

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ PTO8023

RELEASE IN PART
1.4(B),B1,1.4(D)

PAGE 01 BEIJIN 04958 01 OF 05 030311Z
ACTION NODS-00

INFO LOG-00 CCOE-00 SAS-00 /000W
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FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3273

Classification Extended on : 03/03/2016 ~ Class:
CONFIDENTIAL ~ Authority: DSCG 11-1 ~ Declassify on:
06/02/2024

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 05 BEIJING 004958

APPEALS PANEL ACTION: ADDITIONAL
INFORMATION RELEASED 1.4(B),B1,1.4(D)

NODIS **DECAPTIONED**

EYES ONLY FOR C - AMB. SHERMAN, EAP - A/S ROTH AND DAS
DEMING, AND AMB. KARTMAN


E.O. 12958: DECL: 6/04/19
TAGS: PREL, KN, CH, US
SUBJECT: EAP/K DIRECTOR REVERE'S MAY 31 BRIEFING FOR
CHINESE MFA OFFICIALS ON PERRY TRIP TO DPRK

(U) CLASSIFIED BY JAMES F. MORIARTY, POLMINCOUNS.
REASONS: 1.5 (B) AND (D).

SUMMARY

1. (S) ON MAY 31, EAP KOREAN AFFAIRS OFFICE DIRECTOR
EVANS REVERE PROVIDED CHINESE MFA OFFICIALS A BRIEFING ON
SPECIAL PRESIDENTIAL ENVOY WILLIAM PERRY'S MAY 25-28
VISIT TO PYONGYANG. REVERE STRESSED THAT THE U.S. VALUED
CLOSE COOPERATION WITH CHINA ON DEVELOPMENTS ON THE
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KOREAN PENINSULA, AND WITH THIS IN MIND, THE SECRETARY
AND DR. PERRY HAD DISPATCHED HIM TO BRIEF THE MFA ON THE
TRIP



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[REDACTED]

2. (S) SUMMARY CONT. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

END SUMMARY.

KEEPING THE CHINESE INFORMED

3. (S) ON MAY 31, EAP KOREAN AFFAIRS OFFICE DIRECTOR EVANS REVERE MET CHINESE MFA ASIA DEPARTMENT DEPUTY DIRECTOR GENERAL NING FUKUI TO PROVIDE A BRIEFING ON FORMER DEFENSE SECRETARY/SPECIAL PRESIDENTIAL ENVOY WILLIAM PERRY'S MAY 25-28 VISIT TO NORTH KOREA (DPRK). REVERE OPENED HIS PRESENTATION BY STATING THAT SECRETARY ALBRIGHT, DEFENSE SECRETARY COHEN AND NSA BERGER HAD STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF FULLY BRIEFING CHINESE OFFICIALS ON DR. PERRY'S TRIP TO NORTH KOREA; THE UNITED STATES VALUED AND WANTED TO CONTINUE ITS CLOSE COOPERATION WITH CHINA ON THIS ISSUE. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

4. (S) REVERE TOLD HIS CHINESE MFA INTERLOCUTORS THAT THEIR MEETING PROVIDED A GOOD OPPORTUNITY TO CONTINUE DIALOGUE ON AN ISSUE OF GREAT STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE TO BOTH CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES. REVERE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE ACCIDENTAL BOMBING OF THE CHINESE EMBASSY IN BELGRADE HAD CAUSED DIFFICULTIES BETWEEN THE U.S. AND CHINA. NEVERTHELESS, IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA TO CONTINUE DIALOGUE ON IMPORTANT STRATEGIC ISSUES SUCH AS THE KOREAN PENINSULA IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN PEACE AND STABILITY IN EAST ASIA.


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ATMOSPHERE OF THE VISIT

5. (S) DPRK FIRST DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER KANG SOK JU WAS DR. PERRY'S HOST AND PRIMARY INTERLOCUTOR IN PYONGYANG, REVERE NOTED. KANG HAD MET WITH THE PERRY DELEGATION FOR 10 HOURS OVER THE COURSE OF THREE DAYS. ON MAY 26, DR.

