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PART B6

INCLUDING
TELEGRAM

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O 171537Z DEC 82 -----052787 171554Z /41
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8309

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DISSENT CHANNEL

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PEPR, IS, EG, JO, PLO, XF
SUBJECT: THE UNITED STATES AND THE PALESTINIANS: NEED
FOR AN OPEN DIALOGUE

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT).
2. DRAFTING INFORMATION

THIS MESSAGE WAS CO-DRAFTED BY [REDACTED]

EMBASSY TEL AVIV. THE MESSAGE HAS BEEN DISCUSSED WITH OTHER EMBASSY OFFICIALS, BUT NO CLEARANCES WERE SOUGHT.

3. SUMMARY: SINCE 1975, THE U.S. GOVERNMENT HAS CONSISTENTLY REAFFIRMED ITS POLICY, INCORPORATED IN THE 1975 MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE USG AND ISRAEL, NOT TO "RECOGNIZE OR NEGOTIATE WITH THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION SO LONG AS THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION DOES NOT RECOGNIZE ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO EXIST AND DOES NOT ACCEPT SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338." IN 1982, THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ISSUED INSTRUCTIONS TO THE U.S. CONSULATE IN JERUSALEM NOT TO ENGAGE IN OFFICIAL CONTACTS WITH MUSTAFA DUBIH OR OTHER REPRESENTATIVES OF THE VILLAGE LEAGUES IN THE WEST BANK, THIS INSTRUCTION COMING IN RESPONSE TO A REQUEST FOR GUIDANCE BY THE CONSULATE ON WHETHER ITS OWN PRACTICE OF AVOIDING CONTACT, FOLLOWED DURING THE PREVIOUS YEAR, SHOULD BE MODIFIED. AS A RESULT OF THESE TWO POLICY DECISIONS, THE USG HAS EFFECTIVELY FORECLOSED COMMUNICATION WITH TWO ARTICULATE EXPONENTS OF PALESTINIAN INTERESTS -- IN THE PLO CASE, THE ORGANIZATION WITH WHICH THE GREAT MAJORITY OF PALESTINIANS IDENTIFY AND SUPPORT AS THEIR POLITICAL SPOKESMAN. THIS MESSAGE URGES REVIEW OF BOTH POLICY DECISIONS, PARTICULARLY IN LIGHT OF THEIR INCONSISTENCY WITH OVERALL U.S. FOREIGN AFFAIRS OBJECTIVES OF MAINTAINING AND FACILITATING CONTACT AND DIALOGUE WITH ALL STRAINS OF POLITICAL EXPRESSION ON ISSUES OF CONCERN TO THE U.S. FURTHERMORE, THESE POLICIES SEVERELY HAMPER U.S. EFFORTS TO BROADEN PARTICIPATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS, AND LEAVE THE FIELD OPEN TO THOSE FORCES WHICH SEEK TO PERPETUATE, RATHER THAN RESOLVE, THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT.

4. IN ARGUING THIS CASE, WE ARE NOT UNMINDFUL OF THE EFFECT WHICH A CHANGE IN U.S. POLICY WILL HAVE ON ISRAEL'S PERCEPTION OF U.S. ADHERENCE TO PREVIOUS COMMITMENTS. IN THE FIRST INSTANCE, WE CONFESS TO SOME CONFUSION AS TO THE EXACT NATURE OF THE U.S. COMMITMENT TO ISRAEL REGARDING THE PLO, SINCE WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE 1975 MOU HAS BEEN AMENDED BY SUBSEQUENT

PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENTS. IN A BROADER SENSE, WE BELIEVE THAT COMMITMENTS SUCH AS THESE NEED TO BE DEVELOPED WITH MUCH MORE CARE AND FORESIGHT, SO THAT U.S. POLICY DOES NOT FIND ITSELF NEMED IN BY SWEEPING PROMISES MADE DURING THE ANXIOUS, LAST-MINUTES OF NEGOTIATIONS. WE SEE THIS LATTER PROBLEM AS PARTICULARLY RELEVANT IN VIEW OF FUTURE COMMITMENTS WHICH ISRAEL WILL INEVITABLY DEMAND OF THE UNITED STATES IN RETURN FOR PROGRESS IN THE PEACE PROCESS.

