THE BATTLE FOR IRAN

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FOREWORD

This account of the role of the Central Intelligence Agency in the political action operation that altered the course of history in Iran was written with the enthusiastic cooperation of the Near East Division, Directorate of Operations. It is based on files remaining in the Division (although the great bulk of the correspondence and traffic dealing with the operation was destroyed in 1962), on the draft history written in 1954 by Dr. Donald N. Wilber, on personal interviews with a number of active and retired Agency officers who participated in the action, on Central Reference Service personality files, and on a variety of open sources. Unless otherwise noted, major documentary sources were NE Division files.

Claud H. Corrigan
CIA History Staff
I. INTRODUCTION

Iran in late 1952 was sliding toward economic and political chaos. Its young ruler, Mohammad Reza Shah, was indecisive and vacillating in the face of the crisis created by his fanatically nationalistic Premier, the 72-year-old Mohammad Mosadeq. His country was involved in a bitter dispute with Great Britain over the oil concession that the British had since 1901 built into a lucrative industry. Iran's nationalists, personified by Mosadeq, had paralyzed this industry rather than allow foreigners to continue to direct its operations and benefit from their natural resources. With the dispute at an impasse and with Mosadeq ruling by decree, the country seemed headed for an economic collapse and political anarchy whose final outcome could well have been the establishment of a Soviet satellite in the Middle East. How the diplomatic and intelligence services of the United States worked with Iranians loyal to the Shah to prevent the loss of Iran is the subject of this history. Understanding of how and why this action was taken will be clarified by an initial review of historical events and of Iran's people, economy, and politics.

II. IRAN, ANCIENT AND MODERN

A. The Nation

1. Imperial Past

The first Persian empire, that of the Achaemenid dynasty, was founded by Cyrus the Great in the Sixth Century B.C. through conquest

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1 See Appendix B for a brief biography of Mosadeq.
2 Persia was derived through Greek from Persis, the name the Greeks used for Parsa, the tribe and province of the Achaemenids. In 1935 Reza Shah insisted that foreigners use Iran, the native usage which means "Land of the Aryans," rather than Persia.
of the Medes and other kingdoms of the region now generally known as the Middle East. Cyrus' grandson, Darius, further extended the empire, which he divided into 20 satraps or provinces connected by a network of imperial roads. The Achaemenid empire endured for almost 200 years, until it was destroyed by Alexander the Great of Macedonia. The Greeks were soon succeeded by the Parthian dynasty, which in turn was followed by the Sassanids, who ruled for 400 years from the third to the seventh centuries A.D. and who restored the glory of ancient Persia.

In 651, however, the Arab invasion swept across Persia, which for the next nine centuries was ruled by a succession of foreign conquerors. A native Persian dynasty rose again at the beginning of the 16th century when the Safavids came to power; their rule lasted over 200 years and reached its peak under Shah Abbas from 1587 to 1620. Invading Afghans overthrew the Safavids in 1722 and were in turn driven out by Nadir Shah, a Turkic-speaking tribesman who launched a campaign of conquest that included invasions of India and the Caucasus. The succeeding dynasty, that of the Qajars, lasted until the early 1920's when Reza Khan, a colonel in the Iranian army's Cossack Division, seized power in a military coup. He became Shah in 1925, deposing the Qajars and founding the Pahlavi dynasty. When Iran was occupied in 1941 by British and Soviet troops in order to guarantee the Allied supply route to the embattled Russians, Reza Shah abdicated and was succeeded by his son, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, the present Shah.

2. The people Of Iran's population in 1952 of under 18 million, more than 70% were ethnic Iranians of Indo-European stock; Persians made up

3 See Appendix B for biographic details on Reza Shah.
The other ethnic Iranians included Kurdish, Gilani, Mazandaran, Lur, Bakhtiar, and Baluchi tribesmen, many of whom were nomadic or seminomadic peoples. Another 22% or so of the population were Turkic peoples, primarily the Azarbaijani of the northwestern provinces but also including the Turkoman and Qashqai tribal groups. Arabs made up about 5% of the population, and the remainder were non-Muslims, including Armenians, Assyrians, and Jews. Persian (or Farsi, as it is known in Iran) was the official language, spoken by most ethnic Iranians, although Turkic and Arabic dialects were also in use.

Almost all Iranians are Shia Muslims, in contrast to the Sunnis who predominate in the Muslim world. Shites believe that the true succession to the leadership of Islam continued through the line of 'Ali (Mohammad's son-in-law) in the series of the 12 Imams, in contrast to the Sunnis who insist that the Caliphs succeeding Mohammad were selected by the consensus of the Muslim community. Although there is no organized Shia hierarchy, certain titles distinguish special members of the religious community. A cleric of limited theological training is a "mullah," while one who has studied at a higher institution is a "mujtahid" and qualified to adjudicate questions of religious conduct. The most important Iranian religious leaders have borne the honorary title of "Ayatollah," and the leader at the Shrine at the city of Qom may issue decrees which have the force of law to the faithful. A descendant of Mohammad may use the title "Sayyid" as part of his name, but he is not necessarily a religious figure.

The social structure in the early 1950's included an elite composed of the Shah, his court, and the 200 or more ruling families whose wealth...
derived from agricultural landholdings. Below the elite was the upper middle class that included government officials, professional men, importers, bankers, and merchants. The urban middle class consisted mainly of small merchants, craftsmen, lower level clergy, and teachers and as a group had not benefited greatly from the economic development and educational opportunities of the previous two decades. The day laborers, street vendors, and service workers were at the bottom of the urban class structure. Most of the country's people were working in the 1950 era as tenants, bound to their landlords by an almost feudal system. Outside the Iranian social structure were the tribes, whose social system in times of peace impeded the progress and modernization of Iran and was a source of weakness. In times of stress, however, the tribes were a source of strength.

In the 1941-45 period, they remained relatively untouched by the general collapse, but while retaining some stability, the tribes contributed to confusion and disorder through their clannish narrow-mindedness, tribal rather than national loyalties, and readiness to resort to violence.

As a people, Iranians have been described as having an intense national pride that has resulted from a fairly homogeneous stock and a 2,500-year history. In spite of this pride in the achievements of past dynasties and the high level of intelligence among those who have had the means to develop their potentials, the national movement of the 1950's accomplished little.

Among the reasons accounting for this are the fact that nationalistic feelings and native intelligence are often accompanied by an individualism that inhibits cooperation, by a cynicism that despises enthusiasm, by an impatience that derides calculation, and by a volubility that abhors discretion. Their nationalism thus has lacked an air of common purpose, of willingness to sacrifice, of the dedication that has given impetus to the national movements of other, less well-endowed peoples.

3. The economy

In 1950 Iran was still basically an agricultural nation with a backward economy. Farming, stock raising, forestry, and fisheries probably accounted for half the gross national product; wheat was the major crop, followed by barley, rice, cotton, and tobacco. Manufacturing was growing in importance, with textiles--cotton and wool--leading the cement, match, and glass industries, although food processing was still the most important non-oil activity.

Oil, of course, prior to 1951 when the effects of the dispute with the British were severely felt, was contributing about a third of budgetary revenue and nearly two-thirds of foreign exchange. Oil revenues started to climb when the war ended, going from £7.13 million in 1946 to £16.03 million in 1950; by 1952, they were only £8.3 million. In 1950, 31,217,000 metric tons of oil were exported, but this fell to 9,158,000 metric tons in 1951 and to a pitiful 14,000 metric tons in 1952 when the British left.
4. Politics and government

Until the early years of the 20th century, Persia had either been an absolute monarchy or had been under the rule of foreign invaders. In July 1906, however, popular resentment against the excesses of Muzaffir ad-Din, a Shah of the Qajar dynasty whose excursions to Europe were nearly bankrupting his country's treasury, grew so strong that widespread demonstrations and riots forced him to proclaim a constitution. This relatively liberal document, supplemented in 1907 and amended in 1925, 1949, and 1957, provided for a government of three branches. The power of the executive was vested in the cabinet and in government officials acting in the Shah's name. The judiciary was composed of a hierarchy of civil courts up through the Supreme Court, while the legislative branch comprised the parliament, or Majlis, of 136 members, elected by the people every 2 years, and, after 1949, the smaller Senate, half of whose members were appointed by the Shah and half elected.

Whatever power remained in the hands of the Qajar Shah vanished soon after World War I, in which Iran had maintained a slightly pro-German neutrality that was violated by Turkey, Russia, and Britain. In February 1921, a young reformist politician, Seyyid Zia ed-Din Tabatabai, and Col. Reza Khan, commander of the Iranian Cossack Division, combined to overthrow the government. Zia ed-Din became Premier and Reza Khan commander-in-chief of the army, but the two soon quarreled, and Zia ed-Din fled into exile. In May 1921, Reza Khan remained

The Cossack Division, at that time the only well-organized and effective unit in the army, came into being as a result of Nasr ed-Din Shah's visit to Russia in 1879. The Shah admired his Cossack escort and asked the Czar to send him Russian officers to organize a Cossack cavalry regiment in the Iranian army. It grew to a brigade and then a division, and its White Russian officers and noncoms were retained until October 1920, when Reza Khan replaced Col. Starrovsalsky as commander and other Iranians took over for the remaining Russians.
in power as Minister of War, devoting himself to the reorganization of the army. Unifying the heterogeneous military units into a closely knit, centrally-controlled army, he employed it to pacify Azerbaijan, and quell the rebellious tribes. Reza Khan took over as Premier in 1923, and two years later he became Shah.

The two focal points of Reza Shah's dictatorial rule were nationalism and modernization, and in this he greatly resembled Kemal Ataturk in Turkey, although his methods and goals were less radical. He improved the status of women and checked the power of the Shia clergy, but he stopped short of Ataturk's romanization of the national language—Farsi retained its Arabic script. As a nationalist, he was suspicious and guarded toward the Soviet Union and challenging toward the British, particularly as to the oil concession, which he felt did not sufficiently benefit Iran. He brought in first American and then German economic advisers to reorganize the country's finances and to serve as a counter-weight to Soviet and British influence.

Reza Shah's dictatorial rule ended with the occupation of his country by the Soviets and the British in August 1941—an episode that will be discussed below—and a month later he abdicated in favor of his son, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, who was proclaimed Shah by the Majlis. He left Iran at once and eventually did so in exile in South Africa in 1944. The Iranian government he left behind faced a difficult period, with a Russian occupation in the north and a British one in the south. Tehran remained a neutral zone, but the Allies controlled the transportation.
system, and wartime shortages of food and consumer goods led to a
crippling inflation.

Suddenly brought to power in an occupied country, the young Shah,
partially
who had been educated in Europe and who was believed to favor constitu-
tional government, was unable to provide strong leadership
to his government. As a result the power of the Majlis increased, a
large number of transitory political parties and partisan newspapers
were started, the tribes again became defiant, the clergy became stronger,
and the Communists—banned as a party in the 1920's—returned in the
 guise of the Tudeh Party. Tudeh, headed by leftists and former Communist
Party members, received funds and direction from Moscow and recruited
both members and sympathizers throughout Iran during the war years and
until its overt apparatus was crushed in 1954.

Little more than a department of Reza Shah's government in the 1920's
and 1930's, the Majlis emerged from the years of occupation as a revitalized
political force. It insisted on confirming the appointment of the
U.S. financial advisory mission in 1942, it imposed limits on the govern-
ment's right to negotiate oil concessions, and it took on the selection
of a new Premier as its privilege—even though the Shah retained the right
to approve or disapprove the choice. In its dealings with Premiers or
Shahs, the Majlis had a powerful weapon—the quorum veto. The constitution
stated that the Majlis could only be considered convened when two-thirds of
its 136 deputies had reached Tehran, and half of those present in the
capital constituted a quorum. Thus, if 91 deputies were in Tehran, the
absence of 46 of them could keep the assembly from functioning.

Political parties in the Western sense had never been strong in Iran,
and during the war years their number had multiplied. Only the Tudeh was
an effective political organization, and it was included among the
"minority" parties, as opposed to the "majority" grouping that tended

to vote together on key national issues. In general, political forces
in postwar Iran had sorted themselves out into left, right, and center
groups. Tudeh and its sympathizers were on the left. The right was
more heterogeneous and included Dr. Mohammad Mosadeq's National Front, the
fanatical religious organizations Fedayan Islam and Mojahadin Islam, the
several small fascist parties, most Tehran University students and
professors, and many small merchants and businessmen. The center was
moderate and inclined to be more pro-Western; it included the Shah, most
army officers, the Democratic Party, and the wealthy merchants and land-
owners who favored the status quo. Aided by landowner control over the
peasant vote, center candidates usually won the majority of Majlis seats,
but in the late 1940's and early 1950's, the nationalistic policies of
the right regularly won the voting support of the left and center.

B. Between Russia and the West

1. Aggression from the North

Iran lost wars and territory to Czarist Russia in 1913 and
again in 1928 and has lived in varying degrees of dread of its northern
neighbor ever since. Great Britain was the counterbalance to Russian
power—the British goal was to keep Iran as a buffer between Russia and

7 For example, in the 16th Majlis, elected in 1950, the National Front
was composed of Mosadeq and eight followers who nonetheless were usually
able to carry a majority of deputies with them on key votes.

8 Fedayan Islam, numbering at most a few hundred members, carried out
terrorist acts in support of its goal of restablishing Islamic
law and practice to a dominant place in Iran. Mojahadin
Islam was more political; its religious spearhead in the Majlis included
mullah Ayatollah Kashani and Shams Qanatabadi, two influential, politically
oriented religious leaders.
India—until 1907, when Britain and Russia signed an agreement to divide Iran into zones of influence. The British purpose was to secure Russia as an ally in Europe against the growing power of Imperial Germany, and the result was that northern and central Iran as far south as Isfahan was open to Russian economic and political influence. The British zone was southeastern Iran adjacent to Indian Baluchistan until 1915, when in return for rights to the oil-rich southwestern zone the British recognized Russian claims to control of the Turkish Straits.

During World War I, Iranian neutrality was violated by the Turks, the Russians, and the British; the Russians entered northern Iran to counter Turkish advances through Iran toward the Caucasus, while the British sent in troops and organized Iranians into the British-officered South Persian Rifles to counter German attempts at subversion among the tribes and sabotage of the oil pipeline. The Russian military collapse in 1917 left a vacuum in northern Iran and the Caucasus that the Bolsheviks, Turks, Germans, and British attempted to fill. Britain's anti-Bolshevik intervention in Russia and Iran ended in 1919, but a treaty was concluded with Iran in August 1919 that would have made Iran a virtual British protectorate. This treaty was never ratified by the Majlis, however, and when Reza Khan and Seyyid Zia ed-Din seized power in 1921, Iran formally repudiated it.

From the start, Soviet Russia's official policy toward Iran was friendly. In a January 1918 note, the Soviets renounced all Czarist privileges contrary to the sovereignty of Iran and promised to aid the Iranians in expelling British and Turkish occupying forces. Their note
also declared that the 1907 treaty with Britain was no longer binding.

In an additional note of 26 June 1919, the Russians annulled all Iranian debts, renounced all Russian concessions in Iran—including the Russian Discount Bank and all railroads, harbors, and highways built by them—and declared the capitulations (privileges and exemptions guaranteed to Russian citizens in Iran) null and void. The Soviet-Iranian Treaty of Friendship of February 1921 formalized the provisions of the 1919 note, renounced any interference in one another’s internal affairs, gave Iran the right to maintain naval forces in the Caspian Sea, and permitted Russia to send troops into Iran if it should become a base for a third-country threat to the Soviet Union. (This final provision, which originally applied to White Russian forces, was subject to Soviet interpretation of what constituted a threat and was a significant factor in restraining forceful British response to the Iranian takeover of the oil industry in 1951.)

Iranian relations with the Soviets in the 1920s concentrated on trade, which built up significantly until 1926, when a sudden and strict embargo was placed on Iranian agricultural products, mainly from the northern provinces. The embargo forced Iran to conclude a commercial treaty with the Russians that introduced barter transactions and gave the Soviets exclusive marketing privileges in Iran. This had several results: The Soviet share of Iranian foreign trade rose from 23% in 1926-27 to over 38% in 1928-29; Iranian industrial development was deliberately discouraged by the artificially low prices the Soviets put on competitive manufactured goods; and, Iran began to turn toward Germany as a foreign trade partner.

Germany, in addition to increasing its purchases of Iranian products, also became involved in the construction of the Trans-Iranian Railway, one
of Reza Shah's most important accomplishments. Germans ran Iran's internal airlines in the late 1920's and the 1930's, supplied railway rolling stock and motor vehicles, and aided industrialization in Iran by setting up foundries, coal mining equipment, a cement factory, textile and paper mills, and a machinegun factory. A German financial adviser replaced the American Dr. Arthur Hillspaugh in 1927, and the Germans and Iranians signed a trade treaty in 1923 and a treaty of friendship in 1929. As a result, Germany's share of Iran's foreign trade rose from 8% in 1932-33 to 45.5% in 1940-41, and by August 1941 the number of German advisers, technicians, and businessmen in Iran reached 2,000.

The nature and extent of this German penetration into Iran became very significant when German armed forces invaded Russia in 1941 and rapidly moved deeply into the Soviet Union. Iran was the shortest and most feasible route for badly needed war materials to be sent to Russia by its new allies in the West. Further, the possibility of a German takeover in Iran was a risk the Russians could not allow. On 19 July and 16 August 1941 the British and Soviet diplomatic missions in Tehran presented notes demanding the expulsion of the Germans in Iran, but Iran insisted it was neutral and that no danger existed. On 25 August, the final Allied demands were presented and the invasion began; the Soviets entered Iran from the north in three columns, the British from the south in two. Iranian armed resistance was negligible except for a sharp fight in Khuzistan that cost 55 British casualties. The Ali Mansur cabinet resigned on 27 August, and the official surrender took place the next day.
Under its terms, the Soviets were to occupy the five northern provinces and the British the southern provinces, leaving central Iran and the capital to the Iranians; all Germans were to be expelled or turned over to the Allies; Iran was to facilitate the transport of Allied supplies. Reza Shah's position was made untenable by the poor performance of his army and by the subsequent hostile Allied propaganda campaign, and he abdicated in favor of his 22-year-old son on 16 September 1941. Although most Germans were interned or sent back to Germany, a number of key agents escaped and sought to stir up the tribes to sabotage and rebellion; Maj. Julius Schulze worked among the Qashqai, and Franz Hayr tried to stir up the Kurds and sabotage the railroads. A number of prominent Iranians were found to be listed among Hayr's actual or potential agents, and many of them—including Maj. Gen. Fazlollah Zahedi, who in 1953 became the leading Iranian military man in the coup that ousted Mossadeq and who succeeded him as Premier—were arrested and sent to detention camps in Palestine.

The de facto situation of the occupation was confirmed by the Tripartite Treaty of Alliance signed by the Soviet Union, Britain, and Iran on 29 June 1942. In this treaty, the Allies promised to withdraw their forces from Iran not later than six months after hostilities with Germany and its associates had ceased. Although the Iranians feared Russia and disliked the British presence and methods employed in seizing and running the transport system, they declared war on Germany in September 1943; presumably to ensure being on the winning side. When Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin met in Tehran in November 1943 (without ever officially consulting or advising the Iranian government), they signed the Declaration on Iran, which recognized Iranian assistance to the war effort, promised economic aid, and reaffirmed Iran's independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity.

