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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington, D.C. 20520

~~SECRET~~

February 27, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Cuba

The attached talking points are for the President's review prior to his meeting Monday morning with the Secretary and Dick Walters.

L. Paul Bremer, III
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

As Stated

~~SECRET~~

RDS-3 2/27/02

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State, Security, July 21, 1997
E, LOS RARS, Date 12/16/04

SECRET/EYES ONLY

Draft Talking Points

Approach to Cuba

- The two countries are headed inexorably towards confrontation. We did not seek it, but Cuban activities in Central America challenges our security in a way we cannot and will not ignore;

- We do not propose--as we did in Vietnam--to engage U.S. forces in the terrain of our adversary's choosing. That is neither necessary nor desirable. But the use of force, if necessary, against the source is an option which we do not exclude. That way of dealing with the problem would be both more efficient and more acceptable to the U.S. public.

- Cuba has sent various signals that it is interested in negotiations. Clearly it would be in the interest of both countries if ^{AGREEMENT} ~~negotiations~~ could settle the principal differences. For twenty years we have lived as adversaries. The costs to both of us of our conflict are escalating sharply. We would be willing to try to find an alternative before facing up to that escalation.

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-- Many points are at issue. But four are indispensable:

(a) your organizational, training and logistical support for ^{MILITARY} ~~liberation~~ ^{AGAINST ORGANIZED GOVERNMENTS} movements in Central America and Colombia must end; (b) your security and military assistance to Nicaragua--the advisers and the material--must be withdrawn; (c) Cuban forces must be withdrawn from Angola; and (d) you must take back the Cuban criminals unlawfully sent to the U.S. or we will be required to consider other means of returning them to Cuba.

-- During the last Administration talks were held under the rubric of improving our relationship. Yet Cuba only wanted to talk about its agenda, and never addressed ours (Africa and Central America). Indeed as the talks progressed, Cuban behavior became more aggressive (Ethiopia, the launching of the offensive in Central America, Mariel).

-- We do not plan to repeat the experiment. We would be prepared to consider discussions on any part of our relationship-- but only if Cuba agrees to address these ^{Four} ~~three~~ points with a view toward their ^{TIMELY} resolution.

-- Time is short for us. We hope we do not have to address the solution to the Cuban problem by force. But if we must, it is better to do so early in the Administration,

and when Cuba's protector is tied down in Poland and Afghanistan.

President Reagan held out in his speech to the OAS the possibility that Cuba and the U.S. could have a friendly and supportive relationship, in which neither challenged the other. That would require major changes on both sides. Let me reiterate that we are ready to work for such a relationship--but only if our basic interests as outlined above can be safeguarded.

Note: Walters would agree to carry any response, but not attempt to carry the conversations further.



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