

Spec. Grp file

11 April 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Special Group (5412) Meeting, 11 April 1963

1. <sup>98</sup> [Reconnaissance of Laos and North Vietnam was reviewed. The Group expressed approval of the CIA program. They authorized two flights over Laos and North Vietnam on the assumption that one of the NEFA flights would cover the extreme western targets desired by Sarit. If, on the other hand, the four India - Communist China border flights were not executed at this time, then CIA was authorized to fly three flights over Laos and North Vietnam to cover all of the targets desired by both Sarit and COMOR.]

2. <sup>96</sup> [Status of negotiations for India - Communist China reconnaissance was reported. It was agreed that this question should be pursued further by CIA. No immediate action was indicated. Dr. Scoville reported that no further information would be forthcoming from either India or Thailand until about the 20th of April.]

3. Cuban operations. The proposed infiltration-exfiltration operations, past and projected, were reviewed and approved. The proposed program of sabotage and harrassment, both the general program and the detailed plan, was discussed at length. It was reported by Mr. Bundy that this program was developed more or less at the direction of higher authority. It was not the intention of higher authority to approve and authorize specific actions; what he was seeking was detailed information concerning our capability and what might be expected on a series of operations which were within our capability. I took the position, which was supported by Alexis Johnson (somewhat less vocally, however) that I questioned the advisability of proceeding with the program until we had crystallized the total policy designed to remove the Soviets from Cuba and also remove Castro. I said I was not clear as to how this was to be accomplished, nor did I feel that there was any agreed series of actions designed to meet this end objective. Therefore, it appeared to me that we are projecting a few of the annoying operations, none of

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docid 104-10306-10003

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which would permanently impair the facilities under attack nor would they seriously impair Castro's economic or military posture and, hence, serve no useful purpose. Furthermore, I estimated that under the laws of averages, a number of the teams would be rolled up and they would as they had in the past attribute the whole thing to the U.S. Government and the CIA. Since we had stood down the ALPHA 66 and others, more or less disenfranchised ourselves from the Cuban colony in Miami as a result of the Miro Cardona incident, we would have no plausible denial and in fact would find ourselves in a rather difficult position. It was agreed this matter should be further studied and reported on next Thursday, and possibly discussed with higher authority on Friday. An important part of this issue is the SNIE now under preparation which has to do with the future of Castro.

**ACTION:** I should discuss this subject with General Carter and some of the Senior Staff on Friday morning to prepare an agreed CIA position and also to schedule the completion of the SNIE.

4. North Vietnam monthly report was accepted.
5. <sup>98</sup> [The funds for Kong Le were approved. However, Alexis Johnson was asked to go back to Ambassador Unger with an insistent message that Phoumi support Kong Le with money now in which came from the United States. However, if this appeal failed, the support recommended in the paper should be given for a limited period of time.]
6. <sup>98</sup> [The covert annex to the Bolivian internal defense plan was remanded because the Special Group (CI) had remanded the basic internal defense plan. However, there was no objection expressed to the annex but it must not be construed that the Special Group approved any subjects covered in the annex.]
7. <sup>98</sup> [The Colombian internal defense plan was not considered.]
8. <sup>98</sup> [Colonel Steakley submitted a report on inadvertent overflights by reconnaissance since 1 January 1961. This report was noted. DCI raised the question as to why he had not been informed. Apparently this was an oversight as written procedures had been established by Colonel Steakley for prompt informing of all members of Special Group when instances of this type occurred. Apparently, Alexis Johnson was]

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[informed by Colonel Steakley's office and he was under the impression that I was informed. However, he was on leave and therefore did not know that I had not been informed.]

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9. [British Guiana situation was opened up for discussion and placed on the agenda for next week. Alexis Johnson reported on Mr. Burdette's position, substantially paralleling Helms', with the effect that he was disappointed in the British position, that he felt time had run in favor of Jagan, and they would like an appeal made to Macmillan. Bundy took exception. McCone stated that CIA felt much as Johnson reported and furthermore objected to the [redacted] [redacted] in its own political actions which would be attributable both whether they succeeded or failed. It was agreed to place subject on agenda for next week.]

ACTION: Subject should be carefully reviewed by staff.

JAM:bd

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