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Nonetheless, when the war ended in 1945, there were difficulties with the Soviets. In late 1944, they attempted to get Iranian approval for their exploitation of oil in Semnan in the Soviet zone. The furor over Iran's rejection of this offer, which was backed up by U.S. Ambassador Leland Morris' statement that the U.S. Government recognized the sovereign right of Iran to refuse to grant oil concessions, led to the resignation of Premier Sa'ed. With the new Premier under heavy Soviet pressure, Mohammad Mosadeg introduced a bill into the Majlis making it a crime for any cabinet minister to enter into negotiations with or to grant oil concessions to foreigners without the approval of the Majlis. The bill was passed on 2 December 1944.

Frustrated in their attempts to obtain a solid claim to oil in northern Iran, the Soviets became reluctant to leave Azerbaijan. On 29 November 1945, the United States proposed that all Allied troops be evacuated by 1 January 1946, but the Soviets insisted on the March 1946 date previously agreed to by the British. On 12 December, the "Autonomous Republic of Azerbaijan" was proclaimed, a national assembly elected, and Ja'afar Pishevari, a veteran Comintern agent, was named Premier. At the same time a Kurdish uprising took place in western Azerbaijan, and a Kurdish People's Republic was proclaimed with Qazi Mohammad as president; it promptly allied itself with the "Autonomous Republic."

On 22 January 1946, the Shah asked Qavam as-Saltaneh to form a new government. After dismissing General Arfa, who had pro-British tendencies as Chief of Staff, Qavam went to Moscow in February to negotiate with the Russians. The Soviets proposed that their troops remain indefinitely in parts of Iran, that Iran recognize the internal autonomy of Azerbaijan (whose premier would also be designated governor-

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general), and that rather than a Soviet oil concession a joint Iranian-Russian stock company be set up, with 51% of the shares to be owned by Russia, 49% by Iran. Qavam rejected these demands and returned to Tehran, where he faced a political crisis. The 14th Majlis was due to end its two-year term on 11 March 1946, and it had voted that no elections for the next Majlis could be held while foreign troops were still in the country (U.S. forces left Iran 1 January, the British on 2 March). The deputies' attempts to meet and vote to extend their terms were frustrated by Tudeh demonstrators, who until after 11 March physically prevented a quorum from gathering. Qavam was thus left to rule the country until the 15th Majlis could be elected.

Iran then brought the matter of the continuing Soviet occupation before the new United Nations Security Council, and under U.N. and U.S. pressure, the Soviets on 4 April 1946 concluded an agreement with Iran that called for evacuation of all Soviet troops within a month and a half after 24 March 1946, the establishment of a joint stock oil company which would be approved by the Majlis within 7 months after 24 March, and arrangements for improvement of relations between the Iranian government and the people of Azerbaijan.

Accordingly, Qavam worked out an agreement with Pishevari that would have conceded most Communist demands while leaving Azerbaijan under the nominal authority of Tehran. The Soviets appeared to be gaining influence in Iran, an impression that was reinforced when on 2 August 1946 Qavam brought three Tudeh Party members and a Tudeh sympathizer into his "popular front" cabinet. In the meantime, Tudeh had provoked an oil
workers’ strike in Khuzistan that involved 100,000 workers...

The inclusion of Tudeh in the Qavam government brought British reaction. British troops were moved from India to Iraq, with the stated purpose of securing supplies of Iran oil.

Britain needed. Then, with encouragement from British military advisors in their region, a coalition of Qashqai, Bakhtiari, and other tribesmen was formed which in a demonstration of Bushire, Abadeh, Kazerun, Bandar Amir, and besieged Shiraz.

was ultimately worked out in mid-October between the tribal Khan Qashqai, and General Zahedi, then commanding the garrisons in which the government recognized the tribes’ demands. On Qavam resigned and took office again, and the new cabinet had not include the Tudehites; on 24 November Qavam ordered the Azarbaijan to supervise the elections for the 15th Majlis.

chance to redeem itself for the failure in 1941, the army enthusiastically. There was little resistance from the light Azarbaijan forces, and on 14 December the “autonomous” collapsed. The army also captured the Kurdish stronghold of executing the leaders of that rebellion. In Tehran, Tudeh were raided, and the way was opened for the elections to be

When the 15th Majlis was finally inaugurated in August, opposition led by Dr. Mosadeq began to fight the ratification of oil agreement. In the face of Soviet pressure on the Iranian U.S. Ambassador, George V. Allen, in a speech on 11 September, the

Irano-American Cultural Relations Society, made it clear that Iran...
free to accept or reject the Soviet offer, and that in any case Iran would be supported by the United States against Soviet threats or pressure.

Citing American policy aimed at removing the fear of aggression anywhere in the world, Allen said:

The United States is firm in its conviction that any proposals made by one sovereign government to another should not be accompanied by threats or intimidation. When such methods are used in an effort to obtain acceptance doubt is cast on the value of the proposals.

Our determination to follow this policy as regards Iran is as strong as anywhere else in the world. This purpose can be achieved to the extent that the Iranian people show a determination to defend their own sovereignty. Patriotic Iranians, when considering matters affecting their national interest, may therefore rest assured that the American people will support fully their freedom to make their own choice.

Iran's resources belong to Iran. Iran can give them away free of charge or refuse to dispose of them at any price if it so desires.

Thus convinced of U.S. support, on 22 October 1947 the Majlis rejected the Soviet oil agreement by a vote of 102 to 2 and instead passed a bill that forbade further oil concessions to foreign governments or partners and called for negotiations with the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company for a greater share of the profits. This measure was to have far-reaching effects on Iran's relations with Great Britain and the United States.

2. The Oil Dispute, 1949-53

The involvement of Great Britain in Iranian oil went back to the original D'Arcy concession of 1901, the first of a series of grants that were renegotiated at various times to keep up with the growth of the oil industry and world demand for oil. The Anglo-Persian Oil Company was founded in 1909, but it took on a new complexion in 1914 when the British government became the major shareholder. The reason for this

9 The New York Times, 12 September 1947
official investment was obvious; Winston Churchill became First Lord of the Admiralty in 1911 and forced the decision, which had been debated for nearly a decade, to convert the Royal Navy from burning coal to burning oil. On the brink of a major war, the navy had to be assured of a source of oil, which was both efficient and cheap. Anglo-Persian (Anglo-Iranian, after 1935) Oil Company continued to extract oil under its original concession for the next 30 or so years, building pipelines as well as a large refinery at Abadan. The concession was renegotiated in 1933 to give Iran a greater share of the net profits and to modify the concession area. Managers and technicians continued to be either British or Indian, with the Iranians providing unskilled or semiskilled labor.

Following the passage of the Majlis legislation of 1947 rejecting the Soviet oil concession, the Iranian government presented to Anglo-Iranian a list of 25 points to be discussed. Chief among these were British taxation on Iran's share of company profits, Iran's rights to the company's installations at the end of the concession in 1993, a reduction in the number of British employees, the royalty basis—that is, the price to be paid to Iran for each barrel extracted and sold through AIOC's marketing and transporting system, and Iranian tax and custom exemptions. After lengthy discussions, the so-called "Supplemental Agreement" raising the royalty payment from 4 to 6 shillings a ton and giving Iran 20% of distributed profits and general reserve was sent to the Majlis on 19 July 1949.

Debate began shortly thereafter, but the term of the 15th Majlis ended before a vote on ratification could be taken. Elections for the 16th Majlis were finally completed in March 1950, and Mosadeq and his eight National Front colleagues led the balloting in Tehran. Ali Mansur

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was named Premier, and the proposed Supplemental Agreement was turned over to the Majlis Special Oil Commission for study in June 1950, the same month in which Gen. Ali Razmara, a former Chief of Staff, became Premier. The commission's report to the Majlis stated that the agreement did not adequately secure Iran's rights and should not be ratified. Razmara's Minister of Finance then withdrew the agreement and reopened negotiations with the AIOC, which by February 1951 was willing to agree to a 50-50 profit sharing similar to the agreement that Aramco had worked out with Saudi Arabia. Razmara, however, had asked a group of experts to study the feasibility of nationalization of the oil industry; their view was that Iran lacked sufficient technical expertise to run the industry, that the concession could not legally be cancelled, that heavy compensation would be due Britain, and that both foreign exchange and prestige would be lost by hasty nationalization. When Razmara opposed immediate nationalization as impractical under the circumstances, he was assassinated on 7 March 1951 by a member of Fedayan Islam, the rightist religious terrorist group. Hosein Ala briefly succeeded Razmara as Premier, and the Majlis approved the principle of nationalizing oil. When Ala resigned in April, the Majlis voted to recommend Mosadeq to the Shah as Premier, and he was appointed to the post on 29 April. Acting swiftly, the Majlis approved on 1 May a nine-point nationalization law. This act began a summer of hectic but fruitless bargaining that culminated in impasse and the departure in October 1951 of British managers and technicians.

Because the true issue in the dispute was political, in that the Iranians had come to identify oil with their own resurgent nationalism, the two governments were never able to understand
one another's position. The British, attempting to deal with a political problem in economic terms, believed that the Iranians had to sell their oil or go broke and that the best approach was to wait them out, at first for workable terms and later--after nationalization--for adequate compensation. The Iranians, assuming that the West could not do without their oil, were convinced that by hiring non-British technicians and leasing tankers they could operate the oil industry on their own. To the British, the Iranians seemed irrational and wasteful; to the Iranians, the British appeared overconfident and condescending. As a result, their negotiations were so unproductive and mutually frustrating that the British even considered military intervention to seize Abadan, although the strong possibility that the Soviet Union would invoke its 1921 treaty with Iran to oppose such a British move served as an effective deterrent.

The legalistic approach of the British government, which as the major stockholder in the AIOC regarded the oil concession as a treaty or, at the very least, an agreement between nations, was to take the matter first before the International Court of Justice and then to the Security Council of the United Nations. In the end, the Security Council deferred to the decision of the ICJ as to its own jurisdiction, and when in June 1952 the court ruled that the concession was not a treaty and hence not a proper matter for it to consider, all legal approaches were exhausted. The dispute was at an impasse, and by October 1952 diplomatic relations between the two countries were broken off.10

3. Iran and U.S. Foreign Policy

United States foreign policy under President Harry Truman has

10 A more detailed but still necessarily brief description of the oil dispute is included as Appendix B to this history.
been generally characterized as the "containment" of Communist aggression.

Whatever its name, the policy evolved in 1947 when the British Government informed the United States that it could no longer afford to support Greece and Turkey—militarily and financially—against the very real threat of Soviet aggression and subversion. In assuming this burden, Truman said in a message delivered before Congress in March 1947:

I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.

I believe that we must assist free peoples to work out their own destinies in their own way.

I believe that our help should be primarily through economic and financial aid which is essential to economic stability and orderly political processes.

The world is not static, and the status quo is not sacred. But we cannot allow changes in the status quo in violation of the Charter of the United Nations by such methods as coercion, or by such subterfuges as political infiltration. In helping free and independent nations to maintain their freedom, the United States will be giving effect to the principles of the Charter...

Should we fail to aid Greece and Turkey in this fateful hour, the effect will be far-reaching to the West as well as to the East.

Usually credited with originating the containment theory behind the Truman doctrine is George F. Kennan, who in February 1946 as counselor of the U. S. Embassy in Moscow sent the Department of State a long telegram in which he analyzed Soviet postwar policy aims. His telegram struck responsive chords in Washington; James Forrestal, then Secretary of the Navy and later the first Secretary of Defense, gave the telegram wide circulation within the national security bureaucracy. When Kennan returned from his tour of duty in Russia, Forrestal sponsored him for the post of director of the National War College, where he stayed for less than a year before becoming head of State's new Policy Planning Staff.

Kennan's article "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," which appeared in *Foreign Affairs* for July 1947 and which is credited with the initial statement of the containment policy, was an amplification of his Moscow telegram. It was originally written for Forrestal in response to a paper on Marxism and Soviet power prepared by a Forrestal staffer and sent to Kennan for comment. In January 1947, Kennan addressed the Council on Foreign Relations in New York on his views on the Soviet Union, and *Foreign Affairs* editor Hamilton Fish Armstrong asked him for a paper along the lines of the talk for publication in that journal. Rather than write another paper, Kennan asked Forrestal's permission to publish the one he had done earlier, and when this was forthcoming, sent it to Armstrong with the request that it be signed "X".

In the "X" paper's description of the exercise of Soviet power, Kennan noted the innate antagonism between capitalism and socialism that was deeply imbedded in the minds of Soviet leaders. Moscow invariably assumed that the aims of the capitalist world were antagonistic to Soviet interests, and that, said Kennan, "means that we are going to continue for a long time to find the Russians difficult to deal with." Thus, he continued, "...the main element of any U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies." These could be contained "by thadroit and vigilant application of counter-force at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points, corresponding to the shifts and maneuvers of Soviet policy, but which cannot be

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charmed or talked out of existence."

However, in Kennan's view and in that of former Secretary of State
Dean Acheson, he was not the author of a containment policy or doctrine;
he merely described what was happening. That he did it well, in a way
that met the approval of a number of key policymakers of the time is
obvious, but it was continued Soviet intransigence in pursuing openly
North aggressive policies that led to the U.S. reaction to the Korean invasion
in 1950, and the Korean War in turn institutionalized a set of
operational premises along these lines:

A. The Soviet Union would resort to military expansionism if
it were not checked by visible countervailing military power;
B. Local imbalances of military power which favored the
Soviets or a Soviet satellite would lead to further "Koreas";
C. The most appetizing local imbalance to the Soviets was
in Central Europe;
D. The global balance of power would shift in favor of the
Soviets if they were able to swallow the rest of Central Europe, i.e.,
West Germany and Austria; only the Greco-Turkish flanks had such a
critical function for the balance of power (Japan was next most
critical);
E. Local imbalances in secondary and tertiary areas must not
be neglected; the capability and clearly communicated will to defend
whatever areas the Communists chose to attack was necessary to prevent
them from picking and chosing easy targets for blackmail and aggression.
A number of small territorial grabs could add up to a critical alteration of the global balance, and our failure to defend one area would
demoralize nationals in other such localities in their will to
resist the Communists.

It was against this background of U.S. policy and planning that
the status of Iran in late 1952 was considered, and although Dwight D.

13 In later years, writing in his Memoirs--1925-50, Kennan said that
the X article's most serious defect was "the failure to make clear that
what I was talking about when I mentioned the containment of Soviet power
was not the containment by military means of a military threat but the
political containment of a political threat." Whatever such hindsight
is worth, Kennan's words were generally taken to mean political and
military containment on a universal scale.
14 In "Three Comments on the 'X' Article," by W. Averell Harriman,
Arthur Krock, and Dean Acheson, Foreign Policy, No. 7, Summer 1972.
15 In the view of Seyom Brown in The Faces of Power; Constancy and
Change in U.S. Foreign Policy from Truman to Johnson; Columbia University
Eisenhower succeeded Truman as President on 20 January 1953 and John Foster Dulles became his Secretary of State with the avowed intention to go beyond containment toward "dynamic liberation," U.S. policy in Iran continued to stress the need to contain Soviet power there as elsewhere.

The U.S. involvement in Iran's oil problems was admittedly reluctant; we had backed the Iranian government in 1947 when it resisted the oil concession the Russians were seeking to arrange in the north. Our statements at that time probably did much to encourage the Iranian mood to challenge the British concession as well, and that challenge grew into a bitter dispute, the United States found itself caught in the middle of an argument between its chief European ally and an underdeveloped Middle Eastern country to which it was providing military and economic aid. As a result, the U.S. role became not so much one of mediator but rather as an honest broker attempting to bring two clients into an agreement for their mutual benefit. Truman's Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, had proposed in July 1951 that the President send Averell Harriman, his foreign policy adviser, to Tehran to reopen negotiations. Despite violent anti-American rioting by Tudeh the day he arrived, Harriman did get the two sides talking again, but to little avail. When the British brought the case before the Security Council in October 1951, Mosadeg argued Iran's position before the Council; afterward, he visited Washington and met with Truman and Acheson, but their talks came no closer to reaching a basis for settlement.

With the British out of Iran, the United States continued to look for solutions, and proposals involving both the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the American oil industry were put forth, without success. By the end of 1951 the Conservatives, under Churchill, were back in power in Britain and less willing than Labor to be frustrated by Iran, and Mosadeq's position, increasingly dependent on Tudeh support, grew more precarious. By February 1953 he was at odds with the Shah, and both Britain and the United States were ready to look for realistic alternative solutions.
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Estimate of chance: III
III. COVERT ACTION

A. The Genesis of TPAJAX

The many chroniclers of Central Intelligence Agency misdeeds, whether in their books, magazine articles, or newspaper columns, have long placed the August 1953 coup that overthrew Premier Mosadeq near the top of their list of infamous Agency acts. Complete secrecy about the operation that was known under the cryptonym of TPAJAX has been impossible to enforce under existing laws, and enough talkative people, including many Iranians, were privy to segments of the operation to make it relatively easy for journalists to reconstruct the coup in varied but generally inaccurate accounts. The point that the majority of these accounts miss is a key one: the military coup that overthrew Mosadeq and his National Front cabinet was carried out under CIA direction as an act of U.S. foreign policy, conceived and approved at the highest levels of government. It was not an aggressively simplistic solution, clandestinely arrived at, but was instead an official admission by both the United States and United Kingdom that normal, rational methods of international communication and commerce had failed. TPAJAX was entered into as a last resort.

The target of this policy of desperation, Mohammad Mosadeq, was neither a madman nor an emotional bundle of senility as he was so often pictured in the foreign press; however, he had become so committed to the ideals of nationalism that he did things that could not have conceivably helped his people even in the best and most altruistic of worlds. In refusing to bargain—except on his own uncompromising terms—with the

17 A number of these are included in Appendix C.
Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, he was in fact defying the professional politicians of the British government. These leaders believed, with good reason, that cheap oil for Britain and high profits for the company were vital to their national interests. There had been little in their experience to make them respect Iranians, whom company managers and Foreign Office representatives saw as inefficient, corrupt, and self-serving. That the British misjudged their adversaries badly is obvious; they were convinced that when Iran felt the financial pinch, its resolve would crumble, and an agreement could be worked out to the satisfaction of both sides. Henry Grady, who spent two unhappy years as U.S. Ambassador to Iran during the height of the oil dispute, quoted the British theme that he had heard in so many variations as: "Just wait until the beggars need the money badly enough—that will bring them to their knees."

In fact, of course, the loss of oil revenue did not bring the Iranians to their knees; it merely forced them to take the risky steps that increasingly endangered their country's future. It was the potential of those risks to leave Iran open to Soviet aggression—at a time when the Cold War was at its height and when the United States was involved in an undeclared war in Korea against forces supported by the U.S.S.R. and China—that compelled the United States in planning and executing TPAJAX.

