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SECTION I - THE OBJECTIVES OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY

INTRODUCTION

Throughout its history the foreign policy of the Soviet Union has been based on suspicion and mistrust. The Soviet leaders have considered the Soviet Union as an island surrounded by capitalist enemies. While in the early days of the Soviet regime it was recognized that collaboration with capitalist countries might be advisable on occasion, this was to be resorted to solely for the achievement of Soviet objectives and did not in any way imply the abandonment of the eventual aim of the overthrowing of capitalist regimes. Stalin's decision to build socialism in one country brought about, at least in theory, the abandonment of the aim of world revolution. Capitalist countries, however, were still considered as enemies, and as recently as 1937 Stalin himself declared: "Capitalist encirclement--that is not an empty phrase; it is a very real and disagreeable phenomenon." The events of the past few years have doubtless done much to persuade Soviet leaders that collaboration with capitalist countries is possible, but there have been too many reverses in Soviet relations with other countries for the Soviets readily to bring themselves to think in terms of lasting friendly relations with other countries.

This attitude of considering other countries as enemies explains many of the peculiarities of the Soviet conduct of foreign relations. The habits <sup>and methods</sup> formed in the conduct of affairs on this basis over a long period of years are difficult to change, no matter how much the aims of Soviet policy may have developed.

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The Soviet Union has always had two foreign policies, one actual, the other professed. The two do not always coincide. Let us examine first the declared or professed Soviet foreign policy.

DECLARED



## DECLARED FOREIGN POLICY

### a. General Principles

As in the case of other countries the declared Soviet foreign policy embraces the advocacy of certain general principles as well as the achievement of specific objectives. ~~By general principles is meant such objectives as freedom of speech, freedom of trade, respect for the independence and sovereignty of other states, etc.~~

The difference between the Soviet Union and other countries in respect to the general principles they advocate lies in the fact that in the case of states such as Great Britain and more particularly the United States, their own self-interest will be served by the establishment and maintenance of these general principles. They are thus in themselves actual objectives of our policy and we will on occasion sacrifice more specific objectives to further them. It is true that on occasion we have deviated from or broken the principles we have advocated but in general they constitute sincere objectives of our policy.

The Soviet Union, on the other hand, has professed to advocate policies such as freedom of the press, freedom of religion, non-interference in the affairs of other states, etc. in which it often not only had no vital interest but to which, in some cases, it was actually opposed. There are a number of factors which contribute to or explain this hypocrisy. Such a practice naturally flows from a concept of foreign relations as <sup>something</sup> being akin to war. It is necessary deliberately to conceal one's intentions from the enemy. But there are other factors contributing to this practice. One is

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the need of Soviet propaganda for a set of simple general principles for which support can be obtained not only from the mass of the Soviet people with their different nationality, economic and geographic interests, but also from communist or other pro-Soviet groups abroad.

Finally, it may be mentioned that the Soviet leaders have recognized to some extent that failure to pay at least lip service to certain widely held beliefs, <sup>or ideals</sup> would cause undue difficulties, for Soviet diplomacy, <sup>with other governments.</sup>

As examples of general principles advocated by the Soviet Union may be mentioned Soviet adherence to the Atlantic Charter, the Declaration of United Nations and the Declaration of the Moscow Conference. <sup>recent</sup> A purely Soviet statement of this nature was contained in Marshal Stalin's speech on November 7, 1943 when he said:

"The victory of the Allied countries over Hitlerite Germany will put on the agenda important questions of organizing and rebuilding the state, economic and cultural life of the European peoples. The policy of our Government in these questions remains unchanging. Together with our Allies we shall have to:

"1) liberate the peoples of Europe from the fascist invaders and help them to rebuild their national states dismembered by the fascist enslavers--the peoples of France, Belgium, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Greece and the other states now under German yoke must again become free and independent;

"2) grant the liberated peoples of Europe the full right and freedom to decide for themselves the question of their form of government;

"3) take measures that all fascist criminals responsible for this war and the sufferings of the peoples bear stern punishment and retribution for all the crimes they committed, no matter in what country they may hide;

"4) establish such an order in Europe as will completely preclude the possibility of new aggression on the part of Germany;

"5) establish lasting economic, political and cultural collaboration among the peoples of Europe, based on mutual confidence and mutual assistance, for the purpose of rehabilitating the economic and cultural life destroyed by the Germans."

b. Specific

b. Specific Objectives

So far as specific <sup>declared</sup> objectives are concerned, Soviet policy is dynamic. It is constantly striving to achieve a set of clearly defined objectives. As these are accomplished or become obsolete, they are replaced by new ones. Soviet foreign relations seem never to be in equilibrium. There is a similarity between this technique and that employed by Hitler before the present war. He was continually making one last demand on the basis that once this concession was made Germany would settle down to friendly relations with other states. The comparison is perhaps unfair but the technique is much the same. The question of the Baltic states and Finland, the second front campaign, the Polish question come to mind in this connection. Obviously many of these declared objectives are actual Soviet objectives but it will be recalled that in the case of the Baltic states, for instance, incorporation into the Soviet Union was not mentioned until Soviet troops were already in control of those countries.

ACTUAL

## ACTUAL SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY

### a. General Principles

The secrecy and mystery that surrounds Soviet foreign policy makes it extremely difficult to judge what Soviet policy is at any given time. It is only by examining the events of the past that it is possible to see the thread that connected the various Soviet moves in the field of foreign relations. Certain general objectives of foreign policy are common to all countries including the Soviet Union. Among these may be mentioned security, economic stability, etc. Apart from such objectives which are so broad as to be almost meaningless, it would appear that Soviet policy is based more on concrete and specific objectives than on general principles. Policies such as the support of collective security <sup>were</sup> ~~are~~ judged by the Soviet leaders by their effectiveness in securing the specific objectives which they desire to achieve. If they failed <sup>at</sup> any time to serve Soviet needs they <sup>were</sup> ~~will be~~ ruthlessly scrapped.

