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Rex Urtel 2
~~copy~~ (July 10)

Dept ~~copy~~ discussed with Irish Emboffs latest version Irish disarmament resolution transmitted Reftel. Following points made:

1. US shares basic objectives Irish proposal opposing uncontrolled spread nuclear weapons and this reflected US laws which specifically prohibit transfer custody nuclear weapons to other nations.

2. US however cannot rpt not accept obligations in field of disarmament which are not subject to control and verification. This perhaps most important reason why Irish resolution unacceptable to us.

3. Irish proposal places US and USSR on same plane and while US under considerable compulsion US public opinion to heed GA resolutions, USSR under no such restraints.

4. US has and still advocates world-wide cessation of production of nuclear weapons along with gradual reduction existing stocks. These proposals are ~~un-~~controllable and if accepted would lead toward achievement Irish objectives. USSR consistently refused accept this kind verifiable and controllable agreement.

5. Introduction Irish proposal next GA would provide USSR with useful platform launch propaganda attack on present US policy deploying nuclear weapons abroad and training US allies in use such weapons in event war. This policy designed

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Drafted by: IO:UNP:SIGrand:dt 7/10/59

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Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: UNP - J. J. Sisco

Clearances: EUR - Mr. Nulley

S/AE - Mr. ~~Weller~~

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increase ability certain states more rapidly defend themselves if necessary but USSR would obviously ignore this and use Irish proposal as means of diverting attention from meaningful disarmament discussions.

6. Irish themselves concede difficulties detecting transfer nuclear weapons in violation of resolution. They concede that integration of Soviet and satellite armies such that verification weapons transfer practically impossible. However they argue adverse psychological effect of detection of violation/^{Irish} resolution would deter USSR. We pointed out USSR has long record defiance GA resolutions.

At conclusion of conversation in answer to question, we affirmed US position re Irish proposal basically remains same as last GA. We added we hoped to keep in touch with them after they thought through problem further.

Request Embassy ~~to~~ make foregoing views orally to Irish FONOFF.

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