


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Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS



DUCK HOOK

20 JULY 1969



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20 July 69
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Office of Chief of Naval Operations

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CNO LTR SER 374M/725755 of 29 April 1980
REVIEW ON 20 JULY 1989

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CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

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21 July 1969

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Dear Mel,

In response to Henry Kissinger's request, I have had prepared a detailed plan for the mining of Haiphong and the interdiction (quarantine) of merchant ships carrying military supplies to Sihanoukville.

The mining plan has three options with response times varying from 12 to 86 hours. I recommend option A.

Viewed solely from a military point of view, the interdiction (quarantine) concept is relatively simple, requires few forces with little risk to these forces. The other implications of such an operation are, of course, substantially more complicated.

I have attached a proposed memo from you to Henry forwarding the plans for the consideration of higher authority.

With warmest regards.

Sincerely,

T. H. MOORER
Admiral, U. S. Navy

Honorable Melvin R. Laird
Secretary of Defense
Washington, D. C. 20301

Attachment

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

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Dear Henry,

In response to your recent request, a detailed plan has been prepared for the mining of Haiphong and the interdiction (quarantine) of merchant ships carrying military supplies to Sihanoukville.

Please let me know if I may be of any further assistance.

Warmest regards.

Sincerely,

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, D. C. 20500

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SUMMARY OF MINING PLAN FOR HAIPHONG PORT COMPLEX

1. This paper summarizes a plan for mining the Haiphong Port Complex, including Cam Pha and Hon Gai.

BACKGROUND

2. In 1968 cargo throughput into Haiphong averaged 4100 tons per day. So far in 1969 this average has increased to 5200 tons per day. About 90 percent of all imports via sea into North Vietnam pass through Haiphong. USSR provides about 50 percent of this shipping. This cargo is estimated to consist not only of food and petroleum products which contribute to the prosecution of the war, but in addition, trucks, generators, and other war supporting materials. (See Tab A). The closing of the Haiphong Port Complex will have a major effect on the North Vietnam economy and the capability of the North Vietnamese to support the war in the South.

HAIPHONG COMPLEX MINE PLAN

3. The mining plan (Tab C) is designed to stop entry of deep draft shipping into the ports of Haiphong, Hon Gai, and Cam Pha (all in Haiphong Complex), and to disrupt major attempts by the North Vietnamese to employ lighterage for offloading deep draft shipping which would be forced to anchor to seaward of the minefields.

4. Three options are specified in the Mining Plan, viz, A: Three CVA's; B: Two CVA's; and C: One CVA. Option A, using 154 mines/605 destructors, provides the most complete and effective mining of the Haiphong Complex and accomplishes the mission in one launch (except during brief period when no large CVA is available). Option A has disadvantage of longer reaction time because one of the three CVA's involved may be in port when the plan is initiated. (See Tab B for Reaction). Options B and C, using 98 mines and 400-600 destructors, provide effective mining of the deep water channels with much quicker response time. Disadvantages inherent in B and C are less dense minefields and elimination of certain shallow water destructor fields.

5. Arming delays of 72 hours are set on all mines to allow time for departure of third nation shipping.

6. The use of mines is not an offensive act since no weapons are specifically directed against any target. Any damage which occurred to either North Vietnam or third country shipping would be self inflicted resulting from their decision to penetrate waters that have been openly declared unsafe. There is no coercion on the part of U.S.

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7. Plans provide for follow-on launches, when directed, to lay destructor fields. These are designed to disrupt lighterage if reconnaissance reveals that North Vietnam is offloading substantial amounts of cargo from ships at anchor. Destructors will not be delivered earlier than 48 hours after initial minefields are laid. (24 hours is maximum delay which can be set on destructors).

8. SAR (Search and Rescue) ships and PIRAZ (Positive Identification Radar Advisory Zone) ships will be positioned to the north to provide necessary support. BARCAP (Barrier Combat Air Patrol) and TARCAP (Target Combat Air Patrol) will also be provided.

9. Tab A describes North Vietnamese Air Order of Battle which could be encountered. Considering the low level profile of the mission (approximately 300') there is little or no danger from either MIG aircraft or SA-2 emplacements. In most cases, minefields selected are outside the range of AAA, although some exits from target area will approach AAA defenses. Based on planned aircraft tracks and known locations of North Vietnamese air defenses, expected aircraft loss rate will be approximately 3 percent (conservative estimate).

10. Provisions are included in the plan for follow up reconnaissance to check on effectiveness of fields and reaction of the North Vietnamese. Reseeding operations will be executed as necessary to maintain the integrity of the various minefields.

11. For diversionary purposes, several weeks prior to execution, PIRAZ and SAR forces will be relocated to positions in the Tonkin Gulf which they will occupy during the actual mission. After about 12 hours on station they will return to current operating areas. This relocation will be repeated at random intervals (about every 10 days) to inure North Vietnamese defenses and entice them to lower their guard when mission is actually carried out.

12. Detailed rules of engagement are listed in Tab D. Flak suppression will be required against those AAA sites of greatest threat to own forces. Talos missiles are authorized over land against hostile MIG aircraft which threaten U.S. forces.

13. Possible reactions by USSR, Communist China, and North Vietnam have been analyzed and appear in Tab E. An interesting conclusion of this analysis is that much of the uneasiness about Vietnam throughout the world has subsided and that it is likely that the mining of the Haiphong Complex would generally be interpreted as a show of determination, whereas a year ago it might have been regarded as recklessness.

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14. Third nation shipping would have three options: Not to enter, enter with risk, or anchor outside. Many studies show that sufficient barges, sampans, and junks are available for lightering operations but this is a very difficult operation, requiring large numbers of people and excessive time. It is particularly difficult during the Northeast Monsoon season (September-May). Further, while moving from ship to shore, lighters are vulnerable to ship and aircraft attack without undue risk to third nation ships and without risk of killing civilians ashore. If decision is made to interdict lighters while they are moving from ship to shore, surface gunfire, as well as air, can be employed.

15. The rules of international law regarding mine-laying have been reexamined. The traditional laws of war do not cover mining except in a state of war. The political and technological history of the cold war has rendered laws of war, based on the "war or peace" dichotomy, obsolete and irrelevant. Acts in self-defense are lawful under international law. Therefore, the mining of Haiphong Harbor and its approaches, as described in this plan, is considered to be a lawful exercise of South Vietnam's and U.S. right of collective self-defense against the aggression of North Vietnam. (See Tab F).

TABS

- A - Intelligence
- B - Execution Timing
- C - Mining Plan Concept
- D - Rules of Engagement for Mining Plan
- E - World Reaction to Mining
- F - Legal Ramification of Mining

Tab

A

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TAB A

INTELLIGENCE

HAIPHONG

1. General Situation:

a. Air Threat: There are eight serviceable jet airbases in North Vietnam with an estimated 94 jet fighters of the MIG 15, 17, 19 and 21 variety. Strip alert is stood at five of the eight bases. The NVN GCI coverage of NVN and the Gulf of Tonkin is excellent but the NVN Air Force has only a limited all weather/night capability.

b. SAM Threat: There are three known active SAM sites which could take under fire aircraft over water conducting operations in the proposed minefield area. SA-2 operational effectiveness below 1000' is limited due to ground return.

c. AAA Threat: There is limited threat from NVN gun AAA over the minefield. There is known light AAA (effective range 4 NM) on Ile de Norway and the heavy AAA in the vicinity of Cat Bi/Kien An airfields and Hon Gai has an effective range of 7 NM to 25,000 feet.

d. NVN Naval Threat: (Haiphong Area)

Motor Gunboat (PGM)	11
Motor Torpedo Boat (PT)	9
Subchaser (SC)	2
Hydrofoil Motor Torpedo Boat (PTH)	1

(1) The PGM is capable of 43 knots for 1 hour. At 20 knots, range is 655 NM. Armament consists of 2-37MM single mounts and 2 - 20 MM single mounts. It has surface search radar SKIN HEAD.

