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IPS/CB/IR by TR/... Date: 4/23/08

*S/S 21.53*

February 14, 1963

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Dear Dwight:

I refer to our conversation last fall with regard to discreet surveillance of Israeli scientists who might be seeking information that could contribute to a nuclear weapons program, and to Mr. Furnas' letter to you of November 15 on the same subject.

In addition to Israel Dostrovsky, at Brookhaven, who was mentioned in Mr. Furnas' letter, we understand that the following Israeli scientists who are most competent in this field are or will soon be at the indicated United States centers:

Fritz Klein -- also at Brookhaven.

Michael Anbar, Chief of Chemistry and Isotope Research for the Israel Atomic Energy Commission, soon to arrive at Stanford.

Yuval Neeman, Scientific Director of Israel's Nabi Rubin reactor, arriving shortly to spend a year at the California Institute of Technology in Pasadena.

In this connection, I am enclosing for your information a copy of a personal letter from Mr. Lockling, of the Embassy staff at Tel Aviv, on this subject.

We are also taking this matter up through the United States Intelligence Board.

Sincerely,

*/s/ Alex*

Enclosure:

Letter from Mr. Lockling, dated January 24, 1963.

U. Alexis Johnson

Mr. Dwight A. Ink,  
Assistant General Manager,  
Atomic Energy Commission.

*introduced by RAB*

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G:UAJohnson:ges

Copies to: NEA  
SCI  
INR

*J.L.B.*

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DATE 08/16/08/NW 36905  
BY 341...

*AE 6 / SR-215*

*cc to G, NEA, SCI, INR, RF*

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
ASSISTANT SECRETARY

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FEB 6 1963

**FILE**

TO : G - Mr. Johnson  
THROUGH: S/S *MR*  
SCI - Mr. Rollefson See attached memorandum (Tab D)  
FROM : NEA - James P. Grant *JPG*  
SUBJECT: Israel's Atomic Energy Program: Israeli Nuclear Scientists in the United States

DISCUSSION:

On October 19, 1961, NEA submitted to you a memorandum (Tab B) expressing concern at the possibility of efforts by visiting Israeli scientists to obtain classified United States information in the nuclear weapons field. We suggested that the Atomic Energy Commission and U.S. security agencies be alerted to this possibility and that an appropriate, discreet surveillance over Israeli scientists be instituted when they are in a position to observe U.S. atomic energy installations. Subsequently, you mentioned this to Mr. Ink of the AEC (Tab C) and Mr. Roger Hilsman of INR was asked to take this up in the USIB and otherwise as desirable.

In this regard, we have received from our Embassy in Tel Aviv (Tab A) information that the following Israeli scientists, who are among the dozen most competent in this field, are or will be in the indicated U.S. centers:

Israel Dostrovsky--now at Brookhaven Laboratory, Long Island.

Fritz Klein--also at Brookhaven.

Michael Anbar, Chief of Chemistry and Isotope Research for the Israel Atomic Energy Commission, soon to arrive at Stanford.

Yuval Neeman, Scientific Director of Israel's Nabi Rubin reactor, arriving shortly to spend at year at the California Institute of Technology in Pasadena.

We attach for your information and files a copy of the letter we received in this regard (Tab A). It also contains certain other elements of interest which you may wish to pass on to the AEC.

ATTACHMENTS:

- Tab A - Copy of Letter from Amembassy Tel Aviv.
- Tab B - Memorandum of October 19, 1961.
- Tab C - Letter to Mr. Dwight Ink of the AEC.
- Tab D - Memorandum from SCI/E.J.J. Kretzmann to Mr. Grant.

AE 6 / SR-245

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

NEA:NE:MRCrawford:ebb  
2/2/63 *Pus*

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OFFICIAL - INFORMAL

SECRET - NOFORN

American Embassy,  
Tel Aviv, Israel,  
January 24, 1963.

Dear Bill:

We were very much interested in the memorandum of conversation of January 14 with Denis Speares on the subject "UK Concern re Israel Nuclear Intentions." The wall of security surrounding atomic energy developments here is quite effective, and successfully prevents us from obtaining detailed knowledge of progress, intentions, and degree of French assistance. We do pick up occasional straws in the wind but these do not all point in the same direction.

There is no question that Israel is moving steadily and purposefully in the direction of acquiring experience in the field of nuclear technology. For such a small country, they have invested heavily in Nahal Soreq, the Machon-Arba (next to the Weizmann Institute), and especially in Dimona. The financial pinch is showing up in several directions. There was the much publicized establishment of the "Company for Scientific Development", directed by several of the Cabinet Ministers whose avowed purpose is to solicit fifty million pounds. Another indication is the fact that the Nahal Soreq establishment is now for the first time soliciting grants and contracts from United States Government agencies.

