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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: September 14, 1954

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SUBJECT: Exchange of Views on European Situation.

PARTICIPANTS: The Secretary
Mr. Herbert Hoover, Jr., Under-Secretary Designate

Ambassador Bonnet, French Embassy

Mr. John Wesley Jones, WE

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The French Ambassador called this morning at his request to report that he has been recalled to Paris for consultation by the French Premier and Foreign Minister, M. Mendes-France. The Ambassador said that he wished to carry back with him the latest U.S. views on the European situation.

The Secretary replied that he had been out of touch with European affairs for the last two weeks but that he had two basic thoughts on the problem of Western Europe: (1) that Germany should be granted full sovereignty without any discriminatory limitations; and (2) that some organic link, political, military or economic, between France and Germany must be developed, although it need not be limited to those two countries. The Secretary elaborated the first consideration by referring to his position in the drafting of the Japanese Peace Treaty which firmly opposed any limitations on Japanese rearmament or other aspects of Japanese sovereignty. With respect to the second consideration the Secretary explained that he felt that a mere treaty relationship between France and Germany was not a sufficiently sound basis on which to build a healthy Europe. He deplored the rejection of the EDC Treaty by the French Parliament; all other solutions to the Franco-German problem were imperfect by comparison. He said that with the failure of EDC in France the West would have to do the best it could with some other vehicle but that it would be a makeshift at best and that it would not be caught up and supported with the same enthusiasm by our Western Allies or by the American people, particularly the U.S. Congress.

The conversation turned to the British Foreign Secretary's current European tour. Mr. Dulles said that he had just received a message from Mr. Eden suggesting a meeting in London of the Nine Powers on September 22. He found the Eden message among the papers on his desk and read to the Ambassador certain passages from it,

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among them that Mr. Eden had found wholehearted support among the Benelux Ministers for a policy of integrating Germany into the West and of obtaining a German contribution to its defense; that the German Chancellor attached importance to some kind of German political integration into Europe; that Eden hoped by modification and expansion of the Brussels Pact, to include Germany and Italy, to achieve such an integration wherein the U.K. would participate equally with France and Germany; that there be a Nine-Power Conference on September 22 in London to precede the NATO Ministerial meeting.

The Ambassador asked whether, putting aside Congressional disapproval of anything less than EDC to achieve German integration into the defense of Western Europe, the Secretary's views were that something along the lines of the Eden proposals, that is, German entry into NATO with commitments under the Brussels Pact, would be desirable in the circumstances. The Secretary immediately interposed that he did not wish to give the Ambassador the impression that it was only the Congress which had grave misgivings about any European solution other than EDC; that he, himself, shared these views. The Secretary continued that we had given specific assurances to the EDC countries last spring regarding U.S. support in Europe when EDC became a reality. He added that the French Government should not expect that these assurances would be given in other circumstances. The Secretary said that we had very little information about the Eden proposals other than the message from which he had just read. We would not, of course, do anything to hinder the European nations from arriving at the best solution possible in the light of the French rejection of EDC, which was to have formed the political basis for an effective NATO military defense, but that Europe could not expect the same support from the U.S. that it had been prepared to give to a true European community.

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The Ambassador said that if there was any ~~doubt~~ of withdrawal of U.S. troops or withdrawal of support for the Western European defense efforts this would, of course, have a very adverse affect upon the possibilities of German entry into NATO. He added that the French Premier would have a sufficiently difficult time getting the French Assembly to agree to German entry into NATO under present circumstances and that without assurances of continuing American presence and support in Europe his task would be next to impossible. The Ambassador in assuming that the Bonn Conventions were no longer applicable asked whether, in the Secretary's view, the British still expected to hold reserve powers when Germany was granted her sovereignty. Mr. Dulles replied that while he did not know the British position, we did not feel that the Germans should be asked to leave reserve powers to the present occupying states and that we favored unconditional sovereignty for the Federal Republic, *subject to treaty arrangements fully accepted by Germany.*

The Ambassador then turned to Far Eastern questions and asked if the Secretary had been pleased with the French position at the Manila Conference. The Secretary referred to his efforts on behalf of the French Delegate to have a French text of the Manila Pact considered authentic along with the English one. The Ambassador said that there were many questions, particularly of a financial nature, which France and the U.S. must discuss with respect to Indochina and said that the visit of the French Finance Minister, Edgar Faure, to Washington next week would provide an opportunity. He explained that there was first the question of U.S. assistance to the Associated States which was, of course, our business but which we would wish to discuss, no doubt, with the French. Also there was the question of the support of the French Expeditionary Corps for which his Government would undoubtedly need continuing help in maintaining in the Far East.