PERRY HAD MET KIM YONG-NAM FOR NEARLY THREE HOURS. AT THAT MEETING, PERRY HAD ASKED KIM TO CONVEY A LETTER FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO DPRK SUPREME LEADER KIM JONG-IL. PERRY ALSO HAD MET WITH LT. GEN. LI YONG CHOL, A DIRECTOR OF THE DPRK'S NATIONAL DEFENSE COMMISSION (NDC) AND CLOSE CONFIDANTE OF KIM JONG-IL. [REDACTED]



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REPRESENTATIVES FROM THE MFA, PARTY, ARMY, AND NDC HAD ATTENDED MANY OF THE SOCIAL EVENTS AND SEVERAL MEETINGS. DR. PERRY'S VISIT TO THE BIRTHPLACE OF KIM IL-SONG AT MANSUDAE ALSO HELD SIGNIFICANT SYMBOLIC VALUE.

6. (e) THE U.S. DELEGATION WAS IMPRESSED BY THE FRIENDLY, POLITE, AND SINCERE TREATMENT GIVEN BY THEIR DPRK HOSTS, REVERE STATED. IT WAS EVIDENT THAT THE NORTH KOREANS HAD ATTEMPTED TO SHOW RESPECT IN THEIR ACTIONS AND LANGUAGE FOR PRESIDENT CLINTON, DR. PERRY IN HIS ROLE AS THE FIRST

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U.S. PRESIDENTIAL ENVOY TO VISIT THE DPRK, AND THE U.S. DELEGATION. REVERE COMMENTED THAT THE OFFICIAL DPRK MEDIA TREATMENT OF THE VISIT WAS, BY DPRK STANDARDS, VERY HIGH PROFILE AND EITHER NEUTRAL OR POSITIVE IN TONE.

U.S. OBJECTIVES

7. (C) REVERE OUTLINED THREE U.S. GOALS FOR THE U.S. MISSION TO PYONGYANG:

-- TO ESTABLISH A MEANINGFUL RELATIONSHIP WITH SENIOR OFFICIALS IN AS MANY DPRK OFFICIAL ORGANS AS POSSIBLE.

-- TO REAFFIRM EXISTING DIALOGUES AND AGREEMENTS WITH THE DPRK, INCLUDING THE AGREED FRAMEWORK AND THE 1993 U.S.-DPRK JOINT STATEMENT.

-- TO CONVEY TO SENIOR LEVELS OF THE DPRK LEADERSHIP U.S. INTEREST IN FUNDAMENTALLY CHANGING OUR BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP.

8. (C) THE U.S. APPROACH CONTAINED TWO CRITICAL ELEMENTS, REVERE EXPLAINED. FIRST, THE U.S. WAS WILLING TO PUT THE PAST BEHIND US. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] REVERE ALSO NOTED THAT PRESIDENT CLINTON HAD DETERMINED A NEW APPROACH WAS NECESSARY AND THAT WE HAD UNDERTAKEN A MAJOR EFFORT TO REVIEW THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPALS OF OUR POLICY TOWARD THE DPRK. DR. PERRY HAD MADE CLEAR TO HIS NORTH KOREAN HOSTS THAT HE HAD MET WITH THE PRESIDENT JUST PRIOR TO HIS DEPARTURE

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FOR PYONGYANG. HIS MISSION WAS TO CONVEY AN IDEA OF HOW A NEW RELATIONSHIP COULD COME ABOUT. PERRY WAS IN THE FINAL STAGES OF THE POLICY REVIEW. BEFORE CONCLUDING HIS REPORT AND SUBMITTING FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE PRESIDENT, HE WANTED TO VISIT THE DPRK TO PRESENT IDEAS AND EXPLORE NORTH KOREAN VIEWS.

U.S. STRATEGIC VIEW OF THE REGION

9. (C) REVERE SAID THAT PERRY HAD PRESENTED TO THE DPRK A U.S. STRATEGIC VIEW OF THE REGION AND HOW U.S.-NORTH KOREAN RELATIONS FIT INTO THAT VIEW. NONE OF PERRY'S POINTS WOULD SURPRISE CHINA. THE UNITED STATES REGARDED ITSELF AS A PACIFIC POWER WITH LEGITIMATE SECURITY INTERESTS IN THE REGION. THE UNITED STATES HAD ADOPTED A NUMBER OF NEW APPROACHES TO THE REGION TO REFLECT THE FACT THAT THE COLD WAR HAD ENDED. THE U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE IN THE REGION WAS NO LONGER DIRECTED TOWARD ANY ONE COUNTRY AND OUR APPROACH TO MILITARY AND SECURITY ISSUES, AND RELATIONSHIPS, WAS ONE OF RESPECT FOR ALL COUNTRIES' SOVEREIGNTY.

