

ROUTINE

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ALERT B1, 1.5(D)

PAGE 01 TOKYO 04532 01 OF 07 140629Z SS05253
INFO: X(01) EAP (01)
----- 14/0720Z A1 DRF (TOTAL COPIES: 002)
ACTION SS-00

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 /001W
-----4CF2E2 140629Z /38

R 140627Z MAR 91
FM ANEMBASSY TOKYO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5264
INFO RUEHBK/ANEMBASSY BANGKOK
ANEMBASSY JAKARTA
ANEMBASSY BEIJING
ANEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR
ANEMBASSY MANILA
ANEMBASSY SINGAPORE
ANEMBASSY SEOUL
ANEMBASSY CANBERRA
ANEMBASSY LONDON
ANEMBASSY ROME
ANEMBASSY PARIS
ANEMBASSY BONN
ANEMBASSY BRUSSELS
ANEMBASSY MOSCOW
USMISSION USNATO 7106
COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB JA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 07 TOKYO 04532

EXDIS DECAPTIONED

DEPT PLEASE PASS TO COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB AND USCINCPAC
HONOLULU

CINCPAC ALSO FOR POLAD

E.O. 12356; DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, MARR, JA, IZ, US
SUBJECT: THE GULF WAR; IMPACT ON JAPAN AND
U.S.-JAPAN RELATIONS

REF: STATE 068000

1-~~6~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: WHILE NOT UNSUCCESSFUL BY THE STANDARDS OF JAPAN'S FOREIGN POLICY OF THE LAST FORTY FIVE YEARS, THE GOJ'S ESSENTIALLY PASSIVE APPROACH TO THE GULF WAR STIMULATED THE ALREADY EXISTING DEBATE HERE ON JAPAN'S ROLE IN THE POST-COLD WAR WORLD; NECESSARY ADJUSTMENTS IN U.S.-JAPAN RELATIONS; AND THE ADEQUACY OF JAPAN'S POLITICAL AND BUREAUCRATIC SYSTEM TO HANDLE THE NEW CHALLENGES. NO CONCLUSIONS WERE REACHED, BUT THE OBSTACLES TO A MATURE FOREIGN POLICY WERE HIGHLIGHTED, INCLUDING ENDURING PACIFIST SENTIMENT AND DISTRUST OF THE JAPANESE MILITARY, THE GAP BETWEEN THE DESIRE FOR RECOGNITION AS A GREAT POWER AND WILLINGNESS TO BEAR THE ASSOCIATED RISKS AND RESPONSIBILITIES, AND THE INADEQUACY OF JAPAN'S BUREAUCRATIC AND PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM IN DEALING WITH CRISIS MANAGEMENT. JAPAN APPEARS TO BE DRAWING SOME LESSONS FROM THE CRISIS: THE GOJ NEEDS TO DO MORE THAN SEND MONEY BUT THERE IS NO CONSENSUS ON WHAT THIS

CONTRIBUTION SHOULD BE; JAPAN IS NOT A GREAT POWER OR HUNGRY TO BECOME ONE, BUT IT NEEDS THE ABILITY TO DO MORE THAN SIMPLY FOLLOW THE U.S. LEAD IN FOREIGN POLICY; AND THE JAPAN SOCIALIST PARTY HAS AGAIN DEMONSTRATED ITS IRRELEVANCE WHILE THE LDP DISPLAYED
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT H. MILLER
DATE/CASE ID: 6 MAY 2002 199405013

TOKYO 04532 01 OF 07 140629Z SS05253
THE ABILITY TO PUT TOGETHER A WORKING COALITION WITH THE KOMIITO AND DSP, PERHAPS ESTABLISHING A PATTERN FOR THE 1990S.

