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SUBJECT: MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER GANDHI, JUNE 3

DOWNGRADED TO
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file

1. S - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. ON JUNE 3 I MET WITH PRIME MINISTER RAJIV GANDHI AT HIS RESIDENCE. HE WAS SCHEDULED TO LEAVE THAT SAME EVENING, JUNE 3, FOR A VISIT TO SYRIA, WEST GERMANY, THE UNITED NATIONS IN NEW YORK AND ON HIS WAY BACK, HUNGARY. HE IS SCHEDULED TO RETURN TO DELHI ON JUNE 12. THE MEETING LASTED 50 MINUTES AND WAS ATTENDED BY RONEN SFN.

3. THE PRIME MINISTER DID NEARLY ALL THE TALKING. HE STARTED BY SAYING THAT THIS WAS THE FIRST MEETING WITH ME SINCE THE DISMISSAL OF JUNEJO BY ZIA AT THE END OF MAY. HE SAID THAT INDIA WAS CONCERNED ABOUT THIS RECENT DEVELOPMENT. WHILE WE (INDIANS) HAD A NUMBER OF DIFFERENCES WITH JUNEJO, HE NEVERTHELESS HEADED AN ELECTED GOVERNMENT AND IT WAS THE BEGINNING OF A DEMOCRATIC PROCESS IN PAKISTAN. WHILE JUNEJO AND HIS GROUP SHARED MANY OF THE VIEWS OF ZIA INSOFAR AS INDIA WAS CONCERNED, NONETHELESS IN THE LONG RUN IT WOULD BE EASIER FOR TWO DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENTS TO SETTLE THEIR DIFFERENCES THAN BY PAKISTAN REVERTING TO ARMY RULE. THE PAKISTAN ARMY MAINTAINS A GRUDGE AGAINST INDIA FOR THE 1971 DEFEAT AND THIS GUIDES ZIA IN HIS POLICIES. AFTER ALL, THE JUNEJO DISMISSAL COULD NOT HAVE HAPPENED IF ZIA DID NOT ENJOY THE FULL SUPPORT OF THE ARMY. JUNEJO'S CRITICISM OF SOME OF THE PAK ARMY FAILURES WAS A LITTLE TOO MUCH FOR ZIA TO TAKE.

4. GANDHI NOTED THAT THE DECLINE IN THE POLITICAL AND SECURITY CONDITIONS HAD BEEN CITED AS REASONS BY ZIA FOR DISMISSING THE GOVERNMENT. IN SHORT, ZIA FELT THAT THE DOMESTIC SITUATION SHOWED GREATER INSTABILITY. PRIME MINISTER GANDHI HOPED WE WOULD KEEP THIS IN MIND WHEN IT CAME TO OUR OWN AID PROGRAM TO PAKISTAN AND THE KIND OF WFAPONRY WE MAKE AVAILABLE.

5. THE PRIME MINISTER SAID THE JUNEJO DISMISSAL IS CERTAINLY A SETBACK IN PAKISTAN'S ROAD TOWARDS DEMOCRACY.

HE WONDERED WHETHER ELECTIONS WOULD BE HELD IN PAKISTAN WITHIN THE 90 DAYS PROMISED BY ZIA. BUT EVEN IF ELECTIONS WERE HELD, WOULDN'T THEY BE HELD UNDER THE CONTROL OF THE ARMED FORCES? HOW SECURE WOULD ANY NEW PAKISTANI PRIME MINISTER FEEL AFTER WHAT HAPPENED TO JUNEJO? WOULDN'T THE NEW PRIME MINISTER FEEL THAT IF HE GETS TOO FAR OUT OF LINE THE SAME FATE AWAITS HIM THAT JUNEJO MET ON MAY 28? INDIA, AS ALL COUNTRIES, WILL BE WATCHING WHAT HAPPENS NEXT IN ISLAMABAD AND WHETHER THE ELECTION PROMISE WILL ACTUALLY BE FULFILLED.

