


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
MEMORANDUM FOR UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY
SUBJECT: The Next Steps in the North Korea Nuclear Issue (U)

(A) President Bush informed President Roh in early July that the North Koreans must fulfill their international obligations without conditions.



The key to the modified linkage strategy is to demand that the North Koreans go beyond their international obligations and desist from reprocessing--something they are legally able to do. As you recall from Hawaii, it is by no means a certainty that the South will agree to the issuance of such a demand to the North. In fact, all of us are concerned that the South itself wants to reserve the option of reprocessing at some future date. Nevertheless, no reprocessing is something which the U.S. should insist on for both Koreas. This concept was laid out in your private memorandum to Bob Gates in mid-August, but he has not responded to you.

It will be impossible to complete interagency coordination before you meet Kim Chong-Hwi on September 22, but you must move quickly to see if a consensus on the concept of modified linkage can be reached in the next two months.



DOS 5 USC § 552 (b)(1); E.O. 13526 & 3.3(b)(6)
OVS (U) 5 USC § 552 (b)(1); E.O. 13526 & 1.4 (a)(b)(d)(h)
DASD (NM) 5 USC § 552 (b)(1); E.O. 13526 & 3.3(b)(6)


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Here is the gameplan I propose:



Step 2-- Upon your return from New York, you call Bob Gates, Reggie Bartholomew, and Arnie Canter to brief them on the results of the meeting and to discuss with them the modified linkage concept. You need to tell them whether you sensed in New York that Kim is willing to ask the North to stop reprocessing, and why you believe the modified linkage strategy has the best chance for stopping the North Korean program.


Step 3-- You need to ask Bob Gates to readdress this issue with Brent Scowcroft, and see if the modified linkage strategy is acceptable. You will need Bartholomew and Canter's help here.

Step 4-- If the response from Scowcroft is positive, you will need to discuss this strategy with SECDEF and CJCS. These need to be accomplished in October.

Step 5-- You travel to Korea in late October to inform Kim Chong Hwi of this modified linkage strategy and get the South Koreans to accept this strategy which calls for no reprocessing on the entire peninsula.

Step 6-- If the South Koreans come back with a positive response in November, then at the SCM in late November SECDEF can formally give the go-ahead to bargain to the South Koreans and discuss with them how to implement this strategy.

Meanwhile, we will begin staffing on the comprehensive approach I briefed you last week.



005D(P) 5 USC & 552 (b)(1); E.O. 13526/3.4 (b)(4)
DASD(NM) 5 USC & 552 (b)(1); E.O. 13526 & 3.3 (b)(6)
DOS 5 USC & 552 (b)(1); E.O. 13526 & 3.3 (b)(6)

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You must be personally engaged in the above steps, since this problem can now only be resolved at the highest levels of this government. The persuasive work to be done--both with ROKG and USG--may be too difficult for the short time we have. This is why a dual-track strategy may be best. There is no guarantee that the modified linkage strategy will succeed.

[REDACTED]

Nevertheless, I continue to feel that the second approach puts us in the "moral high ground" and the best position in the very likely event that the North continues to march on with its weapons program undeterred.

DAFD (NM) 5 USC § 552 (b)(1); E.O. 13526 § 3.3(b)(6)
DOS 5 USC § 552 (b)(1); E.O. 13526 § 3.3(b)(6)

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