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SAFEGUARDS

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Attached is Sir John Cockcroft's record of his discussions with Dr. Rabi and Dr. Emelyanov on October 29 and November 1 in New York on the subject of safeguards.

2. Sir John has since explained that the fourth country Emelyanov thought should be invited to the proposed technical talks was France. He thought that Emelyanov's idea that onerous controls should not be applied to the supply of a power reactor to India rose from his basic standpoint that strict controls need be applied only to chemical separation and diffusion plants and that Emelyanov was unaware of the Indian intention to construct a separation plant. Sir John also received the impression that Emelyanov had no power to act on safeguards and was unlikely to represent the Soviet Government in any detailed discussions on the subject. On the other hand the Foreign Office imagine that Emelyanov's initiative in suggesting these discussions must have been taken with the knowledge of the Soviet Government, perhaps with the purpose of trying to obtain further information about our basic attitude towards safeguards.

3. As the State Department are aware, the position of the United Kingdom Government is that they cannot undertake to maintain their present safeguards policy unless all leading suppliers including the Soviet Union are prepared to refrain from making sizeable exports of nuclear materials without safeguards, and the United Kingdom Government are therefore anxious to establish what the Soviet position really is, fairly soon, especially in view of the impending problem of

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the Indian power reactor. They would therefore be glad to take part in further exploratory discussions with the Russians on safeguards, whether in Moscow or elsewhere. Such discussions would, they think, be more likely to be profitable if they took the form of a confidential and informal exchange of views between two or three experts from each of the participating countries. The participation of the French would no doubt be a complicating factor and although in the United Kingdom view it would probably be advisable to give the French a chance to take part, especially in view of Emelyanov's suggestion, it may be that in view of their present policy on safeguards the French would prefer not to do so.

British Embassy,

Washington, D.C.

December 14, 1959

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CONFIDENTIALRECORD OF DISCUSSION ON OCTOBER 1959

Dr. Emelyanov said that the U.S.S.R. accepted the principle of control to prevent plutonium produced from materials supplied by the Agency being used for military purposes. They had accepted the Statute of the Agency dealing with control and were prepared to help in working out a control system. He thought that the opposition of the U.S.S.R. delegate to control, expressed at the General Assembly in September 1959, was to the particular system advocated and not to the principle of control.

2. He did not personally like the draft control document produced by the Agency and would get his staff to examine it on his return, and would let us have detailed comments. One further objection was to the use of a critical size criterion, when the staff responsible did not have access to classified information on critical size.

3. He expressed some strong antagonism to a particular member of I.A.E.A. staff.

4. He was in favour of a case by case approach; for example, if the Agency supplied 100 grammes of plutonium to a particular laboratory, the standard audit procedure should be applied and the laboratory held accountable. I asked whether having settled the control procedure for one case, this would be automatically applied to a similar case. He replied that circumstances would usually be different, for example, there might be several laboratories in a particular country holding plutonium, and this should be taken account of in the control rules.

5. I asked for his views about the application of control to a nuclear power station supplied to another country. He said that he did not think control was necessary unless that country possessed a plutonium separation plant. The U.S.S.R. would be prepared to leave the spent fuel element in the country, if the country had no plutonium separation plant. He replied that in general, the fuel rods would be returned to the parent country for processing, since a Chemical Separation Plant was so expensive.

6. I asked how he would suggest dealing with the case of a country possessing a plutonium separation plant. He suggested that control should be an accounting of the input and output of the plutonium plant.

7. He said that his views were personal and not considered views.

8. A further meeting has been arranged for November 1st.

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RECORD OF DISCUSSION ON NOVEMBER 1

Rabi and I continued our discussions with Emelyanov. I said that since India intended to invite tenders for a nuclear power station one of our three countries might have to decide whether safeguards should be applied. Emelyanov pointed out that India could probably build a nuclear power station without our help. Safeguards would therefore have to be voluntary. He thought that in the context of world disarmament it would be reasonable to ask India to accept controls provided they were not too onerous. When he was in India they had asked whether atomic energy development could be consistent with freedom.

2. Emelyanov thought that it was necessary to settle some broad principles of control, in particular the point at which control should be applied. He considered that control was necessary only at the plutonium separation plant and the diffusion plant.

3. We suggested that tripartite discussions at the technical level, preferably in Moscow, might be useful and he agreed but thought that quadripartite discussions might be better.

4. Emelyanov again emphasised that he was speaking personally and not representing his Government.

5. He is interested in East/West cooperation in building some advanced facility such as a high power accelerator, an advanced reactor or a fusion project. He will discuss this with McCone.

6. Rabi will report these discussions to McCone.



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