How real were the risks in what Mosadeq was doing? Had the British sent in the paratroops and warships, as they were to do a few years later against the Egyptians at Suez, it was almost certain that the Soviet Union

18 In his article in the 5 January 1952 Saturday Evening Post, entitled "What went Wrong in Iran?"
would have occupied the northern portion of Iran by invoking the Soviet-Iranian Treaty of Friendship of 1921. It was also quite probable that the Soviet army would have moved south to drive British forces out on behalf of their Iranian "allies." Then not only would Iran's oil have been irretrievably lost to the West, but the defense chain around the Soviet Union which was part of U.S. foreign policy would have been breached. Had the Soviets had the opportunity to achieve the ancient Russian dream of a port on the Persian Gulf and to drive a wedge between Turkey and India. Under such circumstances, the danger of a third world war seemed very real. When it became apparent that many elements in Iran did not approve of Mosadeq's continuing gamble or the direction in which he was pushing their country, the execution of a U.S.-assisted coup d'état seemed a more desirable risk than letting matters run their unpredictable course. Mosadeq was already openly threatening to turn to other sources for economic help—the Soviets—if Britain did not meet his demands or if the United States did not come forth with massive aid to replace his lost oil revenue. Peacefully or in war, the Soviet Union appeared to be the only potential beneficiary of Mosadeq's policies.
the aged Premier was rapidly become a "prisoner of the left" because of his growing reliance on the support of the Soviet-backed Tudeh Party, which had a membership in 1952 of about 25,000 plus many more thousands of supporters and sympathizers.

approval to explore the matter was obtained through Department of State

20 As the organization replacing the Communist Party of Iran, outlawed by Reza Shah, Tudeh had been receiving Soviet financial support and advice since 1941.
a CIA NEA Division officer who was there 
to recall attending a decisive meeting at State in company with Kermit Roosevelt at which Gen. W. Bedell Smith 
proceeded; shortly after he left the Agency to become Under Secretary of State early in February 1953. Smith's affirmative response to the question, "Do we go ahead?" was the informal green light that the planners in NEA Division had been waiting for; his laconic, unprintable answer was Smith's main contribution to the meeting, at which the reasons for overthrowing Mohammad were carefully discussed.

21 No minutes of this meeting are available in DOD files.
as an action based on NSC Report 136/1, "U.S. Policy Regarding the Present Situation in Iran," which had been adopted by the National Security Council as action No. 680 and approved by the President on 20 November 1952.

The fact that this decision and the staff work preceding it were very closely held in Washington is borne out by a memorandum of 10 June 1953 from the Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs (GTI) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs recommending policies more supportive of Mosadeq. It reasoned that since conditions were deteriorating almost to the point of no return and since an attempt to remove Mosadeq would risk a civil war and would, even if successful, alienate the Iranian people, we should increase our financial and technical assistance to Iran in the hope that Mosadeq would be able to muddle through. The desk officers' position paper recognized that increased U.S. aid would, of course, frustrate British policy, which was to undermine Mosadeq's position. By late June, however, State was aware of the planned operation, and a further position paper that stipulated certain conditions to be met by the British was prepared on 25 June, as described in the discussion of planning, below.

B. The Planning Phase

To carry out a [operation] a great deal of advance planning was necessary.

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24 No documentary evidence of this approval is available in the CIA Executive Register or the remaining files on TPAJAX.
Their first point of agreement was that Maj. Gen. Fazlollah Zahedi\textsuperscript{26} was the logical choice to head the coup, despite the fact that his career balance sheet had nearly as many minuses as pluses. Zahedi's obvious assets were his record as a leader and combat officer, his devotion to the Shah, and his aggressive desire to change the course of his country's destiny. His debits were many: his wartime reputation as a pro-Nazi and suspected agent who had been arrested by the British and sent to Palestine was further tainted by charges of corruption. In addition, he had been out of the army for four years and had only limited contacts with active duty officers at the regimental and battalion levels. He nonetheless was regarded as the sole Iranian with sufficient support among Iranian army officers and pro-Shah politicians to be the central coup figure.

\textsuperscript{26} See Appendix B for biographic details.
The planning discussions also took up the assumptions on which the plan would be based. These were: that Zahedi was the best candidate for coup leader; that the Shah must be brought into the operation, against his will if necessary; that the army would follow the Shah rather than Mosadeq if given a clear-cut choice; that a genuine legal or quasi-legal basis must be found for the coup; that public opinion must be aroused against Mosadeq; and, that the new government to be established in power must be guarded from possible Tudeh countercoup attempts. Tehran Station and Headquarters
were kept apprised of these assumptions, with which they did not always agree. The Station, for example, backed Ambassador Henderson when he told Washington that the Shah probably would not act decisively against Mosadeq, while Headquarters was concerned about finding a possible substitute for General Zahedi because of the negative aspects of his background.

The proposal that anti-Mosadeq leaders seek "religious refuge" was never implemented in the field; it probably reflected the views of primarily concerned with psychological and propaganda operations was attuned to the utilization of local customs and traditions.
completed a revision of the plan. Their major change was to concentrate on building up the size and effectiveness of the anti-Mosadeq forces rather than on countering actions by the elements supporting the Premier.

Reduced to its essentials, the plan called for the following sequence of events, in which timing was of great importance:

The goal of the operation was to replace Mosadeq with a leader whom the Shah and the army would support and who would be willing to negotiate a reasonable oil settlement that would prevent an economic collapse and reduce Iran's vulnerability to the Soviet Union. General Zahedi was such a man, perhaps the only one who met all the requirements.

30 Also included in Appendix D.
Zahedi would be brought to power through a military coup that would, because of the Shah's participation, be fundamentally legal. The Shah, who had been indecisive under the pressure of the oil dispute and Mosadeq's maneuvering for more power, would be induced to do his part.

The Shah's role would be to sign three documents: a royal decree (firman, in Farsi) naming Zahedi as Army Chief of Staff; another firman appealing to all ranks of the army to carry out the orders of the new Chief of Staff; and, an open letter calling on army officers to support the bearer, General Zahedi. The letter would be used by Zahedi to recruit the coup group of officers in key posts that would enable them to carry out the military objectives of the plan, including the seizure of army headquarters, Radio Tehran, the army radio station, the houses of Mosadeq and his principal associates, police and Gendarmerie headquarters, the telephone exchange, the Majlis building, and the National Bank. Key government figures, army officers, and newspaper editors supporting Mosadeq would be arrested. Special measures would be prepared for dealing with the anticipated violent reaction of Tudeh Party members to Mosadeq's overthrow.

The plan envisaged three different scenarios by which the coup might be carried out: first, a massive religious protest against the government,

31 The Gendarmerie were a national, paramilitary, rural police, whereas the National Police were an urban force.
followed by military action by the army officers loyal to Zahedi; the second alternative, taking advantage of the crisis that would develop at the anticipated moment when Mosadeq would force the Shah to leave the country, and then starting the military action; or, as the third alternative, starting the military action the moment that Mosadeq, frustrated by the Shah, presented his resignation and sent the Tudeh and National Front mobs into the street. Under any of these scenarios, the military action itself was seen as beginning with General Zahedi assuming the post as Chief of Staff, seizing army headquarters, and ordering the arrest of Mosadeq and his compatriots. The Shah would then appoint Zahedi as Premier, and the Majlis would be called into session to confirm his appointment.

The plan also discussed the use of the press, including propaganda themes, as well as utilization of the Majlis, the political parties, religious leaders, and bazaar merchants in carrying out the operation. Finally, it estimated the coup's chances of success and the probable implications for the United States if it should fail. It was this plan that CIA to the Department of State in order to obtain simultaneous high-level approval.

As a sidelight, it should be mentioned that before Roosevelt left he briefed U.S. Ambassador to Iran Loy Henderson, who was in Washington for consultation. The briefing on the proposed operation took place on 6 June 1953 and was attended by General

32 This was a technique Mosadeq had used before to rally the street mobs to his support and to intimidate his opposition. It was anticipated that he would try it again if the Shah put any sort of pressure on him.

33 No formal estimates as to the potential for success of the coup were prepared by ONE, although that Office was producing special estimates on the situation in Iran.
Cabell (the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence), Frank Wisner (the Deputy Director for Plans) memo of this conversation notes that the Ambassador stated categorically that the Shah would not back Zahedi when the time came for action unless extreme pressure was exerted, possibly including the threat of replacing him. Ambassador Henderson also warned that the army would not play a major role in the coup without the Shah's active cooperation, and he urged that an alternate plan be prepared that would utilize the Amini brothers. In more general terms, he pointed out the inconsistency of telling the Shah that no more U.S. aid would go to Iran while Mosadeq remained in power, while at the same time the Point Four (technical assistance) program was in the process of implementing a $3,400,000 Village Council program. Overall, the Ambassador was negative about many aspects of the plan, although less so than he had been when consulted in Tehran. He agreed to delay his return to Tehran by arranging a prolonged European visit, thereby adding his absence to the war of nerves against Mosadeq.

By mid-June, the purpose of the plan was known to some senior Department of State officers, and the Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs prepared a comment on 25 June for the Secretary of State that in general approved of the plan—including the assumption of the risks of failure. However, State set forth two conditions that had to be met: 1) the United States must be prepared to offer immediate and substantial economic assistance—an estimated $60 million the first year—to the new government in Iran in order to stabilize the economy and convince the public that their new government would be able to do more for them than...
the old one, and 2) the British must give a firm commitment to be flexible in approaching the oil settlement and not attempt to force the new government to accept terms that would alienate public opinion. To be acceptable, State said, the oil settlement should recognize nationalization of the oil industry, provide for Iranian control of all property, installations, and production in Iran, allow the Iranian government complete freedom of choice of technical and managerial personnel as well as freedom in the sales of oil and oil product, and dispose of the problem of compensation within the framework of the existing nationalization law and on a basis which would not saddle Iran with excessive indebtedness to the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company.

On 7 July these views were passed to the British by Henry A. Byroade, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, and on 23 July British Ambassador Makins gave Under Secretary of State W. Bedell Smith a Foreign Office memorandum which in diplomatic language acceded to the U.S. conditions. The memo set forth the principles that compensation should be left to the impartial arbitration of an international tribunal and that terms of a future arrangement must not appear to provide a reward for the tearing up of contractual obligations or disturbing world oil prices. The British government would thus be ready to cooperate with the new Iranian government in trying to reach an agreement, within the bounds of those two principles. While this answer was obviously not an across-the-board acceptance of the State conditions, it was not a specific rejection and was clearly an affirmative answer to the question of the British taking a reasonable, flexible approach that would not arouse the Iranian people against the new government.
C. Putting the Plan into Action

After formal approval came from the British Foreign Office and the Prime Minister on 1 July and from the U.S. Secretary of State and on 11 July, NEA Division organized itself for the support of the operation. The news that General Zahedi had virtually no military assets of his own was also painfully confirmed.
The task of recruiting General Schwartzkopf was assigned to [redacted] who on 26 June visited the general, then serving as Administrative Director, Department of Law and Public Safety, State of New Jersey. Without revealing specific details, Schwartzkopf's proposed role in convincing the Shah and won the general's complete cooperation, contingent on the following: 1) that he be allowed to present himself to the Shah as a major general rather than as a brigadier, for prestige purposes; 2) that he be fully briefed on the political situation and all details of the operational plan; and 3) that he be allowed to give some logical explanation of his trip to Iran to the Governor and the Attorney General of New Jersey. After a discussion of possible cover
stories; it was agreed that arrangements would be made for the Government of Pakistan to invite General Schwarzkopf to visit Karachi for the purpose of giving advice on police and security matters and that it would be logical for him to stop and visit old friends in Beirut and Tehran along his route. Schwarzkopf also warned that shortly before his departure from Tehran in 1946, General Razmara,**then Chief of Staff, had tried to poison the Shah's mind against Schwarzkopf because of his resistance to Razmara's desire to absorb the Gendarmerie (over which Schwarzkopf had nominal command as head of the U.S. advisory mission) into the army. As a result of this, Schwarzkopf felt his normally cordial relations with the Shah had become slightly strained by the time of his departure from Iran in 1948.

A question that arose during the planning phase was whether or not to proceed with the U.S. Point Four aid program to Mosadeq's Village Council program (part of the Agrarian Reform Law of 1952, under which landlords had to give the government 20% of their profits, 10% to go back to the peasants and 10% to the Village Council for health, educational, and agricultural improvements). Point Four officials had committed $3,400,000 to the program, which was being exploited in Iran as evidence of U.S. support for Mosadeq, and, despite some misgivings, both Ambassador Henderson and the Department of State felt that cancelling the aid would only serve to irritate Mosadeq and perhaps alert him to the fact that the United States was beginning to actively oppose him. Over Station and Headquarters objections, it was finally decided to proceed with the Village Council commitment. Then, late in July,
the Station recommended that William Warne, the Point Four representa-
tive in Tehran who was closely identified with U.S. support for Mosadeq, be called away from Tehran during the operational phase of TPAJAX, but it was decided that no adequate excuse could be found for the move, which Warne would oppose, and so it was dropped.

D. Involving the Shah

Probably the biggest question mark for TPAJAX planners was the Shah's role in the coup—not only how he would play it, but would he even play it at all? They had little reason to be overconfident, for his indecision and susceptibility to bad advice were notorious. The Shah had his reasons, however. He had assumed the throne in 1941 when his father, a semiliterate strongman, was forced to abdicate by the occupying power, Britain and the U.S.S.R. Leader of a defeated and humiliated country for the first 48 years of his reign, the young Shah attempted to survive by ruling as a constitutional monarch. His very existence was threatened by Tudeh on the left and by Premier Ahmed Qavam on the right; a British correspondent who interviewed him in 1947 described him as "a very frightened young man." Although Qavam, as a strong Premier, was in a position to bring the Pahlavi dynasty to a premature end, he apparently decided to keep the monarchy and took steps to build up the Shah's popularity, crediting him with recovering Azerbaijan from the Soviets. Seemingly stimulated by this appearance of success, the Shah took a more active role as ruler and in 1947 began to intervene more vigorously in political affairs. The attempted assassination by a Tudeh Party member in 1949 frightened him again, but he survived

37 A biography of the Shah is included in Appendix B.
the shots and cast about for some stabilizing factors in his situation.

The U.S. Embassy made this assessment of him in 1951:

The Shah is confused, frustrated, suspicious, proud, and stubborn, a young man who lives in the 'shadow of his father. His fears, questionings, and indecisiveness are permanent instabilities of character. Yet, he has great personal courage, many Western ideals, and a sincere, though often wavering, desire to raise and preserve his country. He is, at all times, eager for and a victim of advice.

How then to convince this mistrusting but gullible ruler of the soundness and effectiveness of the TPAJAX plan in which his own participation was such a key element?
While the coup organization was being pulled together, Mosadeq had
been keeping the political pot boiling. His supporters had held a massive
demonstration on 21 July to mark the second anniversary of the riots that
ousted Qavam and brought Mosadeq in as Premier; Tudeh participation in
the demonstration had been heavy, pointing up Mosadeq's increasing
reliance on Communist supporters. Of the crowd of more than 50,000
demonstrators estimated to have met in Majlis Square, Tudeh members and
sympathizers probably outnumbered followers of the National Front by
ten to one. During the first week in August, Mosadeq carried out a
national referendum on dissolving the Majlis that was passed by an enorm-
ous majority, despite the insistence of opposition deputies that such a
referendum was illegal. attempted

unsuccessfully to persuade anti-Mosadeq deputies to resist his efforts
to oust them by taking religious sanctuary, or bast, in the Majlis building.

Mosadeq's reasons for wanting a new Majlis were obvious; his National Front
had lost much of its cohesion since he had quarreled with Kashani, Baghai, Makki,
Kashani, an influential mullah and political figure, had been a Mosadeq
ally and was the elected Speaker of Majlis; Baghai and Makki were members of
the Premier's original nine-man National Front that had swung the Majlis
toward nationalization of the oil industry (see Appendix A). (In 1951)
and other supporters over his proposed constitutional amendments transferring power from the Shah to the Premier. The National Front, primarily composed of nationalistic rightwingers, was alarmed by Mosadeq’s growing reliance on Tudeh, and this became a major issue in the propaganda campaign.

In an attempt to get across to the Iranian people the changing attitude of the U.S. Government toward Mosadeq, Secretary of State Dulles in his 28 July press conference replied:

The growing activities of the illegal Communist Party in Iran and the toleration of them by the Iranian government has caused our government concern. These developments make it more difficult to grant aid to Iran.

In the early days of August, Roosevelt was compelled to build up the pressure on the Shah. Alterations were made in the original plan with regard to the firmans the Shah was to sign; one was to name Zahedi as Chief of Staff, while the other would declare illegal the referendum dissolving the Majlis. But, getting the actual documents signed was becoming a critical matter. Roosevelt saw the Shah on 2 August and left the palace believing he had obtained the Shah’s agreement to dismiss Mosadeq and appoint Zahedi as Premier, but when Roosevelt met with the ruler the following day, he had become reluctant to act, saying that he was not an adventurer and could not take chances like one. Roosevelt’s argument was that the government could be changed in no other way, and that if the Shah did not join

39 One of the most rapidly changing facets of the plan was the content of the firmans; in their final format, there were two—one removing Mosadeq as Premier, the other appointing General Zahedi in his place.
with the army to oust Mosadeq, either a Communist Iran or another Korean-type conflict was inevitable. These alternatives the United States was not prepared to accept.

At this meeting, the Shah asked for direct assurance from President-Eisenhower that he approved of the Shah’s taking the initiative against Mosadeq, but before this could be passed to Washington, the President fortuitously inserted an item in his speech to the Governors’ Conference in Seattle on 4 August 40 to the effect that the United States could not sit idly by and watch Iran fall behind the Iron Curtain. Roosevelt used the coincidence of this speech by telling the Shah that the President’s comment on Iran had been made to satisfy him, but the ruler continued to balk. On 8 August, the Shah, still irresolute, told Roosevelt that he would send a message of encouragement to the army officers involved, then go to the palace at Ramsar on the Caspian and let the army act, apparently without his official knowledge. If that action were successful, he would name Zahedi as Premier.

but the Shah said that while he approved of the planned action, he would not sign any documents.

Under this extreme pressure, the Shah finally agreed to sign the papers, see Zahedi personally, and then leave for Ramsar. The next day he did meet with the general, but the firmans were not yet ready to be signed. The Shah went on to Ramsar, after promising to sign the decrees as soon as they were brought to him.

40 As reported in The New York Times for 5 August 1953. □ 3.3(h)(2)
Roosevelt then altered the plan one final time by deciding that one firman should dismiss Mosadeq from the Premier's post and the other name Zahedi as his successor.

E. The First Attempt -- and Failure

The Shah's decrees were now in the hands of the coup group, and the next step was to implement the military action plan as soon as possible.

One point seems clear, although the exact details are missing—the initial coup attempt was betrayed. Rumors of a coup to be staged by the army had been in the air for some time, and the Iranians' desultory view of security and their tendency to be talkative were notorious, but according
to Roosevelt, it was probably Colonel Nadiri, chief of the secret police, who told Chief of Staff Riahi that the coup was coming the night of 15
August. General Riahi had been informed of the plot by 1700 on the 15th; —

General Kiani was arrested and held by Colonel Nasiri and other coup officers.