10. (C) WHILE THE U.S. INTENDED TO MAINTAIN ITS SECURITY ALLIANCES IN THE REGION, WE SAW NO REASON WHY FULLY NORMAL U.S.-DPRK RELATIONS COULD NOT COEXIST WITH THESE ALLIANCES, REVERE QUOTED PERRY AS SAYING. WE RECOGNIZED THE POTENTIAL FOR NORTH KOREA TO PLAY AN ACTIVE AND POSITIVE ROLE IN PRESERVING PEACE AND STABILITY IN NORTH

EAST ASIA AND ACKNOWLEDGED THAT NORTH KOREA HAD ITS OWN STRATEGIC VIEWS AND LEGITIMATE DEFENSE CONCERNS. DR. PERRY HAD ASKED THE DPRK TO CONSIDER LEGITIMATE U.S.

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SECURITY CONCERNS IN THE REGION INCLUDING ITS ALLIANCE STRUCTURE. PERRY HAD UNDERScoreD U.S. WILLINGNESS TO RESPECT THE SOVEREIGNTY AND NATIONAL DIGNITY OF THE DPRK AND HAD NO INTENTION OF INTERFERING IN THE NATIONAL SYSTEM NORTH KOREA HAD CHOSEN TO ADOPT.

THREATS TO U.S. AND ITS ALLIES

11. ~~(C)~~ REVERE OUTLINED PERRY'S DISCUSSION OF THE CONTINUED THREATS ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA AND THE NEED FOR A PROCESS OF MUTUAL THREAT REDUCTION. DPRK DEVELOPMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND LONG RANGE BALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEMS WERE THE TWO MAJOR THREATS THAT THE U.S. AND OUR ALLIES PERCEIVED TO BE EMANATING FROM THE DPRK. PERRY MADE CLEAR THE ESSENTIAL NEED TO ADDRESS THESE TWO ISSUES IN A ROBUST FASHION IN THE FUTURE. IF THEY WERE NOT, A DETERIORATION OF THE SITUATION ON THE PENINSULA WERE POSSIBLE. PERRY DID NOT DWELL ON THIS POSSIBILITY,

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AND STRESSED TO THE NORTH KOREANS THE U.S. HOPE FOR A POSITIVE, COOPERATIVE RELATIONSHIP

TWO PATHS FOR U.S.-DPRK RELATIONS

12. ~~(C)~~ PERRY LAID OUT TWO POSSIBLE PATHS FOR U.S.-DPRK

RELATIONS, REVERE POINTED OUT: A DRAMATIC IMPROVEMENT OR A DRAMATIC DETERIORATION OF THE RELATIONSHIP. REVERE EMPHASIZED THAT THE UNITED STATES DELEGATION IN PYONGYANG HAD STRESSED THE DESIRABILITY OF THE POSITIVE RATHER THAN
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THE NEGATIVE PATH TO THE NORTH KOREANS. REVERE SAID THAT NORTH KOREAN RESPONSES HAD INDICATED THAT PYONGYANG UNDERSTOOD THE U.S. WANTED TO TAKE THE POSITIVE PATH.

NUCLEAR PROGRAMS

13. ~~(C)~~ REVERE EXPLAINED THAT PERRY EMPHASIZED TO THE NORTH KOREANS THAT THEIR NUCLEAR PROGRAM WAS NOT COMPATIBLE WITH THE POSITIVE GOALS WE SOUGHT. THE U.S. GOAL WAS CLEAR IN THIS REGARD: THE DPRK'S AGREEMENT TO NEGOTIATE WITH US A MECHANISM TO GIVE THE UNITED STATES COMPLETE AND VERIFIABLE ASSURANCES THAT NORTH KOREA HAD NO NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM.

MISSILE PROGRAMS -- NORTH KOREA'S CHOICE

14. ~~(C)~~ PERRY HAD TOLD NORTH KOREAN OFFICIALS THAT THE DPRK'S LONG RANGE BALLISTIC MISSILE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS POSED AN UNACCEPTABLE THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES AND AN UNACCEPTABLE DANGER TO OUR ALLIES AND OTHERS IN THE REGION, REVERE CONTINUED. NORTH KOREA'S LONGER RANGE MISSILES COULD REACH U.S. TERRITORY AND ALREADY THREATENED THE ROK, JAPAN AND OUR OTHER FRIENDS AND ALLIES IN THE REGION. MOREOVER, SUCH PROGRAMS CREATED PROBLEMS IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREED FRAMEWORK AND THREATENED KEDO PARTNERS. NORTH KOREAN BALLISTIC MISSILE EXPORTS POSED A THREAT TO OTHER REGIONS AS WELL. PERRY NOTED OF COURSE THAT IT WAS NORTH KOREA'S CHOICE WHETHER TO DEVELOP NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND BALLISTIC MISSILES. HOWEVER THE U.S. VIEWED NORTH KOREA'S PURSUIT OF THESE PROGRAMS AS INIMICAL TO THE DPRK'S NATIONAL
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INTEREST.

