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United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

June 13, 1997

*AG/17*

ACTION MEMORANDUM *AG/13*

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With CONFIDENTIAL/NODIS Attachment

TO: The Secretary

FROM: S/PA - Peter Tarnoff

EB - Alan P. Larson *AL*

SUBJECT: The Denver Summit of the Eight

13-Dist.

Please find attached your memorandum for the President regarding the Denver Summit of the Eight.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the attached memorandum.

Approve *WKA 6/16/97* *(MKA)*

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

*with addition as noted done 6/17/97  
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Attachment:

Memorandum for the President.

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**THE SECRETARY OF STATE**  
**WASHINGTON**

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DECL: 06/23/2007

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Madeleine K. Albright *luxa*.

SUBJECT: The Denver Summit of the Eight, June 20-22

The Denver Summit is a high-visibility opportunity for you to demonstrate how the United States and its core democratic partners are harnessing forces of change and globalization in ways that are of direct and tangible advantage to our citizens. At Denver you and your colleagues can lay a strong foundation for our partnership in the 21st century by showing how the world's key democracies are preparing our people and our economies for the challenges of the global marketplace; meeting transnational threats to our security; and integrating new partners into the broader community of free market democracies. This message will be visibly and dramatically underscored by the participation of Boris Yeltsin. The Summit will also give you an opportunity to consult individually with key Summit partners on the eve of the turnover of Hong Kong and the NATO Madrid Summit July 8-9.

A major story in Denver will be Russia's expanded role. Only one leaders' session will be held "at Seven"; Yeltsin will participate in all others. Russia's role at future Summits remains undecided; the Japanese in particular believe full Russian membership is premature. The UK, host of next year's Summit, is leaning toward replicating this year's structure. You can reassure Hashimoto that while we support an expanded Russian role and want to give Yeltsin enough room to claim progress, we continue to believe core financial and economic issues and some questions of nuclear safety should remain at "Seven."

The Summit will launch two new U.S. initiatives. The first is a joint commitment by the Eight to strengthen democracy where it has taken hold and extend its reach where it has not by taking action in four priority areas: promoting

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Classified by Secretary of State Madelene K. Albright  
Reason: E.O. 12958 1.5 (b) and (d)

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good governance and the rule of law, including anti-corruption efforts; strengthening civil society; expanding women's political participation; and boosting business and labor support for democracy and human rights. Looking to the 50th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights next year, you can propose a U.S.-chaired Working Group that will set the stage for a number of high-profile events showcasing your leadership in this area over the coming year and that will report recommendations to the May 1998 Birmingham Summit.

Second, the Eight will unveil a joint strategy to reverse Africa's marginalization, promote its integration into the global economy, and strengthen indigenous African peacekeeping and conflict resolution capacities. While our partners are in broad agreement with the economic elements of the initiative, some shy away from conditioning aid or trade preferences on market reforms. You should press the Eight to take concrete steps to help those who are trying to help themselves. Differences also remain on the question whether the Eight should support creation of a UN forum on African peacekeeping, including a joint coordinating body. France and the UK have delayed final agreement pending consultations with the OAU and African leaders, and Germany believes such an initiative is premature. Our compromise proposal is to endorse the establishment of an African Peacekeeping Support Group at the UN and to urge interested countries to explore mechanisms for coordination of practical activities. In the end, you may need to press for agreement.

On the environment, you will need to manage expectations, particularly those of Chancellor Kohl, who wants to use his trip to the United States -- including Denver and the UN General Assembly Special Session on Environment and Development in New York -- to showcase to domestic German audiences his global environmental leadership. Kohl has asked to lead the discussion on environmental issues, and is likely to press for "deliverables" on climate change, forests, and creation of a new World Environmental Organization. We share the Chancellor's priorities but differ on tactics and modalities. On climate change, the Germans and the EU advocate an unrealistic goal of reducing greenhouse gas emissions fifteen percent from 1990 levels by the year 2020. You should urge them to leave the details to the climate change negotiations while Summit leaders advocate meaningful but realistic reduction targets. On forests, you should resist any German or EU push for an international convention, noting we and environmental NGOs believe it would end up a "lowest common denominator" document and of little value. And rather than create a new organization we believe it would be more effective and efficient to reform UNEP.