(2) The PT boat is capable of 50 knots for 350 NM. At 30 knots for 410 NM. Armament consists of 4 - 12.7 MM guns, 2 - 18" torpedoes, and 4 depth charges. It has surface search radar SKIN HEAD.

(3) The PTH is estimated capable of speeds in excess of 40 knots. Armament is 2 - 21" torpedoes and two twin 12.7 MM gun mounts. It has the POT HEAD surface search radar.

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2. Enemy Forces.

a. North Vietnam.

(1) Naval Forces: The North Vietnamese Navy was designed to be a coastal defense force, but has proved itself incapable of performing the task. Its P-4 Class PT's pose the only threat to large surface craft, but NVN tactics and torpedo readiness render this threat almost negligible. The Navy's SO-1 SC have ASW ordnance, but crews have not been trained to use it. The patrol craft (Swatow Class PGM and Shanghai Class PTF) provide 37 MM mobile platforms to supplement shore defenses, but have no significant anti-ship capability.

(2) Air Force: The North Vietnamese Air Force has grown considerably since the beginning of the Vietnam hostilities. The NVNAF combat inventory presently includes about 94 fighters and 4 IL-28 bombers located in North Vietnam.

3. Enemy Capabilities.

a. North Vietnam is capable of:

(1) Attacking with light jet bombers and jet fighters/ bombers opposing naval forces operating in the Gulf of Tonkin or the northwestern area of the South China Sea.

(2) Conducting limited harassment of opposing naval units operating in the coastal waters.

(3) Conducting limited defensive minelaying operations in coastal waters.

4. NVN Maritime Activity.

a. The Haiphong port complex handles some 90 percent of North Vietnamese seaborne imports. The war has caused North Vietnam's need for imports, particularly foodstuffs, petroleum, machinery, construction materials, trucks, earth moving equipment, and generators, to grow. The principal contribution of the North Vietnamese economy to the war has been as a manpower source and the maintenance of a logistics system capable of moving men and imported war material to the combat zones.

b. The bulk of military equipment used by the enemy in both North and South Vietnam continues to be imported from Communist countries. The value of such aid in 1968 is estimated at \$400 million, down from about \$600 million in 1967. The decline in military imports in 1968 probably reflects reduced needs for air defense weapons, particularly ammunition and surface-to-air

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missiles, since the U.S. bombing cutbacks of 31 March and 31 October 1968. There is evidence that large quantities of arms and ammunition have entered North Vietnam by rail from Communist China. Although there is no specific proof that pinpoints the import of arms into North Vietnam via the sea, this is still a strong possibility. It could be coming by sea and never be detected. Regardless of the fact that it cannot be determined what percentage of arms are coming from which nation and by which route, a reduction in food, petroleum, machinery, construction materials, trucks, and other war-supporting items will reduce the war-making potential of North Vietnam and have a direct effect on its ability to support the war in the South.

c. Haiphong continues to be important as the port through which the North Vietnamese economy is propped-up by its communist allies while its manpower is being drained off to the war in the south.

d. During 1968 seaborne imports to North Vietnam rose to a new high of 1,960,000 tons, 39 percent above the volume in 1967 and the largest increase recorded for any year. Imports from Free World countries remained at the same low level as 1967 (accounting for only 2 percent of the total), thus imports from communist countries provided the total of the increase.

e. More than half of North Vietnam's nearly two million tons of imports during 1968 comprised of food (790,000 tons) and petroleum (385,000 tons). The USSR supplied 77 percent of the petroleum (some 90 percent of which was motor gasoline and diesel oil). Communist China supplied 18 percent. Imports of general and miscellaneous cargo (construction equipment, industrial machinery, trucks and motor vehicles, chemicals, cement, metal products and waterborne logistics craft) increased in 1968 for the fourth consecutive year and totaled 605,000 tons.

f. Imports of general and miscellaneous cargo increased from all parts of the communist world except Communist China, which showed an 11 percent decrease. Imports of this category from China showed a particularly steep decline in the second half of 1968. Motor vehicle imports from China, for example, dropped off from 6,000 tons in the first half of the year to 1,000 tons in the second half.

Tables 1 and 2 provide ship arrivals, by Flag, to North Vietnam since 1964.

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Table 1

North Vietnam:
Foreign-Flag Ship Arrivals, by Flag
1964-68

Flag	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968
<i>Total</i>	580	530	379	386	500
Communist countries	178	274	305	308	351
USSR	48	79	122	181	216
Eastern Europe	58	50	44	29	31
Albania	--	1	2	1	1
Bulgaria	2	5	9	4	4
Czechoslovakia	7	4	--	--	--
East Germany	1	--	--	--	--
Poland	48	40	33	24	26
Communist China	72	144	138	97	98
Cuba	--	1	1	1	6
Free World	402	256	74	78	149
Cyprus	--	3	12	5	13
Denmark	1	--	--	--	--
Finland	1	--	--	--	--
France	1	2	--	--	--
Greece	35	28	7	--	--
Indonesia	1	--	--	--	--
Italy	11	1	1	2	1
Japan	74	37	--	--	1
Kuwait	--	--	--	--	1
Lebanon	20	9	--	1	2
Liberia	7	3	--	--	--
Malta	--	2	4	3	1
Netherlands	8	5	--	--	--
Norway	43	29	--	--	--
Panama	12	1	--	--	--
Singapore	--	--	--	--	6
Somalia	--	--	--	--	9
Sweden	3	--	--	--	--
United Kingdom	177	136	50	67	114
West Germany	8	--	--	--	--
Illegal flag	--	--	--	--	1

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BLOC SHIPPING TO NORTH VIETNAM - 1969


MONTH	SOVIET		POLISH		BULGARIAN	
	NO.	GRT. DWT.	NO.	GRT. DWT.	NO.	GRT. DWT.
JAN	24	102,343 130,885	2	15,771 22,999	-	--
FEB	19	90,869 114,780	4	27,178 39,835	1	7,962 11,600
MAR	17	68,268 85,253	1	8,231 10,580	-	--
APR	21	113,695 140,591	2	13,564 20,359	-	--
MAY	21	97,656 122,841	1	6,904 10,086	2	6,303 6,496
JUN	15	65,373 84,879	1	9,267 12,407	1	5,920 9,200

	E. GERMAN		CUBAN		CHICOM	
JAN	-	--	-	--	8	31,012 44,260
FEB	-	--	-	--	8	39,584 57,610
MAR	1	8,810 10,130	-	--	15	59,341 85,650
APR	1	8,002 10,300	1	9,390 12,686	7	30,770 48,130
MAY	1	8,003 10,300	1	9,732 12,686	4	14,592 22,560
JUN	2	17,658 23,100	-	--	7	28,928 42,360

TOTAL NO.	JAN 34	FEB 32	MAR 34	APR 32	MAY 30	JUN 26
GRT.	149,126	165,593	144,650	175,420	143,550	127,136
DWT.	198,144	223,825	191,613	232,066	181,050	171,946

NORTH VIETNAM: Maritime Ports, Anchorages, and Shipping Channels

NORTH VIETNAM



CONFIDENTIAL
2 JUL 68

	Maritime Port		Maritime Anchorage
	Other Port		Shipping Channel
Principal Waterways			
A SONG THAI BINH			
R CANAL DES BAMBOUS			
LACH TRAY			
At Haiphong: 1 - POL Pier			
2 - Maritime Wharfs			


GULLY OR TUNNIN

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NORTH VIETNAMESE AIR SITUATION AS OF 10 JULY 1969


