

~~SECRET~~ ISLAMABAD 010010/01

(2) ACTION: AMB-1 INFO DCM POL

E X D I S

CSCZCNE0508

31-AUG-88

TOR: 05:32

OO RUEHNE

CN: 37557

DE RUEHIL #8370/01 2431219

CHRG: AMB

ZNY SSSSS ZZH

DIST: EXDI

O 301131Z AUG 88

DOS REVIEWED 19-Apr-2007: DECLASSIFIED IN FULL

ADD:

FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE ASHDC IMMEDIATE 7535

INFO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 5083

RUSBKB/AMEMBASSY KABUL 6530

RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 3970

BT

SECRET SECTION 01 OF 04 ISLAMABAD 18370

*file*EXDIS LAUREL; S/S-O FOR EXDIS LAUREL DISTRIBUTION
REQUEST DEPARTMENT ALSO PASS TO CENTCOM FOR GEN. CRIST

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, MASS, PGOV, PK, UR, IN

SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR OAKLEY'S MEETING WITH GENERAL BEG

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: IN HIS AUGUST 29 MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR OAKLEY, GENERAL BEG EMPHASIZED HIS COMMITMENT TO FOLLOWING CONSTITUTIONAL PROCEDURES AND SAID THAT, EVEN IF HE WERE TO CHANGE HIS MIND, THE REST OF THE MILITARY WOULD NOT ALLOW IT. HE SAID THAT PAKISTAN WAS THREATENED BY A "TRIANGULAR CONSPIRACY" (AFGHANISTAN, THE USSR AND INDIA) AIMED AT DESTABILIZING PAKISTAN. A DEFECTOR FROM THE AFGHAN SECRET SERVICE, HE SAID, WOULD SOON CONFIRM THAT THE KHAD WAS BEHIND THE ASSASSINATION OF SHIA TNFJ LEADER ARIF HUSSEIN AL-HUSSAINI. BEG ALSO DISCUSSED A "GRAND DESIGN" FOR A STRATEGIC CONSENSUS INVOLVING IRAN, AFGHANISTAN, TURKEY AND PAKISTAN.

3. AMBASSADOR OAKLEY CONGRATULATED BEG ON THE GOP'S HANDLING OF THE CURRENT POLITICAL SITUATION AND EMPHASIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF REMAINING CALM. HE REITERATED THE U.S. COMMITMENT TO ASSIST PAKISTAN AND ASKED WHETHER THERE WERE SPECIFIC SECURITY ASSISTANCE ISSUES ON WHICH THE GOP NEEDED ASSISTANCE FROM WASHINGTON (E.G., THE M1A1 TANK). BEG SAID THAT HE WOULD BE IN TOUCH. END SUMMARY.

4. ON AUGUST 29, AMBASSADOR OAKLEY CALLED ON CHIEF OF ARMY STAFF GENERAL ASLAM BEG IN THE LATTER'S OFFICE AT GENERAL HEADQUARTERS. THE AMBASSADOR WAS ACCOMPANIED BY BG CLOYD PFISTER (CENTCOM), MILATT AND POLMILOFF. BEG WAS ACCOMPANIED BY MG CHAUDHRY MUHAMMAD NAWAZ (DIRECTOR OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE).

CURRENT POLITICAL SITUATION

5. BEG BEGAN BY EMPHASIZING THAT THE ARMED FORCES, AS WELL AS THE PAKISTANI PEOPLE, FULLY SUPPORTED HIS DECISION TO FOLLOW CONSTITUTIONAL PROCEDURES AFTER

S E C R E T

ISLAMABAD 010312/01

PRESIDENT ZIA'S DEATH. HE EXPRESSED GRATITUDE FOR U.S. SUPPORT AND SAID THAT, MORE THAN ANYTHING, THE PAKISTANI PEOPLE NEEDED TO SEE THAT THE UNITED STATES REMAINED COMMITTED TO STANDING WITH PAKISTAN. OAKLEY SAID THAT THE U.S. COMMITMENT STOOD AND WOULD ENDURE. HE EXPRESSED ADMIRATION FOR THE STABILITY OF THE TRANSITION AFTER ZIA'S DEATH AND FOR THE COOPERATION BETWEEN THE CIVIL AND MILITARY ARMS OF GOVERNMENT.