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FOR THE SECRETARY

MENDES-FRANCE GIVES US FOLL SUMMARY OF HIS TALKS WITH EDEN:

GERMAN MEMBERSHIP IN NATO HAD ALWAYS BEEN UNPOPULAR IN FRANCE AND HAD COME TO BE REGARDED AS THAT EVIL WHICH EDC WAS DESIGNED TO AVOID. ACCORDINGLY HE HAD HOPED GERMAN MEMBERSHIP IN BRUSSELS TREATY MIGHT PROVIDE SATIS ALTERNATIVE. HOWEVER, OTHER PARTIES TO BRUSSELS TREATY, U.S., CANADA AND APPARENTLY ALL OTHER NATO COUNTRIES DISAGREED AND FELT GERMAN MEMBERSHIP IN NATO ESSENTIAL. HE HAD ACCORDINGLY SOUGHT WITH EDEN WAYS AND MEANS OF MAKING THIS PALATABLE TO FRENCH OPINION AND THEY HAD AGREED IT CLD BEST BE DONE THRU DEVELOPING BRUSSELS TREATY.

BRUSSELS TREATY WLD BE UTILIZED PRIMARILY AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR EDC; IT WLD HAVE TWO GREAT ADVANTAGES OF BRIT MEMBERSHIP AND THAT IT WAS NOT RPT NOT SUPRANATIONAL. SOME NON-DISCRIMINATORY CONTROLS OVER ARMAMENT WERE ESSENTIAL, VOLUNTARY RENUNCIATION BY ADENAUER WLD CARRY LITTLE WEIGHT IN FRANCE AND NATO WAS NOT RPT NOT STRUCTURALLY DESIGNED FOR CONTROL. THEREFORE BRUSSELS TREATY SHLD BE USED. IT MUST NOT RPT NOT BE MERELY PAPER CONTROL OR WINDOW DRESSING BUT MUST HAVE REAL SUBSTANCE. IT MUST ALSO OFFER HOPE FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF POLITICAL INTEGRATION IN EUROPE AND PERHAPS THE DEVELOPMENT OF SUPRANATIONAL FEATURES IN TIME. THERE WLD BE NO RPT NO QUESTION OF SETTING UP NEW ADMINISTRATIVE MACHINERY UNDER THE BRUSSELS TREATY; THERE WLD BE POLITICAL DISCUSSION AND DECISIONS BY BRUSSELS TREATY COUNCIL BUT NATO MACHINERY WLD BE UTILIZED TO ADMINISTER CONTROLS. BRUSSELS TREATY MUST BE PRESENTED TO ASSEMBLY AS SUBSTITUTE FOR EDC AND AS AN ASSURANCE THERE WLD BE NO RPT NO INDEPENDENT WEHRMACHT.

THIS SOLUTION WLD ENTAIL NO RPT NO DELAY. GERMAN MEMBERSHIP IN NATO WLD OF COURSE REQUIRE APPROVAL OF FRENCH ASSEMBLY AND BRUSSELS TREATY MODIFICATIONS WLD TAKE NO RPT NO LONGER. HE AND EDEN HAD AGREED THAT EXPERTS SHLD BE GIVEN ONE MONTH TO PRODUCE SPECIFIC DOCUMENT WHICH SHLD BE CLEAR, SIMPLE AND

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NOT RPT NOT COMPRISE MORE THAN TWENTY ARTICLES.

IN RESPONSE TO QUESTION AS TO HOW TIGHTLY REVISED BRUSSELS TREATY AND GERMAN MEMBERSHIP IN NATO WERE TO BE LINKED TO AVOID DANGER OF ASSEMBLY ACCEPTING ONE AND REJECTING OTHER, HE REPLIED THEY WLD BE PRESENTED TO ASSEMBLY IN SINGLE DOCUMENT AND TWO WLD TAKE EFFECT SIMULTANEOUSLY.