- | | |
|--|--|
| <p>8 IL-28/BEAGLE _____ 4 YUNNANI, 4 PHUC YEN
LIGHT JET BOMBER</p> <p>78 MIG-21/FISHBED _____ 33 YUNNANI, 39 PHUC YFN
JET FIGHTER</p> <p>122 MIG-15/17/FAGOT/FRESCO _____ 59 YUNNANI, 8 KIEN AN, 24 LIUCHOU,
JET FIGHTER 20 HOA LAC, 4 KEP 7 PHUC YEN</p> <p>40 MIG-19/FARMER _____ 10 KEP, 30 YUNNANI
JET FIGHTER</p> <p>6 UMIG-15/MIDGET _____ 1 YUNNANI, 3 KEP, 1 KIEN AN, 1 HOA LAC
JET TRAINER</p> <p>37 IL-14/LI-2/CRATE/CAB _____ HANOI/HAIPHONG/YUNNANI/
TRANSPORT LANG SON AREA AIRFIELDS</p> | <p>20 MI-1/4/HARE/HOUND _____ VARIOUS AIRFIELDS PRIMARILY HOA LAC
HELICOPTER PRIMARILY HANOI/HAIPHONG</p> <p>4 MI-6/HOOK _____ VARIOUS AIRFIELDS PRIMARILY HOA LAC
HELICOPTER</p> <p>29 PROP TRAINER _____ YUNNANI</p> <p>3 AN-24/COKE _____ 1 YUNNANI, 2 GIA LAM
TRANSPORT</p> <p>1 IL-18/COOT _____ GIA LAM
TRANSPORT</p> <p>22 AN-2/COLT _____ HAIPHONG/LANG SON/HANOI
LIGHT TRANSPORT YUNNANI AREA AIRFIELDS</p> |
|--|--|



⊙ SERVICEABLE JET
 ○ SERVICEABLE LIGHT A/C
 ☆ UNSERVICEABLE
 ★ UNDER CONSTRUCTION

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
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NORTH VIETNAM

- SAM ENVELOPE
- POSSIBLE SAM THREAT
- ▲ ESTIMATED LOCATION OF FIRING BATTALIONS

0 25 50
Statute Miles

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NVA AAA BY ROUTE PKG 31 OCT 68 - 31 MAR 69
(37-MM AND LARGER)

LIGHT WEAPONS
 MEDIUM WEAPONS

MONTH	RP 1	RP 2	RP 3	RP 4	RP 5	RP 6A	RP 6B	SUB TOTAL	TOTAL
31 OCT 68	1249	468	550	360	93	1001	509	4229	4624
	38	10	4	63	-	148	135	395	
30 NOV 68	1393	539	611	384	93	1127	606	4753	5165
	34	10	10	51	-	162	145	412	
31 DEC 68	1564	599	571	447	89	1179	626	5075	5439
	29	10	10	44	-	119	152	364	
31 JAN 69	1504	560	545	424	94	1232	570	4929	5280
	29	25	10	52	-	119	118	351	
28 FEB 69	1538	555	555	446	153	1223	570	5041	5352
	36	10	10	47	-	117	101	311	
31 MAR 69	1425	472	491	432	154	1192	618	4792	5129
	35	10	45	123	-	123	120	337	

SITES -	1,202
WEAPONS -	5,129
37mm/57mm -	4,792
85mm/100mm -	337

BASED ON DATA
 AS OF 31 MAR 69

**NORTH VIETNAM
 STATUS OF AAA**


0 25 50
 Statute Miles

RAILROADS
 - - - - - STANDARD GAUGE
 - - - - - METER GAUGE
 - - - - - DUAL GAUGE
 - - - - - INOPERABLE
 - - - - - UNDER CONSTRUCTION

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 EXCEPT BY AUTHORITY OF
 THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
 & NEW ZEALAND
 18 APR 69

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NORTH VIETNAM EW/GCI COVERAGE



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 18 JULY 1969

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TAB B

EXECUTION TIMING

1. Response time will vary as a result of several factors: Location of CVA's, currently assigned mission of CVA's, location and readiness of mines, and configuration of aircraft. The response times in this plan range from 12 hours for options B and C to 86 hours for option A (when one CVA is in most distant port). Response for option A could be reduced to 18 hours provided an alerting message returned the third CVA to Tonkin Gulf.

2. Definition of Execution Terms:

M-Hour: DTG of message ordering mining plan implemented. (A subsequent order is required for launch of mining aircraft unless L-Hour is specified in this message).

L-Hour: Time launch of mining aircraft commences as ordered by appropriate authority. L-Hour may be pre-designated when M-Hour is signalled or may be ordered separately.

D-Hour: Time when all fields are in place for option selected.

A-Hour: Time when all fields are activated.

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3. Timing of pertinent events (M-Hour to L-Hour).

	OPTION A (assuming 1 CVA in port)	OPTION B	OPTION C
(1) All designated Forces in Tonkin Gulf	M +68 hrs (CVA from most distant port)	M +0	M +0
(2) All mines aboard CVA's in readiness condition "C"	M +74	M +0	M +0
*(3) All Surface Forces in launch position	M +77	M +3	M +3
*(4) All mines readied to Condition "A"	M +82	M +8	M +8
*(5) All mines loaded & aircraft ready for launch	M +86	M +12	M +12

* Events (3), (4) and (5) are proceeding concurrently.

4. Time available to higher authority to cancel the mining operation after it is ordered implemented:

a. Unlimited if message implementing mining plan did not specify an L-Hour and if no L-Hour has been signalled subsequently.

b. After L-Hour has been specified or signalled, the mining operation can be cancelled provided the cancellation order is received and understood aboard the CVA's by L +15 minutes.

T a b

C

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TAB C

MINE PLAN CONCEPT

1. Concept. When directed TF 77 will conduct offensive CVA aerial mining operations in the Haiphong Port Complex in order to interdict the maritime logistic support of North Vietnam. Haiphong, Hon Gai, and Cam Pha comprise the complex to be mined and were selected because over 90 percent of the maritime support for North Vietnam enters throughout these ports.

a. The plan provides three mining options, i.e. ALFA (3 CVA's), BRAVO (2 CVA's), and CHARLIE (1 CVA). TF 77 can commence mining operations within 12 to 86 hours after receipt of an execute directive, dependent on which option is selected.

b. In each option the mine fields are armed 72 hours after planting and this fact will be publicly announced. This allows a safe passage period for shipping that desires to depart the area.

2. Mine Fields (See Chart - Appendix 7):

a. Haiphong - The port of Haiphong is mined with five fields. Two fields (A and B) close the main channel with sea mines. Fields 1 and 2 contain mines and destructors and are planted adjacent to the main channel. Field 3 is a destructor field which can be laid over field B in order to seal the main channel to lighterage craft as well as ocean shipping.

NOTE: Sea mine fields are lettered, destructor fields are numbered. Sea mines arm in 72 hours, destructors in 24 hours. No destructors are planted in main channels on the first launch for any option in order to ensure a safe departure channel during the grace period.

b. Hon Gai - Fields C, D and E are sea mine fields designed to block the ocean vessel principal access route. Destructor fields 4 and 5 will block the most used lighterage and anchorage areas serving Hon Gai.

c. Cam Pha - Fields F, G, H and I are sea mine fields designed to prevent access to Cam Pha 72 hours after planting. Destructor field 6 will interdict lighterage operations in the area.

