



OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN  
Joint Chiefs of Staff

9 October 1950

MEMO TO: General Wheeler *J*

It is understood from Colonel Haig, via both Colonel Pursley and Captain Robinson, that the President has directed the execution of the five major actions.

Pursley indicates that the plan is still required, primarily to indicate the details of the scenario to be played out.

Secretary Laird has seen T&A *R.*  
and approves execution as directed by the White House

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*file 1*  
9 October 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL WHEELER *has seen*

THRU: GENERAL MCPHERSON *for*

1. Based upon Colonel Pursley's initial memorandum to Colonel Haig on significant military actions (Tab A), Dr. Kissinger has requested an integrated plan of military actions to demonstrate convincingly to the Soviet Union that the United States is getting ready for any eventuality on or about 1 November 1969. The items marked in the Tab are to be included. Rather than threatening a confrontation (which may or may not occur), the objective of these actions would be a demonstration of improving or confirming readiness to react should a confrontation occur. The plan should envision initiating some actions early next week (13 or 14 October) with all actions completed by 25 October. A low key public affairs program should be included.

2. The integrated plan is desired at the White House by close of business tomorrow. It will probably be an item for discussion with the President on Saturday.

3. I relayed this requirement this morning from Colonel Haig to Colonel Pursley, who asked me to relay it to you. At Tab B is a CM for the Director, Joint Staff, which lays on the requirement.

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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

8 October 1969,

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL HAIG

SUBJECT: Significant Military Actions

In response to your request, a number of concepts for military actions are outlined below which would, in our judgment, be considered by the Soviets as unusual and significant. The following criteria were employed in developing these potential actions:

- a. Ease of detection by the Soviet Union.
- b. High probability of being considered unusual and significant.
- c. Low public exposure in the United States.
- d. Feasible of execution as early as 13 October, or as soon thereafter as possible.
- e. Lasting sufficiently long to be convincing.

Concepts meeting these criteria would include:

- ✓ a. Implementation of radio and/or other communications silence in selected areas or commands, e.g., in SAC and POLARIS forces.
- ✓ b. Stand-down of flying of combat aircraft in selected areas or commands, e.g., for 48 hours in SAC and EUCOM.
- ✓ c. Increased surveillance of Soviet ships en route to North Vietnam.
- ✓ x. d. Increased reconnaissance sorties around the periphery of the Soviet Union.
- ✓ e. Increased ground alert rate of SAC bombers and tankers.

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✓ f. Dispersal of SAC aircraft with nuclear weapons to only military dispersal bases, with or without dispersal of CONAD forces.

X g. Alerting or sending to sea of SSBNs currently in port or by tender.

Modification of the SNOW TIME 70-2-E joint SAC/NORAD exercise has been considered, but does not appear to qualify under the given criteria.

The significance of the costs and risks entailed by the military actions outlined above must be related to the over-all effect desired, which is not known at this time. In absolute terms, neither the costs nor the risks seem to be high.

Robert E. Pursley  
Colonel, USAF  
Military Assistant

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File

~~SENSITIVE~~

CM-4621-69

9 October 1969

387 Worldwide Readiness Test (9 Oct 69)  
Oct 69

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, JOINT STAFF

Subject: Integrated Plan for Certain Military Actions

1. I would like the Joint Staff to prepare an integrated plan of actions which will physically test our military readiness in selected areas worldwide to respond to possible confrontation by the Soviet Union. These actions should be discernible to the Soviets but not threatening in themselves. They should include, but not necessarily be limited to, the following type actions:

a. Stand-down of flying of combat aircraft in selected areas or commands, e.g., for 48 hours to improve operational readiness in SAC and EUCOM.

b. Implementation of radio and/or other communications silence in selected areas or commands, e.g., in SAC and POLARIS forces, or in the Sixth Fleet.

c. Increased surveillance of Soviet ships en route to North Vietnam.

d. Increased ground alert rate of SAC bombers and tankers.

e. Dispersal of SAC and CONAD aircraft with nuclear weapons to only US military bases.

2. The plan should provide for the initiation of some actions by 13 October and the completion of all actions, including return to substantially normal operations, not later than 25 October 1969. A public affairs plan should be included with the theme that the visible actions are simply part of a test of current US military readiness.

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By [signature] [signature] 8/1/02

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3. I desire this plan by 1200 hours, 10 October 1969.  
If necessary, detailed annexes should follow as soon as possible.

(Sgd) EARLE G. WHEELER

EARLE G. WHEELER  
Chairman  
Joint Chiefs of Staff

*Orig #1 - D2S and carried by Mr. K.  
#2 - Yem  
#3 - Jackson  
#4 - Chen  
#5 - status  
#6 - CM*

~~TOP SECRET~~



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