<sup>one</sup> A guiding principle of Soviet policy <sup>however</sup> appears to be that whenever other considerations do not prevent, it endeavors to further the interests and influence of extreme leftist groups in other countries. The Soviet leaders appear more and more, however, to give weight to national as contrasted to international considerations. Whatever the ultimate objectives of the Soviet regime may be the aim of world revolution does not appear to be a practical objective of its current policy.

### b. Specific



## b. Specific Objectives

The actual specific objectives of Soviet policy are seldom revealed if they can possibly be concealed. Here again the tendency to consider all foreign countries as enemies is probably the chief explanation. Assuming that other states wish them ill, Soviet leaders appear to assume that if their objectives, no matter how legitimate, were known, efforts would be made to thwart them. The Soviet policy makers have a love of maneuver and surprise that frequently operates to their disadvantage. By their failure openly to state their objectives, or the motives underlying a given move, they frequently needlessly stir up suspicion and distrust. The manner in which the Soviet Union recently established direct relations with Italy may be mentioned as an example. A frank discussion of the problem with the British and ourselves could have achieved the objective and the harmful repercussions of the abrupt Soviet action avoided. *While actual Soviet objectives are rarely clear to outsiders, there appears to be no uncertainty in the minds of the Soviet leaders at any time as to what they want, this gives the Kremlin a great advantage over democracies which frequently are handicapped by discussion internally and by the slowness of the democratic process.*

## THE REGIME AND THE STATE

Foreign observers frequently overlook or give insufficient importance to one of the most basic factors affecting the determination of policy in any dictatorship; namely, the affect of any given policy upon the regime as contrasted with its effect upon the State. The nature and structure of the Soviet system is so poorly understood, even by persons who have long resided in the Soviet Union, that even if this factor is considered, it is <sup>usually</sup> difficult for an outsider to judge accurately the repercussions of a given action or development on that system.

## SECTION II - THE ORGANIC STRUCTURE OF THE SOVIET STATE

### Introduction

The structural organization of the Soviet System is highly complex and it is of course impossible accurately to describe it in a few paragraphs. For the purposes of this report, however, it may <sup>be</sup> roughly outlined as consisting of four essential parts: the Kremlin, the Party, the NKVD, and the Bureaucracy which, in the Soviet Union, includes the army forces, industry, and agriculture. By Kremlin is meant Stalin and the small group of men with whom <sup>he</sup> Stalin chooses to share the power and tremendous responsibilities that are his. Although <sup>Stalin</sup> ~~he~~ can change these men at will the Soviet system is so highly centralized that <sup>he</sup> Stalin is obliged to share both the power as well as the responsibility of running it. This group runs the country through the mechanism of the Party and the Bureaucracy, with the NKVD supplying any compulsion that is needed.

SECTION I - THE ORGANIC STRUCTURE OF THE SOVIET STATE

THE KREMLIN

THE SOVIET SYSTEM

So far as the conduct of foreign relations is concerned, the most important single fact about the Soviet Union is that it is governed by a dictatorship as absolute as any the world has ever seen. Potentially the most vital and far-reaching decisions can be taken and carried out by the will of one man, Marshal Stalin, and it is believed that all major decisions of policy are in fact taken by him or by the small group of which he is the unchallenged leader.

There have been no important changes in the composition of this ruling group since the war began. The most important organ of the Bolshevik regime is the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. The last change in its composition was the addition of Shcherbakov, Malenkov and Vosnesenski, all prominent Party leaders, as alternate members early in 1939. The State Defense Committee that was created after the entry of the Soviet Union into the war is composed of eight members, all of whom <sup>(except Bulganin)</sup> are also members of the Politburo. The effect of its creation was to bring about an even greater concentration of power.

When power is concentrated in such a small group subjective considerations become of great importance. Unfortunately, little is known of the personal characteristics of most of these men. It is important to note, however, that for the most part they have had little contact with the outside world. Few of them have been abroad since the Revolution and with the exception of

Marshal



Marshal Stalin, Molotov and Mikoyan, almost their only contact with foreigners is the annual Foreign Office reception on November 7. It is these men who make all important decisions on Soviet foreign policy.

Little is known of the inner workings of what may best be described as the "Kremlin", but it may be mentioned in passing that in addition to the Politburo and other organs of the Central Committee, Stalin's personal Secretariat probably plays an important role and it is reasonable to suppose that this Secretariat, which is known to be both large and efficient, has considerable latitude in determining which questions receive Stalin's personal attention, which are referred to the high Party organs and which it can decide upon its own responsibility.

Obviously the number of decisions that must be made by the men at the top of the Soviet regime leave them little time for personally investigating the facts upon which many of their decisions are based. This is, of course, particularly true of Stalin and on occasion the Embassy has had reason to suspect that Stalin had not been given completely unbiased information. It is of course impossible to obtain any confirmation of such conjectures and the only certain fact is that the men around Stalin play an important role in the making of Soviet policy.

## THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS

The People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs probably is <sup>one of</sup> the least important organs of the Soviet Government in the determination of high Soviet foreign policy. Its organization is very similar to that of the Department of State or any other foreign office. In addition to the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Molotov, there is a First Assistant People's Commissar, Mr. Vyshinski, and six Assistant People's Commissars. Under these Assistant Commissars are the various geographical and functional sections of the Foreign Office. Only two of the latter, the Press and Consular Sections, have sufficiently unusual characteristics as to call for any special comment. The Press Section has accredited to it all foreign correspondents in the Soviet Union and handles almost all of the relations of foreign correspondents with other Soviet institutions. There is a close link between the Press Section of the Foreign Office and the official Soviet news agency, TASS. The former chief of the Press Section is at present the director of TASS and apparently he did not relinquish his diplomatic rank upon his appointment to this position.