PAGE 1 OF 5 PAGES

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TAB C

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d. Mine/Destructor allocations - The following quantities of sea mines listed are required for fields A through I for options indicated:

<u>OPTIONS</u>	<u>MINE TYPES</u>			
	<u>MK 50-0</u> 500# ACOUSTIC	<u>MK 52-2</u> 1000# MAG IND	<u>MK 52-3</u> 1000# PRES MAG	<u>MK 55-2</u> 2000# MAG IND
A	10	67	12	25
B	10	42	12	14
C	10	42	12	14

Destructor fields 1 through 6 require the following assets:

	<u>DESTRUCTOR/MINE TYPES</u>		
	<u>DST 36</u> 500# MAG	<u>DST 40</u> 1000# MAG	<u>MK 50-0</u> 500# ACOUSTIC
A1/2*	564	40	30
B1	564	48	20
B2	402	40	20
C	358	36	20

*See paragraph 3a for further definition of options.

All mines/destructors required for the above options are currently aboard 7th Fleet CVA's or at the Naval Magazine, Subic Bay.

3. Forces:

a. Carrier requirements:

Option: A1 - 1 large CVA and 2 small CVA's
A2 - 3 small CVA's
B1 - 1 large CVA and 1 small CVA
B2 - 2 small CVA's
C - 1 large CVA

b. Other ships - The operation includes requirements for the following additional ships:

North SAR - 2 DD/DLG - North Search and Rescue, Strike Monitor

PIRAZ - 1 CAG (TALOS) and 1 DD/BDG - Strike and Cap Control

PAGE 2 OF 5 PAGES

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TAB C

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c. Supporting Aircraft - Support aircraft required include:

Bar Cap/Tar Cap - To protect mining force and carrier
F4/F8 force.

Tankers - Refuel fighters or mining aircraft
EKA3/KA4/KA6 as required.

ECM/AEW - To provide radar following and to
EA6/E2A/E1B counter missiles and fire control
radars.

IRON HAND/FLAK SUPPRESSORS - To provide mining force
A4/A7/A6/F4 protection.

RECONNAISSANCE - To provide Post-Strike results/NVN
RA5C/RF8 reaction.

4. Operations:

a. Plan Description - This is a three option plan providing a choice of 3, 2, or 1 carriers to mine the Haiphong Complex. Principal advantages/disadvantages of each option are presented in the following:

Option A

Advantages: A three carrier force provides the maximum flexibility in strike size and composition. In this concept, total mine requirements are not stored on the CVA's. Some of the required mines are held aboard an ammunition ship in the Tonkin Gulf thus allowing CVA's normal ordnance stowage and operations. Provides the most complete and effective mining of Haiphong Complex.

Disadvantages: Requires mine transfer at sea with attendant delay in response to execute order. Current posture requires two CVA's at Yankee Station; Third CVA late arrival could delay execute up to 86 hours. Requires dedication of two AE's to partial mine load-out thus restricting conventional ordnance stowage and AE deployment.

Option B and C

Advantages: Mines are stored aboard CVA's thus speeding response time. Deep water fields are still effectively mined.

Disadvantages: Mines take up some CVA ordnance storage space - requiring increased replenishment or slight lessening of the normal Vietnam in country support capability.

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b. Aircraft Sortie Requirements - See Appendices I, II, III, IV and V to TAB C. It will be noted that "second launch" or "follow-on" sorties are included. These sorties would provide destructor fields to interdict lighterage craft but will not be launched until directed.

c. Reconnaissance and Replenishment:

(1) Reconnaissance flights/operations will be conducted subsequent to the mine laying operation to determine NVN/Foreign shipping reaction/response to the mining effort as well as results.

(2) In order to extend the maximum effectiveness of the fields as planted, replenishment operations should commence in about 4 months for sea mines and 2 months for destructors. Field attrition resulting from NVN sweeping or mine detonation may require earlier replenishment, but no replenishment will take place until directed.

5. Mine Logistics:

a. For option A, to ensure mine availability and preparedness, two AE's will be loaded with identical inventories of 101 mines; and one AE will always be at Yankee Station.

b. For other options carriers will have aboard a pre-assigned mine loadout and the assisting Mobile Mine Assembly Teams (MOMAT).

c. Subic Bay will support the programmed 4 month mine replenishment requirement and is capable of providing additional mine assets. COMSERVPAC/COMINEPAC will ensure that Subic mine inventories remain filled.

6. Aircraft Losses. Estimated maximum losses would be 3.2%, or for example, in option A2 with 3 launches and 15 support aircraft per launch included, the loss estimate is 6. Minimum loss estimate is 3 aircraft on option C.

7. Execution Diversion/Deception. If an option is approved for planning, TF 77 carriers/support vessels will be loaded to support the option selected. Additionally, CTF 77 will randomly move SAR/PIRAZ ships into the planned northern position in order to lessen NVN initial reaction to support ship positioning when the plan is executed. Normal surface escort and air cover will be provided during these incursions.

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APPENDICES

- I - Option A1 Sortie Requirements
- II - Option A2
- III - Option B1
- IV - Option B2
- V - Option C
- VI - Minefield Coordinates
- VII - Chart

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APPENDIX I TO TAB C
MINEFIELD ASSIGNMENTS

OPTION ALFA ONE

LARGE DECK CVA (CTG 77.X)

<u>SORTIES</u>	<u>FIELD</u>	<u>MINE/DST</u>	<u>MCN **</u>
3 A6	A*	6 MK 52-2	A1-A6
4 A6	B*	6 MK 52-3	A7-A12
1 A7	C	20 MK 50-0	B1-B20
5 A7	D	4 MK 55-2	C-C4
		7 MK 55-2	D21-D27
		14 MK 52-2	D1-D14
2 A7	E	6 MK 52-3	D15-D20
2 A7	F	12 MK 52-2	E1-E12
4 A7	G	12 MK 52-2	F1-F12
		9 MK 55-2	G1-G12
1 A7	H	5 MK 55-2	G13-G21
2 A7	I	11 MK 52-2	H1-H5
4 A6 (NOTE 1)	3	72 MK 36 (DST)	I1-I11
2 A6 (NOTE 1)	6	24 MK 40 (DST)	N/A
2 A7 (NOTE 1)	6	16 MK 40 (DST)	N/A

27C CVA (CTG 77.Y)

<u>SORTIES</u>	<u>FIELD</u>	<u>MINE/DST</u>	<u>MCN</u>
18 A4/7	1	180 MK 36 (DST)	N/A
6 A4/	1	30 MK 50-0	T1-T30

27C CVA (CTG 77.Z)

8 A4/7	2	72 MK 36 (DST)	N/A
10 A4/7	5	100 MK 36 (DST)	N/A
14 A4/7 (NOTE 1)	4	140 MK 36 (DST)	N/A

NOTE: (1) FIELDS 3, 4 AND 6 WILL BE LAID WHEN DIRECTED BUT NO SOONER THAN 24 HOURS PRIOR TO A-HOUR.

* THESE FIELDS ARE ASSIGNED TO A6 AIRCRAFT ON EACH OPTION OF PLANS A, B AND C IN ORDER TO PROVIDE A NIGHT ALL WEATHER CAPABILITY OF MINING THE HAIPHONG DEEP WATER CHANNEL IF DIRECTED.