SECRET
What happened to the other coup officers with assigned missions? A number of them heard the news that the coup was blown and so did nothing. Others were frustrated by the precautions General Riahi took when he learned the coup was coming that night. General Batmangelich, who was to have captured the Chief of Staff’s headquarters, turned back when he saw a large number of troops and tanks surrounding it. General Guilanshah, who was with Batmangelich, said that after their abortive attempt on the headquarters they rode around town looking the situation over until about 0230, when they separated.
The first coup attempt—a conventional military takeover, reinforced by the Shah's signed orders—had taken less than 12 hours, from Saturday night, 15 August, until early in the morning of Sunday the 16th. As the chronology of TPAJAX shows, the next three days were filled with confusion. Mosadeq's forces believed that they had crushed the thing they most feared—an army takeover on behalf of the Shah. Their reaction was to mop up on their remaining enemies and to exploit their victory to the fullest. Monday and Tuesday, the 17th and 18th, the Tudeh Party seized the spotlight, rioting and demonstrating in the streets in a wild outburst of antimonarchical feeling, while Roosevelt and his men waited their chance to reverse things. The second, and winning, phase of the operation was not to come until Wednesday, the 19th.

F. Turning Defeat Around
At noon on 16 August, Radio Tehran broadcast a statement from Mossadeq dissolving the 17th Majlis and promising early elections for the next Majlis. Later that afternoon, the Station learned from the radio that the Shah had flown to Baghdad. As Roosevelt said when he returned to Headquarters after the coup: "He just took off. He never communicated with us at all—just took off." The immediate Station reaction was to try to arrange for the Shah to broadcast to his people from Baghdad as soon as possible. Headquarters was asked to have the Department of State, through the U.S. Ambassador in Iraq, press the Shah to take an aggressive stand about the events in Tehran. State, however, was firmly opposed to any U.S. effort to contact the Shah.

The next day, Monday the 17th, the Shah did make a number of statements that were broadcast over the Baghdad
radio, insisting that he had not abdicated, that he was confident of the loyalty to him of the Iranian people, and that he had indeed dismissed Premier Mosadeq and appointed Zahedi under his constitutional prerogatives. On his own initiative, U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Burton Berry had seen the Shah on Sunday night, the 16th, and had suggested some ideas for the forthcoming statement that by happy coincidence were very much in line with Station thinking.

Foreign Minister Fatemi, who had been released at dawn on the 16th along with the rest of the handful of prisoners taken in the coup attempt, held a press conference at 1400 that afternoon in which he implicated the Court and blamed the Imperial Guard for planning the coup. He said that his own views would be found in an editorial in his paper, Bakhtar Emruz, which was also read over Radio Tehran at 1730—it was a long, inflammatory, and savage attack on the Shah and his dead father. Its broadcast and subsequent printing was credited with doing much to stir up the Tudeh-led anti-Shah mobs that raged through Tehran on 17 and 18 August. At the same time, the violence of its tone and language aroused much public sympathy for the Shah. Fatemi spoke again at 1930 to the crowds massed in Majlis Square, as did a number of pro-Mosadeq Majlis deputies. The Shah was sharply attacked by every speaker; there were insistent demands for his abdication, and the people were told for the first time that he had left the country.
On Monday the 17th, Radio Tehran began broadcasting lists of those involved in the coup attempt. Rumors that these officers were to be hanged on a large gallows reportedly being constructed were widely circulated. Fatemi continued to rail against the Shah in Bakhter Emruz, and his editorial on the 17th said, in part: "O traitor Shah, you shameless person, you have completed the criminal history of the Pahlavi reign. The people want to drag you from behind your desk to the gallows." By mid-morning, Tudeh-led mobs were in the streets of Tehran, tearing down statues of the Shah and Reza Shah, defiling them, and dragging them through the streets. When Ambassador Henderson arrived from Beirut, as scheduled, he drove back to the Embassy past the empty pedestals of the royal statues, of which only the broken bronze boots remained.
Roosevelt had hoped that it would be possible to emphasize the religious aspects of the demonstration to be held the 19th, but if this was to be done, the mullahs wanted to hold it on Friday, 21 August, which was a religious festival day. For a number of reasons, not the least of which was the widespread rumor that the arrested officers were to be hung on the 20th, the operation could not be held off the two extra days the religious leaders wanted.

Richard Cottam, in Nationalism in Iran, University of Pittsburgh Press, 1964, described (p.37) the bazaar mob in some detail, as follows: "Along with the mullahs and frequently closely allied with them are the professional mob leaders. These men typically center their activities in a varzeshgah (athletic club). There are many varieties of varzeshghan, some of them respectable clubs which not only serve as centers for athletes but also for other valuable group activities. But the varzeshghan of the mob leaders are centers for athletic young toughs known as chaq keshan, who can be hired for any kind of corrupt or terrorist activity....when a sizable political demonstration is desired, the mob leaders purchase the participation of large numbers of unskilled laborers. In 1952 observers claim to have seen workers demonstrating for the Communists, for the royalists, and for the Mosadeghist National Front on successive days."
In Washington, the Department of State and Headquarters had gotten the bad news. On the 16th Roosevelt had sent two messages to tell Headquarters that the first attempt had failed. He did not furnish a great deal of detail on just how bad things were, since he was well aware that the reaction would be to cut the losses, get everyone out, and scrub the show. His requests for State Department help in getting Ambassador Berry in Baghdad to instruct the Shah on what to say in his speech there were, as noted earlier, turned down. State indicated that in the absence of any satisfactory indication of possible success of the coup, the United States wished to avoid assuming responsibility for urging statements on the Shah beyond those.
Tuesday, the 18th, became a day of waiting. The Shah and Queen Soroya flew to Rome from Baghdad that morning; when he arrived at 1500, he made additional statements to the press but did not issue a call to action by the forces supporting him. In Tehran, bands of Tudehites still roamed the streets, and a mob sacked the headquarters of the Pan-Iran Party and small Tudeh and National Front mobs fought each other. The secret police attempted to prevent the publication of opposition newspapers, but a number of them, including Dad and Shahed, were able to get on the streets with replicas of the Shah's firmans. The Tudeh Party newspaper blamed the coup attempt on Anglo-American intrigue and called for a democratic republic to replace
the monarchy. Mosadeq's spokesmen on Radio Tehran announced that a 100,000-rial reward would be paid for information on the whereabouts of General Zahedi and that all demonstrations were banned. General Riahi addressed a meeting of all senior officers of the Tehran garrison at the lecture hall of the Military School and told them in very strong terms that they should remain loyal to the government.

Despite the ban on demonstrations, there was continued fighting in the streets on the evening of 18 August. Mosadeq's security forces were sent out to clear the streets, and their operations took on a strong anti-Tudeh tone as they beat up demonstrators and forced them to shout pro-Shah slogans. Belatedly realizing what was happening, Tudeh leaders went out into the streets to try to talk the demonstrators into going home, but the excesses of two days of anti-Shah rioting had already done their damage.

For the Station, there was good news from Kermanshah. Farzanegan finally returned from there early Wednesday morning. He reported that Colonel Bakhtiar was willing to march on Tehran.

No definitive results came from the attempt to persuade the leading Shia cleric in Qom to declare a holy war against the agents of communism, although the pro-Shah newspapers had been prepared to exploit the story, if possible. And, Headquarters sent a message that Tuesday evening that...
The ultimate choice was to be theirs.

Early on the morning of the 19th, pro-Shah groups began to gather in the bazaar area in south Tehran. Many of the people assembling were undoubtedly those that Kashani was paying 200 tomans (2,000 rials, or about $26.65 at the exchange rate of 75 rials to the dollar) a head to be in the streets, but there were also many others who had been stirred up by Tudeh actions and who were looking for leadership.

As the various groups of demonstrators moved northward out of south Tehran, they merged as they reached Sepah Square, where they met the troops sent to turn them back. The soldiers fired hundreds of shots over
their heads, but whether the order to fire into the crowd was never
given or was ignored, they did not shoot into the mob. Sensing that
the army was with them, the demonstrators not only began to move faster
but took on a festive, holiday atmosphere. As Roosevelt said later, it
had become a mob wholly different from any seen before in Tehran; it was
full of well-dressed, white-collar people, carrying pictures of the Shah
and shouting, "Zindebah, Shah!" (Long live the Shah!). Then, the troops
began to join in the demonstration.

Troops from the Imperial Guard, which had been disbanded after its involve-
ment in the 15 August coup attempt, had gathered, and truckloads of soldiers
began driving through the streets, shouting and waving pictures of the
Shah. Drivers kept their lights on, as they had been asked to do as a
sign they supported the Shah.

By mid-morning, after the demonstrators had reached Sepah Square
and fanned out into the center of the city, General Riahi reported to
Mosadeq that he no longer controlled the army, but the Premier told him
to hold firm. Mosadeq's house, a prime target of the demonstrators, was
being defended by Colonel Momtaz' battalion.
Radio Tehran was a key target, since it would not only be able to broadcast the news of the success of the Shah's forces in the capital but would also help convince the provinces to join in supporting the Zahedi government. It was important, also, to get it in unsabotaged condition, ready to broadcast. During the morning hours on the 19th it had been broadcasting cotton prices, then switched to recorded music uninterrupted by news bulletins. Shortly before 1430, it suddenly went off the air, apparently as the pro-Shah troops and demonstrators took control of the building in a short, sharp struggle. When it resumed broadcasting, after a short period of "technical difficulties," all that could be heard was a confused babble of happy voices.
Zahedi was put in the tank, and taken to Radio Tehran, where he made his speech. In it he promised to restore the rule of law, individual freedom, and freedom of assembly, and he added some popular items such as raising wages, cutting the cost of living, providing free medical treatment, and building more roads. The speech was recorded and broadcast again that night.

Although the Kermanshah division did not reach the capital until after the excitement was over, they had entered Hamadan en route just as the Tudeh Party there was staging a large pro-Mosadeq demonstration, which Bakhtiar’s troopers ended in short order. In the wake of the coup, Zahedi named Bakhtiar as military governor of Tehran, where he enforced martial law and was instrumental in the year that followed in removing hundreds of Tudeh members and sympathizers from the army officer corps. 46

Mosadeq’s forces put up more than token resistance at Staff Headquarters and at the Premier’s house, but they were quickly overwhelmed. Newspaper

46 This experience led to Bakhtiar eventually being appointed in 1956 as the first chief of Iran’s newly formed counterintelligence organization, SAVAK (Sazeman-e Etala‘at va Amyyat-e Reshva‘).
accounts of the coup, in particular Kennett Love's dispatch to The New York Times, grossly exaggerated the casualties. Love's story said that more than 300 people were killed or wounded, that Mosadegh's house was stormed by Sherman tanks which in turn were battered by shells from loyalist tanks, and that Colonel Montaz, who led the defenders at the Premier's house, was "torn to pieces" by the mob. "Torn to pieces" was a favorite of Love's; he used it to describe what happened to Foreign Minister Fatemi in his newspaper office. In fact, however, casualties of the coup were relatively light considering the number of people involved; the official toll was 43 dead and 35 wounded, and neither Montaz nor Fatemi was even scratched, let alone dismembered. And Mosadegh, whom the journalists variously described as slipping up a ladder and over his back wall in his pajamas or lying weeping in bed (also in pajamas) when the troops burst in, was not even in his house when it was attacked. He had gone next door and taken temporary refuge with U.S. Point Four Chief William Marne, who was somewhat embarrassed to have a deposed Premier in his hands, even for a brief period. Over the next few days, Mosadegh and other senior officials of his government turned themselves in or were arrested.

News that began to trickle in from the provinces after Zahedi's broadcast on Wednesday afternoon was uniformly good. Radio Tabriz reported that Azerbijan was in the hands of the army, while the station at Isfahan came on the air at 1300 with strong statements in support of Zahedi and the Shah. Kerman proclaimed its loyalty to the new government at 2000, and Meshed, though not immediately heard from, had changed sides as soon as it heard the news from Radio Tehran. TPAJAX's final details were wrapped up; loyal officers were placed in command of all units of the Tehran garrison, the seizure of key military targets was completed, and the arrest lists were carried out. The nation was under martial law, a curfew was put into
effect, and at 2200, Radio Tehran signed off for the night.

In Rome, the Shah was preparing to return to Iran in triumph on 22 August. In a formal statement, he said: "It was my people who have shown me that they were faithful to the monarch and that 2½ years of false propaganda...my country did not want the Communists and therefore has been faithful to me."

IV. The Aftermath of Victory

A successful TPAJAX left behind a good deal of debris to clean up, plus not a few complications.

Roosevelt himself left Iran shortly after the coup.
They were curious, of course, as to why there had been so little reporting from the Station and from Roosevelt during the three days after the failure of the first attempt to overthrow Mosadeq. Roosevelt explained frankly and at length that if he and his men had reported what they were doing, Washington would have thought they were crazy and told them to stop at once. Further, had they reported in detail the reasons why they felt justified in taking the actions they were taking, they would have had no time to carry them out. Therefore, their course was to act, while reporting as little as possible and assuming that they have very little more to lose and everything to win. Everyone recognized, of course, that if the outcome had been different, a substantially different attitude toward Roosevelt's decision and actions might have emerged in many quarters.
The Qashqai had disliked Mosadeq, of course, because of his reliance on
the Tudeh, but they also retained a deep-seated animosity toward the
Shah, whose father had brutally pacified the tribe. When the vote of
the tribal council was taken, it was by a very narrow margin in favor
of peaceful acceptance of Zahedi, despite the sentiments of Khosrow
and the other Qashqai khans for armed rebellion.

It was feared that in the confusion of the coup the tribesmen
might try to take advantage of the situation by a revolt against
the new government. While the army might have been able to put down
such a revolt in short order, the situation could have enhanced Tudeh's
chances to stage a countercoup.
When Roosevelt was debriefed at Headquarters on 23 August, he noted that except for an attempt by some Qashqai to disarm certain Gendarmerie posts, Shiraz was very quiet throughout the coup. After Zahedi was securely in control, several of the other tribes volunteered to take steps to control the Qashqai themselves if necessary rather than have the army sent in after them. Despite their anti-Shah feelings, however, the Qashqai accepted the coup with as good grace as they could muster.

As in every fight, there were losers. Both Mohammad Mosadeg and Brig. Gen. Taqi Riahi were indicted under Article 317 of the Military Criminal Procedure, which states:

Anyone who devises a plot with a view to either overthrowing the foundation of the State, or the succession of the Monarch, or instigates the people to arm themselves against the power of the Monarchy shall be sentenced to death.

The verdict of the Military Court of First Instance and of the Military Court of Revision against the two accused was guilty, and the
punishment was set at three years of solitary imprisonment for Mosadeq and three years of imprisonment with hard labor for General Riahi.49

As for the other key figures in the coup, General Zahedi served as Premier until April 1955, when he left Tehran for medical treatment in West Germany. His relationship with the Shah whose throne he had helped to save was a stormy one; they quarrelled in February 1954 regarding the elections, and Zahedi angrily objected to what he termed the Shah's "childish vacillation" over official appointments. He and the Shah were also at odds over General Batmangelich, whom Zahedi wished to dismiss from the post of army Chief of Staff.50 In general, the Shah resented any attempt by Zahedi to take credit for the coup. In his opinion, he was the primary motivating factor and Zahedi was only his chosen instrument. He had appointed Zahedi as a strong man who could do the job that had to be done; but, once Zahedi had done it, the Shah reverted to the monarch's traditional dislike and fear of a strong man. The general's son, Ardashir, fared better; he married Princess Shanaz, the Shah's daughter by his first marriage in November 1956 (they were later divorced), and he is currently serving as Iranian Ambassador to the United States. 3.3(h)(2)

49 A summary of the court proceedings and the verdicts is included as Appendix F.
Col. Abbas Farzanegan, who played such a key role in building the military organization to carry out the coup, was promoted to brigadier general and became Deputy Minister of Posts, Telephone, and Telegraph before taking over as Minister in April 1954. He retired from the army when the Zahedi government fell a year later, moving to the United States until 1958 when he again returned to Iran. He served briefly as governor of Isfahan and then occupied a series of ambassadorial posts that included Kuwait, Norway, and the Netherlands.

Col. Nematollah Nasiri, the Imperial Guard commander, was also promoted to brigadier general for his loyal service during the coup.
Looking back on TPAJAX after 21 years, the crucial moments obviously were in those four long days when the operation hung in the balance, shifting toward disaster but ready to swing toward victory if the right breaks came. As it turned out, Roosevelt was fortunate enough to get at least two very important breaks. The first, lay in the fact that the Tudeh demonstrations of 17 and 18 August went much too far. They degenerated into vicious anti-Shah riots, and the acts of violence and desecration turned a great many people against Mosadeq and his allies. Alarmed by the open threats to the monarchy and disturbed by the Tudeh clamor for a socialist republic, the people and the army rallied to the pro-Shah demonstrators on the morning of the 19th. The second break came through the tactical mistakes made by Mosadeq’s followers; his Chief of Staff, General Riahi, had almost the whole story of the upcoming military coup attempt by late afternoon on 15 August, hours before the action started. All he had to do was to order the police and military security forces to start arresting officers suspected of being involved in the plot, and the coup would never have started. The failure of Iranian security in general was part of this break.
Riahi had some evidence of U.S. involvement yet his police and military allowed American cars to come and go at will, unstopped and unsearched.

V. The Long View of the Covert Action in Iran

The long-term impact of TPAJAX did not, as Churchill hoped, enable the West to turn things around in the Middle East; over the years since 1953, Western influence in that region has steadily declined. But the course of Iranian history was clearly changed by the events of 19 August. While by no means a dedicated Western ally, Iran retains its fear of the Soviets, and the enormous wealth that it has gained from the increased value of oil in the 1970's has been used and is still being used to build strong military forces not only for self-defense but to support Iranian aspirations for dominance in the Persian Gulf as well. But, a powerful army, a modern air force, and well-equipped navy cannot be built in a vacuum. Changes in the country's social and economic structure to improve national health and educational levels were necessary to provide adequate manpower for these forces. The Shah's program to modernize his country has also made land reform one of its key programs; by 1963 the Crown lands had been sold to the peasants living on them, and by 1971 the government claimed that the task of redistributing the land owned by the wealthy elite was complete. There is little question as to who is running Iran, of course; the Shah has a monopoly of political power, and although parliamentary elections and procedures may furnish the window-dressing of democratic government, it is the Shah alone who determines national policy. The success of the White Revolution—that is, reform and change directed from the top—has solidified the foundations
of the throne that seemed so shaky and insecure in the violent days of 1952 and 1953.