6. BEG SAID THAT HE WAS AWARE THAT SOME IN THE U.S. HAD DOUBTS ABOUT PAKISTAN'S STABILITY AND WERE EXPECTING BEG TO CHANGE HIS MIND AND STAGE A COUP. THIS WAS, HOWEVER, NOT TRUE. HE ASKED OAKLEY TO CONVEY TO THE U.S. MEDIA THAT THE PAKISTANI MILITARY FULLY SUPPORTED "MY DECISION" NOT TO TAKE POWER. EVEN IF HE WERE TO CHANGE HIS MIND, BEG SAID, THE REST OF THE MILITARY WOULD NOT ALLOW IT. BEG ADDED THAT THIS HAD ELICITED A STRONG POSITIVE RESPONSE FROM THE PAKISTANI PEOPLE.

7. BEG SAID THAT THERE WERE SOME IN THE GOP WHO HAD ASKED HIM TO SUSPEND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS, BUT HE HAD SO FAR WITHSTOOD THIS PRESSURE. THERE WAS A STATE OF EMERGENCY, AND BEG SAID THAT HE WOULD SUSPEND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IF NECESSARY TO PRESERVE THE PEACE. HOWEVER, THERE WAS AS YET NO NEED. BEG PRAISED ACTING PRESIDENT GHULAM ISHAQ KHAN AS A MAN WHO THOUGHT CORRECTLY. HE ALSO DEFENDED THE MILITARY'S PRESENCE ON THE EMERGENCY COUNCIL AS NECESSARY, EVEN IF IT WAS "EXTRA-CONSTITUTIONAL." OAKLEY OBSERVED THAT IF THE MILITARY WERE NOT WORKING CLOSELY WITH THE GOVERNMENT TO SUPPORT CONSTITUTIONAL PROCEDURES AS WELL AS TO DEFEND THE COUNTRY, IT WOULD CREATE THE APPEARANCE OF DISUNITY. PAKISTAN WAS ON THE RIGHT TRACK, WHICH WOULD CONSOLIDATE LONG-TERM U.S. SUPPORT AND DISCOURAGE EXTERNAL THREATS.

8. BEG SAID THAT HE WAS CONFIDENT OF PAKISTAN'S ABILITY TO DEAL WITH INTERNAL PROBLEMS, BUT THE EXTERNAL THREAT WAS MORE WORRYING. THERE WAS A "TRIANGULAR CONSPIRACY," CONSISTING OF THE USSR, AFGHANISTAN AND INDIA, AIMED AT DESTABILIZING PAKISTAN. BEG CLAIMED THAT THE KILLER OF SHIA TNFJ LEADER ARIF HUSSEIN AL-HUSSAINI (ASSASSINATED IN PESHAWAR IN EARLY AUGUST) WAS HIMSELF A SHIITE (FROM PARACHINAR) EMPLOYED BY THE AFGHAN SECRET SERVICE. A HIGH-RANKING KHAD DEFECTOR WAS ABLE TO CONFIRM THE

S E C R E T

ISLAMABAD 018370/01

SECRET SECTION OF 04 ISLAMABAD 18370
EXDIS LAUREL;

KHAD'S ROLE IN THIS SOVIET/AFGHAN PLOT TO CAUSE SECTARIAN VIOLENCE DURING THE ISLAMIC MONTH OF MUHARRAM. (SEE PESHAWAR 2027 AND ISLAMABAD 18290, BOTH NOTAL.) THE DEFECTOR MIGHT ALSO BE ABLE TO TELL MORE, PERHAPS ABOUT THE AUGUST 17 CRASH OF PRESIDENT ZIA'S AIRCRAFT. BEG SAID THAT THIS WAS STATE-SUPPORTED TERRORISM AND MUST BE EXPOSED.

see Beg's role today!

9. OAKLEY RESPONDED THAT THE U.S. HAD WARNED THE SOVIETS THAT THE U.S. REMAINED COMMITTED TO PAKISTANI SECURITY. HE ADDED THAT SOVIET ACTIONS OVER THE LAST FEW MONTHS (E.G., THE REOCCUPATION OF KUNDUZ AND VIOLATIONS OF PAKISTANI AIRSPACE) WERE ACTS OF DESPERATION. IF THE U.S. AND PAKISTAN STOOD FIRM TOGETHER AND DID NOT GET FLUSTERED, THEN THE SOVIETS WOULD BECOME CONVINCED THAT THEIR TACTICS WOULD NOT WORK. OAKLEY ADDED THAT THE U.S. WAS COOPERATING IN THE INVESTIGATION OF THE AUGUST 17 TRAGEDY, BUT THIS WAS A PAKISTANI EFFORT, AND THERE WOULD BE NO SEPARATE U.S. REPORT. THE U.S. WAS IMPRESSED WITH PAKISTAN'S HANDLING OF THE INVESTIGATION, AND WE SHOULD NOT ALLOW ITS RESULTS TO DIVIDE US. BEG REPEATED THAT HE WAS CONFIDENT OF THE INTERNAL SITUATION, BUT EXTERNALLY PAKISTAN WAS ON THE DEFENSIVE. ONLY THE U.S., BEG SAID, COULD NEUTRALIZE THIS PROGRAM TO DESTABILIZE PAKISTAN.