The Consular Section of the Foreign Office handles visa and passport questions which are actually under the control of the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs. The Consular Section is at present under the direction of a relatively junior official and it is believed that much of the difficulty which the Embassy encounters in connection with visa matters arises from the fact that it has no contact with the officials who are actually responsible for decisions on such matters.

The Collegium of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs is a policy making organ. It is believed

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to be composed of the Vice Commissars of Foreign Affairs and the more important chiefs of section. Little is known of the way in which this body works, but it apparently decides policy on routine matters and makes recommendations to higher authority on more important questions. Rarely will even a Vice Commissar express an opinion on any question until the policy involved has been determined by the Collegium or, if the question is at all important, by the Kremlin.

Great difficulty is encountered in dealing with the Soviet Government because of the almost universal tendency of Soviet officials to evade personal responsibility. The penalty for mistakes is drastic and in government as in business the man at the top is held personally responsible for anything that goes wrong with his Department. Only those whose positions are relatively secure by reason of their positions in the high circles of the party can afford to take responsibility for difficult decisions. The result is that from bottom to top an endeavor is made to shift responsibility for decisions up to a higher official or to a board such as the Collegium or the Politburo. It is often difficult to get a quick decision on a question because it must be referred to one of these bodies or to Stalin himself. On the other hand when a question is being handled by Stalin or the Politburo, the Soviet Government can act with the greatest rapidity and the decisions taken are instantly carried out by the lower officials concerned who well know the penalty for delay in such a case.

The decentralization of the Foreign Affairs Commissariat has already been discussed in reports submitted

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by the Embassy. Little has been done to implement the decision to create separate Commissariats in the Constituent Republics, and it is likely that this will await the end of the war. There can be no question but that the effective control of foreign affairs will remain in Moscow and in the Kremlin, although the creation of separate Foreign Affairs Commissariats may well affect the methods by which this control is exercised, when certain kinds of problems are being dealt with.



## THE DIPLOMATIC SERVICE

Considering the importance of the position of the Soviet Union in world affairs its diplomatic service must be considered as wholly inadequate and inferior to that of other great powers. The diplomatic service has not been considered a safe profession in a country where thousands of citizens have been sentenced to lengthy prison terms or death on the sole ground of having had contact with foreigners. Consequently, the diplomatic service did not in the past attract many of the more able young Soviet officials and a large proportion of the older and experienced diplomats were eliminated in the various purges. The Soviet Government has been conscious of the weakness of its diplomatic service and has recently undertaken steps to recruit and train a larger number of competent officials and to raise the prestige of its diplomatic service. Among these may be mentioned the creation of a special faculty in the Moscow University, the establishment of a career service, and the provision of uniforms and shoulder insignia for members of the diplomatic service. For the present, however, it must be said that the Soviet diplomatic service is wholly inadequate to the task of representing a great power such as the Soviet Union. With the exception of Litvinov and Maisky, most of the leading Soviet diplomats are mediocrities who appear to be little more than transmitting agents and whose opinions, even if they dared to express them, would carry little if any weight.

In the past Soviet diplomats in foreign capitals have been in touch chiefly with extreme leftist groups  
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## THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT FOR FOREIGN TRADE

The fact that Soviet foreign trade is a monopoly of the Government gives the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade a particularly important position in relation to foreign affairs. It maintains organizations in foreign countries, such as Amtorg in the United States, and since the war, the Soviet Purchasing Commission. The Foreign Office as such appears to have little control over its affairs and it negotiates trade treaties on occasion and maintains its own protocol section. Its influence is further increased by the personality of its Commissar, A. I. Mikoyan, who is one of the leading figures in the Soviet Government and the Communist Party. A reflection of this was the fact that an official of this Commissariat was chosen to head the Soviet delegation to the recent Monetary and Financial Conference at Bretton Woods, rather than an official of the Finance Commissariat.

and members of the communist parties of those countries. It could scarcely be expected that their reports on these countries would be fully objective.

Soviet collaboration with foreign countries suffers not only from the quality of its diplomats but also from the lack of experts who have the necessary technical qualifications as well as a position in the party which would enable them to be entrusted with important negotiations. Steps are being taken to correct this situation, but lack of qualified personnel will probably handicap Soviet collaboration on technical or "lower level" questions for <sup>some</sup> years to come.

## TASS

So far as the Embassy is aware, Tass, rather than the Soviet diplomatic service, is responsible for keeping the Soviet Government informed of developments in foreign countries. The Embassy has had an opportunity of examining the Tass news file on several occasions and has been struck by the fact that it does not attempt to submit an objective report of foreign news but rather tends to report news items that support the official Soviet policy of the moment. This may seem natural in that Tass is supposed primarily to forward items for publication in the Soviet press and rarely does anything contrary to official Soviet policy reach the pages of Soviet publications. On the other hand the Tass files examined in 1943 were replete with reports of American strikes and labor troubles although little mention was being made of these in the Soviet press. The conclusion seems inescapable that generally speaking Tass tends to report what it thinks the Kremlin believes or wants to hear. It does of course report many items critical of the Soviet Union but this is in line with the traditional Soviet view that all capitalist countries are enemies. It is believed that this tendency to seek evidence to support a policy already adopted is a grave weakness in the Soviet system of conducting foreign affairs.



