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PTQ5330

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D)

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ5330

PAGE 01 ABU DH 07994 01 OF 02 281043Z
ACTION NEA-01

INFO	LOG-00	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	OASY-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00
	EUR-01	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01
	L-01	ADS-00	MOFM-04	MOF-03	M-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00
	OIC-02	OMB-01	PA-01	PM-00	PRS-01	P-00	SP-00
	SSO-00	SS-00	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	SA-01	PMB-00
	DRL-09	G-00	/027W				

-----037B26 281044Z /38

O 281040Z NOV 95
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7788
INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
GCC COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABU DHABI 007994

DEPARTMENT ALSO FOR NEA/ARP AND NEA/NGA
LONDON FOR TUELLER; PARIS FOR ALLEGRONE

E.O. 12958: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PINR, TC, IR
SUBJECT: ON NEXT STEPS WITH IRAN

B1

REFS: (A) ABU DHABI 7941 (B) ABU DHABI 6370

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PAGE 02 ABU DH 07994 01 OF 02 281043Z
1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY DAVID C. LITT, AMBASSADOR.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: JOHN S BLODGETT
DATE/CASE ID: 26 MAR 2007 200601141

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REASON: 1.6 (X5) AND (X6).

2. (C) SUMMARY: FOLLOWING THE FAILURE OF TALKS WITH IRAN IN DOHA, THE UAEG PLANS TO "RAISE THE PROFILE" OF THE ISLANDS DISPUTE IN MULTILATERAL VENUES.

[REDACTED] REITERATED CONCERNS ABOUT IRANIAN RETALIATION AGAINST THE UAE IF PUSHED TOO FAR. [REDACTED] URGED THE U.S. TO HELP IMPROVE COORDINATION AMONG THE GCC, AS WELL AS THE INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES, TO COUNTER IRAN'S MILITARY BUILD-UP AND TO DENY IT FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE. HE HINTED THAT ANOTHER LETTER FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO THE GCC LEADERS WOULD BE HELPFUL IN PRESERVING STRONG, UNIFIED GCC POLICIES ON IRAN AND IRAQ, AS WELL AS SETTling BORDER DISPUTES. END SUMMARY.

3. (C) [REDACTED] TOLD AMBASSADOR AND POLOFF ON NOVEMBER 26 THAT TALKS BETWEEN THE UAE AND IRAN IN DOHA HAD ENDED IN FAILURE. THE IRANIANS, HE SAID, REFUSED TO DISCUSS AN AGENDA FOR NEGOTIATIONS ON THE THREE ISLANDS. THEY OFFERED ONLY TO NEGOTIATE ON THE BASIS OF THE 1971 MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN IRAN AND THE EMIRATE OF SHARJAH REGARDING ABU MUSA, ALONG WITH A 1992 LETTER FROM SHAIKH ZAYID PROTESTING UNILATERAL ACTIONS WHICH IRAN HAD TAKEN ON ABU MUSA ISLAND. THE CRUX OF THE PROBLEM, [REDACTED] POINTED OUT, WAS NOT 1992, BUT 1971 -- WHEN IRAN OCCUPIED THE ISLANDS. (COMMENT: IRAN OCCUPIED THE TUNBS BY FORCE AND INTERPRETED THE

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
PAGE 03 ABU DH 07994 01 OF 02 281043Z
MOU WITH SHARJAH TO PERMIT ITS MILITARY FORCES TO LAND ON ABU MUSA. IT HAS SINCE ENCROACHED ON THE SHARJAH PORTION OF ABU MUSA AND REJECTED ANY DISCUSSION OF THE TUNBS OR SOVEREIGNTY OF ABU MUSA. THE 1971 MOU DEFERS THE ISSUE OF SOVEREIGNTY. END COMMENT.)

4. (C) [REDACTED] WENT ON TO SAY THAT THE UAEG PLANS TO "RAISE THE PROFILE" OF THE ISLANDS ISSUE, PARTICULARLY IN THE CONTEXT OF THE GCC, THE DAMASCUS DECLARATION STATES, AND THE ISLAMIC COUNTRIES. HE ADDED THAT HE

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HOPES IRAN WILL RESPOND "RATIONALLY" TO THE U.S.'S
DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS.



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PAGE 04 ABU DH 07994 01 OF 02 281043Z

7. (C) THE AMBASSADOR POINTED OUT THAT THE U.S. HAS A GOOD UNDERSTANDING WITH THE NATO COUNTRIES AND JAPAN REGARDING THREATS POSED BY IRAN. THE MAJOR INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES ALREADY PREVENT EXPORTS OF SENSITIVE TECHNOLOGY TO IRAN, WHILE THE G-7 AND RUSSIA HAVE PUBLICLY ACKNOWLEDGED THE IRANIAN THREAT, AND RUSSIA TOOK STEPS TO END ITS ARMS SALES TO IRAN. THIS COOPERATION, ALONG WITH IRAN'S FAILING ECONOMIC POLICIES, HINDERED IRAN'S ABILITY TO ATTRACT INVESTMENT FROM EUROPE OR JAPAN AND DIMINISHED ITS ALREADY POOR IMPOSITION OF THE U.S. TRADE EMBARGO, THE AMBASSADOR CONTINUED, IRAN HAD DIFFICULTY FINDING NEW PURCHASERS FOR ITS OIL. INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE ON IRAN HAS INCREASED, THE AMBASSADOR COMMENTED, BUT HAS THE MESSAGE GOTTEN THROUGH TO IRAN'S LEADERS?