///

10. BEG ASSURED OAKLEY THAT THERE WOULD BE FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS, AND THAT THEY WOULD BE HELD IN A PEACEFUL CLIMATE. BY NOT DECLARING MARTIAL LAW, BEG SAID, HE HAD ALREADY FRUSTRATED ONE DESIGN OF THOSE TRYING TO DESTABILIZE PAKISTAN. THERE MIGHT BE SOME "CONVULSIONS," BUT THEY SHOULD NOT BE A CAUSE FOR DISMAY. "SOME" IN THE GOVERNMENT WANTED MARTIAL LAW, BUT THEY COULD BE EASILY HANDLED. BEG CONCLUDED THAT HE WAS CONFIDENT THAT PAKISTAN WOULD EMERGE FROM THIS CRISIS A MORE STABLE COUNTRY THAN BEFORE, AND HE HOPED THAT OAKLEY WOULD CONVEY THIS TO THE U.S.

"STRATEGIC CONSENSUS"

11. BEG SAID THAT THERE WERE EMERGING REALITIES IN SOUTH ASIA THAT WOULD BE BETTER FOR PAKISTAN, THE REGION AS A WHOLE, AND THE U.S. BEG SAID THAT PAKISTAN AND AFGHANISTAN ARE NOW ONE. TWO NATIONS BUT ONE PEOPLE. BEG DENIED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE UPSURGE IN ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM AND SAID THAT THERE WOULD BE NO FUNDAMENTALIST GOVERNMENT IN AFGHANISTAN.

/// ✓

12. BEG ADDED THAT IRAN WAS ANOTHER EMERGING REALITY. CLOSER RELATIONS BETWEEN IRAN AND PAKISTAN WOULD HELP DILUTE IRANIAN FUNDAMENTALISM. BEG LOOKED FORWARD TO A "STRATEGIC CONSENSUS" OF PAKISTAN, AFGHANISTAN, IRAN AND TURKEY, WHICH HE TERMED A "GRAND DESIGN." NO FORMAL PACT WOULD BE NECESSARY, BUT SUCH A CONSENSUS WOULD CREATE A NEW REGIONAL POWER EQUATION AND PROVIDE THE U.S. WITH NEW OPTIONS FOR DEALING WITH INDIA, THE SOVIET UNION AND THE MIDEAST.

/// ✓
Dulles

S E C R E T

ISLAMABAD 018370/02

13. OAKLEY RESPONDED THAT TURKEY WAS A STABLE, STRONG KNOWN QUANTITY AND THAT CLOSE PAK-TURKISH TIES WERE AN EXCELLENT THING FOR THE REGION. WE HAD BEEN WORKING WITH BOTH TO TRY AND IMPROVE MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN OURSELVES AND IRAN. HOWEVER, DESPITE IRAN'S ACCEPTANCE OF SC RES. 598 AND THE CEASEFIRE WITH IRAQ AND EFFORTS TO REDUCE TENSIONS WITH THE ARAB GULF STATES, THERE WAS GOING TO BE AN UNCERTAIN, FLUCTUATING INTERNAL SITUATION FOR AT LEAST A FEW YEARS. PAKISTAN COULD NOT COUNT UPON IRAN DURING THIS PERIOD. AFGHANISTAN COULD ALSO BE EXPECTED TO GO THROUGH A PERIOD OF INSTABILITY AND POLITICAL EVOLUTION, EVEN AFTER THE PDPA LEAVES POWER. HOWEVER, AS A LONG-TERM OBJECTIVE, BEG'S IDEA SEEMED A VERY GOOD IDEA.

Oakley's reply to
Beg.