TPAJAX was also to have a very lasting effect outside Iran, however. It changed, for a time at least, some of the methods of conducting and carrying out U.S. foreign policy. The success of covert action in Iran, where the course of history was altered and a potential ally and its valuable petroleum assets kept from slipping into the Communist world by U.S. backing for a military coup, predisposed U.S. planners to apply the technique elsewhere. Had Roosevelt's luck not held and had 19 August turned from a successful gamble into a nightmare of disaster, the United States might well have avoided committing its covert action forces to assist in the overthrow of the pro-Communist government in Guatemala in 1954. And there is reason to doubt that the attempt in 1961 to overthrow Castro's revolutionary government in Cuba would ever have been planned and staged without the successes in Iran and Guatemala glittering in the background to remind the makers of policy that he who does not venture has scant hope of gain.
Whose Oil? An Abbreviated History of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Dispute, 1943-53

In 1972, the then Shah of Persia, Naser ad-Din, in return for much-needed cash, gave to Baron Paul Julius de Reuter, a concession to exploit all his country's minerals (except for gold, silver, and precious stones), all its forests and uncultivated land, and all canals and irrigation works, as well as a monopoly to construct railways and tramways. Although the resulting uproar, especially from neighboring Russia, caused this sweeping concession to be cancelled, de Reuter, who was a German Jew with British citizenship, persisted and by 1889 regained two parts of his original concession—the operation of a bank and the working of Persia's mines. Under the latter grant, de Reuter's men explored for oil without great success, and the concession expired in 1899, the year the Baron died. Persian oil rights then passed to a British speculator, William Knox D'Arcy, whose first fortune had been made in Australian gold mines. The purchase price of the concession was about 50,000 pounds, and in 1903 the enterprise began to sell shares in "The First Exploitation Company." Exploratory drilling proceeded, and by 1904, two producing wells were in. Shortly thereafter, interest in oil was sharply stimulated by the efforts of Admiral Sir John Fisher, First Lord of the Admiralty, to convert the Royal Navy from burning coal to oil. As a result, the Burmah Oil Company sought to become involved in Persian oil and, joining with D'Arcy and Lord Strathcona, formed the new Concessions Syndicate, Ltd, which endured until 1907 when Burmah Oil bought D'Arcy out for 200,000 pounds cash and 900,000 pounds in shares. Burmah's first gusher came in a 1,180 feet in May 1908, near Masjed Soleyman, and a year later, after some complicated financial
dealings in London, the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (APOC) was born, incorporating the shares and rights of the earlier concessionaires. The company chose Abadan as the site of its refinery and made local arrangements for its security with both the Sheik of Mohammerah and the Bakhtiari tribal khans; the former was paid an annual rental and was promised continued autonomy from Tehran, while the latter were to receive 3% of net oil revenues (to be paid out of the Persian government's share of 10%).

When Winston Churchill became First Lord of the Admiralty in 1911, his persistent prodding changed the Royal Navy over to oil. To ensure a source of cheap oil, the British government became a major shareholder in the APOC in 1914, adding 2 million pounds in capitalization and signing a 30-year contract for fuel oil at cut rates (Churchill wrote in 1923 that this contract had saved Britain no less than £7.5 million on its wartime oil purchases).

Differences as to how profits were to be shared between the Persian government and the APOC began after World War I. The company claimed that Persia's share of the profits applied to the earnings of the three subsidiaries actually operating in Persia (based on Article 1 of the D'Arcy concession, which defined its limits as "throughout the whole extent of the country"). Persia claimed it was entitled to a share of the profits from all operations, including extracting, producing, refining, and marketing its oil, wherever these operations might take place. There were also problems over British claims for wartime damage to pipelines by Bakhtiaris incited by German and Turkish agents. The British attempt to negotiate a settlement calling for new profit-sharing arrangements fell through in 1920, and the relationship tottered along under the old agreement until 1933.
In 1921, Reza Khan, a colonel in the Iranian cossacks, seized power by deposing the last Qajar Shah. He visited Abadan after becoming Shah himself in 1925, and his account of the trip gave warnings of things to come. He noted that of the 29,000 employees in the oilfields and refinery, 6,000 were foreigners, and he expressed concern that so few Persians were being trained for higher level posts. He also saw that the British staff enjoyed an obviously higher standard of living than the others, and that while the refinery area appeared prosperous, the surrounding districts had not felt any positive impact from this major industry in their area. Finally, he was disturbed by a manager's description of cutting down production in order not to upset world markets—but at a loss to Persia.

So, Persian dissatisfaction continued to build up until November 1932, when the government notified the company that the D'Arcy concession, signed under the Qajar regime, was annulled and a new concession would be granted on the basis of equity and justice. This new concession was not easily arrived at—the British government referred the annulment to the League of Nations, whose Council sent Dr. Eduard Beneš of Czechoslovakia to reconcile the two sides. Two legal points were thus established that were to affect the later dispute in 1951: the right to annul the concession was recognized, and the League accepted the viewpoint of the British that such a case could be brought to the Council under Article 15 of the Covenant (which provided for a hearing on disputes between members that were likely to lead to a rupture in diplomatic relations and for the solution of which no legal recourse existed). The two parties finally worked out a new concession agreement that was ratified by the Majlis (the lower house of the Persian Parliament).
parliament) and signed by Reza Shah on 29 May 1933; it extended the life of the concession to 1993 and set up a new royalty basis. By its terms Persia would receive 4 shillings on every ton of oil sold in Persia or exported, plus 20% of the dividends over £671,250 distributed to shareholders, with a minimum dividend of £750,000 per year. To avoid Persian taxation, the company agreed to pay a small additional royalty on tonnage, and it would continue to pay British taxes out of gross profits.

It was the oil business as usual until the summer of 1941 when Germany invaded the Soviet Union. Because German influence in Iran (as Persia was renamed in 1935 by Reza Shah) had grown significantly and because the country was the best route for Allied supplies going to the beleaguered Soviets, the Allies determined to send in occupation forces. Russian troops took over the five northern provinces, British forces went into the south, and the area around Tehran was neutralized. Following three days of futile and desultory resistance, the Shah abdicated in favor of his young son, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, and Iran was an occupied country until 1946. Abadan continued to produce petroleum products for the Allies, but the Soviets took advantage of the situation and attempted to obtain an oil concession in the north. In late 1944, the Soviets were advised by Premier Sa'ed that the cabinet had ruled out the granting of further concessions until after the war. When pressure was applied through the leftist parties, Sa'ed resigned, at which point the Majlis passed a bill introduced by Dr. Mohammad Mosadeq forbidding any discussion of or signing agreements for an oil concession with any foreign representatives. The bill passed, despite Communist opposition, thereby blocking a Russian concession, but in the course of the debate the possibility of revoking the
AIOC concession was seriously raised. Despite the law, Premier Qavam in April 1946 signed an agreement giving the U.S.S.R. an oil concession in northern Iran. The Majlis refused to ratify the concession, and in the bill rejecting it, the legislators declared that it was forbidden to grant any concession to export oil to foreigners; further, they instructed the government to look into possible violation of the rights of the people in connection with the southern oil concession held by the AIOC.

With the wartime occupation over, the British oil managers began to have labor troubles. The 1946 general strike was settled with a pay raise, but this was only the start. In 1947 the Iranian Ministry of Finance sent a delegation to London to discuss money due the Iranian government, various employee grievances, reduction of foreign staff, expansion of local distribution facilities, and the AIOC policy of concentrating refining activities outside Iran. To these complaints, the company, obviously feeling secure in the legality of its concession, was relatively unresponsive.

The law of 22 October 1947 instructed the government to open discussions with the AIOC to secure the nation's rights to its oil resources. These "discussions" started more than 5 years of bargaining and debating, proposal and counterproposal, charge and countercharge, until they eventually reached the Security Council of the United Nations. The Iranians led off in August 1948 with a 50-page memorandum that listed 25 points that were to be discussed with the company in implementing the 1947 law. The main items on this list included British taxation of Iran's share of oil profits, Iran's ultimate rights to AIOC installations outside the country at the end of the concession (it had already been promised those in Iran), reduction in the number of foreign employees, the length of the concession (by 1993,}
the Iranians felt, they would have little oil left in the ground), the royalty basis, and tax and custom exemptions. Negotiations with company representatives began the following month, continuing intermittently thereafter. Shortly before the 16 January 1949 attempt by a Tudeh Party member to assassinate the Shah at Tehran University, Premier Saidi identified higher profits and more Iranian employees as his main goals in these discussions; he pointed out that Iran's oil royalties for 1947 were just over £7 million, whereas the AIOC had paid some £15 million in British income taxes. Specifically, Iran wanted control of the company's operations as well as a 50-50 split of the net profits. On 5 May 1949, AIOC chairman Sir William Fraser came to Tehran with a draft of the "Supplemental Agreement," and this draft was basically the agreement signed by the government and company on 17 July. The royalty payment was increased from 4 to 6 shillings per ton, and Iran was to get 20% of the distributed profits (with a minimum of £2.5 million) and general reserve terms were well short of the 50-50 sharing Iran wanted and which Braune was in the process of agreeing to give Saudi Arabia. The agreement was sent to the Majlis on 17 July, and debate began on 23 July, lasting 4 days before the 15th Majlis formally went out of existence. The oil agreement bill as well as the new election bill were left over to the next Majlis.

Elections for the 16th Majlis began in the fall of 1949 and were finally completed in March 1950, with Dr. Mosadeq and his eight followers leading in the balloting in Tehran. Ali Mansur became Premier, and in June the oil agreement was turned over to the 13-man special oil commission that included Mosadeq and five other members of the National Front. Six days later, the Shah dismissed Mansur and appointed General Ali Razmara, former Chief of Staff, as Premier. The commission reported back to the Majlis and
that the agreement was not adequate to secure the rights of Iran and that it was opposed to its ratification. The Minister of Finance then withdrew the agreement, announcing that negotiations for increased royalties would be reopened with the AIOC.

In February the AIOC offered Iran an agreement similar to Aramco's, including the 50-50 profit sharing, but it was too late; the National Front was intent on nationalizing oil and it dominated the Majlis. The oil commission indicated it too favored that course, despite the report from the experts appointed by Razmara to study the feasibility of nationalization. The experts had pointed out Iran's lack of technical and financial expertise, plus the facts that the concession could not legally be cancelled, that Iran would be liable for up to 500 million in compensation, that heavy losses in foreign exchange and prestige would result, and that it would be unwise to antagonize Britain. On 7 March General Razmara was shot and killed by a member of Fedayan Islam, a rightist terrorist group, and Hosein Ala succeeded him as premier.

When the Majlis in mid-March unanimously accepted the principle of nationalization, the British Foreign Office notified the Premier that an act of nationalization would not legally terminate the oil company's operations. Shortly thereafter, strikes broke out in the south as a result of the company's cutting a hardship allowance for Iranian workers in certain areas plus other grievances. Martial law was declared on 26 March, and in early April rioting began in Abadan that did not end until troops fired into the crowd; 6 were killed and 30 wounded, and two British oil workers and a sailor were also killed.

As members of the National Front were presenting their draft of an oil nationalization law to the special oil committee, Premier Ala resigned.
The Majlis approved the law and at the same time voted to recommend to the Shah the appointment of Mosadeq as Premier; the Senate followed suit. The Shah acceded, appointing Mosadeq on 29 April; two days later he signed the nine-point law that in broad terms ordered the government takeover from the AIOC. The company's response was to hold up the May monthly advance payment of £2 million and to ask that entire oil problem be submitted to arbitration, a request that Iran did not acknowledge. On 25 May the British government brought the matter before the International Court of Justice, the same day it despatched the 16th Independent Parachute Brigade Group to Cyprus; two Royal Navy cruisers and three frigates were already in the Persian Gulf area. In addition to the government's request, the AIOC asked the ICJ to appoint an arbitrator, as provided in the 1933 concession agreement. The Iranian view of these appeals to The Hague was simple: Iran did not recognize the competence of the court to deal with the matter, which concerned Iran's internal affairs.

The United States became seriously involved in these discussions for the first time in mid-May 1951. A State Department statement of 19 May urged both sides to try to find an agreeable compromise solution; it noted that the United States recognized the sovereign right of Iran to control its resources and industries but said that the technical knowledge, capital, and transport and marketing facilities were all controlled by the AIOC. It further stated that U.S. oil companies had indicated that they would not, in the face of unilateral Iranian action against the AIOC, be willing to undertake operations in Iran or provide technicians to work there. The note pleased neither Iran nor Britain, which was the object of U.S. pressure to accept the nationalization concept and work toward a compromise. At President Truman's urging, conveyed through Ambassador Grady in Tehran and
by letters to Prime Minister Atlee and Premier Mosadeq, the British agreed to send a delegation and the Iranians agreed to accept it.

Talks got underway on 14 June, with the Iranians demanding that the AIOC hand over 75% of net oil revenues since 20 March and put the other 25% into a bank, presumably to be eventually paid as compensation. The British, 5 days later, proposed that a new company be established by the AIOC to operate the oil industry on behalf of Iran; the profit split would be 50-50. No compromise between these two points of view appeared possible, and on 21 June the British went back to the ICJ with a request for an injunction to halt the nationalization process until the court had ruled on the original U.K. application. Since Iran had already refused to recognize the court's jurisdiction, it was not represented when the court issued an order to maintain the status quo as of 1 May 1951, with a Board of Supervision consisting of two Iranians, two Britons, and one individual of another nationality empowered to run the industry.

Iran ignored this order and prepared to move the managers of the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) into Abadan, while the AIOC began to slow down the output of the refinery and prepare for evacuation. Export of oil stopped, and in the face of an antisabotage law introduced in the Majlis, the British staff resigned. Mosadeq wrote to President Truman on 27 June, complaining about the British attitude and the actions of the British technicians, whom he wished to retain as contract employees to run the oil industry. Truman's reply on 9 July stressed the U.S. desire for a peaceful settlement and urged Mosadeq to go along with the ICJ order; he also offered to send his foreign policy adviser, Averell Harriman, to Iran to help work out a solution. Mosadeq agreed to accept
Harriman as a mediator, provided that any scheme he suggested would be consistent with the nationalization law. Harriman's arrival in Tehran on 15 July was hardly auspicious; in the course of a massive demonstration against the United States, Tudeh mobs fought with the National Front and other elements; the police and then the army intervened, and 15 people were killed, over 200 wounded (the Minister of Interior, General Zahedi, resigned as a result of the criticism he received over the handling of the demonstration).

Seeking to find some common ground for agreement, Harriman persuaded Mosadeq to enter into further discussions on how to implement the law, contingent on the British accepting the principle of nationalization. He flew to London to arrange for a new British mission to Iran but found the Labor cabinet insistent on an improvement in conditions in the oil area, including "an end to provocation of British staff." Compromise versions of the messages between the two governments were worked out by Harriman, and Prime Minister Attlee and Foreign Secretary Morrison agreed to send Richard Stokes, Lord Privy Seal, as the head of a high-level delegation to Tehran. Stokes' proposal, after preliminary meetings with the AIOC staff in Abadan, was very similar to the earlier British suggestion that an AIOC purchasing organization, with Iranian representation, handle the marketing of the oil as a monopoly, with profits evenly divided. Iran, of course, would not give up the idea of nationalization and said it would discuss only three points—the purchase of oil for British needs, AIOC claims for compensation, and conditions required for continued employment of British technicians. At a private meeting of Harriman, Mosadeq, and Stokes, the latter suggested that a British general manager be appointed, to act under direction of the NIOC. The Iranians would not
accept this, proposing instead a board of management composed of experts from countries "with no special political interest" in Iran. Stokes would not even discuss this point and returned to London on 23 August.

U.S. Ambassador Grady was replaced in Tehran on 11 September by Ambassador Loy Henderson, and Mosadeq was advised by Harriman from Washington that his proposals were not workable since they did not conform to the practical and commercial aspects of the international oil industry. Iran told the small British staff still in Abadan that it must leave the country within a week from 27 September, and on 4 October the last of the AIOC personnel duly left Iran.

In the meantime, the British government asked that the case be considered by the U.N. Security Council as a potential threat to world peace, and on 1 October the Council agreed to put the question of intervention on its agenda. Mosadeq flew to New York to present Iran’s case. The Security Council listened to both sides, debated the British resolution from 15 to 19 October, and finally decided to adjourn the question until after the ICJ had ruled on its own jurisdiction. In the British general elections shortly thereafter, the Conservatives were returned to power, with Winston Churchill as Prime Minister and Anthony Eden as Foreign Secretary; in a speech in Commons, Eden declared there were three elements that would be involved in a satisfactory solution to the problem—first, the Iranian economy depended on efficient operation of the oil industry; second, the benefits must be shared between Iran and the developers of the oil resources; and finally, fair compensation must be paid for the act of nationalization.

The ICJ met on 9 June 1952, and the legal arguments eventually were reduced to the interpretation of the Iranian declaration of 2 October 1930.
recognizing the Jurisdiction of the Permanent Court of International
Justice (predecessor to the ICJ) in disputes "arising after the ratification
of the present declaration with regard to situations or fact relating
directly or indirectly to the application of treaties or conventions
subsequent to the ratification of this declaration." The legal points
at issue were whether the dispute related to a treaty or convention and,
if so, was it a treaty or convention covered by the declaration? The
court finally ruled that the word "subsequent" referred to "treaties" and
not "situations" and that since the oil concession was not a treaty, it
did not have jurisdiction. The British thus lost their ICJ case and with
it their chance to have the Security Council pass on their resolution.

The matter nonetheless remained at an impasse. While the nations
involved waited nearly 8 months for the ICJ ruling, other compromise
solutions were sought. In November 1951, officials of the International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) proposed that the bank
finance, as trustee, the production and refining of Iran's oil and then
sell it to the AIOC at current Persian Gulf oil prices, Iran to receive
payment at those prices, less an agreed discount which would go to the
AIOC. The British were willing to go along with this if AIOC technicians
would be employed, but Iran would not agree to either the technicians or
the discount. The IBRD tried again, proposing a neutral board of manage-
ment responsible to the bank which would arrange a bulk export contract
for the sale of oil through established distribution channels; the profits
would be divided three ways—one share to Iran, one to the bulk purchaser,
and one to be held in reserve by the bank. However, on the question of
non-Iranian management, the use of British technicians, and the selling
price of the oil, the negotiations ultimately broke down. The IBRD
mission returned to New York on 23 March 1952. At about the same time, President Truman notified Mosadeq that the United States would not give Iran a loan of $120 million at a time when the country had an opportunity to get "adequate revenue" from its oil resources; he thus none too subtly pressed Mosadeq to settle the oil dispute.

Relations between the Iranian and British governments deteriorated steadily. Iran attempted to sell the oil stored in the tanks at Abadan to Italian and Japanese firms, but AIOC action in the courts plus the cooperation of the international oil industry with the British limited the amounts of oil that could be delivered. In January 1952, Mosadeq had ordered all British consulates closed; he followed that by closing all foreign information and cultural centers in Iran. He made some attempt to reach agreement with the British on compensation, but his proposals included large offsetting amounts for unpaid royalties and other payments stopped by the cessation of oil production in 1951. When the British in October 1952 described his final proposals as "unreasonable and unacceptable," Mosadeq broke off diplomatic relations with the United Kingdom.

