

**Differences With Kozyrev Admitted**

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[By diplomatic correspondents Dmitriy Voskobocynikov, Igor Porshnev, Vitaliy Trubetskoy, and others; from the "Diplomatic Panorama" feature]

[Text] The plans to expand NATO by admitting Central and Eastern European countries to it do not solve the problem of ensuring security for Russia, said the director of Russia's Intelligence Service, Yevgeniy Primakov.

Presenting his service's report on the prospects for the expansion of NATO and Russia's interests at a news conference in Moscow on Thursday, he said that a major decision on expanding NATO may be taken as early as in January.

According to Primakov, the emergence of a big group with a powerful offensive potential on Russia's frontiers will make it necessary to revise the development of Russia's armed forces, but retaliatory measures taken in a brief period of time "would deal a blow to Russia's budget and security."

Primakov qualified as "speculative" the allegations that the influence exerted by the military on the taking of political decisions in Russia increased of late. Nevertheless he noted that the Russian government's inability to take retaliatory steps in connection with NATO's expansion "may generate discontent" among those who are responsible for ensuring security for Russia.

The process of turning NATO into a post-confrontational instrument is slow, and many fears would disappear if the processes of expanding the bloc and altering its nature were synchronic," Primakov said.

With reference to partnership between Russia and NATO, the director of Russia's Intelligence Service noted that such a solution does not resolve the problem of admitting countries adjoining Russia to NATO. According to him, the idea of partnership "will be afloat for a long time yet," since it is "amorphous enough" for the time being.

Russia is far from believing that to expand NATO is tantamount to expanding a springboard for launching a strike on Russia, Primakov stressed. There is no intention of pressing our will on other countries, he declared. Nevertheless Russia has its own interests, and it has the right to protect them, Primakov pointed out.

According to his service's analytical bureau, to expand NATO will not be conducive to speeding up its transformation. The efforts to "change NATO in psychological terms" will take a lot of time yet, he said.

The chief of Russia's Intelligence Service does not believe that conditions will emerge in the near future

that would prompt Russia to create a new politico-military bloc. Nevertheless he said that no state can be deprived of its right to collective security.

When asked about the possibility of disagreements with the Foreign Ministry on the issue of NATO's expansion, Primakov said he is absolutely confident that in strategic terms Russia's foreign ministry works to protect Russian interests. He conceded however that "some differences between departments always exist."

**NATO Report Summarized**

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["Key extracts" from a report by Academician Ye. Primakov, director of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service, under the "IZVESTIYA Documents" rubric: "Prospects for NATO Expansion and Russian Interests. Foreign Intelligence Service Report"]

[Text] Today IZVESTIYA publishes key extracts from a report which has just been promulgated by Academician Yevgeniy Primakov, director of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service, and which touches on what is perhaps the most acute problem of Russia's relations with the countries of distant foreign parts.

The report, which runs to 13 pages, is unclassified: It is open to anyone, indeed it is comes entirely free of charge. The report has two sections. We will pass over the first. It analyzes the approach of various NATO countries to the problem of widening North Atlantic Alliance membership. But the second (which we are publishing in a slightly abridged form) assesses this problem from the viewpoint of Russian interests: economic, political, and military.

**2.1 The North Atlantic Alliance's Prospects**

According to Foreign Intelligence Service [FIS] experts, an analysis of the impact of the process of NATO's expansion on Russia's interests requires first of all forecasts connected with the alliance's potential evolution after the end of the cold war.

Many of Russia's fears associated with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe joining NATO would disappear or would be eased if there were guarantees either of the priority development of the process of changing the alliance's functions or of the parallel expansion of NATO's political functions and its geopolitical scale. But these guarantees are absent.

First and foremost, the question of the prospects for the transformation of NATO is not clear enough. There is no clear understanding in the alliance at the moment of its role and place in the system of international relations in the postconfrontational period.

The stereotypical bloc mentality also persists, particularly in the case of a number of representatives of the military leadership of the Western countries and of the

alliance as a whole. One of these stereotypes is that the USSR, the nucleus of which was Russia, was regarded for many years as the main source of the military threat to the very existence of Western civilization. Obviously it will take a long time to eradicate these "residual" phenomena. And the withdrawal symptoms are bound to be painful.