SECURITY ASSISTANCE ISSUES

14. OAKLEY ASKED BEG TO PUT ON HIS ARMY HAT FOR A MOMENT AND CONSIDER FMS ISSUES. IF THE TRANSFER TO PAKISTAN OF CERTAIN PENDING WEAPON SYSTEMS WERE TO BE NOTIFIED TO CONGRESS THIS YEAR, DECISIONS WERE NEEDED SOON. BG PFISTER OBSERVED THAT, IF THE GOP WISHED, IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO EXPEDITE U.S. ACTION ON PAKISTAN'S REQUEST FOR 115 M1A1 TANKS (AND AVOID A SUBSTANTIAL PRICE

S E C R E T

ISLAMABAD 018370/02

SECRET SECTION OF 04 ISLAMABAD 18372

INCREASE), AS A MEANS OF FOLLOWING THROUGH ON SECRETARY SHULTZ' OFFER OF SUPPORT TO PAKISTAN. OAKLEY ADDED THAT THE U.S. WAS COMMITTED TO SUPPORTING PAKISTAN WITH ACTION AND NOT JUST WORDS. BEG SAID THAT HE WAS TRYING TO REMEMBER WHAT PRESIDENT ZIA'S VIEW WAS ON THE M1A1 TANK, AND OAKLEY REPLIED THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THAT ZIA HAD APPROVED BUT THAT THE DECISION HAD BEEN LEFT TO BEG.

15. BEG ASKED ABOUT THE STATUS OF THE AWACS ISSUE. OAKLEY RESPONDED THAT HE BELIEVED THAT PRESIDENT ZIA HAD COME TO UNDERSTAND THAT AWACS POSED A PROBLEM AT THIS TIME. PAKISTAN'S FOREIGN MINISTER, THE AMBASSADOR IN WASHINGTON AND OTHERS HAD ALL AGREED THAT THIS WAS NOT A GOOD TIME TO SEND THE AWACS ISSUE TO CONGRESS. OAKLEY ADVISED THAT, IF A NOTIFICATION WERE SENT TO CONGRESS AT THIS TIME, IT WOULD PROBABLY NOT BE APPROVED AND WOULD TOUCH OFF A BIG UPROAR. THIS WOULD BE INTERPRETED AS A WEAKENING OF U.S. SUPPORT FOR PAKISTAN AND WOULD BE RESENTED BY THE PAKISTANI PEOPLE. WE HAD HAD SIMILAR PROBLEMS WITH JORDAN AND SAUDI ARABIA, AND IT WAS THE LAST THING THAT PAKISTAN NEEDED OR THE U.S. WANTED AT THIS CRITICAL MOMENT. OAKLEY SUGGESTED THAT WE TAKE ANOTHER LOOK AT THE ISSUE NEXT YEAR, INCLUDING AT THE HUGE QUESTION OF FINANCING. BEG SAID THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THIS AND AGREED.

16. GENERAL PFISTER POINTED OUT THAT THERE WERE A NUMBER OF OTHER SYSTEMS (E.G., COBRA HELICOPTERS, TOW MISSILES AND LAUNCHERS) THAT WOULD DEMONSTRATE U.S. SUPPORT FOR PAKISTAN AND WOULD PROBABLY NOT ENCOUNTER CONGRESSIONAL OPPOSITION. BEG NOTED THAT PAKISTAN HAD REQUESTS PENDING FOR ADDITIONAL F-16'S, TPQ-37 RADARS, HELICOPTERS AND C-NITE NIGHT VISION EQUIPMENT. HE SAID THAT HE BELIEVED THAT THERE WERE RELEASABILITY PROBLEMS WITH C-NITE. (COMMENT: C-NITE HAS BEEN APPROVED FOR RELEASE TO PAKISTAN, AND ODRP WILL SO INFORM BEG'S OFFICE. END COMMENT)

17. GENERAL PFISTER CONCLUDED THAT IF PAKISTAN WANTED THE U.S. TO MOVE QUICKLY ON ANY SPECIFIC OUTSTANDING REQUESTS, THE GOP SHOULD LET US KNOW QUICKLY. BEG SAID THAT HE WOULD BE IN TOUCH.

AFGHANISTAN

18. BEG OBSERVED THAT SOME BELIEVED THAT THE FAILURE OF THE RESISTANCE TO CAPTURE MAJOR AFGHAN CITIES WAS PROOF OF ITS WEAKNESS. THE MUJAHEDIN, HOWEVER, WERE FOLLOWING A CLEVER STRATEGY OF PARALYZING THE SOVIETS' STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK, PARTICULARLY NORTH OF THE HINDU KUSH. AS A CONSEQUENCE, THE RESISTANCE COULD NOW CHOKER THE SOVIETS' WITHDRAWAL ROUTES IF THEY WANTED, ALTHOUGH IT WOULD NOT BE WISE TO DO SO. THE NEXT STAGE, BEG SAID, WOULD BE THE COMPRESSION AND GRADUAL STRANGULATION OF URBAN CENTERS, BUT NOT DIRECT ASSAULTS.