** MINE CASE NUMBER

APPENDIX II TO TAB C

MINEFIELD ASSIGNMENTS

OPTION ALFA TWO

27C CVA (CTG 77.X)

FIRST LAUNCH

<u>SORTIES</u>	<u>FIELD</u>	<u>MINE/DST</u>	<u>MCN</u>
13 A4/7	G	12 MK 52-2	G1-G12
5 A4/7	H	9 MK 55-2	G13-G21
4 A4/7	I	5 MK 55-2	H1-H5
		11 MK 52-2	I1-I11

SECOND LAUNCH

8 A4/7	2	72 MK 36 (DST)	N/A
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FOLLOW-ON

14 A4/7 (NOTE 1)	4	140 MK 36 (DST)	N/A
------------------	---	-----------------	-----

27C CVA (CTG 77.Y)

FIRST LAUNCH

4 A4/7	A	6 MK 52-2	A1-A6
		6 MK 52-3	A7-A12
4 A4/7	B	20 MK 50-0	B1-B20
16 A4/7	1	100 MK 36 (DST)	N/A
	1	30 MK 50-0	T1-T30

SECOND LAUNCH

8 A4/7	1	80 MK 36 (DST)	N/A
--------	---	----------------	-----

FOLLOW-ON

8 A4/7 (NOTE 1)	3	72 MK 36 (DST)	N/A
-----------------	---	----------------	-----

27C CVA (CTG 77.Z)

FIRST LAUNCH

4 A4/7	C	4 MK 55-0	C1-C4
14 A4/7	D	14 MK 52-2	D1-D14
		6 MK 52-3	D15-D20
		7 MK 55-2	D21-D27

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<u>SORTIES</u>	<u>FIELD</u>	<u>MINE/DST</u>	<u>MCN</u>
4 A4/7	E	12 MK 52-2	E1-E12
4 A4/7	F	12 MK 52-2	F1-F12

SECOND LAUNCH

10 A4/7	5	100 MK 36 (DST)	N/A
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FOLLOW-ON

10 A4/7 (NOTE 1)	6	40 MK 40 (DST)	N/A
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NOTE: (1) FIELDS 3, 4, AND 6 WILL BE LAID WHEN DIRECTED BUT NO SOONER THAN 24 HOURS PRIOR TO A-HOUR.

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APPENDIX III TO TAB C

MINEFIELD ASSIGNMENTS

OPTION BRAVO ONE

INITIAL LAUNCH

LARGE DECK CVA (CTG 77.X)

<u>SORTIES</u>	<u>FIELD</u>	<u>MINE/DST</u>	<u>MCN</u>
1 A6/1A7	A	5 MK 52-2	A1-A5
3 A6	B	6 MK 52-3	A6-A11
1 A7	C	10 MK 50-0	B1-B10
3 A7/1A6	D	3 MK 52-2	B11-B13
		4 MK 55-2	C1-C4
		12 MK 52-2	D1-D12
		6 MK 52-3	D13-D18
1 A7	E	4 MK 55-2	D19-D22
1 A7	F	6 MK 52-2	E1-E6
2 A7	G	6 MK 52-2	F1-F6
		3 MK 55-2	G1-G6
1 A7	H	3 MK 55-2	G7-G9
1 A7	I	3 MK 55-2	H1-H3
4 A6	2	4 MK 52-2	I1-I4
		72 MK 36 (DST)	N/A

27C CVA (CTG 77.Y)

<u>SORTIES</u>	<u>FIELD</u>	<u>MINE/DST</u>	<u>MCN</u>
18 A4	1	180 MK 36 (DST)	N/A
4 A4	1	20 MK 50-0	T1-T20

FOLLOW-ON LAUNCH (NOTE 1)

LARGE DECK CVA (CTG 77.X)

<u>SORTIES</u>	<u>FIELD</u>	<u>MINE/DST</u>	<u>MCN</u>
4 A6	3	72 MK 36 (DST)	N/A
14 A7	4	140 MK 36 (DST)	N/A
4 A6	6	48 MK 40 (DST)	N/A

27C CVA (CTG 77.Y)

<u>SORTIES</u>	<u>FIELD</u>	<u>MINE/DST</u>	<u>MCN</u>
10 A4	5	100 MK 36 (DST)	N/A

NOTE: (1) FOLLOW-ON FIELDS WILL BE LAID WHEN DIRECTED, BUT NO SOONER THAN 24 HOURS PRIOR TO A-HOUR.

APPENDIX IV TO TAB C

MINEFIELD ASSIGNMENTS

OPTION BRAVO TWO

INITIAL LAUNCH

27C CVA (CTG 77.Y)

<u>SORTIES</u>	<u>FIELD</u>	<u>MINE/DST</u>	<u>MCN</u>
2 A4	B	10 MK 50-0	B1-B10
1 A4		3 MK 52-2	B11-B13
10 A4	D	12 MK 52-2	D1-D12
		6 MK 52-3	D13-D18
2 A4	E	4 MK 55-2	D19-D22
3 A4	H	6 MK 52-2	E1-E6
5 A4	2	3 MK 55-2	H1-H3
		50 MK 36 (DST)	N/A

27C CVA (CTG 77.Z)

4 A4	A	5 MK 52-2	A1-A5
		6 MK 52-3	A6-A11
4 A4	C	4 MK 55-2	C1-C4
2 A4	F	6 MK 52-2	F1-F6
5 A4	G	6 MK 52-2	G1-G6
		3 MK 55-2	G7-G9
2 A4	I	4 MK 52-2	I1-I4
4 A4	1	20 MK 50-0	T1-T20
3 A4	1	30 MK 36 (DST)	N/A

OPTION BRAVO TWO

FOLLOW-ON LAUNCH (NOTE 1)

27C CVA (CTG 77.Y)

<u>SORTIES</u>	<u>FIELD</u>	<u>MINE/DST</u>	<u>MCN</u>
9 A4	1	90 MK 36 (DST)	N/A
5 A4	5	50 MK 36 (DST)	N/A
10 A4	6	40 MK 40 (DST)	N/A

27C CVA (CTG 77.Z)

<u>SORTIES</u>	<u>FIELD</u>	<u>MINE/DST</u>	<u>MCN</u>
7 A4	3	70 MK 36 (DST)	N/A
11 A4	4	110 MK 36 (DST)	N/A

NOTE: (1) FOLLOW-ON FIELDS WILL BE LAID WHEN DIRECTED, BUT NO SOONER THAN 24 HOURS PRIOR TO A-HOUR.

APPENDIX V TO TAB C

MINEFIELD ASSIGNMENTS

OPTION CHARLIE

INITIAL LAUNCH

LARGE DECK CVA (CTG 77.X)

<u>SORTIES</u>	<u>FIELD</u>	<u>MINE/DST</u>	<u>MCN</u>
1 A7/1A6	A	5 MK 52-2	A1-A5
3 A6	B	6 MK 52-3	A6-A11
		10 MK 50-0	B1-B10
1 A7	C	3 MK 52-2	B11-B13
3 A7/1A6	D	4 MK 55-2	C1-C4
		12 MK 52-2	D1-D12
		6 MK 52-3	D13-D18
1 A7	E	4 MK 55-2	D19-D22
1 A7	F	6 MK 52-2	E1-E6
2 A7	G	6 MK 52-2	F1-F6
		6 MK 52-2	G1-G6
1 A7	H	3 MK 55-2	G7-G9
1 A7	I	3 MK 55-2	H1-H3
4 A6/7A7	I	4 MK 52-2	I1-I4
		20 MK 50-0	T1-T20
		70 MK 36 (DST)	N/A

OPTION CHARLIE

FOLLOW-ON LAUNCH (NOTE 1)

<u>SORTIES</u>	<u>FIELD</u>	<u>MINE/DST</u>	<u>MCN</u>
5 A7	1	50 MK 36 (DST)	N/A
5 A7	2	50 MK 36 (DST)	N/A
4 A6	3	72 MK 36 (DST)	N/A
2 A6/5A7	4	86 MK 36 (DST)	N/A
3 A7	5	30 MK 36 (DST)	N/A
3 A6	6	36 MK 40 (DST)	N/A

NOTE: (1) FOLLOW-ON FIELDS WILL BE LAID WHEN DIRECTED, BUT NO SOONER THAN 24 HOURS PRIOR TO A-HOUR.