Nor should one discount the inertia of the arms race, which requires that the image of the enemy, albeit a potential enemy, be ever present in the mind of the public.

The desire of the central and East European countries, by joining NATO, to get the West to actively contribute to the solution of their domestic political and external problems could have an unexpected effect. If drawn into complex processes in East European states, involving a fierce struggle, the North Atlantic Alliance could face the objective need to harden its line. The transformation of NATO into a universal peacemaking and stabilizing force could be a protracted process. At any rate, there is a danger that this process and the expansion of the alliance's membership will not be synchronized. This would endanger the Russian Federation's interests, since this nonsynchronization could reduce the chances of the split in the continent's finally being mended and could lead to a recrudescence of the bloc policy, moreover in conditions where NATO's zone of responsibility now reaches the Russian Federation's borders.

## 2.2 Geopolitical Aspects

Experts have reached the conclusion that the exploratory proposals to Russia concerning partnership with NATO contain no discernible intention of creating a mechanism to maintain international security that is appropriate, in its composition and functions, to the conditions of the postconfrontational period. The idea of such a mechanism is under discussion in the West. Specialists in the United States, for example, are examining the possibility of the creation at the present stage of a collective security organization that will be something intermediate between NATO, on the one hand, and CSCE and the United Nations, on the other.

Naturally it is of fundamental importance to Russia what kind of alliance it is joining and what its functions are and what kind of partnership it is establishing with it.

## 2.3 Military Aspects

It is hard to imagine and it would be wrong to assume that the geographical expansion of NATO will serve to establish a bridgehead for a strike against Russia or its allies. But this is not the same as saying that NATO's eastward movement does not affect Russia's military security interests.

All kinds of interpretations of the Russian army's position on the aforementioned questions have been going around in the West of late. In particular, the myth has arisen that the generals want to exploit their "heightened

influence" on the Russian Government and "impose" a hard line on it in the sphere of safeguarding national security. These opinions are speculative. The Russian military leadership clearly must make the following points.

1. The fact that as a result of NATO's expansion its biggest military grouping, the biggest in the world, possessing massive offensive potential, comes into direct proximity with the Russian borders demands a fundamental reappraisal of all the defensive concepts, the reorganization of the armed forces, a review of the operational allocation of theaters of hostilities, the development of an additional infrastructure, the redeployment of major troop contingents, and the alteration of operational plans and of the nature of combat training.

2. The implementation of the above measures, rapidly, moreover, will put a strain on the state budget and will weaken Russia's defense capability during the restructuring and the movement of forward-based groupings of armed forces.

3. It is clear that in these conditions there will be a danger that existing programs of cuts, of the reorganization and professionalization of the Armed Forces, programs for equipping them with expensive modern, high-technology weapon systems might be delayed or disrupted. If we fall behind in this sphere there will be a qualitative reduction in the combat potential of the Russian Armed Forces compared with the level of the leading military powers.

4. If the Russian Government is unable to ensure the normal functioning, manning, material-technical provision, and social protection of the Armed Forces there could be disaffection in the Army, which is obviously not in the interests of either the political or the military leadership of Russia or of the country as a whole.

Nor can one overlook the fact that the expansion of NATO would result in its zone of responsibility covering the part of the European continent where interstate borders were altered as a result of World War II. Moreover this process is envisaged in conditions where as a result of the formation of new states in Europe, the Helsinki accords establishing the status quo are ceasing to operate or are being significantly weakened. Consequently, one might say that in the new conditions NATO will be an alternative guarantor of postwar European borders. Along with the positive aspects, this has a negative side as well. There is reason to suppose that when studying the question of the expansion of NATO certain circles in Germany are viewing this process in terms of the future development of the situation around the postwar borders.

The NATO leadership stresses that it has no intention of establishing a "cordon sanitaire" in central and Eastern Europe separating Russia from Western Europe. But this could happen irrespective of the NATO leaders' subjective intentions.