19. BEG WAS ADAMANT THAT THE RESISTANCE DID NOT AIM AT THE COLLAPSE OF KABUL OR THE NAJIB GOVERNMENT. RATHER,

S E C R E T

ISLAMABAD 018370/03

THE RESISTANCE WOULD NEGOTIATE WITH KABUL AND ARRANGE A NEAT CHANGE-OVER OF GOVERNMENT. HE MADE CLEAR, HOWEVER, THAT THE NEW LEADERS (SUCH AS HEKMATYAR AND RABBANI) WERE NOT TRADITIONALISTS OR TRIBAL LEADERS, AND THEY WOULD NOT CEDE POWER TO OTHERS WHO HAD NOT FOUGHT THE SOVIETS.

IRAQ

20. BEG SAID THAT HE BELIEVED THAT PAKISTAN AND TURKEY COULD "HANDLE" IRAN, BUT HE ASKED WHO WOULD HANDLE IRAQ. FOR SADDAM HUSSEIN TO SURVIVE, BEG SAID, HE NEEDED A STATE OF CONFRONTATION, IF NOT WITH IRAN THEN WITH SOMEONE ELSE. OAKLEY RESPONDED THAT THE U.S. STRATEGY IN THE GULF HAD BEEN TO CONTAIN AND NOT ATTACK IRAN UNTIL THE FLAME OF REVOLUTION AND AGGRESSION AGAINST ITS NEIGHBORS BURNED OUT. THIS WAS HAPPENING. WE HAD NOT WANTED IRAQ TO COME OUT OF THE WAR TOO STRONG OR AGGRESSIVE, AND WE HAD CONSCIOUSLY ESTABLISHED A DIALOGUE WITH THE SAUDIS, KUWAITIS, EGYPT AND JORDAN TO CONTAIN AND INFLUENCE BAGHEAD. MOREOVER, IRAQ NEEDED THE HELP OF THE WEST AND THE GULF ARAB STATES IN POST-WAR RECONSTRUCTION. IRAQ SEEMED SLOWLY TO BE COMING AOUND TO A MORE CONSTRUCTIVE APPROACH, BUT ONLY

S E C R E T

ISLAMABAD 018370/03

~~SECRET~~ SECTION OF 04 ISLAMABAD 18370
EXDIS LAUREL

TIME WOULD TELL. OAKLEY ALSO POINTED OUT THAT THE IRAQIS WERE NOT HAPPY WITH THE SOVIETS' DUPLICITY AND DOUBLE-DEALING IN THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR. ||

COMMENT

21. BEG'S STATED COMMITMENT TO CONSTITUTIONAL PROCEDURES TRACKED CLOSELY WITH HIS PUBLIC STATEMENTS, SUCH AS HIS AUGUST 25 ADDRESS TO ARMY OFFICERS IN RAWALPINDI. IN THIS MEETING, HE SEEMED VERY CONFIDENT IN HIS OWN PERSONAL COMMAND OF THE DOMESTIC POLITICAL SITUATION. AT ONE POINT, WHEN CLAIMING THAT THE GOP COULD HANDLE ANY INTERNAL THREAT, HE EMPHASIZED THAT "THE ARMED FORCES ARE SOLIDLY BEHIND ME." THE QUESTION OF WHOM IN THE GOVERNMENT HE SEES AS A THREAT WILL REQUIRE MORE WORK BEFORE IT BECOMES CLEAR.

22. BEG'S REMARKS ABOUT A STRATEGIC CONSENSUS AMONG TURKEY, IRAN, AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN ECHOES SIMILAR STATEMENTS THAT ZIA HAD MADE TO US IN THE PAST. WHILE THIS "GRAND DESIGN" SEEMS TO US SIMPLISTIC, THE GOP UNDER ZIA CLEARLY PLANNED TO ATTEMPT TO INFLUENCE EVENTS IN POST-WAR AFGHANISTAN AND POST-KHOMENEI IRAN IN SUCH A WAY AS TO ACQUIRE "STRATEGIC DEPTH" AGAINST INDIA. BEG APPARENTLY INTENDS TO FOLLOW THROUGH ON ZIA'S PLANS. |||
OAKLEY##

BT
#8370

NNNN

S E C R E T ISLAMABAD 018370/04

**NATIONAL
SECURITY
ARCHIVE**

This document is from the holdings of:

The National Security Archive

Suite 701, Gelman Library, The George Washington University

2130 H Street, NW, Washington, D.C., 20037

Phone: 202/994-7000, Fax: 202/994-7005, nsarchiv@gwu.edu