

DEF-18-6
116390

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

CONFIDENTIAL
Classification

BRWITZ (GEB)

DEF 18-3

FOR OCIT USE ONLY

16 Feb 68 02 52z

Origin

ACTION: US Mission GENEVA PRIORITY

Info:

INFO: Amembassy MOSCOW
Amembassy LONDON
US Mission NATO
USUN NEW YORK

STATE

DISTO/NATUS

SUBJECT: Swedish Amendments

REF: Geneva 2506

DC (GEB) Switz 2600

116390

We are gratified over moderation and reasonableness of amendments proposed by Myrdal on Feb 8 and by the absence of Swedish proposals which would create obstacles to completion of NPT at this session ENDC. Inasmuch as Sweden has taken the lead among non-aligned Eight in presenting concrete amendments designed to be acceptable to all potential parties to NPT we believe there would be definite advantage if we were to accept them with as little change as possible.

At next Co-Chairmen's meeting you should convey foregoing to Roshchin. We anticipate that Soviets may object to Myrdal proposals for amending Article VI, particularly as disarmament

RECORDED BY 15/A

Drafted by:

ACDA/IR: CGleysteen; aow

Tel. Est. 2762

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

OR
The Secretary

Clearances:

ACDA-Mr. Fisher *AS7*
ACDA/GC-Mr. Bunn *cy*
EUR-Mr. Springsteen

L - Mr. Meeker *cy*
DOD/ISA-Dr. Halperin *cy*
IO-Mr. Day *cy*

AEC-Mr. Labowitz (sub.) *cy*
G/PM-Mr. Shaw *cy*
S/S - Mr. Parker *cy*

CONFIDENTIAL
Classification

CONFIDENTIAL
Classification

negotiations other than GCD would be treaty obligation only of nuclear
weapon states and "begin nuclear disarmament" seems to point more to
cut-off than at any other measure. If Roshchin takes this line, you
should say that while we agree that partial disarmament measures on
part of non-nuclear weapon states remain important objective of US
and, we assume, USSR, we accept logic of argument that NPT deals with
nuclear weapons and that purpose of Article VI is to meet objections
of non-nuclear weapon states that August 24 draft did not reflect
sufficient balance of obligations.

reference to
Preambular ~~language concerning~~ CTB would be acceptable to US
because it simply refers to a previous treaty. Given strong Swedish
agitation in past for further progress toward CTB and Swedish
argument that it is inter-related to NPT, we do not see how Swedes
could have devised formulation more easy for nuclear weapon states to
accept under the circumstances.

You should however propose to Roshchin that preambular reference be
recorded "to seek to achieve the discontinuance" to make it track more
faithfully with LTBT language.

FYI Del should exercise due caution in discussion prospects for
CTB with other dels. END FYI.

CONFIDENTIAL
Classification

DECLASSIFIED

Authority MVD T69000

ram to

GENEVA

CONFIDENTIAL
Classification

US could accept Swedish formulation for periodic review. However, language set forth in State 111605 is equally acceptable to us.

FYI. We assume other suggestions made by Myrdal (paras. D through H) were not presented in form of amendments because Swedes realize they would not be acceptable to one or more parties whose adherence to NPT would be essential to its success. However, we have no objection to them as expression of view of Swedish delegation. We recognize Myrdal would want these suggestions on the record because they flow ~~ff~~ from ideas she has pushed persistently in past.

This instruction applies only to Feb. 8 amendments. We doubt there is anything in Feb. 13 amendments we and Soviets can agree on.
END FYI.

You should tell Roshchin that we believe it would be in our joint interest to accept three Myrdal amendments of Feb 8 as modified. We would like to have Soviet views soonest as we also wish to consult our allies regarding these changes to Jan 18 text. We assume that there would be very few, if any, additional ~~amendments~~ ^{amendments} tabled which we would find acceptable. Therefore, we would like to be in a position to be able to incorporate these three Swedish amendments in present joint drafts before the end of this month in order to be

CONFIDENTIAL
Classification

DECLASSIFIED

ram to GENEVA

Authority NND 16900

CONFIDENTIAL
Classification

in position to devote final week or two of conference to preparing report to UNGA.

GP-3

END

RUSK

.22A
TION SHEET

CONFIDENTIAL
Classification

**NATIONAL
SECURITY
ARCHIVE**

This document is from the holdings of:

The National Security Archive

Suite 701, Gelman Library, The George Washington University

2130 H Street, NW, Washington, D.C., 20037

Phone: 202/994-7000, Fax: 202/994-7005, nsarchiv@gwu.edu