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S E C R E T GENEVA 1140

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SUBJECT: DISCUSSION WITH SOVIETS ON MEXICAN AMENDMENTS

DEPALMA AND NEIDLE MET WITH ANTYASOV AND SHUSTOV (USSR) TO HEAR INFORMAL SOV REACTIONS TO US PROPOSALS DESCRIBED IN REFTEL .

ANTYASOV SAID US VERSION ART IV (PARA 10, GENEVA'S 1002) ON PEACEFUL USES LOOKED ACCEPTABLE TO SOV DEL.

PAGEC PAGE TO SECRET US VERSION OF MEXICAN ART IV-A ON PEACEFUL NUCLEAR



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EXPLOSIVE DEVICES (PARA B OF STATE 49458) WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO SOVS BUT SOV DEL BELIEVES IT NOT SATISFACTORY FOR NON-ALIGNED BECAUSE OF (1) ABSENCE OF REFERENCE TO ROLE OF AN "APPROPRIATE INTERNATIONAL BODY"; AND (2) ABSENCE OF REFERENCE TO PROCEDURES BEING ESTABLISHED IN A "SPECIAL AGREEMENT." SOVS SAID THEY ALREADY HVE STRONG HINTS MANY NON-ALIGNED WILL INSIST ON THESE TWO ELEMENTS AND SOVS FEEL THEIR OWN WORDS COULD BE QUOTED AGAINST THEM IF THESE NOT INCLUDED. RGUED THAT WE WISH TO AVOID ANY INFERENCE THAT ALL REQUESTS FOR SERVICES AND ALL PROJECTS, INCUDING THOSE OF NUCLEARS, MUST BE SUBJECT TO SPECIAL AGREEMENT AND CHANNELLED THROUGH INTERNATIONAL BODY. MOREOVER, WE COULD NOT BE SURE NOW WHETHER ONE BROAD AGREEMEN WOULD BE BEST OR SEVERAL AGREEMENTS. PROTOCOLS, RESOLUTIONS, OR ANY COMBINATIONS OF THESE. WONDERED, SINCE US VERSION WOULD APPARENTLY BE ACCEPTABLE TO SOVS, WHETHER WE COULD NOT TRY IT OUT ON SOVS ANSWERED THEY NOT INCLINEDRECOMMEND THAT NON-ALIGNED. MOSCOW AUTHORIZE SOV ACCEPTANCE BECAUSE THEY WERE CERTAIN IT WOULD NOTBE SATISFACTORY TO NON-ALIGNED AND WHOLE PURPOSE OF EXERCISE WAS TO MEET REQUESTS OF RESPONSIBLE NON-ALIGNED. SOVS SUGGESTED US DEL CONSIDER LANGUAGE ALONG FOLLOWING LINES:

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QTE EACH PARTY TO THIS TREATY UNDERTAKES TO COOPERATE TO

INCURE THAT DOTENTIAL DENETITS FROM ANY PRACEFUL APPLICATION OF

NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS WILL BE MADE AVAILABLE TO NON-NUCLEAR.

WEAPON STATES PARTY TO THIS TREATY ON A

NON-DISCRIMINATORY BASIS THROUGH APPROPRIATE INTERNATIONAL

BODIES WITH ADEQUATE REPRESENTATION OF NON-NUCLEAR-WEAPON

STATES, SUBJECT TO PROCEDURES TO BE ESTABLISHED IN A SPECIAL

AGREEMENT OR AGREEMENTS, ANDTHAT THE CHARGE TO SUCH PARTIES

FOR THE EXPLOSIVE DEVICES USED WILL BE AS LOW AS POSSIBLE AND

EXCLUDE ANY CHARGE FOR RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT. UNDTE.

