

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ2548

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ACTION NODS-00

INFO LOG-00 CCOE-00 SAS-00 /000W
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O 171029Z APR 00
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7620

APPEALS PANEL ACTION: ADDITIONAL
INFORMATION RELEASED 1.4(B),B1,1.4(D)

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Classification Extended on : 11/03/2014 ~
Class: CONFIDENTIAL ~ Authority: DSCG 11-1
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NODIS **DECAPTIONED**

DEPT FOR U/S PICKERING, C - AMB. SHERMAN AND EAP - A/S
ROTH, PDAS DEMING, AMB. KARTMAN AND EAP/K

E.O. 12958: DECL: (AFTER KOREAN REUNIFICATION)
TAGS: PREL, PINR, KS, KN
SUBJECT: NSA HWANG LAYS OUT BROAD SUMMIT GOALS FOR CHARGE

REFTEL: SEOUL 2028 AND PREVIOUS

CLASSIFIED BY CHARGE RICHARD A. CHRISTENSON. REASONS: 1.5
(B), (D).

1. (S) SUMMARY: IN AN APRIL 17 MEETING, ROK NATIONAL
SECURITY ADVISOR HWANG WON-TAK TOLD CHARGE THAT PRESIDENT
KIM HAD "HUMBLE" GOALS FOR THE JUNE SUMMIT, ESSENTIALLY
BUILDING A SOLID FOUNDATION OF MUTUAL TRUST

[REDACTED]

1.4(B)
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B1

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[REDACTED] RELATED TO
PEACE AND SECURITY ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA. THE ROKG WOULD
CONTACT THE NORTH ON APRIL 18 AND PROPOSE THAT THE FIRST
ROUND OF PREPARATORY TALKS TAKE PLACE APRIL 22 IN
PANMUNJOM.

1.4(B)
1.4(D)
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[REDACTED]

1.4(B)
1.4(D)
B1

THE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR SAID THAT
A VISIT BY AMBASSADOR SHERMAN MIGHT BE MORE USEFUL IN MID-
MAY, WHEN THE ROK "HAD SOMETHING TO DISCUSS," AND THAT TCOG
MEETINGS MIGHT BE USEFUL IN THE RUNUP TO THE JAPAN-DPRK
NORMALIZATION TALKS AND AFTER THE NORTH-SOUTH SUMMIT.
HWANG ALSO EXPRESSED ANGER AT A ROK PRESS ARTICLE
SUGGESTING THAT THE U.S. AND SOUTH KOREA WERE AT ODDS OVER
SUMMIT PLANNING AND THE AGENDA. END SUMMARY.

ROKG TO SUGGEST FIRST ROUND OF PREP TALKS

2. (S) NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR HWANG CONFIRMED TO CHARGE THAT THE UNIFICATION MINISTRY WOULD CONTACT THE DPRK VIA A COMMUNICATIONS LINK IN PANMUNJOM ON TUESDAY, APRIL 18, AT 10:00 A.M., TO PROPOSE THAT THE TWO SIDES HOLD THEIR FIRST ROUND OF SUMMIT PREPARATORY TALKS ON SATURDAY, APRIL 22, AT

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[REDACTED] PANMUNJOM. HWANG
[REDACTED]

1.4(B)
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[REDACTED] END
NOTE.)

