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*Secdef  
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ACTION NODS-00

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 /000W

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O 210937Z OCT 91 ZFF-4  
FM AMEMBASSY SEUL  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6856

OCT 21 1991

*cf: ISA  
PP*

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DEPARTMENT PASS TO NSC AND U/S WOLFOWITZ

OCT 21 1991

*Please retain.*

TAGS: PREL, MARR, MNDC, KS, KN

SUBJECT: FURTHER KOREAN REACTION TO THE [REDACTED] INITIATIVE

REF: A) STATE 345609 B) STATE 345707 C) SEUL 10976

1. ~~SECRET~~

2. SUMMARY: AMBASSADOR, GEN. RISCASSI, DCM, AND POLCOONS MET WITH NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR KIM CHONG WHI ON OCTOBER 21 TO DISCUSS THE PRESIDENT'S [REDACTED] INITIATIVE AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO THE NORTH-SOUTH PREMIER TALKS SCHEDULED TO START OCTOBER 22. KIM HAD REVIEWED THE PRESIDENT'S AND ACTING SECRETARY'S LETTERS AND NONPAPER. (REFS A AND B) WHICH DCM DELIVERED TO MOFA DIRECTOR-GENERAL BAN KI-MOON ON SATURDAY.

[REDACTED]

KIM IS NOW IN A BIND, HAVING TO FEND OFF PROBES FROM THE SEOUL MEDIA

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13-M-4326

DOS 5 USC § 552 (b)(1); E.O. 13526 3.3 (b)(6)  
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
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
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WHILE EXPLAINING PRIVATELY TO OTHER HIGH LEVEL ROKG  
OFFICIALS THAT HE WAS NOT HOLDING BACK CRITICAL  
INFORMATION. IN ADDITION, KIM REASONS THAT PYONGYANG WILL  
NOW VIEW THE MOVE AS A UNILATERAL USG DECISION AND AS  
FURTHER EVIDENCE OF PLANS FOR WITHDRAWAL OF U. S. FORCES  
FROM THE PENINSULA.



THE ROKG SIDE WILL NOT PROPOSE A MUTUAL  
BAN ON REPROCESSING BUT WILL INDICATE THAT NORTH KOREA  
CANNOT EXPECT IMPROVED RELATIONS WITH THE U. S. OR JAPAN  
UNLESS IT FOREGOES REPROCESSING AND ENRICHMENT.



4. ACTION REQUEST: WE ARE AT A PIVOTAL TIME; THE KOREANS  
ARE CHAFING AT THE LEAK AND INTIMATIONS ABOUT A LACK OF  
PRIOR CONSULTATION. EMBASSY RECOMMENDS THAT UNDER  
SECRETARY WOLFOWITZ PLAN TO VISIT SEUL TO DISCUSS THE  
CRUCIAL SERIES OF NEXT STEPS WITH KIM CHONG WHI AND TO  
SMOOTH SOME OF THE RUFFLED FEATHERS. WE WILL PROVIDE  
FURTHER THOUGHTS ON THIS PROPOSED VISIT SEPTEL. END  
SUMMARY.

5. IN OUR OCTOBER 21 MEETING, KIM MOVED IMMEDIATELY  
BEYOND THE QUESTION OF A BLUE HOUSE REACTION TO THE  
PRESIDENT'S LETTER AND HONED IN ON THE OBERDORFER PIECE IN  
THE POST THAT WAS CARRIED IN FULL BY THE SEUL WEEKEND

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PAPERS. (NOTE: REF. C REPORTED THAT ROH'S REACTION TO  
OUR "HEADS UP" WAS BASICALLY POSITIVE.) KIM SAID THAT  
PEOPLE IN SEOUL WERE "REALLY CONCERNED" ABOUT THE ABSENCE  
OF SPECIFIC PRE-CONSULTATION. AT THE SAME TIME HE SAID  
THE U.S WAS [REDACTED] KIM CAUSTICALLY NOTED  
THAT NON-CONSULTATION WAS "NOTHING NEW" AND CITED EARLIER  
UNILATERAL ANNOUNCEMENTS ON THE CLOSURE OF U.S. AIR BASES  
IN KOREA. HE ALSO POINTEDLY REFERRED TO THE CONTRASTING  
PATTERN OF PRIOR CONSULTATION WITH OUR EUROPEAN ALLIES.

[REDACTED]

DCM PASSED ALONG CONCERNS EXPRESSED BY U/S WOLFOWITZ IN A  
PHONE CONVERSATION THAT MORNING, AND THE AMBASSADOR ASKED  
IF KIM STILL THOUGHT A WOLFOWITZ VISIT COULD BE USEFUL.  
KIM STRONGLY ENDORSED THE IDEA OF CONSULTATIONS WITH  
WOLFOWITZ, SAYING THAT FINAL DECISIONS NEED TO BE MADE.  
CLEARLY LOOKING BEYOND THIS WEEK'S PM MEETINGS WITH THE  
NORTH (ANOTHER ROUND IS TENTATIVELY PLANNED FOR SEOUL IN  
DECEMBER), KIM SAID WE NEED TO FIGURE OUT HOW TO DEAL WITH  
THE NORTH, WHEN AND IF TO MOVE FORWARD WITH ANNOUNCING A  
[REDACTED] HOW TO IMPLEMENT IT, AND DISCUSSION OF  
A RANGE OF OTHER SUPPLEMENTARY ACTIONS (PATRIOT MISSILE  
DEPLOYMENT, FOR EXAMPLE).