8. (C) THE AMBASSADOR ADDED THAT THE U.S. IS WELL AWARE OF THE UAEG'S CONCERNS ABOUT POTENTIAL IRANIAN THREATS

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TO UAE SECURITY. THE U.S., HE SAID, WILL FORGE ITS COOPERATION WITH THE UAE IN SECURITY AND DEFENSE. IT WILL CONTINUE TO WORK WITH THE UAE AND GCC TO DETER IRAN FROM THREATENING ITS NEIGHBORS. A STRONG STATEMENT ON

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PAGE 01 ABU DH 07994 02 OF 02 281044Z ACTION NEA-01

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.O. 12958: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PINR, TC, IR
SUBJECT: [REDACTED]

ON NEXT STEPS WITH IRAN

IRAN AND IRAQ BY THE GCC LEADERS AT THE MUSCAT SUMMIT
COULD HELP DEMONSTRATE THE UNITY OF THE GCC ON
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PAGE 02 ABU DH 07994 02 OF 02 281044Z
SECURITY.

9. (C) [REDACTED] NOTED THAT THE GCC COUNTRIES NEED TO
UNIFY THEIR POSITIONS ON SEVERAL KEY ISSUES, INCLUDING
ISRAEL, IRAQ AND IRAN. QATAR, FOR EXAMPLE, HAS AN
"ADVANCED" RELATIONSHIP WITH IRAN, WHILE OMAN HAS EVEN
REACHED THE POINT OF CARRYING OUT JOINT MILITARY
EXERCISES WITH IRANIAN FORCES.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

11. (C) BORDER DISPUTES REMAIN THE MAJOR OBSTACLE TO
GCC UNITY, [REDACTED] WENT ON, PARTICULARLY THE PROBLEMS
WHICH PERSIST BETWEEN SAUDI ARABIA AND ITS NEIGHBORS.

[REDACTED]

12. (C) THE AMBASSADOR AGREED THAT RESOLVING SUCH
ISSUES IS CRUCIAL TO GCC UNITY. HE ADDED THAT THE U.S.

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CONTINUES TO PRESS THE GCC COUNTRIES TO
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PAGE 03 ABU DH 07994 02 OF 02 281044Z
A FRIENDLY WAY IN ORDER TO ENHANCE THE SECURITY OF THE
ENTIRE GULF.

13. (C) IN A SEPARATE CONVERSATION NOVEMBER 27, [REDACTED]

TOLD THE DCM,

[REDACTED] THAT THE DOHA TALKS
PROVED MEDIATION WILL NOT RESOLVE THE ISLANDS DISPUTE.
MOREOVER, THE IRANIANS WOULD NO LONGER BE IN A POSITION
TO EMBARRASS THE UAE BY CHARGING THAT IT HAS REFUSED TO
TRY TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM THROUGH BILATERAL
NEGOTIATIONS. WITH THE FAILURE OF THE DOHA TALKS,
[REDACTED] ARGUED, THE UAE NOW HAS GOOD CAUSE TO
PRESS FOR SUBMITTING THE DISPUTE TO THE ICJ.

[REDACTED]

15. (C) WHEN THE DCM POINTED OUT THAT SUPPORT FOR
IRAN'S ECONOMY WOULD HELP IT DEVELOP ITS MILITARY
POTENTIAL, [REDACTED] REPLIED THAT THE UAE DOES
NOT FAVOR ANY PARTICIPATION IN IRAN'S ECONOMIC OR
MILITARY DEVELOPMENT. HOWEVER, HE SAID, THE UAEG IS
NOT IN A POSITION TO STOP TRADE BETWEEN PRIVATE

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PAGE 04 ABU DH 07994 02 OF 02 281044Z
INDIVIDUALS AND ENTITIES IN THE EMIRATES. "OUR BORDERS
AND COASTLINE CANNOT BE CLOSED," HE SAID; AND THE UAE
CANNOT AND WILL NOT TRY TO STOP THE LEGITIMATE MOVEMENT
OF GOODS AND PEOPLE BETWEEN THE UAE AND IRAN.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] SAID THAT THE
UAE CANNOT SUPPORT A TRADE EMBARGO AGAINST IRAN BECAUSE
OF ITS LONG STANDING LINKS A
CROSS THE GULF TO IRAN.
HOWEVER, THE UAE HAS SUPPORTED THE U.S. ON STOPPING
EXPORTS TO IRAN OF WMD AND CONVENTIONAL ARMS, AS WELL
AS ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE. THE UAE WILL CONTINUE TO
SUPPORT THE U.S. ON THESE PARTICULAR ISSUES [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] END

COMMENT. LITT

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