APPENDIX VI TO TAB C

MINING

1. Attrition minefields within 12 mile claimed territorial limits for the interdiction of ocean traffic in the Haiphong Deep Water Complex will consist of 9 minefields. A maximum of one mine/destroyer field and 5 destroyer fields are provided to interdict lighterage contingent upon which option is executed.

a. Minefield Coordinates: (Use H.O. Chart 3162, 5TH ED and H.O. Chart 3161, 7TH ED, REV 12/68).

(1) Field "A" Coordinates -	20-47.5 N	106-50.3 E
	20-47.5 N	106-51.1 E
	20-45.8 N	106-52.0 E
	20-45.8 N	106-51.3 E
(2) Field "B" Coordinates -	20-45.2 N	106-52.3 E
	20-42.6 N	106-57.3 E
	20-42.3 N	106-56.4 E
	20-44.85 N	106-51.5 E
(3) Field "C" Coordinates -	20-47.6 N	107-06.85 E
	20-47.6 N	107-07.1 E
	20-46.9 N	107-07.2 E
	20-46.9 N	107-06.85 E
(4) Field "D" Coordinates -	20-48.05 N	107-08.6 E
	20-48.5 N	107-10.1 E
	20-47.5 N	107-10.5 E
	20-47.1 N	107-08.8 E
(5) Field "E" Coordinates -	20-50.15 N	107-11.4 E
	20-50.15 N	107-12.5 E
	20-49.7 N	107-12.6 E
	20-49.7 N	107-11.5 E
(6) Field "F" Coordinates -	20-50.0 N	107-13.8 E
	20-50.0 N	107-14.9 E
	20-49.5 N	107-15.0 E
	20-49.5 N	107-13.9 E
(7) Field "G" Coordinates -	20-55.7 N	107-16.8 E
	20-55.05 N	107-18.0 E
	20-54.2 N	107-17.25 E
	20-53.4 N	107-17.2 E
	20-53.4 N	107-15.2 E
(8) Field "H" Coordinates -	20-53.0 N	107-16.0 E
	20-53.2 N	107-19.65 E
	20-53.2 N	107-19.9 E
	20-52.5 N	107-19.9 E
	20-52.5 N	107-19.65 E

(9) Field "I" Coordinates -	21-05.6 N	107-30.6 E
	21-05.3 N	107-31.1 E
	21-03.5 N	107-29.3 E
	21-04.9 N	107-28.9 E

b. Destructor Field Coordinates:

(1) Field "1" Coordinates -	20-42.1 N	106-47.8 E
	20-43.8 N	106-52.3 E
	20-41.7 N	106-56.0 E
	20-39.8 N	106-49.1 E
(2) Field "2" Coordinates -	20-43.8 N	106-52.3 E
	20-44.7 N	106-54.8 E
	20-42.5 N	106-58.7 E
	20-41.7 N	106-56.0 E
(3) Field "3" Coordinates -	20-44.7 N	106-54.8 E
	20-45.8 N	106-57.7 E
	20-43.0 N	107-00.6 E
	20-42.5 N	106-58.7 E
(4) Field "4" Coordinates -	20-53.8 N	107-01.7 E
	20-53.4 N	107-06.8 E
	20-52.3 N	107-06.9 E
	20-53.0 N	107-01.5 E
(5) Field "5" Coordinates -	20-53.4 N	107-06.8 E
	20-55.2 N	107-09.5 E
	20-55.0 N	107-10.8 E
	20-52.3 N	107-06.9 E
(6) Field "6" Coordinates -	20-59.0 N	107-21.55 E
	20-58.7 N	107-22.6 E
	20-57.1 N	107-20.0 E
	20-57.4 N	107-19.2 E

c. Mine Allocations: Option A

(1) <u>MINEFIELDS</u>	<u>MK 50</u>	<u>MK 52-2</u>	<u>MK 52-3</u>	<u>MK 55-2</u>
A	-	6	6	-
B	20	-	-	-
C	-	-	-	4
D	-	14	6	7
E	-	12	-	-
F	-	12	-	-
G	-	12	-	9
H	-	-	-	5
I	-	11	-	-
	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>20</u>	<u>67</u>	<u>25</u>
(2) <u>DESTRUCTOR FIELDS</u>	<u>DST 36</u>	<u>DST 40</u>	<u>MINE MK 50-0</u>	
I (MIXED FIELD)	180	-	30	

<u>DESTRUCTOR FIELDS</u>	<u>DST 36</u>	<u>DST 40</u>	<u>MINE MK 50-0</u>
2	72	-	-
3	72	-	-
4	140	-	-
5	100	-	-
6	-	40	-
TOTAL	564	40	30

Mine Allocations: Option BRAVO

<u>(1) MINEFIELDS</u>	<u>MK 50</u>	<u>MK 52-2</u>	<u>MK 52-3</u>	<u>MK 55-2</u>
A	10	5	6	-
B	-	3	-	-
C	-	-	-	-
D	-	12	6	4
E	-	6	-	4
F	-	6	-	-
G	-	6	-	-
H	-	-	-	3
I	-	4	-	3
TOTAL	10	42	12	14

(2) DESTRUCTOR FIELDS OPTION BRAVO 1

<u>FIELD #</u>	<u>DST 36</u>	<u>DST 40</u>	<u>MINE MK 50-0</u>
1 (MIXED FIELD)	180	-	20
2	72	-	-
3	72	-	-
4	140	-	-
5	100	-	-
6	-	48	-
TOTAL	564	48	20

(3) DESTRUCTOR FIELDS OPTION BRAVO 2

<u>FIELD #</u>	<u>DST 36</u>	<u>DST 40</u>	<u>MINE MK 50-0</u>
1 (MIXED FIELD)	120	-	20
2	50	-	-
3	72	-	-
4	110	-	-
5	50	-	-
6	-	40	-
TOTAL	402	40	20

Mine Allocations: Option CHARLIE

(1) MINEFIELDS	MK 50-0	MK 52-2	MK 52-3	MK 55-2
A		5	6	
B	10	3		
C				4
D		12	6	4
E		6		
F		6		
G		6		
H				3
I		4		3
TOTAL	10	42	12	14

(2) DESTRUCTOR FIELDS	DST 36	DST 40	MINE MK 50-0
1 (MIXED FIELD)	120	-	20
2	50	-	20
3	72	-	-
4	86	-	-
5	30	-	-
6	-	-	-
TOTAL	358	36	40

d. Mine Descriptions:

- Mine MK 50-0: 500 LB acoustic influence mine
- Mine MK 52-2: 1000 LB magnetic induction mine
- Mine MK 52-3: 1000 LB pressure magnetic mine
- Mine MK 55-2: 2000 LB magnetic induction mine
- DST 36: 500 LB magnetic influence mine
- DST 40: 1000 LB magnetic influence mine
- Mine MK 36-3: 1000 LB pressure magnetic mine

e. Mine Stocks:

NAV MAG SUBIC	MINES
Mine MK 50	148
Mine MK 52-2	330
*Mine MK 52-3	40 (enroute)
Mine MK 55-2	250
*Mine MK 36-3	66

* Mine MK 36-3 acceptable substitute for Mine MK 52-3.

f. Specific Mining Notes:

(1) Mine requirements listed under options B and C are considered the minimum acceptable number in the minefields.

(2) When CTF 77 assigns minefield responsibility by CTG, embarked MOMATS will ensure the mines are labeled with the proper mine case numbers (MCN).

(3) Field BRAVO. Delivery runs should be made to place mines within the buoyed ship channel.

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
(4) Fields DELTA and GOLF. Mines MK 55-2 should be planted in the deep sections of the minefield (approximately 9 fathoms or deeper).

g. Replacement Mines. CVA/AE maintain 10 percent in excess of required mines for spares. Replacement mines will have operational adjustments preset. Spare mines may be substituted without further adjustment for the same MK Mod mine in any field. Spare Mine MK 52-2 may substitute for Mine MK 52-3 in addition to Mine MK 52-2.