The premier in the meantime had scored internal political victories of his own. Reelected by the new Majlis in July 1952, he asked for six months of emergency powers to rule by decree in order to deal with the critical economic situation. When the Shah refused, Mosadeq resigned, and Qavam was appointed in his place; the result was four days of rioting by both Tudeh and the National Front. Qavam resigned, and on 23 July Mosadeq again became premier; his political ally and one of Tehran's best known religious figures, the mullah Ayatollah Kashani, was named Speaker of the Majlis, which then voted Mosadeq decree powers for one year. The Senate and the Shah concurred, and the stage was set for the anti-Shah
political maneuvering of early 1953, during which Mossadegh permitted the Tudeh Party and its front groups considerable freedom, perhaps with the idea of pressuring the United States to come to Iran's aid. Implied threats to turn to the Communists were contained in a Mossadegh letter of 23 May 1953 to President Eisenhower requesting a large loan, and the Eisenhower reply, as a matter of policy, was cold in its rejection of this threat and its accompanying bid for help. Eisenhower's letter concluded:

I fully understand that the Government of Iran must determine for itself which foreign and domestic policies are likely to be most advantageous to Iran and the Iranian people. In what I have written, I am not trying to advise the Iranian Government on its best interests. I am merely trying to explain why, in the circumstances, the Government of the United States is not presently in a position to extend more aid to Iran or to purchase Iranian oil.

In case Iran should so desire, the United States Government hopes to be able to continue to extend technical assistance and military aid on a basis comparable to that given during the past year. I note the concern reflected in your letter at the present dangerous situation in Iran and sincerely hope that before it is too late the Government of Iran will take such steps as are in its power to prevent a further deterioration of that situation.

Following the August 1953 coup that overthrew Mossadegh, the oil dispute was settled along the lines that had been proposed to Mossadegh—the oil industry was nationalized, but its operations were directed by a group of foreign oil companies. The details of this arrangement were worked out by a series of conferences, but Herbert Hoover Jr., as special oil adviser to the Secretary of State, had an important role in convincing the Iranians of the wisdom of dealing with a "consortium." Between Hoover's initial visit to Tehran in October 1953 and the announcement of a new agreement in August 1954, Britain and Iran resumed diplomatic relations.

Under the terms of the agreement, the National Iranian Oil Company delegated basic operations in 100,000 square miles of southwestern Iran to an international consortium known as Iranian Oil Participants, Ltd., until

*See attached map of southwestern Iran.
1975, with an option of extension to 1994. British Petroleum, the new name of the AIOC, owned 40%, Royal Dutch Shell 14%, Compagnie Francaise des Pétroles 6%, and U.S. oil companies 40% (7% each to Standard Oil Company of New Jersey, Standard Oil Company of California, Socony Mobil Oil Company, The Texas Company, and Gulf Oil Corporation, and 5% to Iricon Agency, Ltd., comprised of nine small U.S. oil companies). Since 1955 the AIOC has carried out a number of operations of its own; and, after the passage of a new oil law in 1957, has allowed Italian, U.S., and Canadian companies to explore for oil and conduct operations outside the consortium's territory. The consortium has produced 90% of Iran's oil, however, and the rate of production has been the highest in the world, increasing at an annual rate of almost 14% in the 1960's and reaching 1.7 million barrels in 1971, which was 10% of world output and second largest production in the Middle East. Price increases levied by Iran and other Persian Gulf members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Companies in 1971 and 1972 resulted in an estimated $14 billion for those years, and the Middle East oil crisis of late 1973 raised prices even higher. Iran is currently very concerned about its estimated reserves, which at current rates of extraction may barely last until 1994. Oil accounts for 23% of Iran's GNP, including some 85% of its foreign exchange earnings and 60% of its budgetary revenues.
Bibliography


The bare bones of the life of the man who was Premier of Iran from 28 April 1951 to 19 August 1953 and who was the target of TPAJAX

He was born about 1331 (1873 or 1879 are probably more accurate dates, but 1371 was always given as his official birth year because of the restrictions on the age of Majlis deputies) in Tehran, his mother being a member of the ruling Qajar dynasty and his father the Minister of Finance for some 30 years. His family background was thus the elite, wealthy, landowning class. His secondary education, complete, Mosadeq was sent to Khorasan as the Shah's financial agent while barely out of his middle teens. In 1906, forced into exile because of his role in the Constitutional Revolution that year, he went to Europe to study law at Paris, Liege, and Neuchatel, earning his LL.D. from the last institution in 1914. Returning to Iran, he was elected to the Majlis in 1915, serving on its financial committee. As Under Secretary of Finance in 1917, he resigned after only a few months in office because he was prevented from carrying out reforms in the notoriously padded payroll system. He became governor of Fars Province in 1921, but his criticism of Reza Shah led to arrest in 1930 and exile to the villages. He was again arrested in 1941 but was released in the general political amnesty after Reza Shah's abdication. Mosadeq was again elected to the Majlis in 1944, where in 1947 he organized the National Front, a small, tightly knit, and highly influential group. As a member of the oil commission, he gained in influence not only in the Majlis but among the people, and his April 1951 appointment as Premier was at the Majlis' request. From then until his removal from office in August 1953, he concentrated his energies on expropriating the British-owned
oil industry in defiance of Western attempts to negotiate a settlement that stopped short of complete nationalization. Sentenced to three years in prison in a post-coup trial, he was eventually pardoned by the Shah in August 1956, but he was forced to remain in his village of Ahvaz, under virtual house arrest for the 11 years until his death in March 1967. He had suffered from cancer of the jaw and finally succumbed to internal bleeding after two operations in Tehran.

The above facts do little to explain his behavior as a politician, but, most of his actions, even his most emotional and apparently irrational ones, were probably well calculated. The popular world image of him as an enfeebled old man, given to hysterical weeping and fainting spells, served his own purposes and gave him tremendous leverage among his people. He used the accepted belief that he was ill and weak to avoid things or people he did not want to face, and his apparent physical debility added to the drama of his personality, which in public speeches was capable of moving his opponents.

Mosadeq's power rose from his consummate ability to appeal to national aspirations and emotions. By attempting to deal with a heated political problem in logical, rational terms based on economic facts, the British were unable to achieve anything in the oil dispute but to unify the people of Iran. Reza Shah had held power for 20 years by appealing to latent Iranian nationalism; Mosadeq used this awakened nationalism and the desire for independence to keep himself in power and to defy Britain. His speeches and programs appealed to social discontent, xenophobia, religious fanaticism, and national pride in past glories. His enormous gamble on the oil issue, based on his belief that Britain
and the United States would not let Iran go Communist, was part vanity, part Islamic fatalism. He utilized foremost the technique of opposition—his nine-man National Front opposed every government in power, whether under Sa'ed, Mansur, Razmara, or Ala—and then, once Premier, his single plank was opposition to the British over the oil question.

Mosadeq was antagonistic to the Shah for many reasons: his mother was a Qajar, whose family was overthrown by the Shah's father, the same man that had exiled and then imprisoned him; in addition, he had long believed in constitutional reform to reduce the power of the monarchy. He opposed the army because it had brought Reza Shah to power and was the main source of support for Mohammad Reza Shah; by retiring senior officers and putting in his own Chief of Staff, the young, French-trained Brig.Gen. Taji Riahi, he had obtained a degree of control over the army. But, by so doing, he set the stage for the officer corps to turn against him. His own extreme nationalism, fantasies of omnipotence, and lack of conscience—in manipulating Tudeh, at the risk of it getting out of control as it did in the streets of Tehran on 18 August, were the seeds of his own eventual downfall. But he was a most unusual man, one whose character caught the world's fancy, even as he drove his countrymen toward disaster. At any time in 1951 or 1952 he could have had the same compromise through which his successors gained a nationalized oil industry efficiently run by foreign experts to give Iran the revenue that financed the Shah's White Revolution. He chose to gamble on total victory over Britain, the United States, and the international oil industry—and he lost.
MAJ. GEN. FAZULLAH ZAHEDI

Born in 1897 in Hamadan, Zahedi graduated from the Military School in Tehran and served during the years of World War I and the postwar period under Reza Khan, then a colonel in the Cossack Brigade. As a combat officer, he was decorated for action against assorted bandits and insurgents, including rebellious Kurds, Lurs, and Turkomans. He had become a division commander by 1942, after service as head of the Gendarmerie and the Tehran Police, but he was arrested by the British that year for pro-German activity (his name was found in the papers of Franz Mayer, a principal Nazi agent in Tehran, as an officer who would protect German agents) and deported to Palestine, where he was held until 1945. Despite his arrest and subsequent three years in a detention camp, he did not become fanatically anti-British as did many xenophobic Iranians. Returning to Tehran after the war in 1945, he was given command of the Fars Division and promoted to major general. In 1948, as Inspector General of the army, he was severely injured in a tank accident, losing four ribs, and after 7 months of medical treatment in Germany, some of it by U.S. Army doctors, he was retired in May 1949. The Shah made him his honorary adjutant, and in November 1949 appointed him Director General of the Tehran Police. In April 1951 Zahedi became Minister of Interior in the Ala cabinet and was retained in that post by Mossadeq when he became Premier. He resigned in August 1951, following

*There was a Cossack Brigade in the Persian Army solely because Nasr-ed-Din Shah visited Russia in 1878 and was provided with a Cossack escort by the Czar. The Shah was so impressed by the Cossacks that he asked the Czar to send him Russian officers to organize such a unit in his own army. The Brigade retained Russian senior officers and noncoms until 1920, and as long as it was in existence, it was the best trained and most professional unit in the army.*
the anti-U.S. riots in Tehran on 15 July in which the mob got out of hand and the army had to be called in to fire on them, with the result that many died and hundreds were wounded, on both sides. He was a prime suspect of the Mosadeq government as a potential coup leader and was briefly arrested in February 1953.

ARDESHIR ZAHEDI

Born in December 1927, General Zahedi's son, Ardeshir, was educated at the American University in Beirut and at Utah State University where he earned a BS degree in 1950. Because of his training and language ability, he served with the Rural Improvement Commission which was administering U.S. technical assistance until he was forced to resign in 1952 by Mosadeq. During the planning and operational phases of the coup, he acted as the communications channel to his father and performed very well under difficult circumstances. He was married for a time to the Shah's daughter by Queen Fawzia and has never remarried since his divorce. He has retained the Shah's favor and, in fact, introduced the Shah to Farah in May 1959, the girl who later became Queen and mother of the Shah's sons. Ardeshir was the Iranian Ambassador to the United States in 1960-62 and returned again in April 1973 to the post. In the interim, he was Ambassador to the United Kingdom, 1962-67, and Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1967-71.

MAJ. GEN. NADR BATMANGELICH

General Batmangelich (also spelled Batmanqilich or Batmangelij) was born in Tehran about 1905 and educated in Germany, the Iranian Military School, and the German Staff College. He fought in the Luristan and Fars tribal campaigns and was interned by the Allies from August 1943
to June 1945. He visited the United States on a purchasing mission in 1950 and was put on the retired list in 1952 by Mosadeq. Named Chief of Staff of the army immediately after the 1953 coup, he retained that post despite friction with Premier Zahedi until December 1955 when he was made Ambassador to Pakistan to ease him out of the army command. Clashes with General Hedayet, Chief of the new Supreme Staff, were the probable cause of his reassignment. He then became Ambassador to Iraq in January 1957, was Minister of Interior in 1958-59, and became Adjutant to the Shah in 1959.

After serving as Governor of Khorasan, 1965-68, he retired to private life. He had served as Permanent Iranian Delegate to the CENTO Military Committee before retiring from the army 1965.

Batmangelich never divulged his behavior on the night of 15 August, details of which were known only to few insiders in the Zahedi coup group. He failed to take his objective, the Staff Headquarters, and breaking down, he either turned himself in or was arrested by troops loyal to Mosadeq. There was reason to believe he talked freely to interrogators, providing them with a list of other officers involved in the coup.
APPENDIX B

When Mohammad Reza became Shah in 1941 at the age of 22 following his father's abdication, Iran was occupied by foreign troops--Soviet, British, and American--and its army was demoralized. He had no solid power base and no political machine, and as a result he spent the first 10 years of his reign in conflict with the traditional political power structure bent on regaining the influence it had lost to Reza Shah. The military coup that ousted Mosadeq in August 1953 was thus a major milestone in the Shah's political life.

Mohammad Reza was born on 26 October 1919; he studied 6 years as a cadet at the Military School of Tehran and then went to Switzerland in 1931 for his secondary education. Returning in 1936, he attended the Iranian Military College, from which he graduated 2 years later as a second lieutenant. His first marriage, in 1939, was to Princess Fawzia of Egypt, sister of King Farug, and a daughter, Shanaz, was the only child of this marriage. Divorcing Fawzia, he married Sorya Esfandiari, a half-German, half-Bakhtiari beauty to whom he was very devoted, but the marriage was childless and the throne needed an heir. After the inevitable divorce, he married Farah Diba in 1959, and Crown Prince Reza was born in 1960, followed by two daughters and Prince Ali Reza, securing the succession of the Pahlavi line.

Although various sources criticized the young Shah as suspicious and indecisive to the point of permanent instability, others saw his strengths. An OSS report in 1943 said:

Mohammad Shah is a man of much stronger purpose than is generally realized. He stands almost alone, distrusts most advisers, is honest in his efforts to secure a democratic form of government for Iran. He is not easily influenced and cannot

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be shaken. Installed as a figurehead during the 1941 crisis, he may yet surprise the factions in his country and the outside powers. He thinks along Western lines, and he is inalienably attached to his Iranian army. The military budget is half the national expenditure just now. Yet, of course, the army is the rapid escalation of oil prices in 1973-74 has enhanced the Shah's prestige as spokesperson for the more extreme oil-producing countries, and he could not have taken place without the pressure and determination, the reforms and development probably launched in 1962 as the white revolution, have accomplished much. His reforms have taught the people to act responsibly. His and social development have taught the people to function peculiarly, and economic growth to control his power, carefully controlling political activity. Conflict of the poplar support he saw during the coup, he pressed on and curtailed his thinking about his reservation and voluntary exile. Even so, the very characteristics enabled him to frustrate the voluntary exile, was often ascribed to the Shah's distinction and lack of decisiveness, or forsaken in the triumph of the moment, and although General Zeheli has been observed to be a shrewd and brave man, his program, his haughty fight to Baghdad and Rome was after for the General's has never since allowed them to infringe his position of the Shah took the successful coup of 1953 as a popular mandate to control the political unrest from the political unrests, the military's role and the Shah's confidence by the popular support he saw during the coup, he pressed on. The rapid escalation of oil prices in 1973-74 has enhanced the Shah's prestige as spokesperson for the more extreme oil-producing countries, and he could not have taken place without the pressure and determination, the reforms and development probably launched in 1962 as the white revolution, have accomplished much. 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has been quick to resent criticism of the view that oil is the main resource of those countries, a resource that cannot be replaced and that must be conserved, if only by the pressure of cost. The situation has clearly made the Shah a man whom the world listens to, and he has made the most of it.
APPENDIX C

THE LEGEND: HOW THE PRESS VIEWED TPAJAX

The world of journalism—ever on the alert for the mote in somebody else's eye—found long ago that the Central Intelligence Agency made great copy. Proceeding on the theory that their readers will believe anything dealing with "spies," "agents," and "the secret world of espionage," a number of writers have told what they insist is the inside story of the CIA involvement in Iran in 1953. A sampling of these is included here, without extensive comment, since the distortions and guesses will be obvious to those who have read this history.

Andrew Tully, for example, in CIA—The Inside Story devotes Chapter 7, "King-Making in Iran" to a version of TPAJAX most notable for the purple of its flamboyant prose. Some significant passages are:

It was in 1953, of course, that the CIA stage-managed the overthrow of Premier Mohammed Mossadegh, that celebrated compulsive weeper, who had seized Britain's monopolistic oil company and was threatening to do business with the Kremlin. At the time CIA's coup was hailed as a blow for democracy, which it was. But after disposing of Mossadegh, CIA and the State Department reverted once again to a weakness that so often has been disastrous. In the setting up of the new regime, in which CIA took a major part, no consideration was given as to whether the new men had any
intention of attempting to relieve the misery of the Iranian people. It was enough for the United States that they were anti-Communist.

When Mossadegh announced the expropriation of Anglo-Iranian Oil and nationalization of Iran's oil fields, the international uproar was thunderous. Mossadegh could not do that, and the Western bankers would prove it to him. Iranian oil was virtually boycotted. Mossadegh promptly tried to swing some deals with smaller, independent companies to work the Iranian fields, but the State Department gave these companies little encouragement - which is to say it told them "hands off." Meanwhile, Iran was losing its oil revenues and going broke. Even American financial aid was not enough although the State Department, with understandable reluctance, donated $1,600,000 for a technical rural improvement program in 1951 and followed that with a foreign aid grant of $23,000,000 in 1952. Most of the latter was used to make up Iran's foreign exchange shortages, but Iran remained financially unstable.

Meanwhile, CIA learned that Mossadegh was carrying on a clandestine flirtation with Iran's furtive Communist party, the Tudeh. Soviet intelligence agents flocked into the ancient capital of Teheran and the traffic jam between them and Allen Dulles' energetic young men was almost ludicrous. Almost daily, emissaries from the Soviet danced attendance on Mossadegh as he lolled recumbent on his couch, alternately dozing and weeping. Inevitably, the old dictator put it squarely up to President Eisenhower. In a letter received by the President on May 28, 1953, Mossadegh overplayed his hand - he attempted to blackmail the United States by warning that unless Iran got more American financial aid he would be forced to seek help elsewhere.
Elsewhere was the Soviet Union, with which Mossadegh suggested he would conclude both an economic agreement and a mutual defense pact.

Since Iran otherwise was broke, that meant Mossadegh would have to pledge the rich Iranian oil fields and the refinery at Abadan, the world’s largest, in return for financial assistance from the Soviet. The danger to the West was clear. With Iran’s oil assets in its pockets, the Russians would have little trouble eventually achieving a prime object of Russian foreign policy since the days of the Czars - access to a warm water outlet on the Persian Gulf, the free world’s life line to the Far East. But even if Russia were to get just Iran’s oil, the Western world would be weakened throughout the Middle East and Soviet prestige would soar. It was clear, too, of course, that Anglo-Iranian Oil had a stake of billions of dollars, and when private enterprise of that magnitude is involved State Departments and Foreign Offices are apt to react most sensitively.

The time had come for the United States to embark on an international gamble. CIA reports were that Mossadegh, although popular with the masses, had never been able to undermine the young Shah with his people. If something were to happen whereby the Shah was able to take over more firmly the reins of government, there was a good chance Mossadegh could be unseated. In any event, the Shah had a better than even chance of winning any popularity contest with Mossadegh.

So for a month the White House stalled Mossadegh, avoiding a direct reply in a welter of polite diplomatic notes seeking further discussions. Then President Eisenhower favored Mossadegh with a blunt reply: "No." Everybody agreed it was a calculated risk, a gamble that Mossadegh could be dealt with in such a fashion that he would be powerless to carry out his threat. The CIA forthwith set the wheels in motion for dealing with this tough old man.
First, on August 10, Allen Dulles flew to Europe to join his wife for a "holiday" in the Swiss Alps. Although the political situation in Teheran was becoming more ominous - Mossadegh was conferring daily with a Russian economic mission - United States Ambassador Loy Henderson decided he would like a vacation to Switzerland, too. Almost simultaneously, the Shah's sister, the pretty and tough-minded Princess Ashraf, marched into the royal palace and gave her brother the rough side of her tongue for his hesitancy in facing up to Mossadegh. Then she, too, flew off to Switzerland.