3. WITH RESPECT TO THE IMPACT ON U.S.-JAPAN RELATIONS, AMERICAN SUCCESS REAFFIRMED JAPANESE CONFIDENCE IN OUR STRATEGIC ALLIANCE; BUT "DASHING" HAS LEFT SOME SCARES. MORE IMPORTANTLY, THERE IS A GROWING TREND HERE THAT AMERICA'S WELCOMED SELF CONFIDENCE MAY DEVELOP INTO ARROGANCE DIRECTED AGAINST JAPAN. IN PURSUING OUR INTERESTS HERE, WE HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF JAPAN'S DEFENSIVENESS AND FEAR OF ISOLATION IN THE WAKE OF THE GULF CRISIS TO GAIN GREATER GOJ COOPERATION

[REDACTED]

BUT WE NEED TO AVOID AN OVERLY CONFRONTATIONAL APPROACH THAT RISKS PROVOKING A BACKLASH. WE WILL ALSO NEED TO ENHANCE OUR CONSULTATIONS WITH THE GOJ ON REGIONAL ISSUES, PARTICULARLY WITH RESPECT TO ASIA AND THE MIDDLE EAST, IN VIEW OF THE INCREASING POLITICAL AND BUREAUCRATIC PRESSURE HERE FOR JAPAN TO UNDERTAKE INDEPENDENT INITIATIVES. END SUMMARY

SETTING

4. IN TERMS OF THE TRADITIONAL STANDARDS OF JAPAN'S POST-WAR FOREIGN POLICY, THE GOJ'S ESSENTIALLY PASSIVE APPROACH TO THE GULF WAR WAS NOT UNSUCCESSFUL:

-- JAPAN'S ACCESS TO OIL WAS NOT DISRUPTED, AND THE PRICE EVEN FELL.

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INCOMING

ALERT

PAGE 01 TOKYO 0453Z 02 OF 07 140630Z SS05254
INFO: X (01) EAP (01)

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DEMANDS FOR A MORE EQUITABLE APPORTIONMENT OF RESPONSIBILITIES, AND JAPAN'S DESIRE FOR A MORE INDEPENDENT FOREIGN POLICY.

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-- RESTRUCTURING THE POLITICAL AND BUREAUCRATIC SYSTEM TO ALLOW JAPAN TO DO MORE THAN REACT TO EVENTS AND COME UP WITH "LOWEST COMMON DENOMINATOR" RESPONSES.

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 /001W
-----4CF2F5 140630Z /38

BUT NOT QUITE READY FOR PRIME TIME.

- R 140627Z MAR 91
- FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
- TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5265
- INFO RUEHDK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
- AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
- AMEMBASSY BEIJING
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- AMEMBASSY MANILA
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- AMEMBASSY BONN
- AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
- AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
- USMISSION USHATO 7107
- COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB JA
- USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

6. NOT SURPRISINGLY, THE GULF WAR ENDED WITHOUT JAPAN REACHING A CONSENSUS ON ANY OF THESE BASIC ISSUES. IN PART THIS FAILURE CAN BE ATTRIBUTED TO PECULIAR DOMESTIC POLITICAL CIRCUMSTANCES,

AND, FOR THE FIRST TIME, THE UPPER HOUSE IN THE HANDS OF THE OPPOSITION. THE CRISIS, HOWEVER, BROUGHT TO THE SURFACE MORE FUNDAMENTAL OBSTACLES TO A MATURE JAPANESE FOREIGN POLICY:

-- PACIFIST SENTIMENT IN GENERAL AND DISTRUST OF THE JAPANESE MILITARY IN PARTICULAR REMAIN VERY STRONG, EVEN AMONG MANY SO-CALLED "CONSERVATIVES" IN THE LDP.



WRITE PUBLIC OPINION POLLS REVEALED GROWING SUPPORT AMONG THE JAPANESE PUBLIC FOR THE MULTINATIONAL FORCES AND FOR SOME JAPANESE PHYSICAL PRESENCE; THERE WAS ALSO STRONG REAFFIRMATION OF JAPAN'S "PEACE CONSTITUTION" AND OF CONTINUED

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EXDIS

DEPT PLEASE PASS TO COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB AND USCINCPAC HONOLULU

CINCPAC ALSO FOR POLAD

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, MARR, JA, IZ, US
SUBJECT: THE GULF WAR: IMPACT ON JAPAN AND
-- JAPANESE HOSTAGES WERE RELEASED AT NO POLITICAL OR OTHER COST TO JAPAN.