5. FINALLY, THIS MESSAGE ALSO ADDRESSES THE TACTICAL AND OPERATIONAL QUESTIONS OF HOW AND WHEN TO BEGIN THE DIALOGUE WITH THE PLO AND THE VILLAGE LEAGUES. WE BELIEVE THAT, AT THE PROPER MOMENT, THIS SHIFT IN U.S. POLICY COULD ENHANCE U.S. EFFORTS TO PROMOTE THE PEACE PROCESS. END SUMMARY.

6. THE PROBLEM

(A) PLO: IN THE YEARS SINCE THE 1975 MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT WITH ISRAEL, THE U.S. HAS RESTRICTED THE DEFINITION OF TERMS IN THAT AGREEMENT TO PRECLUDE ANY POLITICAL CONTACT BETWEEN U.S.G. AND PLO REPRESENTATIVES. AN EXCEPTION OCCURRED DURING THE LEBANESE CIVIL WAR AND EVACUATION OF U.S. PERSONNEL FROM BEIRUT WHEN U.S.G. DIPLOMATS ENGAGED IN SECURITY-RELATED DISCUSSIONS WITH PLO OFFICIALS. FROM OUR OWN CONTACTS IN GAZA, AND FROM REPORTING BY OTHER MISSIONS IN THE ARAB WORLD, WE ARE PERSUADED THAT THE VAST MAJORITY OF PALESTINIANS IDENTIFY WITH THE PLO AND ACCEPT THE PLO AS THE LEGITIMATE SPOKESMAN FOR PALESTINIAN

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INQUIRY
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FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9310

POLITICAL REQUIREMENTS, THE PRICE OF OUR MISTAKES
BEING EVIDENT ONLY IN RETROSPECT. CANNOT THE SAME
ARGUMENT BE USED WITH RESPECT TO GEULA COHEN AND
THE TEHIYA PARTY IN ISRAEL WHOSE PLATFORM IS TOTALLY
AT ODDS WITH U.S. POLICY?
8. CONCLUSIONS

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INTERESTS. ALTHOUGH MANY PALESTINIANS DISSOCIATE
THEMSELVES FROM PLO-INSPIRED VIOLENCE, THEY ASSOCIATE
BROADLY WITH THE POLITICAL AND DIPLOMATIC GOALS
OF THE MOVEMENT. BY NOT EVEN ENGAGING IN A DIALOGUE
WITH PLO OFFICIALS, U.S.G. OFFICIALS HAVE THUS BEEN
CUT OFF FROM GAINING INFORMATION AND SORELY NEEDED
PERSPECTIVE ON THE PLO. THIS HAS OBVIOUSLY DETRACTED
FROM U.S. MIDDLE EAST PEACE-MAKING EFFORTS, IN THAT
WE HAVE BEEN FORCED TO DEAL WITH SELF-PROCLAIMED
MODERATE PALESTINIAN SPOKESMEN WHO OFTEN REPRESENT
LITTLE BEYOND THEIR OWN VIEWS OR WISHFUL INTERPRETATIONS
OF PLO VIEWS.

IN SHORT, U.S. POLICY REGARDING CONTACTS WITH
PALESTINIANS -- PLO OR VILLAGE LEAGUE -- IS SELF-
DEFEATING. WE URGE THE DEPARTMENT TO RECONSIDER
POLICY AND DEVELOP WAYS TO PERMIT USG OFFICIALS TO
GAIN FIRST-HAND IMPRESSIONS OF PALESTINIAN VIEWPOINTS.
IN THE CASE OF THE PLO, WE SHOULD NOT FEEL THAT OUR
1975 MOU WITH THE ISRAELIS PRECLUDES CONTACT, HOWEVER
FORCEFULLY THE ISRAELIS STICK TO THIS INTERPRETATION.
IN FACT, THE 1975 MOU PRECLUDES ONLY RECOGNITION
AND NEGOTIATION WITH THE PLO AS LONG AS THE PLO
"DOES NOT RECOGNIZE ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO EXIST AND
DOES NOT ACCEPT SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 242
AND 338." IT DOES NOT RULE OUT CONTACT AND DIALOGUE --
A DIALOGUE WHICH IS NOT ONLY APPROPRIATE AND OVERDUE,
BUT WOULD ALSO SERVE AS AN IMPORTANT IMPETUS TO
THE PEACE PROCESS OVER THE LONG RUN. IN THE CASE OF
THE VILLAGE LEAGUES, USG CONTACTS WOULD GIVE US FIRST-
HAND IMPRESSIONS OF A MOVEMENT WHICH THE GOVERNMENT
OF ISRAEL BELIEVES WILL LEAD THE PALESTINIAN INHABITANTS
INTO THE PEACE PROCESS.