Certainly, the Russian espionage network must have surmised that something was cooking as Dulles, Henderson and Princess Ashraf turned up at the same Swiss resort. Their suspicions were strengthened when an old Middle Eastern hand named Brigadier General H. Norman Schwartzkopf suddenly was discovered in the midst of a leisurely flying vacation across the Middle East. He had been to Pakistan, Syria and Lebanon and, while the Russians fumed, he ultimately turned up in Iran.

The Reds had a right to be fearful, for Schwartzkopf had long been an anathema to the Kremlin. Americans remember him most vividly as the man who ran the Lindbergh kidnapping investigation in 1932, when he was head of the New Jersey State Police. But the world of international politics knew him better as the man who, from 1942 to 1945, had been in charge of reorganizing the Shah's national police force. In this job, Schwartzkopf spent little time tracking down ordinary criminals; he was kept busy protecting the government against its enemies, a job that required the setting up of an intelligence system to keep watch on various political cliques which might seek the Shah's overthrow.
In the course of these intriguing duties, Schwartzkopf had become a close friend and adviser to the Shah and, more important, to Major General Fazlollah Zahedi, one of his colleagues on the police force. So when Schwartzkopf turned up in Teheran in August he could explain with a straight face that he had come merely "to see old friends again." The Russians stormed and protested over his presence in Iran but Schwartzkopf went his casual way, dropping in to see the Shah one afternoon, spending the morning with General Zahedi, and renewing contacts with other old pals in the police and army.

And suddenly the Shah seemed to have located his courage and authority. On Thursday, August 13, the Shah handed down a ukase that sounded as if it had been written in collaboration by Schwartzkopf and Zahedi. Mossadegh was ousted as Premier and his successor was to be General Zahedi. The Shah ordered the colonel of the Imperial Guards to serve the notice on Mossadegh, and the wheels seemed to be turning.

But for some reason the colonel seemed seized by inaction. It was not until two days later, on midnight of August 15, that the colonel and a platoon of his troops showed up at Mossadegh's residence. There they found themselves surrounded by an array of tanks and jeeps, manned by hard-faced Army veterans Mossadegh had rounded up while the colonel vacillated.

The colonel, of course, was clapped into jail and Mossadegh announced that a revolt against the rightful government of Iran had been crushed. He also had some unkind things to say about the youthful Shah, and Iran's king of kings and his queen took the hint and hopped a plane for Rome by way of the then royally safe country of Iraq.
Schwartzkopf, however, held his own ground on the Iranian stage. He took over as unofficial paymaster for the Mossadegh-Must-Go clique. Certain Iranians started to get rich, and the word later was that in a period of a few days Schwartzkopf supervised the careful spending of more than ten million of CIA's dollars. Mossadegh suddenly lost a great many supporters.

The climax came on Wednesday, August 19, four days after Mossadegh had "crushed the revolt." The tense capital was filled with troops, mounted against a new uprising, but none of them looked very happy. There seemed no reason for alarm when a long and winding procession of performers appeared on the scene for one of these impromptu parades common in Teheran. In the procession were tumblers, weight-lifters, wrestlers, boxers -- all performing their specialties as they moved slowly along the streets. As usual, crowds flocked out into the streets to watch the show and to follow the parade.

Then, apparently, somebody gave a signal. The weird procession suddenly broke into an organized shouting mob. "Long Live the Shah!" they cried. "Death to Mossadegh." The crowd joined in the shouting, some of them undoubtedly keeping one hand tight against pockets where their American wages were secured. Soon the entire capital was in an uproar, and when the din was at its loudest troops who had remained loyal to the Shah launched their attack.

For more than nine hours the battle raged, with Mossadegh's troops fighting fiercely but gradually giving ground. Obviously, they were confused by the tactics and swift logistical maneuvers of the Shah's forces, who had been exposed to some American who knew the ropes. Anyway, by midnight Mossadegh's soldiers had been driven into a little ring around the Premier's palace and they were forced to surrender. Troops forcing their way into the palace captured Mossadegh as he lay weeping in his bed, clad in silk striped pajamas. Somebody telephoned Rome and the Shah and his queen packed again, to return to Teheran and install Zahedi as Premier.
This was a coup necessary to the security of the United States, and probably to that of the Western World. But it was another case of the United States not requiring tough enough terms in return for its support. It is senseless, as some observers have written, to say that the Iranians overthrew Mossadegh all by themselves. It was an American operation from beginning to end. But at the end, CIA -- and the American government -- stood by while a succession of pro-Western and anti-Communist administrations, uninterested in the smallest social reforms, brought Iran once again to the edge of bankruptcy. And, of course, the American taxpayer has contributed hundreds of millions of dollars to this corruption.

Then, David Wise and Thomas B. Ross in their "explosive bestseller" The Invisible Government provided yet another version, as follows:

1953: Iran

But guerrilla raids are small actions compared to an operation that changes a government. There is no doubt at all that the CIA organized and directed the 1953 coup that overthrew Premier Mohammed Mossadegh and kept Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlevi on his throne. But few Americans know that the coup that toppled the government of Iran was led by a CIA agent who was the grandson of President Theodore Roosevelt.

Kermit "Kim" Roosevelt, also a seventh cousin of President Franklin D. Roosevelt, is still known as "Mr. Iran" around the CIA for his spectacular operation in Teheran more than a decade ago. He later left the CIA and joined the Gulf Oil Corporation as "government relations" director in its Washington office. Gulf named his a vice-president in 1960.

One legend that grew up inside the CIA had it that Roosevelt, in the grand Rough Rider tradition, led the revolt against the weeping Mossadegh with a gun at the head of an Iranian tank commander as the column rolled into Teheran.
A CIA man familiar with the Iran story characterized this as "a bit romantic" but said: "Kim did run the operation from a basement in Teheran -- not from our embassy." He added admiringly: "It was a real James Bond operation."

General Fazollah Zahedi,* the man the CIA chose to replace Mossadegh, was also a character worthy of spy fiction. A six-foot-two, handsome ladies' man, he fought the Bolsheviks, was captured by the Kurds, and, in 1942, was kidnapped by the British, who suspected him of Nazi intrigues. During World War II the British and the Russians jointly occupied Iran. British agents, after snatching Zahedi, claimed they found the following items in his bedroom: a collection of German automatic weapons, silk underwear, some opium, letters from German parachutists operating in the hills, and an illustrated register of Teheran's most exquisite prostitutes.

After the war Zahedi rapidly moved back into public life. He was Minister of Interior when Mossadegh became Premier in 1951. Mossadegh nationalized the British-owned Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in April and seized the huge Abadan refinery on the Persian Gulf.

The refinery was shut down; thousands of workers were idled and Iran faced a financial crisis. The British, with the backing of Western governments, boycotted Iran's oil and the local workers were unable to run the refineries at capacity without British techniques.

Mossadegh connived with the Tudeh, Iran's Communist party, and London and Washington feared that the Russians would end up with Iran's vast oil reserves flowing into the Soviet Union, which shares a common border with Iran. Mossadegh, running the crisis from his bed -- he claimed he was a very sick man -- had broken with Zahedi, who balked at tolerating the Tudeh party.

* He died September 1, 1963, at age sixty-seven.
It was against this background that the CIA and Kim Roosevelt moved in to oust Mossadegh and install Zahedi. At the time of the coup Roosevelt, then thirty-seven, was already a veteran intelligence man. He was born in Buenos Aires. His father, the President's second son, was also named Kermit. Kim was graduated from Harvard just before World War II, and he taught history there and later at the California Institute of Technology. He had married while still at Harvard. He left the academic life to serve in the OSS, then joined the CIA after the war as a Middle East specialist. His father had died in Alaska during the war; his uncle, Brigadier General Theodore Roosevelt, died on the beaches of Normandy a year later.

The British and American governments had together decided to mount an operation to overthrow Mossadegh. The CIA's estimate was that it would succeed because the conditions were right; in a showdown the people of Iran would be loyal to the Shah. The task of running the operation went to Kim Roosevelt, then the CIA's top operator in the Middle East.

Roosevelt entered Iran legally. He drove across the border, reached Teheran, and then dropped out of sight. He had to, since he had been in Iran before and his face was known. Shifting his headquarters several times to keep one step ahead of Mossadegh's agents, Roosevelt operated outside of the protection of the American Embassy. He did have the help of about five Americans, including some of the CIA men stationed in the embassy.

In addition, there were seven local agents, including two top Iranian intelligence operatives. These two men communicated with Roosevelt through cutouts -- intermediaries -- and he never saw them during the entire operation.

As the plan for revolt was hatched, Brigadier General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, who used to appear on radio's "Bang Busters," turned up in Teheran. He had reorganized the Shah's...
police force there in the 1940s. He was best known for his investigation of the Lindbergh baby kidnapping case when he headed the New Jersey State Police in 1932. Schwarzkopf, an old friend of Zahedi's, claimed he was in town "just to see old friends again." But he was part of the operation.

On August 13 the Shah signed a decree dismissing Mossadegh and naming Zahedi as Premier. The uncooperative Mossadegh arrested the unfortunate colonel who brought in his notice of dismissal. Mobs rioted in the streets; the thirty-three-year-old Shah and his queen (at that time the beautiful Soraya) fled to Baghdad by plane from their palace on the Caspian Sea.

For two chaotic days, Roosevelt lost communication with his two chief Iranian agents. Meanwhile, the Shah had made his way to Rome; Allen Dulles flew there to confer with him. Princess Ashraf, the Shah's attractive twin sister, tried to play a part in the international intrigue, but the Shah refused to talk to her.

In Teheran, Communist mobs controlled the streets; they destroyed statues of the Shah to celebrate his departure. Suddenly, the opposition to Mossadegh consolidated. The Army began rounding up demonstrators. Early on August 19 Roosevelt, from his hiding place, gave orders to his Iranian agents to get everyone they could find into the streets.

The agents went into the athletic clubs in Teheran and rounded up a strange assortment of weight-lifters, muscle-men and gymasts. The odd procession made its way through the bazaars shouting pro-Shah slogans. The crowd grew rapidly in size. By mid-morning it was clear the tide had turned against Mossadegh and nothing could stop it.

Zahedi came out of hiding and took over. The Shah returned from exile. Mossadegh went to jail and the leaders of the Tudeh were executed.
In the aftermath, the British lost their monopoly on Iran's oil. In August, 1958, an international consortium of Western oil companies signed a twenty-five-year pact with Iran for its oil. Under it, the former Anglo-Iranian Oil Company got 40 percent, a group of American companies* got 40 percent, Royal Dutch Shell got 14 percent and the Compagnie Française des Petroles 6 percent. Iran got half of the multimillion-dollar income from the oil fields under the deal, the Anglo-Iranian was assured a compensation payment of $70,000,000.

The United States, of course, has never officially admitted the CIA's role. The closest Dulles came to doing so was in a CBS television show in 1962, after his retirement from the CIA. He was asked whether it was true that "the CIA people spent literally millions of dollars hiring people to riot in the streets and do other things, to get rid of Mossadegh. Is there anything you can say about that?"

"Well," Dulles replied, "I can say that the statement that we spent many dollars doing that is utterly false."

The former CIA chief also hinted at the CIA's Iran role in his book The Craft of Intelligence. "... support from the outside was given... to the Shah's supporters," he wrote, without directly saying it came from the CIA.

Magazines did their part as well. In The Saturday Evening Post for 6 November 1954, Richard and Gladys Harkness co-authored an article entitled "The Mysterious Doings of CIA," which appears to have been a key source for both Tully and Wise-Ross. Richard and Gladys said:

* Gulf Oil, Standard Oil of New Jersey and California, The Texas Company and Socony-Mobil.
Another CIA-influenced triumph was the successful overthrow of Iran in the summer of 1953, of old, dictatorial Premier Mohammad Mossadegh and the return to power of this country's friend Shah Mohammad Riza Pahlevi.

On May 28, 1953, President Eisenhower received a letter from Mossadegh amounting to a bare faced attempt at international blackmail. ... The White House stalled Mossadegh for one month; then turned down the crafty premier with a blunt no. This was a calculated risk at best. It was a daring gamble, in fact, that Mossadegh would not remain in power to carry out his threat. It was, as well, a situation which required a little doing. The doing began in short order through a chain of stranger-than-fiction circumstances involving [Allen] Dulles, a diplomat, a princess and a policeman.

On August tenth Dulles packed his bags and flew to Europe to join his wife for a vacation in the Swiss Alps. The political situation in Teheran was becoming more conspiratorial by the hour. Mossadegh was consorting with a Russian diplomatic-economic mission. Loy Henderson, United States Ambassador to Iran, felt he could leave his post for a short "holiday" in Switzerland. Princess Ashraf, the attractive and strong-willed brunette twin sister of the Shah, chose the same week to fly to a Swiss alpine resort. It was reported that she had had a stormy session with her brother in his pink marble palace, because of his vacillating in facing up to Mossadegh.

The fourth of the assorted characters in this drama, Brig. Gen. H. Norman Schwartzkopf, at this time took a flying vacation across the Middle East. His itinerary included apparently aimless and leisurely stops in Pakistan, Syria, Lebanon -- and Iran. Schwartzkopf is best known to the public as the man who conducted the Lindberg kidnapping investigation in 1932, when he was head of the New Jersey state police. But from 1942 through 1948 he was detailed to Iran to reorganize the Shah's national police
force. Schwartzkopf's job in Iran was more than the tracking down of routine criminals. He protected the government against its enemies -- an assignment requiring intelligence on the political cliques plotting against the Shah, knowledge of which army elements could be counted on to remain loyal and familiarity with Middle East psychology. Schwartzkopf became friend and advisor to such individuals as Maj. Gen. Fazlollah Zahedi, his colleague on the police force, and the Shah himself.

Schwartzkopf returned to Iran in August of 1953, he said, "just to see old friends again." Certainly the general will deny any connection with the events that followed his renewal of acquaintanceships with the Shah and Zahedi. But as Mossadegh and the Russian propaganda press railed nervously at Schwartzkopf's presence in Iran, developments started to unfold in one-two-three order.

On Thursday, August thirteenth, the Shah suddenly issued a double-edged ukase: Mossadegh was ousted by royal decree and his successor as premier was to be General Zahedi. The Shah ordered the colonel of the Imperial Guards to serve the notice on Mossadegh. Two days later, at midnight of Saturday, August fifteenth, the colonel went to Mossadegh's residence to find himself and his platoon surrounded by tanks and jeeps. The colonel was clapped in jail, and Mossadegh proclaimed that the revolt had been crushed. The Shah and his queen, taking events at face value fled to Rome by way of Iraq.

On Wednesday, August nineteenth, with the army standing close guard around the uneasy capital, a grotesque procession made its way along the street leading to the heart of Teheran. There were tumblers turning handsprings, weight lifters twirling iron bars and wrestlers flexing their biceps. As spectators grew in number, the bizarre assortment of performers began shouting pro-Shah slogans in unison. The crowd took up the chant and then, after one precarious moment, the balance of public psychology swung against Mossadegh.
Upon signal, it seemed, army forces on the Shah's side began an attack. The fighting lasted a bitter nine hours. By nightfall, following American-style military strategy and logistics, loyalist troops drove Mossadegh's elements into a tight cordon around the premier's palace. They surrendered, and Mossadegh was captured as he lay weeping in his bed, clad in striped silk pajamas. In Rome a bewildered young Shah prepared to fly home and install Zahedi as premier and to give Iran a pro-Western regime.

Thus it was that the strategic little nation of Iran was rescued from the closing clutch of Moscow. Equally important, the physical overthrow of Mossadegh was accomplished by the Iranians themselves. It is the guiding premise of CIA's third force that one must develop and nurture indigenous freedom legions among captive-or threatened people who stand ready to take personal risks for their own liberty.45

More than a year later, Crosby Noyes, writing in the Washington Star for 27 September 1953, discussed obliquely the significance of Ambassador Henderson, CIA Director Dulles, and Princess Ashraf being in Zurich the same week in August, and mentioned General Schwarzkopf's visit in detail. Without making any direct accusations, he hinted: "It is possible that the CIA agents whose departure from Iran was observed and reported were on purely routine intelligence missions. It is possible -- as a leading columnist has suggested -- that Mr. Henderson's trip to Switzerland was no more than a 'policy of studied indifference' on the part of the State.

Department toward the Mossadegh regime. A friend of the Princess Ashraf here in Washington holds stoutly to the view that her visit with the Shah was undertaken simply to ask him for money. It is possible that Allen Dulles is genuinely fond of mountain-climbing and that Gen. Schwarzkopf just happened to show up in Teheran at a critical moment.

"It is all perfectly possible. But as long as the practice of putting two and two together continues, the argument about what really happened in Iran last summer seems likely to continue."
SECRET

SECRET

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APPENDIX D
a. Presentation to the Shah

(2) Major issue is to maintain independence Iran and keep from the Soviet orbit. To do this Mossadeq must be removed.

(3) Present dynasty best bulwark national sovereignty.

(4) While Mossadeq in power no aid for Iran from United States.

(5) Mossadeq must go.

(6) Financial aid will be forthcoming to successor government.

(7) Acceptable oil settlement will be offered but successor government will not be rushed into it.

b. Demands on the Shah

(1) You must take leadership in overthrow Mossadeq.

(2) If not, you bear responsibility for collapse of country.
A. After agreement with Shah per above, inform Zahedi he chosen to head successor government with US-UK support.

B. Agree on specific plan for action and timetable for action. There are two ways to put Zahedi in office.
   1. Quasi-legally, whereby the Shah names Zahedi Prime Minister by royal firman.

Quasi-legal method to be tried first. If successful at least part of machinery for military coup will be brought into action. If it fails, military coup will follow in matter of hours.
B. Would be widely publicized that this refuge movement on basis two grounds popular dissatisfaction with Mossadeq government as follows:

1. Ground one that Mossadeq government basically anti-religious as most clearly demonstrated ties between Mossadeq and Tudeh; and Mossadeq and USSR. 

2. Ground two that Mossadeq is leading the country into complete economic collapse through his unsympathetic dictatorship.
C. Religious refuge to take place at the dawn of the coup day. Immediately followed by effort have Majlis pass a motion to censure the government. This is to be followed by the dismissal of Mossadeq and the appointment of Zahedi as successor. If successful, the coup would be completed by early afternoon. Failing success, the coup would be mounted later that evening.
The following is a U.S. Embassy translation of the Court of Revision verdict against Mosadegh and Riahi, handed down on 12 July 1954. It reviews the case, sums up the charges against the two defendants, and examines their respective defense. It objects to and overrules the verdict of the Military Court of First Instance and concludes by resentencing the defendants.