It must be borne in mind also that a change in the NATO membership is bound to undermine a number of the alliance's international commitments under multilateral treaties and agreements, in particular the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe, the preservation of which will contribute to stability and security on the continent. In the event of NATO's expansion by the addition of countries of the former Warsaw Pact, the principle of balance of power is upset. So the quotas of the conventional armaments not only of the potential new members of NATO, but also of the CIS countries, above all Russia, in particular on the flanks, would be called into question.

It should be said that all the adjustments to the treaty, which Russia has been seeking over the past 18 months-2 years at bilateral and multilateral talks, have encountered tough resistance and a negative reaction on NATO's part. For instance, Russian President B.N. Yeltsin's message (September 1993) to the NATO countries' leaders, which contained proposals on reviewing "flank" restrictions on Russia's Armed Forces (article V), was virtually rejected by the alliance leadership. There is a great deal of evidence that this will remain the bloc's stance until the end of 1995—the date of completion of the cuts in conventional armaments under the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe.

#### 2.4 Domestic Political Aspects

One cannot overlook the possibility of NATO's expansion's having an adverse effect on the domestic political situation in Russia and on Russians' psychological state. Public antipathy toward NATO has been fostered over a long period in the Russian Federation. This cannot be changed overnight. In view of this, the extension of NATO's zone of responsibility to former union states of the USSR will be seen at the present stage by a large section of the public in terms of "bringing the danger close to the frontiers of the homeland." This could give a fillip to anti-Western forces in the Russian Federation, provide them with arguments for purposeful attempts to discredit the government's course. In these conditions you might see a revival in the country of a "siege mentality" and of isolationist trends with all the negative consequences that would have for the implementation of the course of reforms.

Foreign Intelligence Service experts have arrived at the following conclusions:

- in the conditions of the postconfrontational period and of the absence of the so-called bloc discipline that existed up until the abolition of the Warsaw Pact, Russia has no right to tell the sovereign states of central and Eastern Europe whether they should join NATO or any other international associations;
- it would be in Russia's interests to synchronize the process of expanding NATO's zone of responsibility with a change in the nature of the alliance, the adaptation of its functions to the character of the present stage of historical development;

- the process of the Central and East European states' joining NATO, its character and timeframe, and the new members' obligations and rights must be formed taking into account the opinion of all interested parties, including Russia, the prospects of the strengthening of the foundations of collective security on the continent, the development of all-European cooperation, and also the need to provide guarantees of the unswerving observance by all countries aspiring to participate in the North Atlantic Alliance of the international agreements concluded by them;

- only by taking the aforementioned factors into account will it be possible to contribute to the creation of the prerequisites and favorable conditions for collaboration between the Russian Federation and NATO and the transfer of relations between them to the level of real partnership;

- at the present stage one should conduct a multivector policy of all-round development of cooperation with all international institutions capable of contributing to the creation of an integral system of collective security in Europe.

#### Need for Higher Approval Viewed

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[Aleksandr Vasilyev article: "Primakov Comes Out of the 'Wood.' Kremlin Amending Its Stance on NATO with Help of Intelligence?"]

[Text] The Russian Federation Foreign Intelligence Service yesterday published its report "Prospects for NATO's Expansion and Russia's Interests." We can imagine how it was prepared—how Russian station officers chatted at society receptions or in noisy restaurants with officials and journalists who had accurate information, or pretended they had; how "our man in Europe" would meet a NATO secretary in some zoological gardens and take from her trembling hands a copy of a top secret paper; how another operative would hastily translate an article from Britain's *THE ECONOMIST* magazine, prefacing it with "we have learned from a well-informed source." All this came together in Moscow, in the Yasenevo "wood," where specialists analyzed it and pondered on it, and where stylists scratched their heads, choosing between "seemingly probable" and "there are grounds to believe." Then this raw material landed on the desk of Academician Yevgeniy Primakov, the director of the Foreign Intelligence Service. Incidentally, we have learned from well-informed sources that Ye. Primakov did a lot of work on the report—he is proud of his handiwork, and that is why he presented it in person yesterday.

The conclusion can be drawn from the report that the prospects of NATO's expansion suit everyone except Russia. It is something that the Western powers and their smaller allies want—admittedly, for different reasons. They also have different views of the process whereby



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