OB) VILLAGE LEAGUES: IN LATE 1981, THE ISRAELI AUTHORITIES
HERALDED THE FORMATION OF THE WEST BANK VILLAGE
LEAGUES, PRIMARILY AS A POLITICAL COUNTERWEIGHT TO
PRO-PLO INFLUENCES IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. FOR
REASONS BEST EXPLAINED BY CONGER JERUSALEM, THE
CONSULATE REFUSED TO MAKE CONTACT WITH VILLAGE LEAGUE
REPRESENTATIVES FOR NEARLY A YEAR. IN RESPONSE TO A
RECENT CONGER REQUEST FOR GUIDANCE AS TO WHETHER THIS
PRACTICE SHOULD BE MODIFIED, THE STATE DEPARTMENT ISSUED
INSTRUCTIONS NOT TO MEET VILLAGE LEAGUE OFFICIALS,
THEREBY FORMALIZING INTO POLICY A PRACTICE DEVELOPED
OVER TIME. THE DEGREE OF VILLAGE LEAGUE SUPPORT IN
THE WEST BANK, ITS REPRESENTATIVENESS AND ITS SCOPE
OF ACTION INDEPENDENT OF ISRAELI INFLUENCE ARE CENTRAL,
BUT HARD TO ANSWER, QUESTIONS. U.S. POLICY, HOWEVER,
HAS NOW CUT US OFF FROM ENGAGING IN DIALOGUE WITH
YET ANOTHER BODY OF PALESTINIANS.

9. IN ARGUING THE CASE FOR AN OPEN DIALOGUE WITH
PALESTINIAN ELEMENTS PREVIOUSLY CONSIDERED OFF LIMITS.
TO U.S. OFFICIALS, WE ARE NOT UNMINDFUL OF THE

FROM OUR PERSPECTIVE IN TEL AVIV, IN VIEW OF OUR BEING
CUT OFF FROM THE GROUP WHICH PALESTINIANS CLAIM IS

REPRESENTATIVE AND FROM THE GROUP WHICH ISRAEL PROCLAIMS
IS REPRESENTATIVE, WE DO NOT SEE HOW U.S. JUDGMENTS ON
PALESTINIAN INTERESTS CAN BE FORMULATED WITH CREDENCE.
FURTHERMORE, OUR NON-INVOLVEMENT HAS LEFT THE PALESTINIAN
POLITICAL ARENA OPEN ONLY TO THOSE WHO, FOR DIFFERENT
REASONS, ARE OFTEN NOT COMMITTED TO A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION
OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT. IN A SITUATION WHEREIN
ALL OTHER PARTIES HAVE VESTED INTERESTS IN PROMOTING
COMPETITIVE PALESTINIAN VIEWS, ONLY THE U.S. CAN PLAY
THE CRITICAL ROLE OF HONEST BROKER, A ROLE WHICH
WE HAVE ABDICATED FOR LESS IMPORTANT, EXPEDIENT
POLITICAL PURPOSES.

7. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES

IF ANYTHING, OUR ANALYSIS OF U.S. POLICY IN RELATED
CASES IN THE PAST SHOULD HAVE PERSUADED US TO PURSUE
A DIFFERENT POLICY VIS-A-VIS PALESTINIAN CONTACTS.
HAVE U.S. INTERESTS BEEN SERVED BY OUR REFUSAL IN
IRAQ TO MAKE CONTACT WITH DISSENTING ELEMENTS BEFORE
THE SHAH'S DOWNFALL? OR NORTH KOREAN AND LIBYAN
CONTACTS? IN THESE CASES TOO, THE OVERRIDING AMERICAN
OBJECTIVE OF DIALOGUE WAS SACRIFICED TO EXPEDIENT

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0311

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BROADER QUESTION OF THE CREDIBILITY OF U.S. COMMITMENTS TO ISRAEL. WE NOTE THAT THE 1975 MOU WAS AGREED AS A VITAL ELEMENT TO CONSUMMATE THE SHAR 11 AGREEMENT. WITHOUT IT, IT PROBABLY WOULD HAVE BEEN IMPOSSIBLE TO REACH A SECOND STAGE DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT. HOWEVER, SUBSEQUENT U.S. ADMINISTRATIONS DEFINED THIS COMMITMENT IN WAYS WHICH MADE THE ORIGINAL PROMISE TO ISRAEL MORE SWEEPING, INCLUDING THE POSSIBILITY OF ESTABLISHING EVEN LOW LEVEL DIPLOMATIC CONTACT WITH PLO OFFICIALS. ON THE QUESTION OF DIACOGUE WITH THE VILLAGE LEAGUES, U.S. POLICY IS ALSO BECOMING INCREMENTALLY MORE SWEEPING. FOR EXAMPLE, DECEMBER 17 PRESS GUIDELINES DRAFTED IN RESPONSE TO U.S. NEWSPAPER REPORTS HAVE ELEVATED THE ISSUE OF CONTACT WITH MUSTAFA DUBIN TO AN EXALTED PLANE WHICH, IT IS ALLEGED, HAS A DIRECT AND NEGATIVE IMPACT ON THE PEACE PROCESS AND U.S. REGIONAL INTERESTS.

10. FOR THE FUTURE, WE URGE THAT THE UNITED STATES CAREFULLY EVALUATE AND WEIGH THE CONSEQUENCES OF COMMITMENTS IT PLANS TO ENTER INTO. REGARDING THE QUESTION AT HAND, WE BELIEVE THAT A CAREFUL STUDY OF WHAT THE UNITED STATES HAS COMMITTED ITSELF TO REGARDING CONTACT WITH THE PLO AND THE VILLAGE LEAGUES SHOULD BE UNDERTAKEN; AND WE HOPE THAT, FOLLOWING SUCH A REVIEW, A CONSISTENT AND LEGAL WAY CAN BE FOUND TO INCREASE U.S. DIPLOMATIC MANEUVERINGS WITH THE PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

11. OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

FROM OUR READING OF THE MOOD IN WASHINGTON, WE UNDERSTAND THAT FEW ARGUMENTS WILL BE RAISED OPPOSING THE PRINCIPLES AND IDEAS OUTLINED ABOVE. THE KEY QUESTION, THEREFORE, IS HOW TO OPERATIONALIZE THIS CHANGE IN U.S. POLICY SO AS TO MAXIMIZE THE FULFILLMENT OF U.S. INTERESTS.

(A) TIMING

UNLESS THE NUSSEIN VISIT TO WASHINGTON DECEMBER 21 AUGERS A BREAKTHROUGH IN THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS, WE BELIEVE THAT THE TIME WOULD BE RIPE FOR THE U.S. TO CONSIDER PLAYING THE PLO CARD. IN DOING SO, WE COULD ESSENTIALLY TAKE THE SAME TACK AS WE DID WITH THE PEE FOLLOW-UP DELEGATION, I.E. THE UNITED STATES REMAINS FAITHFUL TO THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS, WE ARE PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE THE PRINCIPLES OUTLINED BY PRESIDENT REAGAN, BUT WE ARE SEEKING WAYS THROUGH DIALOGUE TO ELICIT INTEREST AND PARTICIPATION IN THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS.

(B) TACTICS

WE MUST BE PREPARED BOTH TO PUBLICIZE OUR INITIAL CONTACTS WITH THE PLO AND VILLAGE LEAGUES WHILE CAREFULLY PORTRAYING THEM AS PART OF OUR OUSI ON-GOING.