6. THE PRIME MINISTER THEN TURNED TO AFGHANISTAN. HE EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT ALL SOVIET TROOPS WOULD BE WITHDRAWN FROM AFGHANISTAN ALONG THE LINES GORBACHEV HAD ANNOUNCED PUBLICLY ON FEBRUARY 8. THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE SOVIET TROOPS WAS AFTER ALL THE GOAL OF THE AFGHAN AGREEMENTS AND THIS WAS AS MUCH IN THE INTEREST OF PAKISTAN AS IT WAS IN THE INTEREST OF INDIA. THE AMERICAN AID PROGRAM TO PAKISTAN, AND PARTICULARLY CERTAIN KINDS OF WEAPONRY, MADE SENSE AS LONG AS THE SOVIETS WERE IN AFGHANISTAN. BUT ONCE THE SOVIETS ARE NO LONGER THERE, THE JUSTIFICATION FOR CERTAIN KINDS OF WEAPONRY NO LONGER HAS THE SAME BASIS. GANDHI SAID THAT BOTH THE UNITED STATES AND INDIA SHARED A COMMON GOAL OF SOVIET WITHDRAWAL FROM AFGHANISTAN; WHAT FOLLOWS IN AFGHANISTAN SHOULD BE LEFT TO THE AFGHANS TO SORT OUT FOR THEMSELVES.

7. RAJIV SAID HE HAD MET WITH NAJIBULLAH BECAUSE NAJIB IS COMMITTED TO KEEPING THE FUNDAMENTALISTS LIKE HEKMATYAR FROM TAKING CONTROL OF THE GOVERNMENT IN KABUL. THE INDIANS SHARE THIS OBJECTIVE. THEY DO NOT SUPPORT NAJIBULLAH AS A LEADER BUT MORE FOR TRYING TO KEEP THE EXTREME FUNDAMENTALISTS AS HEKMATYAR FROM GAINING CONTROL OF KABUL. INDIA CAN LIVE WITH ANY KIND OF A GOVERNMENT IN KABUL WHICH IS NOT RUN BY THE EXTREME ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISTS. HE WONDERED WHETHER THE AMERICAN POSITION WASN'T QUITE SIMILAR. THE PRIME MINISTER WONDERED TO WHAT EXTENT ISLAMIZATION WITHIN PAKISTAN AND SUPPORT FOR THE EXTREME AFGHAN FUNDAMENTALISTS WAS NOT ONE CONSIDERATION IN ZIA'S DECISION TO DISMISS THE DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT IN ISLAMABAD.

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8. THE PRIME MINISTER THEN TURNED TO U.S.-INDIAN RELATIONS. HE OPINED THAT INDO-U.S. RELATIONS HAD MADE GREAT PROGRESS OVER THE LAST THREE YEARS, EVER SINCE HE VISITED WASHINGTON IN JUNE OF 1985. HE SAID, "WE HAVE COME A VERY LONG WAY IN A SHORT PERIOD OF TIME." WE ARE NOT ONLY ABLE TO WORK MORE TOGETHER ON HIGH TECHNOLOGY BUT WE CAN TALK TO EACH OTHER IN ALL AREAS. WE CAN AGREE AND DISAGREE BUT WE TAKE EACH OTHER'S VIEWS INTO ACCOUNT. "THERE IS NO MORE SCHISM BETWEEN US. WE ARE ABLE TO COMMUNICATE WITH EACH OTHER AND WE HAVE LAID THE GROUNDWORK FOR A GROWING RELATIONSHIP. WE HAVE WORKED TOGETHER ON ANTI-DRUG TRAFFICKING; WE HAVE WORKED TOGETHER ON AFGHANISTAN; WE HAVE WORKED TOGETHER ON DEFENSE PRODUCTION; WE HAVE WORKED TOGETHER ON TRADE; AND INDIA IS BECOMING AN INCREASINGLY MORE IMPORTANT CUSTOMER OF AMERICAN AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES. WE HAVE LEARNED TO AVOID CONFRONTATION AND WE CAN CERTAINLY CONTINUE TO MAKE A LOT MORE PROGRESS."

