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REMARKS

Declassified Authority: 35459
 By: Dorothy Johnson Date: 06-23-2016

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Memo from NSC to CJCS

DATE OF DOCUMENT

23 Feb 82

SUBJECT

National Defense/Security Briefings

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2	THE ASSISTANT TO THE CHAIRMAN	01	
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23 February 1982

1. INFORMATION - SHOW.

2. Judge Clark has asked that the President receive one hour of briefings on strategic forces matters 1400-1500 on Friday. You and SecDef are invited. Tom Reed is to be "stage manager"; MAJ Johnson of SAGA and LTC Baker of J-3 NWSB are named as briefers. Recommend you read the briefing outline starting at the YELLOW signal.

W/ Eric

CAPTAIN McVADON

*Files
24 Feb 82*

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTONTOP SECRET

February 23, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE CASPAR W. WEINBERGER
The Secretary of DefenseGENERAL DAVID C. JONES, USAF
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: National Defense/Security Briefings

Thank you for the briefings that you provided for me and my staff on Friday, February 19. The briefers were of the highest caliber and obviously had a full grasp of the critical issues presented.

In view of the fine job they did, we would like to have the President receive the same type of briefing here at the White House. We have set aside an hour on Friday, February 26, from 2:00-3:00 P.M. for updates on the RISOP and SIOP. A detailed briefing schedule is attached.

I recognize that this is a very short time frame for such material, but in view of the President's previous exposure to these issues, if we keep attendance to a small group I think we can accomplish what we want in the time allotted. The briefers suggested by Ed Hickey's office on the attached outline would, of course, be accompanied by either or both of you, should you so desire.

My National Security Council Staff point of contact for this matter is Oliver North (395-3345).



William P. Clark

Attachment

Detailed Outline of Presidential Briefing

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Review on 2/22/2002

Extended by William P. Clark

Reason for Extension: NSC 1:13(d)

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~TOP SECRET~~PRESIDENTIAL BRIEFING

SUBJECT: Nuclear Operations

LOCATION: White House Situation Room

DATE/TIME: Friday, February 26, 1982
2:00-3:00 P.M.

The allotted briefing time is designed to enhance the President's understanding of nuclear operations so he emerges with an integrated picture of our nuclear forces, vulnerabilities and his role in controlling a U.S. response to attack. In addition, this briefing will provide the President with the essential information for his involvement in the March 1-5 IVY LEAGUE/NINE LIVES IV exercise.

The President has already been briefed on some of these matters, albeit superficially. The following talking points are designed to serve as the script for the Presidential briefing in the Situation Room. They are framed in terms of both the previous briefs and the President's involvement in the forthcoming exercises.

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS (Judge Clark) (0000-0002)

- Mr. President, today's briefings have a three-fold purpose:
 - To provide you with additional details on our strategic nuclear forces;
 - second, to familiarize you with some of the Soviet's capabilities and the vulnerabilities we face; and
 - finally, to review with you the critical role you play in controlling our response to a Soviet attack on the U.S.
- Tom Reed will be our "stage manager" for this sequence of briefings.

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Review on 2/17/2002

Extended by William P. Clark

Reason for Extension: NSC 1.13(D)

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- (Tom Reed) (0002-0004)

You have already had some of this information in overview prior to this:

- Prior to your inauguration last January, General Jones, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, briefed you on our nuclear forces and their relationship to the Single Integrated Operation Plan (SIOP).
 - On 17 January 1981, Major John Kline, USMC, provided you with an overview of the White House Emergency Plans (WHEP) and described some of the communications procedures that we would use in the event of an attack.
 - On your way back from Texas on November 15, 1981, General Gast (J-3) briefed you on the National Emergency Airborne Command Post (NEACP) and our National Military Command System (NMCS).
 - The next day (November 16, 1981), Major Kline provided you with additional detail regarding the "black bag" that the aides carry -- and its role in the strategic release process.
 - On November 17, 1981, you met again with General Jones at the National Military Command Center (NMCC) and were briefed on our Strategic Forces and listened to a simulated missile attack conference.
 - On January 26 and February 16, I discussed strategic nuclear matters with you: the first time in explaining the upcoming exercises -- the second, last week when we discussed the history of nuclear weapons employment policy.
- We have scheduled this series of briefings together to stress the linkage of the issues and reinforce the critical role you play in an attack and response.
 - We have the objective today of quickly tying all these issues together, showing how they relate to the 1-4 March exercises.

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BRIEFING SEQUENCE (Tom Reed) (0004-0005)

- We have two fundamental areas of concern here today: First, the character of a Soviet attack -- size, location and intent; and secondly, the capacity for a U.S. response, with the emergency procedures to be used in the event of such an occurrence.
 - Our first briefing provides you with a view of what a Soviet nuclear attack on the U.S. might look like. The briefer is Major Johnson from the JCS Studies Analysis and Gaming Agency (SAGA).
 - The SAGA briefing is based upon known Soviet capabilities and a DIA estimate of their most likely attack objectives.
 - John Hughes in his brief for you on February 18 covered some of the Soviet's overall capacity for this kind of attack.
- There's no way of predicting how such an attack might come to pass. The Soviets could strike out of the blue, having decided that time was running against them and hoping that a forceful attack on our nerve centers would disable our ability to respond at all.

