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Safeguards

PRIORITY

FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

FROM : Amembassy, Vienna

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DESP. NO.

TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.

March 11, 1959
DATE

REF : Embtels 1891, 1930

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SUBJECT: IAEA Safeguards

Regarding the London 5-power discussions the US and Canadian representatives met on March 10 with Roger Smith to cover the following points:

1. The importance of not referring in the Secretariat to the London meetings or the results of such discussions lest it give the impression that the Agency's general safeguards regulations are being patterned on ideas of the 5 powers and for this reason increase the extent of opposition in the Board when the regulations are considered. The two representatives did not consequently desire to report the results of the London discussions as such and they spoke in no way for the group but only as individuals. Their purpose was to take up with him a few points in the light of the London discussions which might serve in some measure as general guideposts concerning the limits of acceptability for the United States and Canada in Agency safeguards regulations.

2. The desirability of the evolutionary approach and of the development of safeguards regulations only as needed for the immediate future (in regard to facilities, for research reactors and materials testing and small power reactors): the tactical value of such an approach with respect to consideration by the Board of general safeguards measures. Smith appeared to recognize the advantages of this approach.

3. Minima for reports on reactor operation. Smith's views seemed generally to offer no problem.

4. Frequency of inspection visits: the need for flexibility and for care in working out minima for reactors of output 10-40 MW. Reference was made to the formula developed in London: "Under normal circumstances, taking one year with another, the number of visits shall be of the order of _____ per annum." Smith thought that the concept of a certain number of visits under normal circumstances was a good one. We pointed out possible difficulties that his present curve of intended visits in relation to reactor output might cause in being too precise and providing for too small

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a number of visits for reactors at the lower end of the scale. He reiterated the advantages of specificity in connection with his present curve but said he would give thought to developing a broad-band curve based on ranges of reactor ratings.

5. The acceptability of limited pursuit of successive generations of derived material and the desirability of avoiding in the June meetings detailed discussion of the application of this principle, particularly by presentation of mathematical formulae using the constant "K". It was suggested that the Secretariat might find it useful to refer to the concept as "limited pursuit of significant quantities of fissile materials."

6. Generally favorable regard at the London meetings for the approach taken by the Secretariat in working out the general safeguards regulations.

At the conclusion of this discussion Smith expressed his appreciation for the chance to exchange ideas. He then asked whether the group in London had reached any conclusion on the question at what reactor rating should inspection visits at the time of construction begin in order to determine whether construction conformed with design. We indicated that this point had not become a specific subject of discussion and Smith then asked if we could ascertain from our Governments some views on this matter (see reftel 1891).

Finally Smith indicated that he intended to submit as a Secretariat document in May some 125 pages on safeguards regulations which would be divided into three sections. (See attached copy.) He said that the first two sections, concerning general principles of safeguards and safeguards procedures for atomic energy installations, should present no controversial problems. The third section would deal specifically with the application of safeguards control. Some doubt was expressed whether it would be possible to get through the Board in June such a long document including the extended section on safeguards control when there would be so short a time to study the document after its distribution in May. An alternative possibility was suggested of submitting to the Board in June the first two sections and only a summary of the principles of safeguards control. If this summary could then be adopted there would be more chance for the detailed elaboration of the measures to be accepted by the Board at a meeting in the fall.

Harold C. Vedeler

Harold C. Vedeler
Acting United States Representative to the
International Atomic Energy Agency

cc: London

Enclosure:
List showing sections of
IAEA Safeguards Manual

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23 February 1959

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY Safeguards Manual

1. General Principles of Safeguards

- 1.1 Design and Construction review
- 1.2 Accounting procedures
- 1.3 Inventory control
- 1.4 Measurement and analysis methods
- 1.5 Reports, audits and inspection
- 1.6 Storage and transportation
- 1.7 Health and Safety

2. Safeguards Procedures for Atomic Energy Installations

- 2.1 Ore processing, oxide and metal preparation
- 2.2 Fuel element fabrication
- 2.3 Fuel element prior to irradiation, storage and handling
- 2.4 Reactors
- 2.5 Fuel elements after irradiation, storage and handling

3. Application of Agency Safeguards Control

- 3.1 Rights and responsibilities of Agency
- 3.2 Basic considerations in application of control
- 3.3 General procedures applying to application of control
- 3.4 Specific procedures for application of control
  - 3.4.1 Ore processing, oxide and metal preparation
  - 3.4.2 Fuel element fabrication
  - 3.4.3 Fuel elements prior to irradiation
  - 3.4.4 Reactors
  - 3.4.5 Fuel elements after irradiation
- 3.5 Safeguards provisions in project agreements
- 3.6 Procedure for visit of inspectors to countries, notification procedure, responsibilities of countries visited

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