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APPENDIX VII

SEE TAB C FOR MINEFIELD COORDINATES

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Tab

D

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TAB D

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

MINING HAIPHONG PORT COMPLEX

1. The following rules of engagement are effective for US forces operating in support of the mining plan.

2. Definitions:

a. Territorial seas: A belt of sea adjacent to a coastal state three miles in breadth measured from the low water mark along the coast. However, in the states claiming twelve-mile territorial seas, twelve miles shall be observed for these rules as if it were the width of their territorial seas. The following distance is presumed to be claimed as a territorial sea:

(1) North Vietnam - 12 miles (Presumed)

b. Internal waters: Waters to landward of the territorial sea.

c. Territorial air space: Air space above the land territory, internal waters, and territorial seas of a sovereign country.

d. Immediate pursuit: Pursuit initiated in response to actions or attacks by hostile aircraft or vessels as defined in these rules of engagement. The pursuit must be continuous and uninterrupted and may be extended as necessary and feasible over territorial/internal air space/seas as prescribed herein.

e. Hostile aircraft: An aircraft identified as non-US and non-allied which is observed in the act of attacking or acting in a manner which indicates with reasonable certainty an intent to attack US/friendly forces.

f. Hostile vessel (surface or subsurface)

(1) A vessel which is attacking or acting in a manner which indicates within reasonable certainty an intent to attack US/friendly forces.

3. General Rules:

a. US forces executing this plan are authorized to attack and destroy any hostile vessel or aircraft as herein defined.

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b. Immediate pursuit may be conducted as necessary and feasible pursuant to the above, subject to the following conditions and limitations:

(1) In event US forces are attacked by hostile forces in North Vietnam, or over international waters, US forces may conduct immediate pursuit over internal waters or into territorial seas or air space of North Vietnam.

(2) No pursuit is authorized into Communist Chinese territorial seas or air space.

(3) US forces, which under the limitations of these rules enter unfriendly territorial land, sea, or air spaces in immediate pursuit, are not authorized to attack other unfriendly forces or installations encountered, unless attacked first by them, then only to the extent necessary for self-defense.

(4) Declaration of aircraft or vessels as hostile will be tempered with judgment and discretion. Cases can occur wherein the destruction of communist bloc forces would be contrary to US and allied interests. All available information and intelligence shall be considered in determining action to be taken in such cases.

4. Use of surface to air missiles against hostile aircraft.

Talos, Terrier, and Tartar equipped ships will attack and destroy aircraft as feasible which are positively identified as hostile in accordance with these rules of engagement:

a. Before firing, all indications must eliminate any possibility of firing on friendly aircraft, and must indicate the probable presence of a hostile aircraft. The above requirements may be satisfied by verifying the identity of aircraft through special and other intelligence sources or any other means available.

b. Authority is granted to fire Talos, Tartar or Terrier missiles over the North Vietnam land mass. Missiles will not be fired over territory of Communist China.

c. Missiles will be command destructed five seconds after passing the closest point of approach if intercept is not accomplished.

5. Use of ALQ-91 (SEE SAW) is authorized in accordance with CINCPACFLT 190001Z SEP 68.

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6. Nothing in these rules modifies in any manner the requirement of a military commander to defend his unit against armed attack with all means at his disposal. In the event of such attack, the commander concerned will take immediate aggressive action against the attacking force.

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E

TAB E

WORLD REACTIONS TAB

1. This Tab reviews possible reactions in response to the U.S. mining of the Haiphong Port Complex.

2. General Comments.

a. Mining of the Haiphong Port Complex would be regarded as an "escalation" of the war and would be so treated by the Communist world in its propaganda. It would be accepted as such by most of the rest of the world as well - particularly the neutrals such as Sweden and India.

b. Much of the uneasiness concerning Vietnam which was important in world affairs approximately a year ago has now subsided. In the present world climate it is likely that this act would be generally interpreted as showing determination, whereas a year ago it might have been regarded as recklessness. It is still possible that charges of "recklessness" would be directed against the U.S. Small powers would, in general, manifest more disapproval than large powers who would be more likely to appreciate the dilemma which pushed the U.S. to this action. Large powers would not be likely, however, to "speak out" on behalf of the U.S.

c. It would be interpreted by all discerning governments as primarily a challenge to the USSR. Few would really consider it as sufficient to disturb the peace of the world, but many would act as if they so regarded it. In recent decades, the world has seen a number of examples of the application of force clearly calculated to signal resolve rather than recklessness. The majority of the world's leaders have become inured to the kind of propaganda which inevitably follows this use of force. In the end, those who have no direct interest in the matter take precautions to ensure that they will not become involved. Those who have an interest, but no capability, propagandize. Those governments which have both interest and capability are addressed below.

3. North Vietnam.

a. NVN has only a limited, unsophisticated capability to counter the mining program. Anti-mine warfare efforts should not have any appreciable effect on the program overall.

b. NVN has a considerable capability to attempt circumvention of the mining program through the use of small (mostly wooden) boats and lighters. Some of these would be lost, of course, but this would not deter NVN from putting forth a major effort in this respect.

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c. To the extent that the mining affected the flow of goods into NVN, a maximum effort to compensate for the reduction would be undertaken via the overland and coastal-water routes from Communist China.

d. NVN could be expected to attack US units engaged in the mining. They are not capable of preventing such a US effort, but they could attempt harassment of US ships and aircraft. The expected aircraft loss rate is 3 percent or less.

e. NVN would probably consider that it was in its interest for a Russian ship to be sunk (or appear to have been sunk) by U.S. mines. To this end -- and in this eventuality -- NVN might foster a situation that would encourage a U.S.-USSR confrontation over the mining issue. Russian failure to stand up to the Americans, if that should occur, would be unsettling to NVN, but it would not drive them into the arms of China.

f. To the extent practicable, NVN would probably respond to the U.S. escalation with some escalation of its own elsewhere, probably in Laos.

4. Communist China.

a. Communist China is beginning to figure less and less as a factor in NVN policy surrounding this war. CHICOMS are still the most important suppliers of small arms (up to the size of mortars and some rockets) and ammunition to NVN, but they no longer retain any discernible political influence with Hanoi in return for their arms support.

b. Chinese reaction to the mining is expected to be negligible, except in the propaganda areas, which should also have negligible impact.

c. The Chinese might be persuaded by NVN to step up their aid, if that is required, but Chinese aid and support of any kind would not be likely to compensate NVN for the possible loss of Russian support. (Political and psychological support is perhaps as important as material). In short, NVN is not likely to risk the loss of Russian backing by too ready a dependence on Communist China. At the same time, China would be asked to do more of what she is now doing.

d. If the shipments of Russian goods across China are now encountering difficulties, as reports indicate, then the act of mining, per se, would not be expected to affect that situation. Other factors, such as the Russian-Chinese border talks, would be expected to be of much greater direct importance. The current problems between the Russians and the Chinese are surely bigger than the future of South Vietnam; they may even be bigger than the future of North Vietnam.

