

TELEGRAM

Foreign Service of the
United States of America

OUTGOING

AMEMBASSY DJAKARTA

P. 11

FILES
COMM
CHRON
AMB
MIN

Charge: Embassy

Classification

Control: 540A

This document consists of 4 pages.

Date: Oct 12, 1965
7 PM

Copy 1 of 5 copies. Series _____

ACTION TO: SECSTATE WASHINGTON ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ PRIORITY 971

INFO : CINCPAC PRIORITY UNN

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

L I M D I S

~~RESTRICTED DISTRIBUTION~~

1. According German Embassy officer, Indo Army is now considering possibility of overthrowing Sukarno himself and is approaching several Western Embassies to let them know that such a move is possible.
2. Germany Embassy was informed on Oct 11 by reliable German businessman that he had been asked by Indo Army staff officer to act as intermediary to Indo German Embassy. /source said Sukarno received Army leaders on Oct 10 and latter presented him with sheaf of papers demonstrating PKI complicity in Sept 30 Movement. Sukarno refused to read these papers and upbraided Army for harassing PKI. Army generals then left with sense of deep frustration.

SECRET

Classification

UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED" REPRODUCTION
FROM THIS COPY IS NOT AUTHORIZED

"Single address messages to the Department can be diverted to pouch (appropriate to the classification of the message) without retyping Type "By Pouch" after the address, omit the serial number, and pouch in envelope marked "For DC/T".

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NN/D6 7289

TELEGRAM

Foreign Service of the
United States of America

OUTGOING AMEMBASSY DJAKARTA

SECRET

Charge: Embassy

Classification

Control:

Date:

-2-

3. Australian Embassy has separate report that sheaf of papers presented to Sukarno by Army and that Sukarno refused to read it but Australian report indicates approach was made by Nasution alone on Oct 11. Press confirms that ~~Sukarno-~~ ~~Sukarno-~~ Nasution meeting did occur on Oct 11. Since initial contact of German businessman intermediary was made on morning of Oct 11, we believe that Nasution visit was follow-up and that two reports cover two different occasions on which Sukarno ^{reportedly} refused to read Army evidence.

4. Indo Army representative who contacted Germans said he was making approach under orders and was told to say that Indo Army was considering a quick move to depose Sukarno. He emphasized that they were only considering it and had not come to a decision. If it was done, it would be through a sudden move without warning and Sukarno would then be replaced by a combined civilian-military junta.

SECRET

Classification

UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED" REPRODUCTION
FROM THIS COPY IS NOT AUTHORIZED

TELEGRAM

Foreign Service of the
United States of America

OUTGOING

SECRET

Charge:

Classification

Control:

-3-

Date:

5. The Indo Army representative said several Western Embassies would be approached but not Japanese since Japanese Ambassador regarded by Army as possibly being too close to Sukarno. Japanese Emboff has informed us independently today, however, that Japanese have received similar "low-level" approaches in name of Nasution and they understood that Indo Army was approaching several Western Embassies along same lines. We know of no other approaches at this timex except for related comments to us reported Embtel 950.

6. Indo Army representative ~~to Germans~~ also indicated ^{to Germans} that Indo Army hoped for Western sympathy and economic help if Army does decide to depose Sukarno. Implication was that needed aid would be in form of food and possibly other supplies rather than financial help.

7. COMMENT: DefAtt was informed by Army contact on Oct 12 that Nasution and Saleh saw Sukarno separately and alone on Oct 10 to present evidence of PKI complicity. This source said Sukarno did listen to

■

SECRET

Classification

UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED" REPRODUCTION
FROM THIS COPY IS NOT AUTHORIZED

TELEGRAM

Foreign Service of the
United States of America

OUTGOING

Charge: SECRET Classification Control:
-4- Date:

evidence and acknowledged that PKI involvement in Sept 30 Movement was indicated. Whether Sukarno actually read documents remains questionable. It is certain that some Army leaders are dissatisfied with Sukarno's actions since Sept 30 but it not yet established that they are considering ousting him.

GP-3

GREEN

mg

POL:EEasters *ERM*

+ JJ

RM

POL:RJMartens:efr:ac
10/12/65

SECRET
Classification

UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED" REPRODUCTION
FROM THIS COPY IS NOT AUTHORIZED



National Security Archive,
Suite 701, Gelman Library, The George Washington University,
2130 H Street, NW, Washington, D.C., 20037,
Phone: 202/994-7000, Fax: 202/994-7005, nsarchiv@gwu.edu