U.S. PROPOSAL


15. ~~(C)~~ SUMMARIZING PERRY'S PROPOSAL TO THE NORTH KOREANS, REVERE SAID THE U.S. HOPED TO BEGIN NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE NORTH KOREANS ON NUCLEAR AND MISSILE ISSUES [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] PERRY CONVEYED OUR DESIRE TO ENGAGE IN NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE DPRK TO VERIFY THE NON-PURSUIT OF NUCLEAR AND MISSILE PROGRAMS AND TO ENSURE NORTH KOREA WOULD ADHERE TO MTCR STANDARDS [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] THE UNITED STATES WAS PREPARED TO TAKE STEPS TO CREATE A POSITIVE ENVIRONMENT IMMEDIATELY IN ORDER FOR NORTH KOREA TO AGREE TO NEGOTIATIONS.

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18. (C) REVERE EXPLAINED TO THE CHINESE MFA OFFICIALS THAT
THE IDEAS AND CONCEPTS CONTAINED IN PERRY'S PROPOSAL WERE

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
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
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
CONSTRUCTED OVER THE COURSE OF SIX MONTHS OF INTENSIVE
COORDINATION WITHIN THE U.S. GOVERNMENT AND WITH OTHER
GOVERNMENTS.

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20. (S) REVERE NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT ALL THE DPRK
INTERLOCUTORS HAD EXPRESSED STRONG INTEREST IN IMPROVING
RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES. THE USG REGARDED THESE
SENTIMENTS AS A POSITIVE SIGN BUT BELIEVED THE WINDOW OF
OPPORTUNITY FOR IMPROVED RELATIONS WAS A NARROW ONE WHICH
COULD CLOSE SOON. SPECIFICALLY, REVERE POINTED OUT THAT
THE MOOD IN THE UNITED STATES WAS SUCH THAT MANY POWERFUL
MEMBERS OF CONGRESS WERE ARGUING IN FAVOR OF A SHIFT OF
U.S. POLICY TOWARD NORTH KOREA IN A DIFFERENT DIRECTION.






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REVERE RESPONDED THAT THE U.S. BELIEVED THE NORTH KOREANS WERE SINCERE IN THEIR DESIRE TO IMPROVE RELATIONS. THE QUESTION WAS WHETHER THEY WERE WILLING TO PAY THE PRICE NECESSARY TO DO SO; I.E., BY ADDRESSING NUCLEAR AND MISSILE CONCERNS. THEREFORE, WE WERE STRESSING THAT WE WANTED TO UNDERTAKE A FUNDAMENTAL SHIFT IN U.S. POLICY, AND THAT THE BENEFITS FLOWING TO NORTH KOREA AS RESULT OF SUCH A SHIFT WOULD BE SIGNIFICANT.

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REVERE EXPRESSED HOPE THAT THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER TO KIM
JONG-IL AND THE VISIT TO PYONGYANG OF DR. PERRY, THE
SPECIAL PRESIDENTIAL ENVOY, WOULD PUT SOME OF THE DPRK'S
CONCERNS TO REST. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]


[REDACTED] REVERE SAID
THE LETTER INDICATED THE PRESIDENT'S BELIEF THAT IT WAS
POSSIBLE TO IMPROVE BILATERAL RELATIONS AND HIS HOPE THAT
KIM JONG-IL WOULD JOIN HIM AND TAKE STEPS TOGETHER TO
BRING ABOUT BETTER RELATIONS.

PARTICIPANTS

26. (U) EAP/K DIRECTOR REVERE WAS ACCOMPANIED BY
POLMINCOUNS, EMBASSY INTERPRETER, AND POLOFF (NOTETAKER).
DDG NING WAS ACCOMPANIED BY MFA KOREA DESK DIRECTOR GUAN
HUABING AND SECOND SECRETARY IN THE ASIA DEPARTMENT CHEN
HAI.

[REDACTED]

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28. (U) EAP/K DIRECTOR REVERE HAS CLEARED THIS CABLE.
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