1.4(B)
1.4(D)
B1

MORE REALISTIC SUMMIT EXPECTATIONS

3. (S) HWANG UNDERSCORED THAT WHILE KIM DAE-JUNG VIEWED THE SUMMIT AS A "HISTORIC" EVENT, THE PRESIDENT HAD LIMITED GOALS FOR THE MEETING, WHICH HE HAD LAID OUT IN HIS PUBLIC ADDRESS TO THE KOREAN PEOPLE APRIL 17 (SEPTEL AND FBIS SUMMARY TRANSLATIONS). WHILE THE SUMMIT ITSELF WOULD SERVE AS AN IMPORTANT CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURE, IT WAS "NOT APPROPRIATE" TO BE "TOO GREEDY" AND EXPECT TO RESOLVE ALL THE LONG-STANDING PROBLEMS ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA IN JUST ONE SESSION. THIS FIRST MEETING WOULD CREATE AN OPENING FOR RECONCILIATION, AND HOPEFULLY ATTAIN SOME ADDITIONAL INITIAL SUCCESSES IN THE AREAS OF ECONOMIC COOPERATION, FAMILY REUNIONS AND NORTH-SOUTH INTERGOVERNMENTAL DIALOGUE. THOSE WERE KDJ'S "HUMBLE OBJECTIVES,"

1.4(B)
1.4(D)
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[REDACTED]

CONSULTATION SCHEDULES

5. (C) PRESIDENT KIM "DEEPLY APPRECIATED" THE KIND WORDS OF ENCOURAGEMENT FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON AND SECRETARY ALBRIGHT, HWANG NOTED, AND HE ASKED THAT THOSE THANKS BE RELAYED TO PRESIDENT CLINTON. CLOSE COORDINATION WITH THE U.S. IN THE RUNUP TO THE SUMMIT WAS A KEY ROKG PRIORITY, HWANG STATED, AND COULD TAKE PLACE IN TWO WAYS. MOST IMPORTANT WERE "ROUTINE" BILATERAL EXCHANGES, LIKE OUR

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
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PRESENT MEETING; THE OTHER WAS A TCOG (TRILATERAL COORDINATING AND OVERSIGHT GROUP) MEETING. "IN PRINCIPLE," THE ROKG HAD "NO OBJECTION" TO A TCOG BEFORE THE SUMMIT.



1.4(B)
1.4(D)
B1

6. (C) PERHAPS THE BEST THING WOULD BE TO HAVE A TCOG JUST BEFORE THE NEXT ROUND OF JAPAN-DPRK NORMALIZATION TALKS IN TOKYO OR HONOLULU, HWANG MUSED, SO THAT KEY SUMMIT ISSUES COULD BE DISCUSSED AS WELL. THEN, A SECOND TCOG COULD BE

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HELD AFTER THE KIM-KIM SUMMIT TO BRIEF ON KEY RESULTS OF THE HISTORIC TALKS.

AMBASSADOR SHERMAN'S TRAVEL

7. (S) THE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR THEN NOTED THAT HIS STAFF HAD TOLD HIM THAT AMBASSADOR SHERMAN WAS CONSIDERING A TRIP TO THE REGION IN THE NEAR FUTURE. HE SUGGESTED THAT A DATE IN MID-MAY MIGHT BE THE BEST TIMEFRAME FOR THE VISIT, SINCE THE ROKG "DID NOT HAVE ANYTHING SUBSTANTIVE" TO GIVE AMBASSADOR SHERMAN AT THIS POINT. IT MIGHT BE BETTER TO MEET AFTER THE FIRST ROUND OF PRELIMINARY NORTH-SOUTH VICE-MINISTERIAL TALKS WHEN THE ROKG WOULD HAVE MORE DETAILS ABOUT THE ITINERARY, AGENDA AND SO ON. STILL, THIS WAS SOMETHING BEST DISCUSSED WITH THE KEY MINISTRIES CONCERNED, LIKE MOFAT AND THE UNIFICATION MINISTRY, HWANG SAID. CHARGE REINFORCED USG INTEREST IN A ROBUST CONSULTATION PROCESS BY NOTING THAT SINCE THE INCEPTION OF THE PERRY PROCESS U.S.-ROK COORDINATION ON DPRK POLICY WAS BETTER THAN ANY TIME IN THE PAST AND THAT NOW MORE THAN EVER IT WOULD BE NATURAL FOR US TO DISCUSS KEY ISSUES CLOSELY AND CAREFULLY. THE USG HAD A POSITIVE PROCESS IN MIND, IN KEEPING WITH THE STRONGLY SUPPORTIVE STATEMENTS THAT HAD COME OUT OF WASHINGTON WHEN THE SUMMIT WAS FIRST ANNOUNCED.