9. THE PRIME MINISTER INDICATED THAT THE INCREASING EMPHASIS BY ZIA OF ISLAMIZATION IN PAKISTAN AND PERHAPS IN AFGHANISTAN SHOULD MAKE US THINK ABOUT THE POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES OF THE RISE OF ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM. WAS THE CHINESE DECISION TO PROVIDE SILKWORM TO IRAN REALLY IN WESTERN INTEREST OR FOR THAT MATTER THE DECISION BY THE SAUDIS TO PROCURE THE CSS-2 MISSILE FROM CHINA A MOVE TOWARDS STABILITY FOR THAT PART OF THE WORLD? AND NOW WHAT WOULD BE OUR REACTION IF PAKISTAN JOINED THIS GROUP OF ISLAMIC NATIONS IN PROCURING SUCH MISSILES? FINALLY, ISN'T THE PROGRESS MADE BY PAKISTAN IN THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM AN ACHIEVEMENT TOWARDS AN ISLAMIC NUCLEAR FORCE? THESE FACTORS WILL ENTER INTO INDIA'S THINKING IN MAKING POLICY DECISIONS IN THE MONTHS TO COME.

10. THE PRIME MINISTER NEXT DISCUSSED THE MOOD IN INDIA TOWARDS THE UNITED STATES. HE POINTED OUT THAT MAJOR PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE OVER THE LAST THREE YEARS. THE UNITED STATES IS ACCEPTED TODAY AS A LEADING TRADING PARTNER, A LEADING PARTNER IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, THE MAJOR INVESTOR IN INDIA AND GENERALLY SPEAKING THE ATMOSPHERE HAS IMPROVED TO THE POINT WHERE THE U.S. IS NO LONGER SEEN AS A THREAT BUT RATHER ONE OF THE LEADING FORCES WITH WHICH INDIA WORKS IN NEARLY ALL FIELDS. IT IS A GREAT CHANGE FROM THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE 1970S.

11. GANDHI SAID THAT WHEN HE CAME TO POWER BECAUSE OF THE ASSASSINATION OF HIS MOTHER, THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA DECIDED ON TWO COURSES: NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES AND ALSO INCREASING THE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SOVIET UNION. THERE WAS A CERTAIN "BALANCE" OR "SYMMETRY" IN INDIA'S RELATIONSHIP WITH THESE TWO SUPERPOWERS. GANDHI FEELS THAT SO FAR THESE TWO OBJECTIVES HAVE BEEN ACHIEVED AND HE HOPES THAT THIS TREND WILL CONTINUE IN THE MONTHS AND YEARS AHEAD. IF ONE OF THE TWO SUPERPOWERS REDUCES ITS COOPERATION

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WITH INDIA, THE OTHER SIDE WILL UNDOUBTEDLY BENEFIT. THIS IS CERTAINLY NOT IN INDIA'S INTEREST, WHICH WISHES TO MAINTAIN "BALANCE" WITH THE SUPERPOWERS.

12. THE PRIME MINISTER TOOK NOTE OF THE U.S.-SOVIET SUMMIT MEETING AND ITS IMPACT ON THE WORLD SCENE. IF THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION CAN FIND WAYS OF REDUCING DIFFERENCES, SURELY OTHER COUNTRIES SHOULD BE ABLE TO DO THE SAME IN THEIR QUARRELS. HE ALSO NOTED THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAD MADE AN EFFORT TO REDUCE DIFFERENCES WITH CHINA AND THAT THIS RELATIONSHIP WAS ALSO CHANGING. HE INDICATED THAT HE WAS GIVING SERIOUS THOUGHT TO VISITING CHINA IN THE AUTUMN IN AN EFFORT TO EXPLORE WAYS OF REDUCING INDO-CHINESE TENSIONS. HE ASKED ME TO HOLD THIS INFORMATION VERY CLOSELY. INDIA WOULD ALSO TRY TO FIND WAYS OF AVOIDING A DETERIORATION OF THE RELATIONSHIP WITH PAKISTAN BUT THE VISIT OF PAKISTAN FOREIGN SECRETARY SATTAR HAD NOT LED TO ANY BREAKTHROUGH. INDIA REMAINS DEEPLY CONCERNED ABOUT PAKISTAN'S INABILITY TO STOP AIDING TERRORISTS IN THE PUNJAB.

