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UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

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**Memorandum of Conversation**

DATE: October 4, 1967

SUBJECT: Non-Proliferation Treaty (U)

13 OCT 1967

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. Berndt von Staden, Counselor, German Embassy  
Mr. Culver Gleysteen, Acting Assistant Director, ACDA/IR

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Referring to von Lilienfeld's scheduled call on Under Secretary Rostow on October 5, Mr. von Staden said he wished to give me some advance indication of the subject which would be raised. Mr. von Staden said the Germans had been chagrined that certain amendments to the Co-Chairmen NPT drafts of the type the FRG wished to have introduced by the non-aligned delegations at Geneva had not appeared. In fact very few amendments of any kind had been proposed. Mr. von Staden said the Germans were particularly concerned about the treaty's duration and the lack of a provision dealing with nuclear blackmail and the weakness of the preambular provision on nuclear disarmament.

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I said that the Mexicans had introduced a number of amendments which would interest the FRG. We are now studying these to determine whether, if appropriately modified, we might accept some of them ourselves. It is possible they might also be acceptable to the Soviet side which seems to recognize that certain concessions will have to be made to those critics of the NPT who claim that the treaty is lopsided. Among these amendments is one which would move from the Preamble to an operative provision the obligation on the part of nuclear weapon states to negotiate nuclear disarmament measures. Mr. von Staden said that he was very much interested by this and that he thought that it would be well received in Bonn

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especially by Brandt, whose SPD following attached great importance to this aspect of the NPT.

With respect to nuclear blackmail, I said we did not really know whether the FRG was driving at security assurances or some kind of anti-defamation clause or a combination of both. If the question concerned security assurances, we assume that the German Government is already well aware of how we plan to go about dealing with this in connection with the NPT, i.e., through a UN resolution. We went over fairly thoroughly the difficulties in including any kind of anti-defamation clause in the NPT during the US-FRG consultations last April. At that time we pointed out that a treaty like the NPT could not deal with propaganda and the related issue of freedom of expression. I said the Germans really should regard safeguards as their best protection against charges of defamation.

I told Mr. von Staden that I was unable to say anything about the duration of the NPT, but I thought Under Secretary Rostow would have something to say about this to von Lilienfeld.

Before leaving, Mr. von Staden asked again whether we would have any comments to make about the German request for our views on whether the FRG might acquire permanent membership on the IAEA Board of Governors. I told him that I would look into this.

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