Under the indictment issued by the Army Prosecutor, the accused were charged with the following:

In connection with Dr. Mohammad Mosadegh—

1. Order for the arrest of Col. Nematollah Nasiri (now brigadier general), Commander of the Royal Guards, who carried the order for the dismissal of Mosadegh;
2. Unlawful arrest of official and nonofficial persons;
3. Disarming of the Royal Guards protecting HM the Shah and the royal palaces;
4. Sealing of the royal palaces, dispossessing the officials and guard of the Royal Court from the properties and palaces of the Shah;
5. Issue of telegrams to the Iranian Ambassadors abroad instructing them not to contact HM the Shah;
6. Issue of instructions for omission of the Shah's name from the morning and evening prayers in the military centers;
7. Issue of instructions for the holding of meetings by taking advantage of Government propaganda facilities with a view to insulting the monarch and the constitutional regime, and broadcasting the meetings by radio;
8. Issue of instructions for pulling down and breaking the statues of the late Shah and the present Shah with a view to humiliating the royal household and encouraging insurgents to rise against the constitutional monarchy in Iran;
9. Issue of instructions for the dissolution of the Majlis;
10. Issue of instructions for keeping under surveillance the members of the royal household in Azerbaijan;
11. Issue of instructions for the unlawful arrest of General Zahedi, the Prime Minister appointed by the Shah, and the offer of a reward to the person capturing him;
12. Elimination of the royal anthem from the program of Tehran Radio; and
13. Action for the formation of a regency council by referendum.

In connection with Brig. Gen. Taqi Riahi:

1. Arrest of Col. Nematollah Nasiri (now brigadier general) who was carrying the order for Dr. Mosadegh's dismissal, and other officers without any legal warrant;
2. Disarming of the Royal Guards;
3. Issue of instructions for the omission of the Shah's name from the morning and evening prayers of the soldiers; and
4. Issue of instructions that the demonstrations of the Tudeh Party should not be checked and insurgents should not be prevented from making demonstrations against HIM the Shah and that those people pulling down the statues of the late Shah and those of the present Shah should not be checked.

By virtue of Article 317 of the Army Judicial and Penal Law, capital punishment was demanded for the above-named. The case was referred to the Court of First Instance, which Court after performing the legal formalities and investigating the case, affirmed that Dr. Hosadaq's offences corresponded with Article 317 of the Army Judicial and Penal Law. With due regard to Article 413 of the Army Judicial and Penal Law, Article 44 of the Criminal Code, and Article 46 of the same Law, since the accused is over 60 years of age, he was condemned to three years of solitary imprisonment; General Riahi's offence was found to conform with paragraph (b) of Article 330 of the Army Judicial and Penal Law and he was condemned to two years of correctional imprisonment and permanent dismissal from the Army (according to Article 298 of the Army Judicial and Penal Law).

After the communication of the verdict issued, the military Prosecutor and the accused appealed for a revision according to Articles 217 and 218 of the Army Judicial and Penal Law and Article 219 of the same Law. The case was referred to this Court according to File No.109, on December 26, 1953.

The Court of Revision was formed on April 8 after pass through the necessary formalities, and listened in nine sessions to the explanations of the Prosecutor and the objections of the accused and their defense counsels about the defects of the file and the incompetence of the Court.
On April 22, 1951, the original members of the Court by a majority vote of six to one did not find the objections of the accused and their defense counsel about the defects of the file and incompetence of the Court plausible, and declared their preparedness to investigate the substance of the accusations leveled against both of the accused. The Court of Revision, in 17 sessions held from April 23 to May 12, listened to the objections of the Prosecutor, the accused, and their defense counsel in respect to the verdict issued by the Court of First Instance, and to the last defenses of the above-named. At 12:20 p.m. on May 12, 1951, it declared that the matter had been sufficiently debated and announced an adjournment of the trial. The Court immediately started its deliberations, and with due regard to the substance of Article 209 of the Army Judicial and Penal Law completed the deliberations at 3:30 p.m. on May 12, 1951, and issued the following verdict:

Court's Verdict

A. The main objections of the Prosecutor and the accused to the verdict issued by the Court of First Instance are as under:

Summary of the objections of the Army Prosecutor to the verdict issued by the Court of First Instance in regard to Dr. Mohammad Mosadeq.

1. H.I.M.'s statements to the effect that he waived his claims for the injustices rendered to him by the accused have been interpreted by the Court of First Instance as the pardoning by H.I.M. of his personal claims; while in fact a personal right has a special interpretation from the judicial viewpoint. The Court's interpretation is not proper, because H.I.M. the Shah had not lodged a personal claim against Dr. Mosadeq so that he could withdraw his claim in due course.

2. Since the Court of First Instance has ruled that the crimes attributed to Dr. Mohammad Mosadeq correspond with Article 317 of the Army Judicial and Penal Law and has issued its verdict with due regard to Article 46 of the Criminal Code, and since the above-named's crime is borne out by the circumstances mentioned in the above, Dr. Mohammad Mosadeq apparently should have been condemned to ten years' solitary confinement.
3. Another mistake made by the Court is that reference has been made in the verdict to Article 44 of the Criminal Code, while this Article refers to a mitigation of the original punishment, and Dr. Mohammad Rezaooz has been condemned to three years' solitary confinement. These two facts are contradictory.

4. The Court of First Instance has not stated in the verdict whether the verdict was issued by a unanimous or majority vote.

Summary of the objections raised by the Army Prosecutor against the Court's verdict in connection with General Riahi.

1. The Court has not observed Articles 202 and 217 of the Army Judicial and Penal Law (the Court's verdict must be substantiated and borne out by facts in connection with the crimes attributed to the accused and their conformity with the relevant regulations). Moreover the subordinate punishment (dismissing from Army service) which must never be mentioned in the verdict has been mentioned contrary to Article 298 of the Army Judicial and Penal Law.

2. The Court's reasoning in regard to the defenses put up by the defense counsel of the accused supports the bill of indictment and the Prosecutor's statements made in the Court. The Court has considered the General's actions as hostile and as having been carried out with ill-will and for the purpose of overthrowing the monarchy. However, the punishment decreed has been made to conform with Article 330 of the Judicial Law, i.e., the negligence of duty vis-a-vis the orders of the Army.

3. The Court has considered General Riahi responsible for the actions attributed to him and has affirmed the bill of indictment; but has made an oversight in fitting the crime to the relevant article of the Law. For the Court has in its verdict made clear that the issue of the instructions for the omission of the Shah's name from the morning and evening prayers, and the failure to check the pulling down of the statues and the explicit announcement that the Shah was a fugitive were meant to overthrow the monarchy. Therefore the crime committed by the above-named conforms with Article 317 of the Army Judicial and Penal Law.

Summary of the Objections Raised by General Riahi and his Defense Counsel to the Verdict Issued by the Court of First Instance:

1. With regard to Article 330 of the Army Judicial and Penal Law, General Riahi was not neglecting his military duties while executing the orders of his superiors, so that the Court of First Instance should not have condemned him according to Paragraph (b) of Article 330 of the Army Judicial and Penal Law.
2. The Court has, by setting forth its reasons, considered that the Article referred to by the Prosecutor did not correspond with the accusations levelled against General Riahi and the Court exonerated the accused of the charges levelled against him. Therefore, there were no grounds for the Army Prosecutor to request that the same accusations be again levelled against the accused.

3. During August 16-19 Dr. Mohammad Mosadeq held a legal and official title as far as all army officers were concerned and no one was aware of the command dismissing him; hence the legalization of Mosadeq's orders. Moreover, ever since HIM the Shah ordained that General Riahi, the then Chief of General Staff, should receive his orders directly from the then Minister of National Defense, the Minister was the only lawful commander of General Riahi.

4. In connection with the omission of the Shah's name from the morning and evening prayers to which the Court has alluded, this had nothing to do with the direct will of General Riahi, hence the Article regarding the cancellation of an instruction could not apply to him. The Commander of the Officers' College asked for instructions in this connection in order that probable incidents might be averted, and the then Chief of General Staff reported the matter to the Minister of National Defense and communicated the order issued by the Minister.

The Summary of the Objections of Dr. Mohammad Mosadeq and his Lawyer to the Verdict of the Court of First Instance:

1. Concerning the arrest of Col. Nematollah Hasiri (presently a brigadier general), if I meant to conceal the disposal order, I would not have given a receipt for it. This order could not possibly have remained a secret even though Colonel Hasiri was arrested. His followers and some other no doubt knew of it. He was detained because he had come to my house at 1:00 a.m. to arrest me and complete his coup d'etat. When he understood that the guards of my house were increased, he only submitted the order of His Majesty.

2. The Court of First Instance said that I issued a notice about an imaginary coup d'etat in order to call the 'Royal Guards aggressors and to provoke the followers of His Majesty, and that I detained the faithful servants of the monarch so that people might be incited against this regime. I did not issue any order to arrest the followers of the monarchy. The police forces were responsible for all the actions which took place. The duty of the Royal Guards is to protect His Majesty and the royal palaces. It cannot arrest ministers or Majlis deputies.
APPENDIX F

3. The Court of First Instance said that I ordered the Royal Guards to be disarmed so that when His Majesty returned he would have no one to protect him and hence the mobs could have freedom of action. My purpose was to prevent another coup d'etat.

4. You said that I sealed the royal palaces in order to deprive His Majesty of his own properties. Because His Majesty left the country without any previous notice, my action was simply to protect the royal properties.

5. The Court of First Instance mentioned the fact that telegrams were sent to the Embassies of Iran in foreign countries, forbidding the members to meet His Majesty. I have no knowledge of such telegrams and if Fatemi should say that I told him to so so, I shall bear any punishment set by law.

6. The Court of First Instance also said that I ordered the omission of the name of His Majesty from the morning and evening prayers of the soldiers. It was thought that His Majesty did not wish to have his name prior to that of Iran, so the order was given to the soldiers to pray only for the perpetuity of Iran. After all, if the soldiers pray for the perpetuity of Iran, this does not mean that treachery was meant to His Majesty.

7. The Court of First Instance said that Masadeq and his friends meant to insult His Majesty by allowing the people to demonstrate and take part in meetings. Whenever the representatives of the guilds or the National [ist] parties asked to be allowed to demonstrate, they were given the right to do so provided that the leftwing parties were not permitted to take part, to talk, or to demonstrate. The meeting of that day had no other basis. If the speakers said things and did wrong, it was not my fault and I should not be blamed for their actions.

8. About dissolving the Hajlis, the Court of First Instance said: "The proclamation of the accused to dissolve the Hajlis had no precedence in the parliamentary history of Iran and indicates that he want to put an end to the parliamentary regime and to the fundamentals of the government of this country." First
I must say that if an act which has not been done before and is not written in the laws is carried out, one cannot say that it is a crime. Secondly, our Constitution is based upon government of the people and by the people so a referendum which is also based on the same principles is completely logical and legal. Thirdly, referendum is a good tool in the hands of governments by which they can rely upon the people. For these reasons, a referendum was for the benefit of the country and democracy.

10. About the arrest of the royal family in Azerbaijan I must say that I know nothing and the police have done their duty.

11. The Court of First Instance referred to the order for the imprisonment of General Zahadi, the elected Prime Minister. He was appointed after I was dismissed and because my government could not arrest him, no crime has taken place that I may be punished for.

12. The Court of First Instance thought that the omission of the National Anthem from Radio Tehran was against the customs of the country. I did not give an order for the omission of the National Anthem, but I personally believe that some authorities could cause trouble for those persons who go to places for fun and hear the Anthem but might not honor it as they should. I am sure you do not want the people to be bothered by every possible method.

13. The Court referred to the formation of the Regency Council through a referendum. This action of mine is the best clue to show that my deeds did not follow the contents of Article 317 of the Army Judicial and Penal Law. If my deeds were according to the three subjects of that Article, I did not have to form a Regency Council through a referendum. I intended to send some representatives to Rome so that they might beg His Majesty to return or to appoint the Regency Council in case His Majesty did not wish to return. If His Majesty would not appoint the Regency Council, there was no wish and the Government had no right to do so either. The only possible solution was through a referendum which in turn is neither against the laws nor the interests of the country.

B. Considering the objections in the appeals of the Army Prosecutor, Dr. Mohammad Mosadeg (accused No. 1), Gen. Taqi Riahi (accused No. 2) and their lawyers, which seemed to be acceptable, for the following reasons the verdict of the Court of First Instance is invalid:

In the case of Dr. Mohammad Mosadeg:

First, as the Army Prosecutor object, the Court of First Instance thought that the communication of the Royal Court meant that His Majesty overlooked his personal rights. This is not so because His Majesty’s position is so high that it does not allow him to become a private plaintiff. Moreover, the offense was not a personal one so the offended party would overlook his rights.
In addition to that, according to Article 55 of the Criminal Code, pardon can only be given when the crime has been established. For these reasons, the reference of the Court to the above communication is invalid.

Secondly, considering the nature of the accusation and the reasoning used by the Court of First Instance whereby it compared the punishment to that of Article 317 of the Army Judicial and Penal Law, and observing Article 46 of the Criminal Code, the punishment fixed for him was solitary confinement. Because the said Article has fixed the maximum and minimum penalties of solitary confinement, without taking the mitigating circumstances into consideration, the period of solitary confinement could be fixed without any trouble. Although the Court tried to reduce the sentence and referred to Article 5 of the Criminal Code, the effect of this Article is not noticed in the fixing of the punishment.

In the case of General Riahi:

According to Article 78 of the Constitution and Articles 202 and 217 of the Army Judicial and Penal Law, the verdict of the Court had to be reasonable and the Court had to pay careful attention to the accusations. Not only is the verdict of the Court about Gen. Taj Riahi unreasonable, but also his deeds do not correspond to section 6 of Article 33 of the Army Judicial and Penal Law (this Article concerns the failure of commanders to fulfill their military duties in special circumstances). On the other hand, the Court of First Instance reasoned that the actions of Dr. Hosadeq (accused No. 1) corresponded to Article 317 of the Army Judicial and Penal Law. The Court also related all the accusations against General Riahi (accused No. 2) to some of the deeds of Dr. Hosadeq, directly and indirectly. Therefore, the verdict was given on the basis of the unity of their crimes, although considering their confessions, one can see that the crimes were not the same for both of them. For this reason the verdict of the Court of First Instance is not correct.

For these above reasons, the verdict of the Court of First Instance is cancelled in accordance with Article 233 of the Army Judicial and Penal Law and the verdict of this Court is now announced for Dr. Hosadeq (six votes to one) and General Riahi (five votes to two):

For Dr. Hosadeq:

He confessed to some of his crimes and by means of fallacious and confusing arguments he tried to escape the punishment for the rest. Considering his file and the testimony of witnesses in the Court, his defense did not influence the verdict of the Court, and none of it had any judicial value. His ignorance of some of the events (such as the telegrams to Iranian ambassadors ordering them not to meet His Majesty, formation of meetings through governmental facilities, the speech at the meeting of August 19, 1953 by Dr. Hossein Fatemi, who was regarded by the
accused as his Foreign Minister, the destruction of the statues of His Majesty and those of Reza Shah, and the arrest of the royal family) does not seem acceptable because he was Prime Minister, though illegally, and according to article 61 of the Constitution, a Prime Minister is responsible for all events.

In some places he has shown good will such as concerning the formation of a Regency Council through a referendum about which he frankly said, "My intentions were to send some representatives to Rome in order to beg His Majesty to return and if His Majesty did not wish to do so, to beg Him to appoint the Regency Council. In case His Majesty did not agree to either of these two requests, the Regency Council was to be appointed by a referendum." The Prosecutor of this Court believes that his statement is neither legal nor logical; therefore he does not accept it. If Hosadeq were right, he would have sent the representatives to Rome during the four days of his illegal regime. Although he had all possible means of transportation and so on in his hands, he did not do so. No action was taken for the appointment of representatives to be sent to Rome. His good will did not even induce him to send wires directly or indirectly (through the Embassies of Iran in Baghdad and Rome) to His Majesty although he could have done so. On the contrary, the telegrams sent to the Iranian ambassadors in foreign countries show and prove that he did not intend to show goodwill in this case.

Likewise in connection with the omission of the Shah's name from the morning and evening prayers in military centers, his statements are contradictory to those made by General Riahi because the accused has stated: "Since it was assumed that H.I.M. the Shah did not wish his name to precede that of Iran, it was ordered that the soldiers should pray for the country, in order that H.I.M. the Shah might reign in an independent and free country; the morning and evening prayers of the soldiers for the continued existence of Iran do not indicate any treason against H.I.M. the Shah."

General Riahi has alleged that on the proposal of the Commander-in-Chief, the prayer in question was changed with the advice of Dr. Hosadeq; however, the said accused (Dr. Hosadeq) has not been able to prove his good will in altering the morning and evening prayers or in omitting H.I.M. the Shah's name from the prayers, and has not shown why he did not take this action before receiving his dismissal order, or how it happened that those events which were against the monarchy occurred after the issue of the dismissal order and his refusal to obey it. Therefore, in short, the activities of the Above-named from August 16 at 1:00 a.m. until August 19, singly and collectively, clearly fall under article 317 of the Army Judicial and Penal Law. Considering the fact that the Army Prosecutor applied for a revision of the verdict issued by the Court of First Instance, the above-named is, by virtue of Article 317 of the Army Judicial and Penal Law, condemned to three years of solitary imprisonment, considering the fact that his age is over sixty years.
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The period of his detention since August 15, 1953, must be deducted from the period of his imprisonment.

For General Riahi:

In all the actions committed by him, General Riahi's aim was merely to facilitate the achievement of the aims of the accused No. 1 (Dr. Mosadegh). While having full knowledge of the aims and objectives of the above-named, he has colluded with accused No. 1 to weaken the sense of royalty, shake the position of the monarchy, eliminate the monuments which indicated the existence of the monarchy, encourage the adversaries of the monarchy and the army, and prosecute those whose hearts were kindled with the fire for the love of the king and the monarchy. The issue of the instruction for the alteration of the morning and evening prayers by omitting the Shah's name from the prayer, the despatch of telegrams to the 6th Army Division of Fars and the Military Governor of Abadan to the effect that the Shah was a fugitive, the fact that he did not prevent the pulling down of the statues, and the instruction for shooting on August 19 at individuals who manifested their royal feelings are, in the opinion of the jury, sufficient proofs to corroborate his collaboration and complicity with accused No. 1, Dr. Mohammad Mosadegh.

Therefore, the above-named was an accomplice of Dr. Mohammad Mosadegh, and by virtue of Articles 317 of the Army Judicial and Penal Law and Articles 23 and 29 of the Criminal Code, and Article 30 of the said Law, he is condemned to three years imprisonment with hard labor. The period of his detention since August 19 will be deducted from his term of imprisonment.

An appeal may be made to the Supreme Court against the above verdict within ten days of its declaration, with due regard to the circumstances mentioned in article 2/3 of the Army Judicial and Penal Law.

President of the Court of Revision for the Events of August 16 to 19, 1953..............General Javadi

Signature of the Jury: General Issa Hedayat
                      Ebrahim Vahidi
                      General Nasrollah Khoshnoushan
                      General Ahmad Ajoudani (substitute)
                      General Esatollah Zarqami (assistant)
                      Lt.Gen. Alibjary, Army Prosecutor

May 12, 1954 (3:30 p.m.)

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