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5. The USSR.

a. If the Russians are willing to risk some ship losses in crossing the minefield in order to demonstrate their resolve to support NVN, little will have been gained as regards the NVN war. Russian-U.S. relations will have suffered a setback, but even that should not be serious. The Russians will know that by flaunting the U.S. minefield they are not running a great political risk: that they would primarily be showing only the depth of their own determination. They already know well the depth of the U.S. commitment to South Vietnam, and while they might be momentarily surprised at our mining decision in the light of current U.S. policy, they will soon recover and see it as a challenge thrown down to them to abandon their North Vietnamese ally.

b. If necessary to prove their commitment to NVN, the USSR might cross the minefield. At the very least, they would provide assistance to the NVN in their efforts to circumvent the mining program, perhaps even to the extent of dispatching mine-sweepers. In Russian eyes, it would be, from a political/psychological point of view, a Berlin-Blockade in reverse. Thus the probability is that no open confrontation between the U.S. and Russia would result because none would be necessary.

c. At the same time -- once proper allowance has been made for "face" on both sides -- the Russians would probably be further disgusted with the whole business of the war (which has always been of much less importance to them than to us). The net effect could be to prompt the Russians to put more political pressure on NVN to end the war: to accept a "political settlement." They could not force NVN, and they certainly would not cut off visible support of NVN; but the war in Southeast Asia is becoming an annoyance to the Russians in their current foreign policy aspirations, which primarily seek support against China. The mining of Haiphong would provide them with one more good excuse to put added pressure on Hanoi for a settlement. This pressure would not be visible pressure, for the world to see, and it would not be likely to be instant. It might not even be decisive, but it could be an important factor at this time.

d. Russia's most visible reactions would probably occur outside of Southeast Asia and impinge upon the question of U.S.-USSR relations in general. They might, for example, freeze progress toward such on-going matters as SALT, or they might become more difficult on matters having to do with solutions to the Middle East problem. They could even decide on a course of no cooperation with the present Administration in an attempt to embarrass it politically.

6. U.S. Counter Actions

a. The U.S. can blunt the anticipated propaganda by the

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USSR, Communist China, and others by explaining, at the time the mining of the Haiphong Complex is announced, that the U.S. has gone to great lengths to end the war in Vietnam, by the bombing halt, the withdrawal of combat troops, and political accommodations. These attempts have met nothing but intransigence on the part of North Vietnam and her allies. U.S. patience and understanding have reasonable limits which are now being strained. The mining of the Haiphong Complex is a low order response to the complete lack of cooperation by the North Vietnamese government and its allies.

b. If the USSR suffers ship losses in attempting to run the minefield, the U.S. can express sincere regrets and point out that the loss was completely unnecessary since the original announcement by the U.S. provided sufficient time for all shipping to depart Haiphong safely. Point out that the USSR callously sacrificed the loss of their men and material in spite of all U.S. attempts to protect third nation shipping.

c. If the USSR provides minesweepers to North Vietnam, or sweeps the minefield herself, this will be detected by U.S. reconnaissance aircraft. Upon completion of the sweeping operation, the U.S. can reseed the field as necessary.

d. If, as is most likely, the Soviet ships anchor just to seaward of the minefields and leave the off-loading to the North Vietnamese via lighterage, the U.S. can respond by seeding the lighters' routes with MK 36 destructors. All of the normal routes will have been seeded in the initial mine lay. Follow-on seeding would be needed if the North Vietnamese select alternate routes.

e. There is little the U.S. could do to prevent the USSR from delaying SALT or withdrawing from Mid-East talks. In the case of SALT the USSR might well decide that her vital interests are at stake in gambling on a nuclear arms race and therefore go ahead with the negotiations. If the USSR drops out of the Mid-East talks, the U.S. can express regrets and make plans to continue to seek peace in the Mid-East without Soviet participation.

f. The U.S. could accept the use of Chinese ports by the USSR and transshipment of material by rail from China to North Vietnam. Such an arrangement would delay the arrival of material in Haiphong and Hanoi and could further strain the relations between Communist China and the USSR.

g. A Soviet blockade of Berlin should be addressed as a separate issue without relation to U.S. action in Southeast Asia. The U.S. response would parallel those actions taken in the past to all threats by the Soviets and East Germany to a closure of access to Berlin.

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h. The US could destroy North Vietnamese lighterage with gunfire from US destroyers as the lighters depart the deep water anchorages for the beach. There would be no threat to third nation shipping and no loss of civilian lives.

i. Adverse weather conditions, particularly during the Northeast Monsoon period from September to May with attendant high sea states, would make NVN lighterage operations both dangerous and inefficient. In addition both people and resources would be diverted from other tasks, like fishing and inner harbor transportation, if an extensive lighterage operation were attempted. This diversion and the delay in the arrival of imports would have a cumulative adverse effect on the North Vietnamese economy and their ability and willingness to continue the war effort in the South.

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F

LEGAL RAMIFICATION OF MINING OF HAIPHONG HARBOR
AND ITS APPROACHES

1. The traditional international law doctrines, particularly as codified in Hague Convention VIII (1907) impose the following restrictions, among others, on the use of mine warfare:

a. The use of mines presupposes the existence of a state of war.

b. The laying of mines with the sole object of intercepting commercial shipping is prohibited.

c. The use of mines in time of peace could be considered an act of war by third countries.

d. Interference by mines with movements of international shipping on high seas is prohibited.

2. Whatever the historic worth of these prohibitions, a modern legal analysis of the use of mines in present day international conflict requires an examination of several additional factors. The international laws of war have evolved throughout history out of an interaction from disputes between nations, conflicts between military efficiency and humanitarianism, and changing weapons technology. Since the end of World War II, these laws have been subjected to the unprecedented pressures of cold war international politics and introduction of modern weapons. Because of the resulting revolutionary changes, the traditional laws of war have been rendered obsolete, but no fixed principles have yet been internationally accepted to replace them.

3. However, the national right of self-defense, which has existed since time immemorial, has been recognized in the U.N. Charter and strengthened in international practice. Also, the former simple dichotomy between state of peace and state of war no longer has legal or political validity. Therefore, in assessing the legality of an act of coercion, the rigid formulas of pre-World War II are irrelevant, and new standards for legality must be sought.

4. South Vietnam, a sovereign nation, possesses the inherent right to defend itself against aggression. In the exercise of this right, South Vietnam requested U.S. assistance in repelling the aggression which has been waged by North Vietnam with increasing ferocity for several years. Therefore, the United States and South Vietnam have the right under international law to participate in the collective defense of South Vietnam against armed attack.*

*Department of State Bulletin, dated March 4, 1966, entitled The Legality of United States Participation in the Defense of Viet-Nam.

5. A principal source of supplies for the continued prosecution of that aggression is the Port of Haiphong. The aggression could be greatly reduced by effectively denying to North Vietnam these necessary supplies. As part of its self-defense effort, therefore, South Vietnam and its allies would be justified in employing a reasonable method of denying this flow of supplies. The mining of Haiphong Harbor and its approaches, can properly be considered such a method. Mine emplacement should extend seaward of Haiphong Harbor only so far as is necessary to halt the entrance of shipping to the harbor. Advance notification must be given to all shipping concerning time of activation of mines laid. All shipping entering Haiphong after that time would do so at its own peril.

6. The fundamental test of any act in international law is reasonableness. The reasonableness of self-defense actions is gauged by the standards of necessity and proportionality. It is clear beyond dispute that South Vietnam is deeply engaged in self-defense action against the overt hostilities of North Vietnam. Thus, the necessity for action is clear. In assessing the proportionality of the mining of Haiphong, the following elements are pertinent:

- a. Mining is a passive, not aggressive, measure.
- b. Advance notice will be given to third countries.
- c. Mining will be restricted to the area around Haiphong.
- d. Potentially, no loss of life or property need be incurred.
- e. This defensive measure will reduce loss of life and material elsewhere in the zone of hostilities.

7. In summary, the traditional laws of war do not cover mining except in a state of war. The political and technological history of the cold war has rendered the laws of war, based on the war or peace dichotomy, obsolete and irrelevant. Acts in self-defense are lawful under international law. Therefore, mining of Haiphong Harbor and its approaches, as described in this plan, is considered to be a lawful exercise of South Vietnam's right of self-defense against the aggression of North Vietnam.



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