BROAD AGENDA ITEMS

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8. (S) REGARDING THE AGENDA, HWANG SAID THAT THE ROKG
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ENVISIONED [REDACTED] ITEMS -- RECONCILIATION AND PEACE: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] RELATED TO

1.4(B)
1.4(D)
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PEACE AND SECURITY ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA. THE ROKG'S PRIMARY CONCERN WAS TO ELIMINATE THE CLIMATE OF FEAR WHICH HAD PERMEATED THE PENINSULA FOR 50 YEARS BY ENDING THE MISTRUST AND LACK OF CONFIDENCE BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES. THIS WAS LINKED TO THE LAST SUMMIT GOAL, NORTH-SOUTH DIALOGUE, SINCE A CONSISTENT, PERMANENT GOVERNMENT-TO-GOVERNMENT DIALOGUE MECHANISM WAS NECESSARY TO BUILD TRUST. THIS WOULD BE ACHIEVED BY IMPLEMENTING THE DIALOGUE MECHANISMS ENVISIONED UNDER THE 1992 BASIC ACCORDS.

1.4(B)
1.4(D)
B1

[REDACTED]

1.4(B)
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10. (C)

[REDACTED]

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1.4(B)
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[REDACTED]

1.4(B)
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PRESIDENT KIM'S MARCH 9 BERLIN

DECLARATION, COUPLED WITH THE LONG-TERM CONSISTENCY OF THE ENGAGEMENT POLICY, HAD GIVEN THE DPRK LEADERSHIP THE CONFIDENCE TO REACH OUT TO SOUTH KOREA.

ANGER AT PRESS MISINFORMATION

11. (C) HWANG CLOSED BY VOICING HIS "DEEP ANGER" WITH THE MUNHWA ILBO NEWSPAPER FOR PRINTING AN APRIL 17 ARTICLE SUGGESTING THAT THE ROK AND U.S. WERE AT ODDS OVER PREPARATIONS FOR THE NORTH-SOUTH SUMMIT (SEPTEL). HWANG SAID THAT THE FOREIGN MINISTRY HAD ISSUED AT HIS INSTRUCTION A PUBLIC CORRECTION OF THE "WRONG INFORMATION"

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IN THE ARTICLE. HWANG SAID HE AGREED THAT SUCH ARTICLES LEFT A MISTAKEN IMPRESSION ABOUT U.S.-ROK COOPERATION ON NORTH KOREA POLICY. HE WENT ON TO URGE THAT THE USG NOT TAKE SUCH REPORTS "TOO SERIOUSLY," WARNING THAT THEY WERE LIKELY TO MULTIPLY IN THE RUNUP TO THE SUMMIT.

COMMENT

12. (C) PERHAPS MOST STRIKING IN HWANG'S COMMENTS TODAY WAS HIS EFFORT TO DOWNPLAY EXPECTATIONS FOR THE JUNE 12-14
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SUMMIT. IN PARTICULAR, HE RETURNED SEVERAL TIMES TO THE IDEA THAT PRESIDENT KIM INTENDED THIS AS THE FIRST OF A LONG SERIES OF HIGH-LEVEL MEETINGS, LEAVING IT TO HIS SUCCESSORS TO BRING TO FRUITION A GRADUAL RESOLUTION OF THE LONG-STANDING TENSIONS ON THE PENINSULA. AS A COROLLARY,

1.4(B)
1.4(D)
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[REDACTED]

PRESIDENT KIM HOPED,

TO

CREATE AN ATMOSPHERE OF MUTUAL TRUST IN WHICH MANY OF THE SECURITY CONCERNS WOULD BE MORE EASILY AND NATURALLY RESOLVED.

CHRISTENSON

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1.4(B)
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B1



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