EFFORTS TO MOVE THE PEACE PROCESS FORWARD. WE DO NOT CONCUR WITH THE IDEA THAT HAS BEEN BROACHED THAT INITIAL CONTACTS WITH THE PLO SHOULD BE IN TUNIS OR ANOTHER ARAB CAPITAL BETWEEN A LOCALLY-STATIONED U.S. OFFICIAL AND A PLO OFFICIAL. RATHER, WE BELIEVE THAT A MID-LEVEL WASHINGTON-BASED OFFICIAL SHOULD TRAVEL TO A NEUTRAL SITE IN EUROPE. INITIAL MEETINGS WITH DUBIN OR OTHER VILLAGE LEAGUE OFFICIALS SHOULD TAKE PLACE IN THE SAME TIMEFRAME.

(C) IMPACT ON THE PEACE PROCESS

THE CENTRAL QUESTION IS WHETHER WE CAN CONTAIN THE DAMAGE IN ISRAEL, I.E., BY NOT GIVING THE BEGIN GOVERNMENT AN OPPORTUNITY TO ARGUE THAT THE U.S. HAS UNDERMINED THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS AND THUS THAT ISRAEL HAS THE "RIGHT" TO ANNEX THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. FRANKLY, WE HAVE OUR DOUBTS AS TO OUR ABILITY TO ARGUE THE SUBTLE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN A MODIFICATION OF THE 1975 MOU AND A FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE IN THE PEACE PROCESS WHICH THE 1975 AGREEMENT INAUGURATED. HOWEVER, WE BELIEVE THIS IS A RISK WORTH TAKING AND THIS IS AN ISSUE WHICH IS WORTH THAT RISK.
LEWIS

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ORIGIN: SP-02

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INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 ES-01 /003 R

DRAFTED BY S/P: AWDLFF
APPROVED BY S/P: PHAPLAN

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

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DISSENT CHANNEL FOR [REDACTED] CAP. CONT.

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E.O. 12356 12356: DECLASS: OADR
TAGS: PEPR, IS, EG, JO, PLO, XF
SUBJECT: THE U.S. AND THE PALESTINIANS: NEED FOR AN OPEN
DIALOGUE

[REDACTED] FROM S/P - PHIL KAPLAN, ACTING

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REF: TEL AVIV 19662

1. ~~0~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. THANK YOU FOR YOUR DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE ON "THE U.S.
AND THE PALESTINIANS: NEED FOR AN OPEN DIALOGUE". COPIES
OF YOUR CABLE HAVE BEEN DISTRIBUTED TO THE OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY, THE DEPUTY SECRETARY, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT,
THE UNDERSECRETARY FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS, THE SPECIAL
NEGOTIATOR FOR MIDDLE EAST PEACE, AND THE ASSISTANT
SECRETARY FOR NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS. WHEN COMMENTS FROM
THESE OFFICES HAVE BEEN RECEIVED, A MEMBER OF THE POLICY
PLANNING STAFF WILL COORDINATE A REPLY. SHULTZ

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INFO OCT-08 403-08 ES-01 /003 R

DRAFTED BY S/P:NEBOVIS:COB
APPROVED BY S/P:SBOSWORTH
S/P:ESVENDSEN (DRAFT)
S/S-M:CPATRIZIA (DRAFT)
P:RAAPHEL
HEA:VCLUVERIUS

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TO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

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DISSENT CHANNEL FROM BOSWORTH TO [REDACTED]

I.O. 12356: DECL:040R
TAGS: PEPR, IS, EG, JO, PLO, XF
SUBJECT: THE UNITED STATES AND THE PALESTINIANS: A
NEED FOR AN OPEN DIALOGUE
FOR [REDACTED]
FROM S/P DIRECTOR STEPHEN BOSWORTH

REFS: (A) TEL AVIV 1806Z (B) STATE 352534

1. -- ENTIRE TEXT.

2. REFTEL WAS A VERY THOUGHTFUL MESSAGE AND IT GAVE US A
CHANCE TO REVIEW OUR POLICY ON A VERY IMPORTANT AND
SENSITIVE SUBJECT.

