

APPEALS PANEL ACTION: ADDITIONAL INFORMATION RELEASED 1.4(B),B1,1.4(D)

~~SECRET~~

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NORTH KOREAN MISSILE PROLIFERATION

BACKGROUND

Classification Extended on : 05/12/2017 ~ Class: SECRET ~ Authority: DSCG
11-1 ~ Declassify on: 01/05/2024

The United States continues to place a high priority on restraining North Korea's irresponsible missile practices. In October 1998, the U.S. held a third round of missile talks with the DPRK (previous rounds were in 1996 and 1997) and made clear our strong opposition to North Korea's destabilizing missile development and export activities. We made clear that the DPRK's attempt to orbit a satellite via a Taepo Dong-derivative missile in August 1998 was highly destabilizing.

We also issued a strong warning to North Korea that the U.S. viewed further launches of long-range missiles (No Dong or Taepo Dong) and transfers of long range missiles or related missile technology as direct threats to U.S. allies and ultimately to the U.S. itself; if the DPRK proceeded with such activities there would be serious, negative consequences for U.S.-DPRK relations. At the same time, however, we noted that if the DPRK is prepared to cease activities of concern, there could be an improvement in our relations. We restated our 1997 offer of limited U.S. sanctions-easing in return for DPRK restraint in both indigenous missile development and deployment and missile exports.

The DPRK continued to resist limits on its indigenous missile development and deployment

[Redacted]

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B1

Both sides agreed to have another round of talks at the earliest practical date. We have been discussing dates for a possible fourth round of talks, but no arrangements have yet been agreed to. (S)

Since the October talks, we have continued to put down strong public markers about our opposition to the DPRK's continued unrestrained missile development and export practices. We also have asked our MTCR Partners, China and others to exercise extreme vigilance over exports of missile-related technology to prevent the DPRK from obtaining materials for its missile program. (S)

[Redacted] may suggest that the U.S. focus exclusively on DPRK export restraint. If so, we should underscore the importance of restraining both the DPRK's missile exports and its indigenous programs. Both aspects of

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DPRK missile activities increase the security threat to the U.S. and its allies, and they are mutually reinforcing. Missile exports provide cash for developing more capable missiles, and as the DPRK develops more capable missiles, it is under pressure to sell them to help recoup its investment. Finally, we should reaffirm that we share [redacted] concerns and we will keep [redacted] informed on the latest developments in this area. (S)


1.4(D)
B1KEY POINTS TO MAKE

- o The U.S. remains concerned about the DPRK's continued development and marketing of ballistic missiles, particularly missiles of extended range.
- o Last August's Taepo-Dong launch was irresponsible and provocative. It demonstrated the DPRK's increased ability to use missiles to deliver military payloads.
- o We met with the DPRK for a third round of missile talks in early October in New York. These talks were serious and candid.
- o We made it clear that if the DPRK launches additional long-range missiles or persists in exports of such missiles and their technology there would be very negative consequence for U.S.-DPRK relations.
- o However, if the DPRK is prepared to cease missile activities of concern, there could be commensurate improvement in our relations.

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- We also reiterated our offer from 1997 which would provide economic sanctions easing in return for North Korean restraint in indigenous missile development and deployment and missile technology exports.
- The North Koreans rejected limits on indigenous programs,



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- Our comprehensive missile freeze/sanctions-easing package is still on the table and we will continue to press the DPRK to restrain both its missile export and missile development activities. It is vitally important that a "deal" with North Korea include both indigenous missile development and missile technology exports restraint.
- Exports and indigenous development are intertwined. Missile exports provide cash for developing more capable missiles, and as the DPRK develops more capable missiles, it is under pressure to sell them to help recoup its investment.

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- The U.S. and DPRK agreed to meet again soon at a mutually agreeable date. We are hopeful we can schedule another round of talks soon.
- We recognize your interest in this matter. DPRK cooperation with Iran's missile program is disturbing.
- We will keep you fully informed of any developments.

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B1
1.4(D)

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