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We are proposing a strong separate statement on Bosnia, to be announced by you after Friday's dinner, that presses for significant acceleration of peace implementation efforts by all parties and reaffirms the willingness of the international community to assist as long as results are forthcoming. The Bosnia war criminal issue needs to be discussed on the margins. Rather than a meeting of the Five, as in Paris, it is less potentially risky and embarrassing to do it in bilaterals or on the margins. A clear statement of support for the Middle East Peace Process would also help at this sensitive moment. A concerted call for Iran to cease its dangerous and disruptive behavior would be useful, but Russia does not want to single out Iran in terms harsher than in the Lyon Communiqué, and some allies advocate a more conciliatory posture based on Iran's recent elections. We are trying to find bridging language that meets everyone's needs, including ours, but you may need to work to maintain pressure on Iran until its actions argue otherwise. On Hong Kong, you should seek a clear statement by the Eight holding China to its commitments to preserve Hong Kong's autonomy, way of life, fundamental freedoms and rule of law, and pressing for democratic elections as soon as possible.

Your bilateral meetings will also be critical, particularly to set the stage for the July 8-9 NATO Summit in Madrid. NATO will be an important topic with every Partner, even the Japanese, who have registered interest in the NATO-Russia Founding Act.

You should encourage Yeltsin to participate in an inaugural session of the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council on the second day of the Madrid Summit. You can praise him for tackling politically sensitive economic issues at home and for Russia's recent diplomatic breakthroughs with Ukraine, Moldova and others. You can reaffirm our intention to follow through on our Helsinki commitments and review Russia's progress toward fulfilling WTO and Paris Club accession requirements, and should press Yeltsin to follow through on the promises made in Helsinki and Paris on START II, CWC, and limiting military and nuclear cooperation with Iran. If he cites the importance of an early framework agreement on CFE, you should stress that Russian negotiators have not yet shown flexibility in Vienna.

Denver will be the place to build a decisive core of allies in favor of inviting three new members to join the Alliance at Madrid. Securing German, British, Dutch and Canadian agreement on three will be essential to your discussions with Prodi and especially Chirac. You will need

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to be firm on your own reasons to hold to three when Prodi and Chirac push for Slovenian and Romanian membership. At the same time, you can suggest that we work together, with France and Italy in the lead, on a joint strategy to reassure Romania and Slovenia, underscore our common interest in focusing greater Alliance attention on promoting long-term stability in southeastern Europe, and in particular encourage closer cooperation on Albania, where elections are set for June 29. Managing the political optics of the "who" decision is an important concern for our European allies, so even if you are able to secure agreement on three, you should not be surprised if Chirac, Prodi and Kohl fail to give such agreement public support -- yet.

You can remind Chirac that it would be most unfortunate to miss the historic opportunity before us at Madrid for deeper French involvement in a new NATO. But if, as we expect, he is not ready to deal with AFSOUTH, you should signal our readiness to go forward at Madrid with the many other aspects of NATO's internal adaptation to which we have already agreed. You will also want to reaffirm your desire to avoid a clash over investments in Iran, but note we will need to respond if the oil firm Total decides to invest there in violation of U.S. law.

With the Dutch and the EU you also should express your pleasure that Mutual Recognition Agreements (MRA) negotiations have been successfully completed.

You should emphasize to Chretien our intention to get salmon negotiations on track, the need for Ottawa to deal quickly with British Columbia on the Nanoose lease issue and, time permitting, the need for joint action on transnational telemarketing fraud. Discussions with Hashimoto are an opportunity to endorse the Defense Guidelines interim report and to press Japan to negotiate a liberal aviation agreement.

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