13. THE CONVERSATION THEN TURNED TO MORE SPECIFIC ISSUES. I ASKED THE PRIME MINISTER POINT BLANK WHETHER THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA HAD CHANGED ITS POSITION ON THE PROCUREMENT OF A SOVIET MAINSTAY AIRCRAFT. THE PRIME MINISTER SAID THE INDIAN POSITION REMAINS WHAT HE TOLD ME SOME MONTHS AGO.

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I.E., THAT THE PROCUREMENT OF A SOVIET TYPE OF AWACS HAS NOT REPEAT NOT EVEN BEEN DISCUSSED IN THE INDIAN CABINET AND THAT CERTAINLY NO REPEAT NO DECISIONS HAVE BEEN TAKEN. FIRST OF ALL, INDIA IS STRAPPED FINANCIALLY AND WILL ONLY LOOK FOR SUCH HIGH TECHNOLOGY ITEMS IF PAKISTAN PROCURES THE AMERICAN AERIAL EARLY WARNING SYSTEM. BUT AS LONG AS PAKISTAN DOESN'T MAKE A MOVE ON THIS FRONT, INDIA CERTAINLY WILL NOT INITIATE SUCH AN ARMS RACE. IF PAKISTAN PROCURES AN AWACS AT THIS TIME WITH THE SOVIETS WITHDRAWING FROM AFGHANISTAN, THEN INDIA MUST ASSUME THAT AWACS WILL BE PROCURED BY PAKISTAN AGAINST INDIA. OBVIOUSLY INDIA COULD NOT UNDER SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES REMAIN INDIFFERENT.

14. I THEN ASKED THE PRIME MINISTER ABOUT INDIA'S PLANS FOR THE PROCUREMENT OF A TRAINING AIRCRAFT. THE PRIME MINISTER SAID THAT THE INDIAN AIR FORCE IS CONSIDERING A BRITISH AND FRENCH OFFER. BUT INDIA HAS BALANCE OF PAYMENTS PROBLEMS. I ASKED WHETHER INDIA WOULD CONSIDER AN OFFER BY THE UNITED STATES FOR THE MANUFACTURING IN INDIA OF THE F-5 TRAINER. THE TOOLS I HAD BEEN TOLD IN WASHINGTON ARE THE PROPERTY OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT AND WE MIGHT BE WILLING TO MAKE AN OFFER TO THE INDIANS UNDER CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES. THE PRIME MINISTER REPLIED THAT AN AMERICAN OFFER WOULD CERTAINLY BE CONSIDERED ON AN EQUAL FOOTING WITH ANY OTHER OFFER BUT THAT ONE NEW CRITERIA WOULD BE THE IMPACT OF SUCH A PURCHASE ON INDIA'S BALANCE OF PAYMENTS. IF THE FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS ARE INTERESTING, THERE ARE CERTAINLY NO POLITICAL OBSTACLES FOR INDIA TO TURN DOWN A SERIOUS UNITED STATES OFFER.

15. THE LAST COUPLE OF MINUTES WERE DEVOTED TO A DISCUSSION OF THE SUPERCOMPUTER. THE PRIME MINISTER WAS HAPPY TO NOTE THAT THE ARRANGEMENT FOR THE PURCHASE OF THE FIRST SUPERCOMPUTER FROM AMERICA HAD BEEN FINALIZED AND THAT SHIPMENT WAS SCHEDULED TO TAKE PLACE THIS FALL. HE HOPED THAT WE COULD START NEGOTIATIONS WITHOUT DELAY ON A SECOND SUPERCOMPUTER, THIS TIME FOR THE INDIAN INSTITUTE OF SCIENCE IN BANGALORE. AFTER ALL, HE POINTED OUT, IT TOOK MORE THAN A YEAR AND A HALF AFTER THE NEGOTIATION OF THE AGREEMENT TO COMPLETE THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE ACTUAL SALE OF THE COMPUTER. IF WE STARTED NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE COMPUTER NOW, HE REALIZED THE DELIVERY OBVIOUSLY WOULD NOT BE RIGHT AWAY.

16. HE SAID HE LOOKED FORWARD TO SEEING ME AFTER HIS RETURN FROM HIS TRAVELS SOMETIME AFTER JUNE 12. DEAN

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