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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

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NLS F97-004 #18

BY MDP NARA, DATE 5/9/60

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Working Luncheon with General Secretary  
Mikhail Gorbachev (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
The Vice President  
Secretary of State Shultz  
Secretary of Defense Carlucci  
Chief of Staff Baker  
Director Wick, United States Information  
Agency  
Colin L. Powell, Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs  
Assistant Secretary of State for European  
Affairs Ridgeway  
U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union Jack F.  
Matlock  
Mark Parris, Director, Office of Soviet Union  
Affairs, Department of State (Notetaker)  
John Herbst, Director, Office for Policy  
Development, NSC (Notetaker)

General Secretary Gorbachev  
Foreign Minister Shevardnadze  
Aleksandr Yakovlev, Politburo Member and  
Central Committee Secretary for Ideology,  
Propaganda, and Culture  
Anatoly Dobrynin, Central Committee  
Secretary and Chief, International  
Department  
Chairman Kamentsev, Foreign Economic  
Commission  
Central Committee General Department Chief  
Boldin  
Chief Administrator of the Central Committee  
Kruchina  
Ambassador Dubinin (U)

DATE, TIME,  
AND PLACE: December 10, 1987, 12:40 PM - 2:10 PM  
Family Dining Room (U)

While walking from the Oval Office meeting, which ended at 12:15 p.m., to the Family Dining Room, the President emphasized to Gorbachev the necessity of Vietnamese withdrawal from Cambodia. The President noted that the occupation was possible due to the Soviets' extensive support and urged them to use their influence with Hanoi. Lunch began at 12:40. (S)

Gorbachev began by continuing the discussion of Afghanistan from the recently concluded Oval Office meeting. He suggested that the Joint Statement adopt the language on Afghanistan prepared by

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Shultz then said he felt the working group had made progress in clarifying the Soviet view that withdrawal from Afghanistan and national reconciliation need not be linked. This was necessary because national reconciliation would take a great deal of time. Also, in the end, this was something the Afghan people must do among themselves. Understanding this delinkage would help pave the way for the next Geneva round, which should concentrate on the unresolved issue of Soviet withdrawal. ~~(S)~~

Gorbachev responded that Soviet withdrawal was definitely linked to an American obligation to cut off support for opposition forces on the date Soviet troop withdrawal started. As of that date, Soviet troops would no longer engage in military operations and the ceasefire would go into effect. Gorbachev emphasized the importance of the American and Soviet sides' using their influence with the parties to the Afghan conflict to promote national reconciliation. He said that the Soviet side would tell Najib-- and the American side should do the same with the opposition forces--that the creation of a coalition government was their affair. They should find a balance of concessions. (S)

At the same time, Gorbachev continued, both the Americans and Soviets should say that they did not want the new Afghanistan to be led by either a pro-American or a pro-Soviet government. Afghanistan should be neutral and nonaligned. Of course, Gorbachev added, this was just his projection of how things would develop. Gorbachev noted that the situation could develop differently. The Soviets would withdraw and the United States could continue financial and military support for the opposition forces. This would lead to increased tension. Gorbachev said that he did not see how the Soviets could withdraw forces in such circumstances. There must be linkage of withdrawal and non-interference. ~~(S)~~

Gorbachev suggested that after the meeting the two sides move the questions to a practical footing. He said that this would be well-received by public opinion. ~~(S)~~

Secretary Shultz said that as he and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze discussed following the meeting of the working group yesterday, the Soviet side welcomed American readiness to reaffirm support for the Geneva agreements. This resolved the non-interference issue. The missing piece in Geneva remained the timetable for a troop withdrawal. ~~(S)~~

Gorbachev interjected "that there must be an end to American support for the opposition forces at the same time." If there was agreement on this, Gorbachev said, let us declare it. If the American side needed more time to think this over, it should take it. But the Soviet side wanted to engage in specific action. Gorbachev added that action here would demonstrate American sincerity in addressing the Afghan problem. It would also help the Soviets judge American intentions regarding other regional conflict situations. ~~(S)~~

Secretary Shultz responded that both the United States and the Soviet Union accepted the Geneva agreements. These agreements covered the issue of outside support. According to the agreements, after the signing of the accords, a troop withdrawal would begin; and 60 days after this, American support would cease. (S)

Gorbachev rejoined that he understood three points in the Geneva agreements were settled. The fourth point remained to be settled. (S)

Shultz noted that the linkage of national reconciliation and troop withdrawal had been a problem; but now Soviet statements indicated that there was no such linkage, and the American reaffirmation of support for the Geneva accords meant that we could devote our attention to the fourth point, a timetable for troop withdrawal. This could get the process moving. (S)

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze remarked that there was no linkage "in effect" between troop withdrawal and national reconciliation. He added that national reconciliation would be a long process. (S)

Gorbachev said that the Soviet side had already confirmed this. He then asked if we could state that after the Summit we would begin work to consider practical, concrete measures with the parties concerned. (S)

Secretary Shultz agreed. (S)

Gorbachev then proposed that the Joint Statement on regional issues mention that Afghanistan was discussed. (S)

When Secretary Shultz noted that Afghanistan was already in the statement, Gorbachev suggested that it mention other regions discussed, such as Cambodia, South Africa, and the Middle East. (C)

Shultz noted that most of these were included. (S)

Shevardnadze remarked that Central America had been discussed and was not in the Joint Statement. So it should be added, as should southern Africa. (S)

Gorbachev said that this would show the responsibility of the United States and the Soviet Union--the degree of responsibility incumbent on us in handling regional conflicts. (S)

Secretary Shultz said that the Joint Statement noted the dialogue between the Soviet Union and the United States should have as its goal "to help the parties to regional conflicts find peaceful solutions that advance their independence, freedom, and security." Shultz added that our discussion on regional issues had been getting better and better. (S)

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