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SECURITY INFORMATION

CIA 36312-a  
IAC-D-55/4  
(Revised)  
28 July 1953

Copy No. 58

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

NSC STATUS REPORT ON THE FOREIGN  
INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM

1. Representatives of the IAC have prepared the attached revision of IAC-D-55/4 (26 June 1953). They recommend:

a) That the IAC concur in this report.

b) That the DCI, in transmitting this report to the President and the NSC, indicate that the effects of recent budget cuts on intelligence activities cannot be assessed at this time and therefore are not reflected in this Report.

c) That inasmuch as intelligence programs by their very nature are not subject to rapid change, the DCI propose to the NSC that hereafter a complete revision of this Status Report be prepared only on an annual basis (as of 30 June, or such other date as the NSC may desire), and that semi-annually there be submitted a brief supplementary statement of the most significant changes which have occurred since the annual report.

2. The NSC requires that this paper be submitted by 1 August 1953. It would therefore be appreciated if each agency would telephone its concurrence or proposed changes to the Secretary of the IAC by noon, Friday, July 31.

[Redacted Signature Box]

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Secretary

DOCUMENT NO. \_\_\_\_\_  
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.   
1) DECLASSIFIED  
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS <sup>0</sup> C 2011  
NEXT REVIEW DATE: \_\_\_\_\_  
AUTH: HR 10-2  
DATE: 30 MAR 1981

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No. 7 - THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM

(Prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency and concurred  
in by the Intelligence Advisory Committee)

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
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VII. SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE

1. Scientific and technical intelligence regarding the USSR and Satellites continued to make some progress during the first half of 1953. However, in the last analysis, production of realistic estimates is still dependent upon securing information on Soviet objectives and progress. There continues to be improvement in the analysis and evaluation of available information; however, the flow of information of a scientific and technical nature from conventional sources is becoming increasingly inadequate. As a consequence, there is an urgent need for the further development and utilization of new and improved methods and techniques for the collection of scientific and technical intelligence information. Efforts along these lines have progressed slowly in the past six months, notwithstanding present potential in the fields of  <sup>25X1</sup>  
 photographic reconnaissance.

2. A review of the effects of DCID 3/4 (which allocated primary production responsibilities between CIA and the departments of the Department of Defense and established the Scientific Estimates Committee (SEC)) was scheduled for the first half of 1953. In order to provide <sup>25X1</sup> more time for an appraisal of the effects of this directive, the review has been postponed until August 1953.




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VII. SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE (Continued)

4. Existing scientific and technical intelligence on conventional Soviet armaments other than naval continues to be good so far as standardized items in current use are concerned. However, intelligence on weapons and equipments pertaining to the Soviet air offensive and defensive capabilities remains generally inadequate. Information regarding Soviet guided missiles programs is also poor, although certain projects based on German developments are becoming better known. In general, knowledge of key scientists, test facilities, and trends in military research and development remains too inadequate to be a sound basis for predicting future Soviet weapons and equipment.

5. While the existence of a Soviet biological warfare program has not been positively confirmed, there continue to be indications supporting the belief that such a program does exist. Existence of a Soviet chemical warfare program has been confirmed; however, very little additional information related to this program has been received in the past six months. The limited progress obtained in chemical warfare intelligence has come from increased utilization of Soviet open literature in related fields. The extreme scarcity of intelligence in both fields offers an opportunity for the Soviets to obtain technological surprise.

6. Some progress has been made in the exploitation of open scientific literature and in research in depth on institutions, but knowledge of basic scientific research and development behind the Iron Curtain remains inadequate. Information on Soviet long-range scientific development programs is similarly poor. Information on

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VII. SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE (Continued)

the quantity of Soviet scientific and engineering manpower is reasonably adequate, but estimates of its quality remain less satisfactory. In view of the increasing importance of such basic scientific information to the prediction of future Soviet potential, a concentrated effort to improve intelligence in this field is planned for the coming months.

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
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XII. COLLECTION (Continued)



b. Propaganda Analysis

Requirements of estimating offices and psychological warfare activities have resulted in a slight shift in emphasis in the propaganda analysis effort, leading away from the preparation of weekly reviews of the whole propaganda field and towards the production of more numerous specialized propaganda studies on substantive intelligence problems.

8. Foreign Materials and Equipment

Collection of Soviet bloc items from overt sources has increased appreciably during the past six months and has provided useful data to economic and scientific intelligence and to the [redacted] program. While military operations in Korea have not led to the capture of many important military end-items since January, plans are under consideration for more intensive exploitation and analysis

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
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of captured explosives, propellants and other material available in the Far Eastern theater. Significant information on aircraft components was obtained from inspection of the MIG 15's

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


The Joint Technical Intelligence Subcommittee of the JIC has absorbed the functions of the former Joint Materiel Intelligence Agency in the collection and exploitation of foreign materials.

9. Monitoring of Radio Jamming

Under NSC 66/1 the agencies undertook the construction and organization of a monitoring system to obtain information on Soviet jamming and related activities in the radio frequency spectrum. A pilot operation involving a very limited number of stations is being established. Adequate information as to the extent of Soviet jamming, concentration of the jamming stations, and related information must await the initiation and implementation of a much-expanded program.

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