They might attack only strategic nuclear forces (Minuteman sites and bomber bases) while holding our cities hostage to a second strike. Such eventualities might follow an armed conflict in Poland, Cuba, or at sea.

Alternatively, a Soviet first use of strategic nuclear weapons might follow an escalatory conventional war, in the exchange of tactical nuclear weapons and culminate in a strategic nuclear attack.

 - The casualty and damage estimates are our best estimates of what the results of this kind of attack would yield.

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RISOP (Major Johnson, SAGA) (0005-0023)

- (BRIEFER SITTING ACROSS FROM THE PRESIDENT -- SLIDES ON SCREEN) The Soviet strike capability (relate to John Hughes, Deputy Director - DIA brief on 18 February).
 - ICBM: Number, Type, Range; Delivery Time
 - SLBM: Number, Type, Range; Delivery Time
 - Aircraft: Number, Type, Range; Delivery Time
 - Total Generated Attack/RV capacity (5700 + weaps)
- Types of Attack
 - Counter Force Targets
 - U.S. Strategic Launch Sites
 - U.S. C3 Capability
 - Counter Value Targets
 - Population
 - MIL/Industrial Capacity/Transportation Network
 - EMP Bursts (very brief - allude to more later)
- Effect on U.S.
 - Film (5 minutes) (narrated by Briefer)
 - Casualty/Destruction Effects
 - Probable damage to U.S. Strategic Forces (.75)
 - Damage to Assessment/Retargeting Capability
 - Civilian Population Casualties (80M += 30-37%) based on today's lack of civil defense.

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- Other Types of Attack (very brief -- less likely)
 - Precursor A/C attack
 - Day-to-day (bolt out of the blue) (5-DELTA)
 - Accident/terrorist/sabotage

SUMMARY/QUESTIONS/ANSWERS (Tom Reed)

- Thank you (Maj Johnson) (RISOP BRIEFERS NOW DEPART)
 - It is important to note that the civilian casualty figures shown here are based on today's minimum CD capability. We estimate that the Civil Defense program funded in your budget this year can reduce these casualties from 80M to 40M - or by about 50%.
 - We will be coming back to some significant issues raised in this brief.
 - EMP -- and its effect on our response capabilities.
 - The fact that all of our current relocation facilities in the "National Arc" (the alternate Military Command Center, Special Facility and some of your own emergency locations) are probably targeted.
 - The overall issue of when we launch a retaliatory strike will determine how much of our response capability is destroyed.

TRANSITION (Tom Reed) (0023-0024)

- Our next briefing will detail for you how we plan to respond to such an attack.
 - Brief background/history of SIOP -- creation of JSTPS in 1960.
 - As you remember, the SIOP (Single Integrated Operations Plan) was briefed in overview for you prior to your inaugural (January 20, 1981) by General Jones, and again briefly during your visit to the NMCC on November 17, 1981.

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- (ENTER SIOP BRIEFER) (Col Ken Baker)
- The SIOP briefier is Col Ken Baker, JCS.
- He will cover the details of exactly how the SIOP procedures are executed, the role you have in that process and the various options you have open to you in responding to an attack.

^{NW56}
SIOP (Col Ken Baker) (0024-0100)

- Background/Comparison: U.S. vs. USSR
 - Nuclear vehicles
 - Nuclear weapons
- SIOP Targeting Objectives, Planning, Forces. A discussion of how U.S. force availability (generation) changes as a function of strategic warning time.
 - Targeting priorities (allocation of weapons to leadership, nuclear threat, conventional threat and economic/industrial targets).
 - Day-to-day vs. generated.
 - Force readiness (associated with day-to-day or generated).
 - Alert forces (composition and weapons available day-to-day).
 - Generated forces and timing to achieve.
- SIOP Structure/Options: Discussion of composition of the overall SIOP and how the availability of specific attack options changes as a function of strategic warning time.
 - Composition of the SIOP: Building Block Concept
 - Options available from day-to-day alert posture.
 - Major Attack Options (MAOs)
 - Launch Under Attack Option (LUA)
 - Optional Withhold Categories Available

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- Options available as forces are generated.
 - Selective Attack Options (SAOs)
 - .. Subsets of MAOs
 - .. Targets grouped functionally
 - Basic Attack Options (BAOs)
 - .. Subsets of the SAOs
 - .. Targets grouped functionally and regionally
- Additional Options Available
 - PRC/North Korea
 - Secure Reserve Force

- Execution Capabilities

- Attack Warning
 - Methods
 - Quality/confidence/timeliness
- Threat Assessment
 - Quality
 - Timeliness
- Time availability for SIOP Decision and EAM dissemination.
- Connectivity

- Surprise Attack Response Procedures (SARP) Discussion

- Q & A

- Summary (Tom Reed)

- Thank you, General Jones and Colonel Baker.
- These two briefings provide you, Mr. President, with the details of what the Soviets can do to us -- and how we can respond.
- We will now adjourn and allow for the President's next scheduled event. There is coffee available in the Mess next door.

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