IT HAD BEEN AGREED THAT EDEN WLD CONVOKE NINE-POWER MTG IN LONDON SEPT 27 OR 28 AND THAT NAC MINISTERIAL MTG SHLD BE HELD IN LATE OCT OR PERHAPS BEGINNING NOVEMBER AND THAT EVERY EFFORT WLD BE MADE TO COMPLETE PARLIAMENTARY ACTION BY ALL PARLIAMENTS CONCERNED BEFORE END OF YEAR. MENDES EXPRESSED HOPE THIS WLD BE SATISFACTORY TO US SINCE ACTION SHLD HAVE BEEN TAKE BY TIME CONGRESS RECONVENES.

IN RESPONSE TO QUESTION WHETHER HE CONSIDERED THIS SOLUTION ONE FOR WHICH HE CLD WHOLEHEARTEDLY SEEK ASSEMBLY APPROVAL, HE SAID IT DEFINITELY WAS SUCH A SOLUTION AND THAT WHILE DETAILS MUST STILL BE WORKED OUT, POLITICAL PROBLEMS WLD BE DIFFICULT AND HE DID NOT RPT NOT WISH TO APPEAR TOO OPTIMISTIC, HE THOUGHT THERE WAS REASONABLE CHANCE OF SUCCESS. HE DID NOT RPT NOT WISH APPEAR EGOTISTIC BUT FELT HE HAD BETTER CHANCE OF GETTING IT THROUGH THAN WLD SOMEONE ELSE. HE SAID HE WLD NEED HELP FROM ALL CONCERNED INCLUDING U.S. HE INQUIRED WHETHER THERE WAS ANY CHANGE IN YOUR PLANS AND WAS ADVISED THAT THERE HAD NOT RPT NOT BEEN BUT THAT THIS INFORMATION WLD BE COMMUNICATED TO YOU IMMED.

BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE FOR AIRPORT, EDEN HAD TIME MERELY TO TELL US THAT HE CONSIDERED OUTCOME AS BEING AS GOOD AS CLD BE EXPECTED AND CONSIDERABLY BETTER THAN HE HAD ANTICIPATED YESTERDAY.

ON RETURNING FROM AIRPORT JEBB GAVE US MORE DETAILED ACCOUNT WHICH CONFIRMS THAT GIVEN US BY MENDES. ADDITL POINTS WERE THAT EDEN HAD EMPHASIZED GRUENTHER'S OPINION THAT NATO MACHINERY CLD BE EFFECTIVELY UTILIZED FOR OPERATIONAL AND LOGISTICAL CONTROL. (GRUENTHER GABLING FULL ACCOUNT). MENDES HAD REPEATEDLY INDICATED SENSITIVITY TO BEING ISOLATED AND ALONE AND IT WAS ONLY LATE THIS AFTERNOON THAT HIS APPREHENSION AS TO AGAIN BEING ALONE AT NINE-POWER MTG IN LONDON HAD BEEN ASSUAGED. EDEN HAD AGREED TO USE HIS INFLUENCE WITH OTHER BRUSSELS TREATY AND NATO MEMBERS TO BRING ABOUT SOLUTION ALONG ABOVE LINES. EDEN WISHES TO DISCUSS THIS PERSONALLY WITH YOU.

YOUR ANNOUNCED DECISION TO OMIT PARIS HAD HAD VERY SATISFACTORY EFFECT BUT THIS UNEXPECTED SATISFACTORY OUTCOME OF EDEN-MENDES TALKS DOES, WE BELIEVE, CHANGE SITUATION. IN CIRCUMSTANCES, WE RECOMMEND THAT IF POSSIBLE YOU PLAN TO COME HERE TOMORROW EVENING, EVEN IF YOU CLD ONLY SPEND AN HOUR OR TWO. EDEN AND JEBB, WHILE RELUCTANT TO OFFER SUGGESTIONS, BELIEVE IT WLD BE USEFUL IF YOU CLD STOP HERE.

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