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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

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Authority NND 907401

600.0012/9-159

YR 320
330.13

DATE: September 1, 1959

SUBJECT: Irish Disarmament Resolution at 14th General Assembly

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PARTICIPANTS: Mr. C. D. Wiggin - First Secretary, British Embassy
Miss Gillian Brown - British Embassy
Mr. Joseph J. Sisco - UNP
Miss Elizabeth A. Brown - UNP

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In the course of a conversation reviewing the British position on the 14th General Assembly agenda (see separate memorandum of conversation), Mr. Wiggin left the attached note dealing with the Irish resolution on dissemination of nuclear weapons. He expressed the view it was unlikely that Ireland would agree to revise it in any way that would make it acceptable.

Mr. Sisco indicated that the US was studying the proposal but had not reached any final conclusions. Of course we would be consulting closely with the UK on the matter.

Joseph J. Sisco

Attachment:
as stated.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

NND 941089
By sh/m/h/m Date 4/20/96

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DISARMAMENT

The following represents the Foreign Office's thinking on the latest provision of the Irish draft resolution for the next General Assembly on "the prevention of the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons".

Our view on this draft is that although the Irish have now taken the point about the problem of inspection and control being paramount in the prevention of the dissemination of nuclear weapons, the course proposed in their resolution is completely unrealistic at the present stage. In some ways it is an adjunct to the complete control of the production of fissile material for both military and non-military purposes; indeed, it goes even further than that and really belongs to the final stage of a comprehensive disarmament plan. The control required to ensure that nuclear weapons are not passed on to other countries would involve a complete count of the nuclear armouries of the nuclear powers and a continuing check on them. If we are ever to get to such a stage of control and inspection in disarmament measures the problem of disseminating nuclear weapons would not arise. Anyhow the Russians would certainly oppose such far-reaching measures of control for the dissemination of nuclear weapons and so should we in the absence of any comprehensive disarmament plan. In addition the implementation of the resolution would require very far-reaching controls over the non-nuclear powers.

We should be grateful if our views could be passed on to the Americans. We should also like to know whether they have now decided, in the light of the latest version of the Irish resolution, what course they intend to take. Our own attitude will of course depend on whether the Americans propose to renew discussions with the Irish on the resolution. Short of withdrawing it altogether, it is difficult to see how the Irish could improve it, unless by coming round to our view that the best way of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons is to obtain a satisfactory agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests under effective controls."

BRITISH EMBASSY,

WASHINGTON, D.C.

August 31, 1959

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