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UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
WASHINGTON

D-MR. MOSER

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OFFICE OF
THE DIRECTOR

MAY 23 1967

TO : STATE S/P - Mr. Owen
FROM : ACDA - Adrian S. Fisher, Acting Director *AS Fisher*
SUBJECT: S/P Memorandum of April 5: "New Proposals re
Securing Non-Nuclear Countries' Adherence to
a Non-Proliferation Treaty"

The Under Secretary has asked that ACDA take responsibility for reviewing and coordinating needed follow-up action on your memorandum of April 5. I believe that it would be useful for the representatives of the bureaus that received copies of your memorandum to discuss the various problems raised and suggestions made in your memorandum. I suggest a meeting on Friday, May 26, at 2:30 p.m. in my office. I believe it would also be helpful to have someone from AEC attend the meeting.

Attached are some ACDA views concerning the problems in your memorandum for which you proposed action be taken.

Attachment:

As stated.

- cc: U - The Under Secretary
- M - Mr. Rostow
- S/C - Mr. Bowie
- G - Mr. Kohler
- EA - Mr. Bundy
- NEA - Mr. Battle
- EUR - Mr. Springsteen

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ACDA VIEWS ON SUGGESTED ACTIONS
THAT MIGHT BE TAKEN TO MEET CONCERNS OF NPT
SIGNATORIES

Spin-off Technology. To reduce the concern of non-nuclear-weapon states that signing the NPT would permanently deprive them of nuclear spin-off technology, the U.S. should stress that (a) civilian research is far more fruitful per dollar than spin-off from military research, and (b) spin-off technology from U.S. military nuclear programs is available to all countries. Studies to document the first point are already available. To assist in strengthening the latter point, the AEC should conduct a study embracing the following questions:

a. How efficiently is U.S. nuclear spin-off technology declassified and published at present?

b. What could and should be done to achieve more complete and faster dissemination of this technology abroad, particularly through IAEA and EURATOM?

c. How can the facts about present dissemination, and any improvement therein, be best used to help persuade states to sign the NPT and continue to adhere to it? How can we make better known to other countries the mechanisms used for such dissemination?

In view of the existence of IAEA, EURATOM, and other channels for disseminating nuclear technology abroad, there appears to be no need to create a new international corporation for this purpose. There should be discussions with USG participants in the current NATO technological gap study, since the two studies may be mutually helpful.

Supply of Nuclear Fuel. To assist U.S. policy formulation in this area:

a. The AEC, in coordination with other interested agencies, should develop promptly a U.S. policy on which

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additional countries the U.S. should give assurances of future nuclear fuel supply similar to those recently given to West Germany and Italy.

b. The AEC should also study whether it would be useful and desirable to reaffirm the present U.S. offer of nuclear fuel to the IAEA or to pledge additional nuclear fuel to the IAEA.

c. The AEC, together with other interested agencies, should conduct a study of the following question: Assuming that sooner or later non-nuclear-weapon states will consider constructing their own uranium enrichment plants, should the U.S. try to head off such construction by proposing alternatives, such as plants owned and operated by the IAEA? The study should explore the relative merits of a wide variety of alternatives, and should be made within the U.S. government, with no IAEA participation at this time.

Security Concerns. The question of our response to the Indian suggestions regarding parallel U.S.-Soviet declarations and a U.N. resolution on security assurances is presently under consideration and recommendations have been sent to the Secretary. We should consider the question of holding "private U.S.-Indian discussions of possible contingencies involving CHICOM nuclear blackmail" after we have a clear idea of the way the parallel declarations idea is progressing.

Japanese Nuclear Role. Informing the Japanese that the U.S. is ready to join them in creating a bilateral U.S.-Japanese nuclear consultation mechanism hardly seems necessary or relevant as a means for allaying possible Japanese concerns over signing a non-proliferation treaty. The Security Consultative Committee established by the U.S.-Japanese Security Treaty already consults on a wide range of matters in the field of security. Just recently a sub-committee has been established to deal in greater depth with specific security issues. This sub-committee will discuss the subject of ABMs at its first meeting in Tokyo on 25-26 May, at which time the Japanese may also raise the question of future arrangements for defense of Japan against nuclear attack or consultation on other nuclear matters.

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Keeping in mind present legal obstacles to full discussion of nuclear matters, as well as the Japanese political problems referred to in the S/P memorandum, we might wish to assure the Japanese of our willingness and intention to consider these subjects in future consultations. Unless the Japanese raise the question, however, it seems questionable whether we should suggest at this time that Japanese adherence to a non-proliferation treaty should in any way be contingent upon a U.S. commitment to establish a U.S.-Japanese nuclear consultation mechanism.

Duration. The problems that various countries have with a treaty of unlimited duration are, as the S/P memorandum points out, closely related to the withdrawal provisions and also the amendments provisions. It is possible that a less tight withdrawal provision than the one in the current draft will emerge during the ENDC discussions (particularly since Indian and FRG views on the time period in a duration clause are likely to differ). At the present time, however, it does not appear desirable to decide on the answer to this problem since such related questions as the amendments provision have not been resolved. In any event, any avenues for resolution of these concerns are more likely to be found in the stand taken by other non-nuclear states and especially the Indians, and Soviet reactions thereto, when a treaty draft is in open discussion and not at this time following extensive U.S.-German discussions.

Disarmament. It is agreed that non-nuclear states would find it easier to sign an NPT if there were stronger evidence of the nuclear countries' intent to move seriously to halt and reverse the arms race. It is also recognized that the preamble may have to be strengthened in this regard and this question is currently under discussion in the Co-Chairmen's meetings.

A Presidential statement of desire for a review of our disarmament policy in the light of continuing technological advances might be helpful at an appropriate time -- but not until we are somewhat closer to an agreed text with the Soviets than at present.

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U.K. Status. It seems questionable whether at this time the S/P suggestion that the U.K. be encouraged to indicate that it does not favor indefinite maintenance of its separate national nuclear program would be particularly helpful in securing adherence by others to the NPT. The U.K. is already inclined to stop with the Polaris A-3 and does not seem disposed to go into the next round of the arms race. There might, however, be some value in having the U.K. stress the importance of working towards the eventual merger of its nuclear forces into a federated European force. U.K. phasing out through merging into a unified Europe is possible only if the U.K. has something to offer Europe, namely, its nuclear weapons. Thus we would not want to encourage the U.K. to move into Europe while at the same time asking it to abandon beforehand one of its bargaining advantages.

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