## THE COMMUNIST PARTY

Virtually all Soviet officials who have an important role in Soviet foreign affairs are, of course, Party members. It is necessary, however, to distinguish the Communist Party in general from the Party leaders referred to above, who actually run the country. There has been a very considerable change in the composition of the rank-and-file of the Party since the war and it is by no means clear what effect this will have upon the future role of the Party. A discussion of these changes is beyond the scope of this report, but the two most important developments would appear to be the broadening of the base of the Party membership by the enrollment of a large number of Soviet intellectuals, members of the armed forces and office workers, and secondly, the extent to which Party leaders have assumed Governmental positions.

In so far as the conduct of foreign relations is concerned, two of the most important functions of the Party are keeping the Soviet leaders informed of the state of public opinion and explaining and convincing the people of the wisdom of whatever policy is decided upon. This will be discussed further below in the section dealing with propaganda.

The role of communist parties abroad is discussed under the section dealing with the implementation of Soviet policy. Now that the Comintern has been abolished it is not clear what organ of the Soviet Government handles liaison with foreign communist parties.

According to a statement published in Pravda in November 1943 party membership had increased from

3,400,000

3,400,000 members in 1940 to 4,600,000. It is now probably well over five million. The relatively high percentage of party members among war casualties and the fact that many of the new party members have been drawn from elements of the population who previously had slight representation has resulted in a striking change in the character of party membership. On the other hand, the rank and file of the party appears to have decreased in importance during the war as far as the formulation of policy is concerned. Important changes in the functions and organization of the party may be expected after the war. While party members have taken a leading role in the conduct of the war, the millions of Soviet men and women who have so courageously borne the suffering of the war and so heroically contributed to the victory cannot easily be left to one side in the organization of the state. Either they will have to be brought into the party, in which case it ceases to be the compact disciplined body it has been heretofore, or else party members will lose some of their prerogatives as the elite of the Soviet state.

## THE PRESS

The Soviet press is completely subject to the control of the regime and is an important organ in the conduct of foreign affairs. Not only is it used to influence public opinion within the country but frequently Soviet policy is implemented by the publication of articles in the press rather than by a direct communication to a foreign government or by an official statement of policy. An important development since the war has been the creation of the Sovinform Bureau. This organization conducts Soviet propaganda abroad and fulfills in a sense the opposite function of Tass. It is headed by Lieutenant General Scherbakov, an influential member of the Politburo who is also in charge of the Political Administration of the Red Army. He is said to be anti-American but the Embassy has no confirmation of this.

## THE ARMED FORCES

A new factor in Soviet policy making has arisen as a result of the war. The Soviet Union has what is probably the largest land army in the world and in the conduct of its operations it must inevitably deal with questions related to foreign policy. It is probable, however, that the Soviet military authorities have less direct influence on foreign policy than the military authorities of any other great power. Nevertheless, a new problem has arisen for the Soviet leaders in dealing with this enormous body of men who have been trained to accept responsibility; who are conscious of their achievements, and who must somehow be reintegrated into the Soviet system after the war. The Soviet army cannot be considered as an independent factor in the same sense as the German or even the British and American armies because of the extent to which it is integrated with the communist party machine throughout all ranks. Any tendency to deviate from the "party line" is promptly dealt with by disciplinary action or by intensive propaganda carried out through the Political Administration of the Red Army. Nevertheless, the best brains in the country have gone into the army and army officers have been more free than civilians from the blighting effects of fear of responsibility and of the direct control of the N.K.V.D. The steps taken during the war to restore traditional military traditions and discipline and to raise the prestige of the army officers has intensified their consciousness of their own particular set of interests and they now constitute an important influence which the Soviet leaders must take into account in their policy making.

OTHER



## OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

A discussion of all the organizations that play a role in foreign affairs is beyond the scope of this report but a few should be mentioned for, although they have little if any importance in the determination of Soviet policy, they are instrumental in carrying out its application.

Prominent among these are what may be called the nationality groups such as the All Slav Committee, the Union of Polish Patriots, and the Free Germany Committee. Similar organizations are the Anti-Fascist League of Youth and the Anti-Fascist Committee of Women.

There are also a number of cultural and scientific organizations that have some contact abroad although every effort is made to channel these contacts through an organization known as "Voks", or the U.S.S.R. Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries. This organization effectively stifles any but the most innocuous and impersonal exchange of information.

The steps taken during the war to restore some of the prerogatives of the churches, particularly those of the Russian Orthodox Church, suggest that the church may in the future be used to further Soviet foreign policies. There is no indication, however, that there is any intention of allowing the church to have any independence or to give it any function in the formulation of policy.

## THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT FOR INTERNAL AFFAIRS

In a recent public address A. Y. Vyshinski, ranking Vice Commissar for Foreign Affairs, stated frankly that the Soviet system was based upon a combination of persuasion and force. Although he did not say so it is the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs (N.K.V.D.) that supplies the force while the Communist Party provides the persuasion.

The many ramifications of this organization are beyond the scope of this report but some knowledge of its functions is necessary for an understanding of Soviet foreign relations.

It is difficult to explain to anyone who has not lived in the Soviet Union the all pervading influence of the N.K.V.D. Its power derives directly from the leaders and no one can interfere or intervene with it except the small ruling group. Even they, should Stalin so desire, would be subject to its jurisdiction as was the case in the famous purges. Because of this independence, which no other organ of the Soviet Government enjoys, the N.K.V.D. is probably the most efficient branch of the Government.

Its operations and its relations with other organizations are for the most part shrouded in secrecy but whenever a subject falls within its jurisdiction, its decision or ruling cannot be, or at least is not, opposed unless the member of the ruling group considers that it so affects an organization responsible to him as to warrant his taking the risk of having it questioned on the highest level. This accounts for much of the difficulty foreign representatives encounter in dealing with

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matters involving the N.K.V.D. for they have no direct access to it *and other organs of the Soviet Government can intervene with it only at the highest levels.*

The N.K.V.D. is responsible not only for the security of the State but also for the maintenance of the regime and it is reasonable to presume that it has an important voice in the determination of Soviet foreign policies whenever these factors are involved.

