



NATO - Strategy Wilson

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

October 22, 1990

MEMORANDUM

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TO: — Distribution

FROM: EUR - James F. Dobbins, Acting *RCD*

SUBJECT: Revised NATO Strategy Paper for Discussion at Sub-
Ungroup Meeting, October 24, 3:30 pm, Room 6226A

Attached is a new draft of the NATO strategy paper we have been working on. It will be the primary topic of discussion at Wednesday's meeting. Also included is the latest revision of the "Questions to ask ourselves" about NATO's future.

The NATO strategy paper should require only minor corrections after our next meeting. It will then be proposed for inclusion on the agenda of the October 29 DC meeting.

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NATO's Future

Political Track of the Strategy Review

Questions to ask ourselves

Europe has changed dramatically and fundamentally in the last year. No longer divided, Europe stands to assume a greater role in world affairs. NATO and its members must now answer nationally for themselves and collectively for the alliance multiple questions about the future structure, role and mission of NATO. This process is now underway in a variety of fora on both military and political tracks. NATO's changes may need to be as radical as those in Europe. The following paper presents the major questions and some comments designed to promote discussion and perhaps answers, or at least definitions of what would be our maximum desired and minimum acceptable outcomes, as well as what would be unacceptable outcomes from the U.S. perspective. (For questions from the UK perspective, see USNATO 5495, attached.)

The European Pillar

NATO remains the vital link of the U.S. to Europe. While NATO should remain the central pillar of Europe's security architecture, the changes sweeping Europe argue for a greater role for a European pillar in our security partnership. As we draw down our presence in Europe, this inevitably means the Europeans will have a larger role. A greater European security identity will likely develop with or without our support, inside or outside of NATO. Therefore, it is in our interest to influence and shape this development as much as possible, to ensure that it is in fact a European "pillar" of a transatlantic alliance. The U.S. should seek to transform NATO however needed, so that NATO retains its primacy among other Europe-only structures. Some, above all the French, anticipate a lessened U.S. role, but others (especially the British, Italians, and the smaller allies -- who can be enlisted to press our interests) remain anxious that the U.S. maintain not only its transatlantic link but also continue to act as a balance to the larger powers of Europe (above all, Germany). The answers to questions about the European pillar will shape our answers to most other queries.

- o What form does the U.S. want a European security identity to take? Should it be based on existing institutions or could we support the creation of entirely new foundations?
- o What are the implications of a strong European pillar for NATO command and control structures? Can the U.S. give up or share its military lead? Would that be consistent with retaining U.S. nuclear forces in Europe?

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- o What will the effects of WEU actions in the Gulf be for its role as a security organization? Should we favor the Italian proposal to insert the WEU into the EC? Could the WEU be used for operations now considered out-of-area for NATO forces?
- o How broad or narrow should membership in any European security organization be? Will it include the countries of Eastern Europe? Will a separate East European pillar emerge?

Institutional Relationships

Europe and especially the Eastern European countries have entered a new era of independence. Yet most appreciate the value of some form of collective security and more so the value of collective economic relations. Each country and each Euro-oriented international organization defines its goals and security in unique ways. NATO need not compete with other organizations, but rather seek to form relationships of coordination and cooperation. These organizations themselves are facing a new future with questions for themselves of membership, function and responsibilities.

- o What are best estimates of the futures of the WEU, EC, COE and CSCE? Will they expand their memberships? Will they expand their own mandates? Will a CSCMediterranean come into being? Will CSCE take on an active, military/security role in trying to handle Balkanization or a peace-keeping role in a disintegrating Yugoslavia?
- o What would a restrictive membership mean for these groups and frustrated prospective members? Would unlimited membership, and the resultant unworkable collective security lead to renationalization of defence forces?
- o How can NATO best work with, but not be overwhelmed by, these organizations? What institutional forms could such cooperation assume?
- o How might the relationships among these institutions be structured to encourage greater European burdensharing, while strengthening transatlantic cooperation and maintaining NATO's core security role?