3. WE NOTE YOUR VIEW THAT THE U.S. SHOULD FOSTER AN
OVERALL POLICY OBJECTIVE OF "MAINTAINING AND FOSTERING
CONTACT AND DIALOGUE WITH ALL STRAINS OF POLITICAL
EXPRESSION ON ISSUES OF CONCERN TO THE U. S." IN
FOSTERING SUCH DIALOGUES, THERE ARE ALWAYS A NUMBER OF
CONSIDERATIONS THAT MUST BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT. FIRST,
THERE IS THE QUESTION OF HOW RELEVANT THE GROUP IS TO THE

ISSUE WE ARE CONCERNED WITH AND THEIR ABILITY TO HAVE A
SIGNIFICANT IMPACT ON THAT ISSUE. THERE IS ALSO THE
QUESTION OF COSTS AND RISKS THAT MAY ATTEND THE
ESTABLISHMENT AND THE MAINTENANCE OF SUCH A DIALOGUE.
SUCH QUESTIONS ARE NOT ALWAYS EASILY ANSWERED AND IN MANY
CASES INVOLVE JUDGMENT CALLS.

4. YOU ARE CORRECT THAT THE MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT WITH
ISRAEL ON SEPTEMBER 1, 1973, PROVIDED ONLY THAT WE "WILL
NOT RECOGNIZE OR NEGOTIATE" WITH THE PLO UNTIL IT MEETS
OUR CONDITIONS. ORIGINALLY, THIS LANGUAGE -- WHICH WAS
NEGOTIATED WITH ISRAEL -- WAS UNDERSTOOD NOT TO PRECLUDE
DIRECT CONTACTS. FORMER SECRETARY KISSINGER CONFIRMED
THIS IN A TELEVISION INTERVIEW LAST YEAR. NEVERTHELESS,
IN THE YEARS THAT FOLLOVED IT CAME TO HAVE THIS MEANING.
WHILE MOVING BACK TO THE ORIGINAL MEANING IS AN OPTION,
THE ATTEMPT TO DO SO WOULD BE SEEN, AND USED POLITICALLY,
AS A BROKEN COMMITMENT.

5. IN THE CURRENT CIRCUMSTANCES WE DO NOT THINK THAT IT
WOULD BE USEFUL OR APPROPRIATE TO CHANGE CURRENT POLICY
ON DIRECT CONTACTS WITH THE PLO OR REPRESENTATIVES OF THE
PALESTINIAN VILLAGE LEAGUES. OUR POLICY ON THE ISSUES OF
MIDDLE EAST PEACE IS DEFINED BY UNSC RESOLUTIONS 242 AND
338 AND THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS. THESE PROVIDE FOR PEACE
BETWEEN ISRAEL AND ITS NEIGHBORS ON THE BASIS OF "RESPECT
FOR THE SOVEREIGNTY, TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND POLITICAL
INDEPENDENCE OF EVERY STATE IN THE AREA AND THEIR RIGHT

TO LIVE IN PEACE WITHIN SECURE AND RECOGNIZED BOUNDARIES
FREE FROM THREATS OR ACTS OF FORCE," AND IT IS ON THIS
BASIS THAT WE WISH TO MAINTAIN A DIALOGUE WITH THE
PALESTINIANS. THE PLO HAS NOT ACCEPTED THOSE PRINCIPLES
ON THE OTHER HAND, WE HAVE MADE IT CLEAR TO ALL CONCERNED
THAT WE ARE WILLING TO CONDUCT A DIALOGUE WITH THE PLO IF
IT WILL ACCEPT UNSC RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338 AND THE RIGHT
OF ISRAEL TO EXIST IN SECURE BOUNDARIES. WHEN IT MEETS
THOSE CONDITIONS, IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO TALK TO THEM.
THE PRESIDENT HAS SAID AS MUCH PUBLICLY.