7. [REDACTED]

HE RETURNED TO POINTS DISCUSSED AT  
THE HONOLULU TALKS AND INDICATED THE ROK SIDE WOULD BE  
INTERESTED IN FURTHER REFINING THEIR PRINCIPLES, INCLUDING  
THE ISSUE OF WHAT WORD TO USE IN PLACE [REDACTED]  
KIM MADE IT CLEAR THE ROKG WOULD LIKE TO COME FORWARD WITH  
A POLICY WITH SCOPE FOR [REDACTED] IN EMERGENCY  
SITUATIONS, BUT HE DID NOT ELABORATE.

8. LOOKING AHEAD TO THIS WEEK'S PRIME MINISTERIAL, THE  
AMBASSADOR RAISED THE QUESTION OF HOW THE WEEKEND

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DEVELOPMENTS WILL BE USED WITH THE NORTH KOREANS. KIM SAID THERE WILL BE NO LINKAGE, "WE WILL STICK TO [REDACTED] I GIVE YOU MY WORD ON IT." HE THOUGHT THAT A FEW DAYS AFTER HIS RETURN FROM PYONGYANG ON OCTOBER 25 WOULD BE A GOOD TIME FOR FURTHER DISCUSSIONS WITH WOLFOWITZ, WHO KIM THOUGHT WOULD BE WELL ADVISED TO MAKE A NON-PUBLICIZED TRIP SO AS TO AVOID THE INTENSE MEDIA SPOTLIGHT.

9.

[REDACTED]

HE ADDED THAT PYONGYANG WILL LIKELY SEE THE MOVE AS PART OF A LONGER TERM PROCESS OF UNILATERAL DECISIONS BY THE U. S. TO LEAVE THE PENINSULA. THE DCM ASKED IF THE DECISION DID NOT IN FACT LEAVE THE SOUTH IN A BETTER NEGOTIATING POSITION. KIM RESPONDED THAT THE NORTH WILL HONE IN ON THE SOVEREIGNTY ISSUE AND TELL THE SOUTH THAT THE SEOUL GOVERNMENT SHOULD HAVE TAKEN THE INITIATIVE, NOT THE U. S., IMPLYING THAT THE ROKG SHOULD NOT EXPECT RECIPROCAL GESTURES IN THE DIALOGUE CHANNEL FOR DECISIONS IT DID NOT CONTROL.

10. THE AMBASSADOR ACKNOWLEDGED THAT KIM HAS BEEN PUT IN AN AWKWARD POSITION JUST PRIOR TO THE PM TALKS, AND HE EXPRESSED REGRET FOR THE WAY THINGS HAD DEVELOPED, SAYING IT WAS A GOOD DECISION BADLY HANDLED.

11. KIM TOUCHED BRIEFLY ON EXPECTATIONS FOR THE PYONGYANG TALKS, SAYING THE ROK SIDE WOULD BE WILLING TO SIGN A NON-AGGRESSION PACT IF THE NORTH AGREES TO A RANGE OF CBM'S AND EXCHANGES, AND IF THE PACT DOES NOT JEOPARDIZE EXISTING BILATERAL TREATY ARRANGEMENTS. KIM ADDED THAT IF THE NORTH DOES NOT SHOW FLEXIBILITY NOW, THEY MAY BE UNDER PRESSURE BY THE SPRING TO BE MORE FORTHCOMING. HE SAID THE FALL CROPS WILL KEEP FOOD SUPPLIES UP THROUGH THE

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
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EARLY WINTER, BUT THAT NORTH KOREANS CAN EXPECT TO FACE  
THE "SPRING HUNGER" PHENOMENON. THIS COMBINED WITH THE  
LOSS OF MANY OF THE BENEFITS OF PAST TERMS OF TRADE WITH  
USSR WOULD ADD PRESSURE ON THE NORTH TO RESPOND. ASKED IF  
THERE WERE ANY KEYS THE ROKG DELEGATION WOULD BE LOOKING  
FOR IN THIS ROUND OF TALKS THAT MIGHT FORESHADOW MORE  
FLEXIBILITY BY THE DPRK, KIM SAID NO, A FURTHER INDICATION  
OF THE CURRENT SENSE OF CAUTION WE ARE SEEING AMONG ROKG  
OFFICIALS.




13. COMMENT: WHILE KIM WAS GENUINELY ILL AT EASE WITH  
THE UNTIMELY EFFECTS OF PUBLICITY SURROUNDING THE ...  
INITIATIVE TOWARD KOREA, HE WAS ALSO USING THE OCCASION TO  
PRESS HIS CASE FOR SUPPLEMENTING MILITARY SYSTEMS. WE  
WILL BE DISCUSSING OPTIONS IN THIS REGARD FURTHER WITH

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


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GEN. RISCASSI AND FORWARDING OUR THOUGHTS TOGETHER WITH  
IDEAS FOR THE PROPOSED WOLFOWITZ VISIT. GREGG

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