The N.K.V.D. keeps a close check on the activities of all foreigners who enter the Soviet Union and its policy of holding contact between Soviet citizens and foreigners to a minimum has remained virtually unchanged since the outbreak of the war. Only a small group of intellectuals, artists, writers, personal servants and a few specially designated officials dare risk other than the most casual contact with foreigners. Even members of the Foreign Office and Soviet diplomats when in Moscow scrupulously avoid personal relationships with foreign diplomats whom they may have known intimately abroad. Some indication of the attitude of the N.K.V.D. is furnished by the fact that the section of the Commissariat handling affairs of foreigners, including diplomats, is known as the "Special (or Counter-Espionage) Department":

It is generally believed that at least one representative of the N.K.V.D. is assigned to every Soviet Mission abroad apart from the regular intelligence service. It seems reasonable to suppose that the intelligence reports submitted by N.K.V.D. agents do not attempt objectively to reflect conditions abroad but rather to report any activities believed to constitute a threat to the Soviet State or to the Bolshevik regime.

A large part of the responsibility for the organizing of foreign military units as well as such organizations as the Union of Polish Patriots and the Free Germany Committee falls to the N.K.V.D. and it seems likely that it will be very much concerned with Soviet activities in foreign territory which has been or will be occupied by the Red Army.

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## THE SOVIET PEOPLE

Even in a dictatorship the mass of the people have some effect upon foreign relations. There is little agreement among observers as to the extent to which the Soviet leaders take public opinion into account in the formulation of policy. The care with which the public is propagandized with respect to foreign relations would indicate, however, that while the regime may be able to ignore public opinion to a large extent when formulating policy, it feels obliged to convince the public of the wisdom of its decisions.

The problem is, of course, highly complicated by the many nationalities involved, each with its own language and cultural and historical traditions, as well as by the different geographic and economic factors involved in an area as large as the Soviet Union.

The people of a large and heterogeneous state such as the Soviet Union cannot long be forced to carry on a war. This fact was well recognized by the Soviet leaders and at the outbreak of the war the already existent trend toward nationalism was greatly accelerated and the orthodox appeals to patriotism, religious feeling, etc. replaced to a large extent the emphasis upon communism. The Soviet people responded to an amazing degree and their support of the war has been genuine and wholehearted. There were of course defections, and there were stern precautionary measures such as the transfer of the Volga German population, but in general it may be said that the Russian people remained loyal to the Soviet regime. As a result of the successful conduct of the war the regime is probably more secure than at

any

any previous time in its history. On the other hand the Soviet people feel they have earned the right to have the confidence of the regime and to live under a less harsh and strict rule. After the severe suffering of the war their immediate desires are material but they doubtless also feel that they are entitled to a greater share in shaping the destinies of the country they have defended at such cost. Such a development would contribute greatly to friendly relations between the Soviet Union and other States for the Russian people desire to live in peace.

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This brief, incomplete description of the Soviet machinery for dealing with foreign affairs will, it is hoped, be sufficient to indicate the rigities and limitations which it places upon both the formulation and implementation of Soviet foreign policies. It is clear that the ~~close~~ intimate relationships and close cooperation on detailed problems that exists between the United States and Great Britain is impossible with the Soviet Union.

On the other hand cooperation at the top level for the achievement of broad major objectives is possible if each side will take account of the limitations and peculiarities of the other.

SECTION III - SOVIET METHODS OF CONDUCTING  
FOREIGN RELATIONS

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Introduction

Whatever the objectives of Soviet policy may be, their methods of conducting foreign affairs are different from those of other states and are apt to interpose serious obstacles in the way of collaboration with the Soviet Union. These methods are mainly based upon the "enemy" attitude mentioned above, but even if, as is hoped, that attitude is rapidly changing, many of the peculiarly Soviet methods will remain both from habit and because some of them are related to factors inherent in the Soviet system. A few of the more striking of these methods, habits, or techniques of the Soviet conduct of foreign affairs are discussed below.

Intervention

The essential basis of actual Soviet conduct of foreign relations before the present war was intervention in the internal affairs of other states. Particularly in the early days of the regime, <sup>the Soviet Union</sup> ~~it~~ also suffered from the attempts of other states to intervene in internal Soviet affairs. The long period during which the Soviet Union was more or less ostracized by other states combined ~~to with~~ their own objective of world revolution left them almost no other method of attempting to achieve their objectives. They could not very effectively appeal to other states as a whole to support their policies and could only openly appeal or surreptitiously connive at support by left or communist groups in other states. The chief agency of Soviet interventionist policy has in the past been the Communist International which is discussed below. Mention has already been made, however, of some of the other agencies such as the Labor Unions, the Church, the All Slav movement, etc., which can be used to intervene in the internal affairs of other states.



All states endeavor to exercise influence in other states and to that extent they may be said to be intervening in the internal affairs of those states. In the case of democratic countries this is often not a conscious policy of the government but a result of the independent actions of its citizens. For example, large investments in a foreign country, private loans, writings of publicists, etc., result in the acquisition of influence by the state whose citizens engage in these activities. Under the Soviet system as presently constituted almost all such activities must be regarded as being directly controlled by the Soviet Government and therefore more objectionable to the state subject to them.