6. IN THE MEANTIME, THERE IS ANOTHER FACTOR TO
CONSIDER. THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS PROVIDE FOR THE
TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE WEST BANK AND GAZA TO
BE NEGOTIATED BY EGYPT, ISRAEL, JORDAN, AND THE U. S.,
AND THEY PERMIT THE DELEGATIONS OF THE JORDAN AND EGYPT
TO INCLUDE "PALESTINIANS FROM THE WEST BANK AND
GAZA...." WHILE SOME OF THE INHABITANTS OF THE WEST BANK
AND GAZA MAY BE MEMBERS OF THE PLO, THEY ARE NOT OVERTLY
IDENTIFIED AS SUCH AND, IF THEY WERE, ISRAEL WOULD
PROBABLY REFUSE TO NEGOTIATE WITH THEM ON THE GROUNDS

THAT THEY WERE TERRORISTS AND THAT THEY OPPOSED THE
PRINCIPLES OF THE COA. IN ANY EVENT, THE COA DO NOT
PROVIDE FOR REPRESENTATION BY THE PLO AS SUCH IN THE
NEGOTIATIONS, AND WE BELIEVE WE SHOULD CONCENTRATE OUR
EFFORTS ON GETTING REPRESENTATIVE PALESTINIAN INHABITANTS
FROM THE WEST BANK AND GAZA INTO THE JORDANIAN AND/OR
EGYPTIAN DELEGATIONS.

7. INDEED, A PERSUASIVE CASE COULD BE MADE THAT -- AT
THIS PARTICULAR TIME -- OUR POLICY GOALS WOULD BE
HAMPERED, RATHER THAN FURTHERED, WERE THE PLO TO MEET OUR
LONG-STANDING TERMS FOR COMMENCING A DIALOGUE. PUBLIC
ATTENTION IN THAT CASE WOULD INEVITABLY FOCUS ON THE
US-PLO RELATIONSHIP AND WELL-MEANING OBSERVERS WOULD
CONTENT THAT THE PLO HAD EARNED A PLACE AT THE
NEGOTIATING TABLE. THE ESSENTIAL ISSUE OF ARAB
ENDORSEMENT OF JORDANIAN PARTICIPATION WOULD AT BEST
BECOME FOR THEM CONFUSED AND PERHAPS LOST SIGHT OF
COMPLETELY.

8. AS FAR AS THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE VILLAGE LEAGUES
ARE CONCERNED, WE DO NOT REGARD THEM AS TRULY
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE VAST MAJORITY OF THE INHABITANTS OF
THE WEST BANK AND GAZA, EITHER JURIDICALLY OR
POLITICALLY. THEY HAVE NOT BEEN ELECTED AND HAVE NO REAL
MANDATE FROM THE PEOPLE THEY PURPORT TO REPRESENT. IN
FACT, SINCE THE VILLAGE LEAGUES AND THEIR REPRESENTATIVES
ARE CONSIDERED BY THE OTHER PALESTINIANS TO BE ISRAELI
COLLABORATORS, IDENTIFICATION WITH THEM COULD CAUSE THE
OTHER PALESTINIANS TO EQUATE OUR GOALS WITH THOSE OF THE
ISRAELIS AND DAMAGE OUR EFFORT TO GET TRULY
REPRESENTATIVE WEST BANKERS INTO THE PEACE TALKS.

9. WHILE THE ABSENCE OF DIRECT CONTACTS WITH THE PLO AND
THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE VILLAGE LEAGUES COMPLICATES OR
PREVENTS AN EFFECTIVE DIALOGUE WITH THESE GROUPS, WE ARE
AWARE OF THEIR VIEWS. THE VIEWS OF THE PLO ARE PASSED TO
US ON A REGULAR BASIS BY THE SAUDIS, THE JORDANIANS, AND
OTHER OFFICIALS AND PRIVATE CIRCLES. IN ADDITION, PLO
OFFICIALS APPEAR FREQUENTLY ON RADIO AND TV IN THE U.S.,
WHERE THEY EXPOSE THEIR VIEWS. THE VIEWS OF
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE VILLAGE LEAGUES ARE OFTEN
PUBLISHED IN THE PRESS.

10. YOUR POINT ABOUT THE PLACE AND MANNER OF THE
DIALOGUE WITH THE PLO IF AND WHEN IT BEGINS IS WELL
TAKEN. THE SUGGESTION WE MADE FOR CONTACT IN TUNIS WAS
MEANT FOR THE PRELIMINARY STAGE. THIS NEED NOT BE THE

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BY OR EVEN THE ULTIMATE WAY THE DIALOGUE IS CARRIED
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