4° RE US SUGGESTION FOR OPERATIVE ARTICLE ON DISARMAMENT IPARA 2 OF REFTEL), ANTYASOV SAID FLATLY USE OF WORD "VERIFIABLE" WAS "UNACCEPTABLE" SOVS GAVE FOLLOWING REASONS IN ADDITION TOTHOSE CONTAINED PARA 3 REFTEL: (1) WORD NOT IN MEXICAN PROPOSAL: ITS INCLUSION WOULD NOT BE RESPONSIVE





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TO A NON-ALIGNED REQUEST: (2) SOVS HAVE REFRAINED FROM ASKING FOR ADDITIONAL WORDS OR PHRASES THEY KNOW WE CANNOT ACCEPT, SUCH AS "NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT": (3) THIS SHOULD NOT BE A MATTER OF PRACTICAL IMPORTANCE FOR US SINCE EVERYBODY KNOWS US WILL NOT AGREE TO ANY MEASURE UNLESS IT CONSIDERS THAT VERIFICATION ASPECT IS SATISFACTORY: AND (4) LIMITED TEST BAN TREATY CALLED FOR NEGOTIATION OF COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN, BUT DID NOT USE WORD "VERIFIABLE" AND THIS HAS NOT PREVENTED US FROM INSISTING ON WHAT IT BELIEVES TO BE ADEQUATE VERIFICATION.

PAGE 4 RUFHGV 1140 S E C R E T DESPITE URGING OF S DELOFFS, SOVS STATED THEY WOULD NOT RECOMMEND TO MOSCOW FAVORABLE CONSIDERATION OF WORD "VERIFIABLE." DEPALMA POINTED OUT THAT NEED FOR WORD "VERIFIABLE" WAS PATICULARLY RELEVANT WHEN ARTICLE TALKED ABOUT ARRIVING AT AGREEMENTS. HE WAS NOT SURE, IF REQUIREMENT OF ARRIVING AT AGREEMENTS WAS DELETED, WHETHER OR NOT IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR US CONSIDER ALTERNATIVE LANGUAGE IN WHICH PARTIES WOULD UNDERTAKE TO PURSUE NEGOTIATIONS IN GOOD FAITH REGARDING CESSATION OF THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE AND DISARMAMENT, AND REGARDING AN AGREEMENT ON GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT UNDER STRICT AND EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL CONTROL. SOVS THOUGHT FORMULATION ALONGTHESE LINES MIGHT PROVE ACCEPTABLE, BUT SUGGESTED IT WOULD BE BETTER TO REFER TO DISARMAMENT "MEASURES", FOLLOWING THE REFERENCE TO CESSATION OF THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE. THEY THOUGHT THERE WOULD BE MUCH CONFUSION AS TO DIFFERENCE BETWEEN GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT AND *DISARMAMENT" IN PRECEDING PHRASE. "DISARMAMENT MEASURES," HOWEVER, WOULD CLEARLY INCLUDE LIMITED AND PARTIAL DISARMAMENT STEPS.

PAGES RUFHGV 1140 S E C R E T
6. ON US SUGGESTION TO COMBINE DISARMAMENT PREAMBULARS
(PARA 4 OF REFTEL), SOVS SAID THEY WOULD NOW PREFER LEAVE
PREAMBLE EXACTLY AS IS AND NOT COMBINE PARAS. DEPALMA
REPEATED ARGUMENTS MADE BY FISHER IN PARA 5 REFTEL. SOVS
SAID THEY WOULD THINK OVER FURTHER AND HINTED THEY MIGHT BE



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ASLE COMBINE PARAS IF "VERTFIABLE" QUESTION WAS SOLVED.

ON SWEDISH SUGGESTION TO REPEAT LTB PREAMBULAR PLEDGE
TO WORK TOWARD CTB, SOVS INDICATED IT MIGHT BE USEFUL IDEAD
DEPALMA SAID US DID NOT THINK IT NECESSARY AND ASSUMED SOVJETS
AGREED CO-CHAIRMEN SHOULD NOT TAKE ANY INITIATIVE REGARDING
THIS IDEAD SOV DELOFFS APPEARED ACQUIESCE IN IDEA THAT
THIS PROPOSAL COULD BE LEFT FOR LATER CONSIDERATION AFTER
THIS PROPOSAL COULD BE LEFT FOR LATER CONSIDERATION AFTER
THESPONDED TO MEXICAN AMENDMENTS BUT LEFT IMPRESSION
SOVET DEL PREPARED AGREE TO REFERENCE TO LTB PLEDGE

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