

~~SECRET~~

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SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//USDP:ISA//

AMEMBASSY SEOUL

INFO USFK SEOUL KOR

~~SECRET~~ EXCLUSIVE PERSONAL FOR

AMBASSADOR GREGG; INFO GENERAL RISCASSI FROM USDP PAUL WOLFOWITZ

SUBJECT: CONSULTATIONS IN SEOUL [U]

1. ~~SECRET~~ DON. I SHARE KIM CHONG HUI'S DISMAY [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] I AM ALSO VERY ANGRY, AS I ASSUME HE IS, ABOUT THE MISREPRESENTATION OF WHAT TOOK PLACE IN OUR NEW YORK MEETING..

2. ~~SECRET~~ ON THE MATTER OF CONSULTATIONS, HOWEVER, AS I RECALL, YOU WENT IN TO SEE KIM ONE WEEK BEFORE THE MOST RECENT PRESIDENT'S LETTER ARRIVED AT THE BLUE HOUSE. I SHARE YOUR FEELING THAT IT MIGHT HAVE BEEN USEFUL TO PROCEED MORE SLOWLY, BUT I DO THINK WE GAVE THEM A REASONABLE AMOUNT OF TIME.

3. ~~SECRET~~ THAT SAID, I WOULD BE HAPPY TO COME TO SEOUL FOR FURTHER CONSULTATIONS--OR TO MEET KIM SOMEWHERE ELSE--BUT THE TIMING IS VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE AT THE MOMENT, PARTICULARLY WITH

USDP:FILE  
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0USD(P)  
DATE 02 OCT 2017  
FOIA CASE # 12-F-1306

DRAFTER:COL MOON, OSD/ISA-77757

*Paul Wolfowitz* NOV -1 1991

RELEASER

JSISC ALTERNATE MESSAGEFORM

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13-M-4329

DASD(NM) 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(1); E.O. 13526 § 1.4(d)

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THE NATO SUMMIT IN ROME NEXT WEEK.

4.  MOREOVER, I DO NOT BELIEVE I HAVE ENOUGH YET TO SAY ON THE MATTERS OF CONCERN TO KIM CHONG HWI, AND I BELIEVE IT IS IMPORTANT FOR ME TO BE HERE TO PUSH THOSE DECISIONS FORWARD SO THEY WILL BE READY FOR SECRETARY CHENEY'S TRIP TO SEOUL.

PLEASE TELL KIM THAT I KNOW HE IS EXTREMELY INTERESTED IN MORE DETAILS ON SOME SORT OF COMPREHENSIVE CONVENTIONAL ENHANCEMENTS

ALTHOUGH WE DO NOT BELIEVE "COMPENSATION" IS NECESSARY, WE DO TAKE SERIOUSLY ANY SIGNAL THAT COULD BE ERRONEOUSLY INTERPRETED BY BOTH THE NORTH AND THE SOUTH REGARDING THE STRENGTH OF OUR COMMITMENTS AND WE BELIEVE THERE ARE A NUMBER OF CONVENTIONAL STEPS THAT WILL NOT ONLY REINFORCE DETERRENCE BUT ALSO INCREASE THE PRESSURE ON NORTH KOREA TO DEAL WITH THE NUCLEAR PROBLEM.


ALTHOUGH THERE IS LITTLE I CAN TELL THE KOREANS AT THIS POINT, WE ARE WORKING TO GET A PACKAGE TOGETHER BY THE TIME OF THE SCM/MCM, AND IF WE DO, WE CAN TRY TO GET SOME INFORMATION OUT TO KIM RIGHT BEFORE THAT.

5.  PLEASE CONVEY TO KIM MY REGARDS AND MY SENTIMENTS REGARDING THE LEAK. PLEASE ALSO LET HIM KNOW THE DIFFICULTIES

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WITH MY TRAVELING AT THIS TIME. HOWEVER, I BELIEVE THE THREE  
UPCOMING HIGH-LEVEL U.S. VISITS SHOULD SERVE TO DEVELOP A  
COMMON STRATEGY ON THE NORTH KOREA NUCLEAR PROBLEM.

L. (U) WARM REGARDS. PAUL.

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National Security Archive,  
Suite 701, Gelman Library, The George Washington University,  
2130 H Street, NW, Washington, D.C., 20037,  
Phone: 202/994-7000, Fax: 202/994-7005, [nsarchiv@gwu.edu](mailto:nsarchiv@gwu.edu)