A proposal to invest heavily in nuclear power stations in Israel has been revised enthusiastically in recent weeks. A committee reporting to Shimon Peres has recommended that the Government "seriously consider" the establishment of a number of such stations of large capacity within the next 10 years. An international advisory committee headed by Philip Sporn, an American utility executive listed in Who's Who, is expected quite soon to consult on this proposal.

Our feeling at the present, in agreement with paragraph 4 of your memorandum, is that the AEC type activity in Israel is part of a long-term program toward developing nuclear competence which can

be

William R. Crawford, Jr., Esquire,  
NEA/NE,  
Department of State,  
Washington 25, D.C.

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be applied as needed to supplying energy for industry or military capability. There are good reasons to conclude that Israel does not now have a "crash program" for developing a nuclear weapon.

Probably the strongest indicator of the long-range and methodical approach is the fact that the dozen or so top scientists whose training equips them to participate in a nuclear weapon development are obviously being kept busy with other things. To cite a few examples: Amos de Shalit is working full time as Scientific Director of the Weizmann Institute; Gullio Racah is Rector of the Hebrew University; Israel Dostrovsky has spent the last 18 months at the Brookhaven Laboratory on Long Island; Fritz Klein, Dostrovsky's most valued deputy, has been at Brookhaven for the last seven months. Two of the three most capable scientists now actively engaged in classified research are planning to come to the United States this summer for a year or more of study. These are Michael Anbar, Chief of Chemistry and Isotope research for the AEC, who is planning a year at Stanford, and Yuval Neeman, Scientific Director of the Soreq Establishment who plans to spend next year at Cal.Tech. in Pasadena. Of the highly competent men only Ernst Bergmann, Chairman of the AEC, carries on year after year on classified work without major interruptions.

By keeping a fairly careful watch on the activities of the dozen more capable scientists I think we will be able to detect rather quickly whether Israel switches from its present methodical approach and adopts an emergency program. Assuming that Israel continues on its present course however, I think we can guess at the following timetable for the achievement of a competence in nuclear weapons: enough experience and fissionable material will have to be acquired in about 6 to 8 years to produce the first test explosion; the development of sufficient weapons to constitute an effective "frappe nucliare" will require about 10 to 12 years.

Sincerely,

William Bruce Lockling

SECRET - NOFORN

November 13, 1961

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RESTRICTION

Dear Dwight:

You will recall that Deputy Under Secretary Johnson spoke to you briefly a week or so ago about the Department's concern over possible Israeli activities in the nuclear field.

The background of this matter, as you no doubt know, is that last summer we arranged for an unpublicized visit to the new Israeli nuclear power reactor at Dimona by two eminent American scientists. Their report indicated for the time being at least the reactor seemed designed for the peaceful purposes the Israelis claimed for it.

There remains, however, in this Department a concern which is supported by the Intelligence Community (for example, NSR 35-61, "The Outlook for Israel") that Israel may become interested in weapons production when the Dimona reactor goes into operation and a supply of fissionable material becomes available. According to NSR 35-61, an inhibiting factor in a possible Israeli weapons program would be lack of weapons designs. While such designs might be obtained in other ways, it is conceivable that the Israelis might attempt to acquire them through clandestine means in the United States. The assurances of the Israeli Government as to its present peaceful intentions regarding use of the Dimona reactor notwithstanding, we feel the U.S. Government must be alert to the various implications of the foregoing.

As you are well aware, it is U.S. policy to oppose acquisition of independent national nuclear weapons capability by countries not now possessing such a capability. In order to follow carefully the progress of the Israelis in the nuclear

Mr. Dwight A. Ink,  
Assistant General Manager,  
Atomic Energy Commission.

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field and to be alert to the possibility of the development of a military nuclear program, we intend to press the Israelis to arrange further open visits to Dimona by "neutral" scientists. Prime Minister Ben-Gurion assured President Kennedy of his agreement on this point when the two met last May. We believe it would be desirable, however, for additional precautionary steps to be taken. Appropriate discreet surveillance of Israeli scientists in a position to observe U.S. atomic energy installations would probably be wise. Specifically, surveillance of Dr. Israel Dostrovsky, who has been given a research and teaching grant at Brookhaven National Laboratory for the current academic year, would be desirable in the light of Dr. Dostrovsky's reputation as one of the individuals primarily responsible for guiding Israel's atomic energy program.

We have, through the Department's representation in the U.S. Intelligence Board, made known our concern that appropriate agencies of the U.S. Government be alert to the security considerations mentioned above. We would also appreciate your taking whatever action is appropriate within the Atomic Energy Commission to see that proper precautions are observed.

Sincerely yours,

Howard Furnas  
Deputy

cc: NEA - Mr. Crawford  
INR - Mr. McAfee

S/AE:HFurnas:reg

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