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One of the variables in many questions about NATO's and Europe's future is the newly independent states of Eastern Europe. The question of what type of relationship each NATO ally and the alliance as a whole develops with these states is delicate and complex and presents the dilemma of defining interests and accepting responsibility. These states wish to become full partners in the modern world. Decades of Soviet hegemony leave them leery of outside domination, yet respectful of the advantages of collective security. Some have indicated an interest in joining the multilateral organizations of Europe, including NATO.

In the current environment, it is not in the best interest of NATO or the U.S. that these states be granted full NATO membership and its security guarantees. We are not in a position to guarantee the security of these countries vis-a-vis the Soviets, and do not in any case wish to organize an anti-Soviet coalition whose frontier is the Soviet border. Such a coalition would be perceived very negatively by the Soviets and could lead to a reversal of current positive trends in Eastern Europe and the USSR. To date, the Eastern Europeans have been pleased with offers to establish liaison offices at NATO. But the relationship, through both institutional structures and economic and political interests, will continue to develop.

- o What role do we want the East European states to play in Europe? In European security? What are U.S. and NATO interests vis-a-vis these states? How should the NATO/Soviet Union relationship be developed? What of NATO's relationship with the USSR's constituent parts, especially if some republics pursue full independence?
- o Will the Warsaw Pact persist? Should we encourage its persistence, as a mechanism to manage international tension within eastern Europe? What role does the U.S. or NATO have to play in the domestic stability of these governments? In their security/territorial integrity?
- o What are we prepared to risk, what are we prepared to implicitly or explicitly offer them, particularly in the area of security guarantees? Could NATO demonstratively agree to consider requests for assistance from non-members, thus providing a way to protect Eastern Europe from falling under Soviet hegemony, thus injecting an element of doubt/deterrence into possible Soviet future planning?

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- o Is the membership of any of these countries in NATO consistent with U.S. interests? Is it possible to envision allowing only select East European countries to join NATO?
- o How can relations with these emerging democracies, combined with the new Western relationship with the Soviet Union, be managed to avoid any hint of superpower condominium, anti-Sovietism, or Eastern European containment?

A Changing Definition of "Out of Area?"

The focus on the Soviet threat has in the past kept NATO's definition of "out of area" clear: the term referred to all areas outside of the North Atlantic area. A potential Soviet threat remains and constitutes one basic justification for the continuance of NATO. But changes within the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, and now the Gulf crisis, blur the clarity of what is NATO's "area" and the definition of a "threat" of that area. In addition, NATO and national planning will lead to NATO forces after restructuring which should be more mobile and capable of more rapid counterconcentration to meet threats to NATO territory, whether in central Europe or on the flanks. Such mobility could more readily be used to meet out-of-area threats.

- o Should NATO redefine its area of operations? Into what areas and interests? What range of commitments is possible?
- o Can NATO expand and institutionalize its current ad hoc role as a forum for planning, coordination and information sharing on out-of-area operations without undermining its current charter? How would "passive solidarity" (whereby the degree of engagement in dealing with a given problem might vary from ally to ally but the machinery of the alliance would be available for coordination) work in concrete terms?
- o Location of activity: Should states that border on the old area (Eastern Europe) be implicitly or explicitly included or excluded? What about Turkey's Middle Eastern neighbors?
- o Source of threat: Should domestic disturbances that threaten external interference (reexerted Soviet influence in Eastern Europe) be addressed by NATO? How should the alliance react to challenges to the economic interests of NATO members? Can and should NATO assist in curbing transnational problems such as terrorism or environmental pollution?

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Future of Arms Control

It appears that the long-standing Western effort to eliminate the massive Soviet conventional superiority in Europe through arms control is about to yield positive results.

- o What further steps in arms control, if any, are in the U.S. and NATO's interest? What are the prospects for controlling nuclear proliferation or armaments of mass destruction in other nations not interested in arms control?
- o What role can NATO play in implementation of existing (or soon to exist) arms control agreements?

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