The Soviet Union is one of the few great powers in the world and no one can dispute its right to exercise in other countries <sup>the influence</sup> which belong to it by right of its importance and prestige. The danger in the case of the Soviet Union, however, is that in the past it has seldom shown any restraint in the exercise of that influence and the Soviet system is such that it is very difficult for it to do so. In the few cases where Soviet influence has for a time been predominant, Hungary under Béla Kuhn, the Baltic States in 1939, and Spain early in the Spanish Civil War, the Soviet Union has shown a tendency to stop short of nothing less than complete Soviet domination. The reasons for this will be touched upon in the sections of this report that follow.

#### The Communist International

At one stage in Soviet history the most important agency in the conduct of Soviet foreign relations was the Comintern. A more or less orthodox foreign policy was conducted through the People's Commissariat for Foreign

Affairs while the real objectives of Soviet policy were sought through direct action on the part of the Communist Party organizations in foreign countries. These parties were organized on the same basis as the Party in the Soviet Union, that is on unquestioning loyalty and strict discipline. The result was that the membership of these parties was small, but they were completely under the control of Moscow and were ready at a moment's notice to carry out the latest directive from the Kremlin no matter how unsuited such directive might be from the standpoint of the domestic situation in which the local party had to work. In the more important countries Communist controlled newspapers such as the Daily Worker were used to publicize these policies and in some countries acquired a considerable influence beyond the actual party membership in that country. This system continued to function long after the objective of world revolution ceased to have any practical significance in Soviet plans. Communist parties abroad were, however, useful in implementing purely Russian nationalistic policies.

During this earlier period the operations of the Comintern were mainly negative and destructive in character. They were based upon the premise that all capitalistic governments were enemies of the Soviet Union and that the aims of both international Communism and the Soviet Union would be furthered by fomenting difficulties for those governments thus bringing nearer the day of revolution and weakening enemies of the Soviet Union.

With the advent of Fascism in Italy and more particularly the rise of National Socialism in Germany, the Kremlin recognized that Soviet interests would not be served by weakening countries that might act as a counter balance to the German threat. Consequently the so-called "Popular Front" policy was adopted. Communist  
Parties

Parties abroad being too small and uninfluential to obtain power and themselves carry out a constructive policy on behalf of their own countries and consequently on behalf of the Soviet Union in opposing Germany, they were instructed to cooperate with more moderate left groups in order to obtain power. The Kremlin's long subordination of the interests of foreign Communist parties to those of Moscow, however, had so weakened these organizations that they were for the most part ineffective.

While the abolition of the Comintern in May 1943 made a nice political gesture to Russia's allies, it in fact did little more than register publicly an already existing situation. This does not mean, however, that Moscow's influence over Communist parties abroad has been ended and there has been much recent evidence to the contrary. Present Soviet policy in this respect is not now clear but appears to be developing somewhat along the following lines. Control by Moscow over the individual members of foreign Communist parties has been relaxed but the leaders appear to be as much under the control of Moscow as they ever were and there is a striking similarity in the policies they have adopted. The greater autonomy accorded them will in many cases no doubt enable the party to become stronger. There is also evident a willingness on the part of Moscow to adapt its technique to fit local situations. In general, it would appear that the leaders of these foreign Communist parties have been directed to go as far to the right in forming combinations with other parties as may be necessary to obtain power or at least to ensure a position of influence to the Communists.

It is the fact that almost all Communist parties outside the Soviet Union have been under the direct and  
complete

complete control of Moscow that has made the exercise of Soviet influence to bring these parties to power so threatening to other states. Unless and until the Soviet Union will allow these parties to become really independent, Soviet efforts in their behalf can only be regarded as an attempt to gain control of the Governments of the countries concerned. There is some evidence that this has been recognized by the Kremlin but the real test of Soviet policy in this respect can only come when a Communist Party abroad actually obtains power.

#### Soviet Propaganda

In addition to the direct intervention in the internal affairs of foreign states, the Soviet Government has made extensive use of propaganda. The art of propaganda has been developed to a high degree in the conduct of the internal affairs of the Soviet Union. In addition to the usual media of the press, radio, books, magazines, and motion pictures, extensive use is made of what is called "agitation". Highly trained specialists are constantly at work drilling into the people the line set forth by the Kremlin. The Political Administration of the Armed Forces, Communist Party groups, Komsomols, Trade Union organizations, etc., are used for this purpose and care is taken that every member of the community is reached. The members of these organizations are themselves the subject of constant agitation both for their own enlightenment and in order that their own propaganda work will be more effective.

Soviet internal propaganda is generally fairly simple and based chiefly upon repetition and the fact that it has no outside competition. The attempt to extend this technique to propaganda abroad is generally speaking unsuccessful although its failure is not always apparent

because



because many of its deficiencies are overcome by foreign groups abroad sympathetic to the Soviet Union, ~~who offset many of its deficiencies.~~

This can perhaps best be made clear by an example. In its propaganda concerning its claim to the Baltic States and to Eastern Poland, the Soviets have placed great emphasis upon the fact that a plebiscite had been held in those areas which had expressed a desire to become part of the Soviet Union. Such an argument of course had little effectiveness abroad where it was exposed to destructive criticism and its use probably injured the Soviet case generally for it tended to lead to the reasoning that if this argument was false, perhaps the other Soviet arguments were equally false. Such an argument might <sup>however</sup> be effective in the Soviet Union where the other side of the case does not get a hearing.

It frequently happens that a propaganda line is put out for internal consumption even though the line taken may have an effect abroad not desired by the Soviet Government. Sometimes this is avoided by giving directives to the party agitators and propagandists to explain the matter at closed meetings of factory workers, party groups, etc., with no reference to it in the press. The carrying out of such directives is highly organized and foreign observers have little access to information concerning these activities. If, however, it is important that the issue be made clear to all elements of the population it is usually dealt with both by the press and by the party propaganda apparatus. In cases where there is a conflict between the requirements of internal propaganda and those of foreign relations, it is frequently the former that determine the line taken, for in the Soviet Union as in the

United States, foreign affairs normally occupy a less important place relative to internal questions than is the case in European countries.

