted]

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[redacted]

Over two hours, we heard the GOS express its interest in working with the US and the international community, its concerns, and its readiness to act. [redacted] led off by saying that the GOS understood that time is running out and of its "genuine resolve" to address the humanitarian "issues" as well as those that contributed to the Darfur problems. He said that humanitarian assistance is the important "first phase" of what must be done. Help must be given to the displaced, affected and refugees. Immediate needs include food and other supplies,

transport, roads and providing security and protection to the displaced. But it would also be important in the next phases to focus on development to counter the causes of the long-term conflict. Meanwhile, efforts must also begin to reach a political settlement -- including all parties -- and social reconciliation (through activation of traditional tribal mechanisms). But [redacted] emphasized that the GOS understands that humanitarian assistance must come first. [redacted] noted that the GOS understands that it has a problem and needs help from the U.S. and international community. The government, he said, wants a partnership with the U.S. to work on the humanitarian, political and social issues.

5. (C) [redacted] said that the humanitarian work would be "guided by the ceasefire" so it is important that it be maintained. He said that for the partnership with the international community to work, there must be an understanding of what needs to be done specifying the needs and personnel required. He spoke of the importance of the voluntary return of the displaced. They needed basic service, transport, rehabilitation assistance, police to maintain law and order and the return of government administration. (The police, he said, needed help with transport.) According to [redacted] the army would be redeployed to support the police. The "nomads" would be "guarded and coordinated" by the police in their movements to grazing lands. But resource conflicts caused the conflict and need to be "overcome." Farmers must be helped to go from subsistence to commercial farming and the nomads must become more settled as well.

6. (C) Charge said that the U.S. wanted to work with the GOS to address the humanitarian crisis. He briefed the group on the

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recent mortality figures -- gross mortality being estimated as 3.6 per 10,000 people per day meaning perhaps 360 deaths every day. . He noted the human and political concerns this raised and the likelihood that left unaddressed the figures -- and political outrage -- would increase. Immediate changes were needed in the GOS procedures on humanitarian assistance to Darfur. (He provided copies of the steps the GOS should take.) Charge recognized the long-term development needs of the people of Darfur but said that the urgent task in front of us now is to save lives and ensure that there is a long-term. He also cautioned that there is probably not enough time for the displaced to return securely to their land before this rainy season. What we could do is help keep people alive over the next 12-18 months and help those who may be prepared to return while ensuring also that those still on their land but affected by the war also do not become displaced. Charge said the government would not be judged by how quickly the displaced return to their land but by how it cooperated in meeting urgent needs while preparing for a secure return. In that regard, it said it would be important to prevent the jenjaweed from occupying land they had seized (as we had been seeing recently).

7. (C) [ ] said that the rebel's have the practice of attacking small police posts and this impedes re-establishing order. The police are key, as is an effort to regularize the "tribal militias" which play a traditional role in self-defense. Charge said that we could encourage the rebels not to attack the police but the real problem is the impunity with which the jenjaweed are now operating. They often abuse and kill civilians in the presence of the police and army. The government must act against these outlaws (the government's preferred term) if they are to build trust with the people. [ ] said that the real solution is a political agreement ending the conflict. For that to occur, the parties (government and rebels) need to agree on the rules of the game and to respect them. Charge said that we recognize the importance of the political process and that it must be inclusive of all parties and groups in Darfur. We are prepared to accompany and encourage the political side. In that regard, perhaps the government should put on the table its vision for a decentralized Sudan with local elections and resource sharing.

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8. (C) [ ] raised the question of U.S. intentions

and stressed the need to share a common vision of what must be done in Darfur. Charge said that the U.S. wants to work with the government to help the people of Darfur, we have no other agenda. He assured that while some others may wish to use the Darfur issue against the government, that is not the US

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intention or policy. We have put much effort into re-establishing our relationship with the GOS and working with it against terrorism and for peace. The USG does not want to use the Darfur issue against the GOS but rather wants to work with the government to help ensure that the issue does not overwhelm our relationship and impact negatively on the IGAD process. Charge said that the GOS should do everything it can do to facilitate humanitarian access and end the jenjaweed violence. Perhaps some of the jenjaweed, he noted, need to be arrested. The military itself should avoid confrontations with the rebels. Any military sent to provide security for IDPs should not be former jenjaweed in PDF uniforms. [redacted] [redacted] said they were reassured by this message. The meeting ended with an agreement to coordinate closely. The Charge said he would be the point of contact for discussions at the level of this meeting and gave everyone his cell number. [redacted] [redacted] joked that they already had it.)

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9. (C) Charge met with [redacted] immediately after. Charge made same general points as above. He asked that [redacted] transmit to President Bashir that the U.S. remains committed to the peace process and ready to move ahead in our relationship. But he stressed that the Darfur issue could end up "blowing the relationship out of the water." [redacted] said that with the U.S. approach of stressing working with the GOS, cooperation would be possible.


10. (C) Charge (and DCM) next met with Foreign Minister Ismael. Ismael had clearly been briefed by [redacted] on our suggestions and on the meeting with [redacted]. Ismael and Charge traded comments (details of meeting will be reported septel) and then Ismael briefed on steps he said that he had decided to take (along lines of subsequent announcement). He said that he would seek approval from President Bashir (which he almost certainly had already) and hoped to announce the changes in the next few days. But Ismael stressed that while the GOS does not want a return to war, the rebels are trying to "change the facts on the ground" by occupying places they did not occupy at the ceasefire. He accused "the Zaghawa" of trying to seize land that they never had. The army, he said, has orders to not allow the rebels to do this.

11. (C) Ismael said that the AU must move quickly to station monitors. Charge asked for a clear statement of the GOS position on monitoring, was there a problem with US participation. (He told Ismael that we had committed personnel and an aircraft that would probably come from CPMT assets.) Ismael said that GOS had no problem with the U.S. The Sudanese had given the AU some "observations" but said they told the AU that it was the AU's decision and the GOS would accept anything.

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Charge asked if there would be any problem with using US military personnel that form part of the DLO for Darfur ceasefire monitoring. Ismael replied that the GOS accepted US participation without any distinction. It simply wants the monitoring deployed quickly. The rebels must decide before that happens how they wish to be treated. If they wish to move into populations or towns that they have not occupied till the ceasefire, they must give up their weapons. If they want to retain their weapons, they need to declare their locations and numbers and remain in those locations. If the rebels move, he said, "they will be attacked." He added that the government's ability to control the jenjaweed depends on the rebels not seeking to move into their land or attack them. Charge replied that the government must do all it can now to stop the jenjaweed, who continue to attack and harass civilian with impunity.



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