The war greatly increased the already existing trend of Soviet internal propaganda away from the old limited slogans of Marxism and a wide field was opened to Soviet propagandists permitting them to appeal to and make use of national pride, historic traditions and even religious feeling. On the other hand the old standbys such as the capitalist encirclement and capitalist imperialism had to be played down or abandoned in view of the fact that the Soviet Union found itself in the one situation it had never very seriously envisaged, that is, engaged in a war on the side of Great Britain and the United States. Moreover, criticism of internal developments in the countries fighting against Germany could no longer be conducted as before and reports of strikes, race riots, etc., in the western democracies have received less and less attention in the Soviet press. When, however, developments occur in allied countries that are antagonistic to basic Soviet policies, the Soviet propaganda machine easily reverts to its sledge hammer methods.

#### Special Treatment

A technique that is peculiarly Soviet is that of giving special treatment to persons who it is believed may be of particular use to the Soviet Union. It is of course in line with eastern psychology and tradition that a distinguished visitor be given "the works" so far as entertainment is concerned, but the treatment accorded what Ambassador Harriman has aptly called the "Vodka visitors" to the Soviet Union goes beyond this. The movement of all foreigners in the Soviet Union including diplomatic and

press

press representatives is closely restricted and they are virtually isolated from contact with all but a few Soviet officials and citizens. Although permission to visit the Soviet Union is difficult to obtain, once granted the foreigner concerned, if he has any importance to the Soviet Union, is made to feel that his every desire will be accorded and he will in fact be given privileges rarely extended to a resident foreign representative. Even though this is well known, the visitor in spite of himself is usually "sold" and goes away convinced that other people do not understand how to deal with the Russians.

In a somewhat similar category is the treatment given those visitors or resident diplomats who are fortunate enough to be received by Stalin. Stalin's friendly and cooperative attitude may be, and probably is, sincere. Problems taken up with him can be settled on the spot and he has tremendous personal charm and understanding. It is a far cry from this, however, to the day to day conduct of affairs, and the rigidity and cumbersomeness of the Soviet bureaucracy on the lower levels has to be experienced to be appreciated.

#### The Party Mentality.

All of the important Soviet leaders and most Soviet diplomats have had long years of training in the Communist Party. What may be called the "party mentality" is to a considerable extent carried over into the conduct of Soviet diplomacy. One of the fundamental principles of the party is that once a party policy is decided upon and announced, all members of the party are obliged not only to accept it in its entirety but actively to endeavor to carry it out. Any deviation from the party line brings  
rapid



rapid and severe retribution. There is a consequent tendency to consider any individual, even though he be a foreigner, who opposes any part of Soviet policy as an enemy of the Soviet Union. To some extent this also applies to foreign governments, particularly those of small countries.

A corollary of this is that the Soviet regime is extremely sensitive to criticism. In internal affairs Soviet leaders are accustomed to treating other than approved "self criticism" as counter-revolutionary and they cannot easily pass over foreign "cracks" at this or that action or decision of the highest Soviet authority. What to us may be an objective discussion of a given Soviet policy is to them an attack upon the regime because the regime is never wrong. Internal "wreckers" or traitors may cause a given policy to fail, or a modification may be made in the policy to meet the machinations of foreign capitalist enemies, but errors in judgment simply do not occur in the high circles of the Soviet system.

A similar aspect of this tendency to apply to foreign relations, the techniques developed for internal purposes appears in Soviet propaganda.

The labels of "fascist" or "reactionary" are slapped on anyone, even those who are sincerely friendly to the Soviet Union, if they seriously oppose any essential part of the Soviet program. The attack on Mr. Willkie was in accordance with the best Soviet tradition. This attitude or habit of thinking is likely to make difficult Soviet relations with neighboring states. If a neighbor of the Soviet Union is to possess real independence it is bound at some stage to oppose this or that Soviet policy and is likely accordingly to find itself in a very difficult situation with respect to its powerful neighbor.

### The Elimination of Opposition

The Soviet method of dealing with opposition within the country is to eliminate it. If the opposition is merely dissatisfaction with a Soviet policy the matter may be dealt with as Mr. Vyshinski pointed out by a combination of persuasion and force. If, however, opposition to the Bolshevik regime is involved, the method used is always force. This generally takes the form of forced labor or liquidation depending upon the seriousness of the offense.

When the Soviet Union took over the Baltic States this method was applied and large numbers were sent to Siberia. The population of that part of Poland occupied by the Soviet Union under the 1939 agreement with Germany suffered similar treatment.

If the Soviet Union is to live up to its declarations such as those of the Moscow conference and Mr. Molotov's declaration respecting Rumania, it will have to learn to exercise restraint and to suffer an opposition even in areas where it exercises the predominant influence.

### The Alternative Policy

Apart from the question of a declared and an actual policy, the Soviet Union has in the past frequently developed simultaneously two alternative policies. There are various ways in which this is carried out. One is by a press campaign that is at variance with the policy being followed by the foreign office. The Comintern was also useful in this respect. The existence of this alternative policy often exerts pressure on other states in the accomplishment of the policy currently being followed by the foreign office. A recent example was the development of the Free Germany Committee, Stalin's references to the distinction between the Nazis and the German people and other



moves which built up the possibility of a rapprochement with Germany after the war or even a separate peace. Soviet officials stated that all this was purely a move in psychological warfare and the Embassy so interpreted it, nevertheless, it did also serve as a threat to the Allies not to let Russia down, whether or not it was so intended. Relations with the Soviet Union can reach a solid basis only when the Soviet Government has sufficient confidence in our good intentions to commit itself without reservation and lose its fear of climbing out on a limb, by whole-hearted collaboration with other states.

#### The Most-Favored-Nation Technique and Reciprocity

The Soviet Government adapts its policy to suit circumstances using either the principle of reciprocity or that of most-favored-nation treatment as the basis for its actions. *diplomatic relations* In its effort to isolate the Soviet people from foreign contacts, and because of its attitude that capitalist governments are enemies and their representatives therefore enemy agents, the Soviet Government has placed restrictions upon foreign diplomatic representatives that exist in no other capital. Also with respect to many specific questions such as the protection of patents and copyrights, the Soviet Union has maintained practices that are applied nowhere else in the world. It endeavors nevertheless to obtain for itself the advantages of the more liberal attitude of other countries by insisting upon most favored nation treatment. It maintains, for example, that the restrictions that it places on the movements of foreign diplomats are applied to all and that no country can place similar restrictions upon Soviet diplomats because

this

this would involve discrimination. On the other hand the Soviet Government is equally quick to demand reciprocity whenever the application of this principle is in the Soviet interest.

Immediate Self-Interest

Considering capitalist states as enemies the Soviet Government has not always considered that the best transaction was one which benefited both parties and all too often has endeavored to get the best of the bargain. As a corollary of this it has tended to judge each problem in the light of the immediate self-interest of the Soviet Union and has taken longer range considerations into account only when obliged to do so. It has regarded concessions made to it by other governments with suspicion and has not considered general good-will as having any real value in international relationships. It has, accordingly, been impossible to "bank" good-will with the Soviet Union for future withdrawals and other governments having made a concession or gesture to the Soviet Government in the interests of friendly relations have had a rude shock when they found the Soviet Government dealing with the next issue that came up on a "hard boiled" basis of advantage or disadvantage to the Soviet Union. If a concession on the part of the Soviet Union were involved, it had to be offset by a new equivalent concession on the part of the other state. The Soviet Government considered that the other state must have already received some advantage from the previous concession or it would never have been made.

This does not mean that good-will plays no role in Soviet relations for, like any other state, it can judge the future only by the past and friendly actions on the part of  
the

the United States and Great Britain have, it is to be hoped, done much to convince the Soviet leaders that friendly relations with us are possible.

Soviet Methods of Conducting Economic Relations

Soviet conduct of economic relations does not differ greatly from their conduct of political affairs. Secrecy, suspicion, and a bargaining mentality are ~~different~~ <sup>evident</sup>. While, as pointed out above, the Soviet Union has not heretofore attempted to penetrate or intervene in the capitalistic aspect of the internal economic affairs of foreign states, as it has in their political affairs, its interest in foreign labor movements has often had important economic effects. Here again the Soviet Government has shown little real interest in the general principles involved in labor movements and has preferred to work specific objectives - generally political - to any general effort to improve labor standards. It has never, therefore, shown any real interest in the International Labor Organization and it seems probable that the Soviet leaders have considered that the more capitalist states were able to improve labor conditions, the weaker would be the case for the Soviet system. The chief theoretical argument used in capitalist states for international collaboration to improve labor conditions has been that one state could not improve its standards without incurring a competitive disadvantage in respect of other states serving the same market which did not take similar measures. Such argument has no force in the Soviet Union where cost of production has little relation to export price policies.



## CONCLUSION

The foregoing account naturally presents a one-sided picture for it has dealt with only the Soviet obstacles to collaboration. It has not been possible in this report to deal with those that arise on the side of the democracies although in Soviet eyes these are many. Just as democratic Governments have in the past considered Communist agitation as a direct threat to their existence so the Soviet regime has considered our advocacy of democratic principles as a threat to them. Good relations will not be furthered by ignoring ~~xxxx~~ the differences between us ~~am~~ the obstacles that lie in the way of cooperation. During the next few years when the Soviet Union will need our help we will have to patiently endeavor to disabuse them of their suspicions and ~~at~~ the same time resolutely oppose them when they step over the bounds of sound and decent relations between ~~sixxxx~~ sovereign and independent states. Weakness in such cases will only ~~mis~~lead them and make the eventual solution of these problems infinitely more difficult. If they clearly understand what concessions we are prepared to make to them and which principles we ~~will~~ are determined to uphold regardless of the result they will respect us for defending them. If these are not clearly defined and understood there is danger that our opposition to any given Soviet action will simply be interpreted as unfriendly and this will strengthen the hands of those persons within the Soviet Union who are opposed to collaboration with us.



## INTRODUCTION

The situation in which the Soviet Union will find itself at the end of the war gives reason to hope that the Soviet Union will, at least for a few years, take its place in the family of nations and cooperate with other states upon a more normal basis than has been the case in the past. The changes that have occurred since the outbreak of the war in the factors affecting Soviet foreign policy are well known and have been dramatically reflected in such developments as the Anglo-Soviet alliance and the Moscow and Tehran Conferences. Less generally appreciated, however, are the factors affecting Soviet policy that have changed but little, if at all. It is believed that if our collaboration with the Soviet Union is to be successful, account must be taken of certain of the peculiarities <sup>which have</sup> pertained to Soviet foreign relations in the past. The following is not intended to constitute a complete or balanced discussion of Soviet foreign policy, but rather an attempt to single out some of these aspects of the Soviet conduct of foreign relations which are most apt to be overlooked or misunderstood. These fall into three categories, namely, (1) the effect upon Soviet foreign policy of the organic structure of the Soviet system, (2) certain characteristics of the past Soviet concept of foreign policy, and finally (3) the Soviet method or technique of conducting foreign affairs which has been specially developed to carry out this concept of policy within the limitation imposed by the organic structure of the Soviet system. The field covered is so wide that the factors discussed can be dealt with only in the most simple terms.



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