-- JAPAN'S POST-WAR CONSTITUTIONAL PROHIBITION ON THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE REMAINED INTACT.

-- AND JAPAN'S FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTION OF \$13 BILLION DOLLARS TO THE MNF AND THE FRONT LINE STATES (\$80 PER JAPANESE CITIZEN) PROVED TO BE A BARGAIN IN TERMS OF BENEFITS RECEIVED.

5. HOWEVER, THE GULF CRISIS AROSE AT A TIME WHEN JAPANESE WERE ALREADY RAISING QUESTIONS ABOUT JAPAN'S ROLE IN THE POST COLD WAR WORLD AND SERVED AS A CATALYST TO THIS DEBATE, RAISING FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES, SOME OF WHICH HAD NOT BEEN ADDRESSED SINCE THE END OF THE WAR. THESE ISSUES INCLUDED:

-- THE CONTINUED EFFICACY OF JAPAN'S RENUNCIATION OF ANY MILITARY ROLE BEYOND TERRITORIAL SELF-DEFENSE IN A WORLD MOVING TOWARD COLLECTIVE SECURITY, AND THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN JAPANESE SOCIETY.

-- DEFINING AND BUILDING PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR A JAPANESE CONTRIBUTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY BEYOND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE.

-- FINDING A NEW EQUILIBRIUM IN U.S.-JAPAN RELATIONS TO REFLECT THE SHIFT IN THE ECONOMIC BALANCE, AMERICAN

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----- 14/0720Z A1 DRF (TOTAL COPIES: 002)
ACTION SS-00

TOKYO 04532 03 OF 07 140631Z
LEAVING LITTLE TIME FOR POLICY DEVELOPMENT. RELEVANT
MOFA OFFICE DIRECTORS STAYED IN THE BUILDING ROUND THE
CLOCK FOR DAYS ON END

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WHILE IN
REALITY THE MINISTRY ENDED UP RELYING ON CHN, LIKE THE
REST OF US.

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R 140627Z MAR 91
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5266
INFO RUEHBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
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AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
USMISSION USHATO 7108
COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB JA
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DEPT PLEASE PASS TO COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB AND USCINCPAC

HONOLULU

CINCPAC ALSO FOR POLAD

E.O. 12356; DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, HARR, JA, IZ, US

SUBJECT: THE GULF WAR; IMPACT ON JAPAN AND
NON-INVOLVEMENT OF JAPAN IN MILITARY ACTIVITIES
ABROAD. INDEED, A FEW DAYS AFTER THE END OF THE
CONFLICT IN THE GULF, THE LDP, KOMIITO, AND DSP
RECONFIRMED THEIR EARLIER UNDERSTANDING THAT THE
"PEACEKEEPING FORCE" LEGISLATION TO BE SUBMITTED TO
THE DIET THIS SPRING WOULD RULE OUT THE PARTICIPATION
OF ACTIVE-DUTY SELF DEFENSE FORCE MEMBERS.

-- A LARGE GAP WAS REVEALED BETWEEN JAPAN'S DESIRE FOR
RECOGNITION AS A GREAT POWER AND ITS WILLINGNESS AND
ABILITY TO ASSUME THESE RISKS AND RESPONSIBILITIES.
WITHOUT COMPELLING ECONOMIC INTERESTS AT STAKE (IRAQ'S
INVASION OF KUWAIT WAS NOT SEEN HERE AS PUTTING AT
RISK JAPAN'S ACCESS TO OIL), NEITHER THE POLITICAL NOR
THE BUREAUCRATIC LEADERSHIP COULD OVERCOME THE
INGRAINED HABITS OF A MIDDLE-RANKING POWER SEEKING TO
MINIMIZE RISKS AND MAKE NO ENEMIES. OPPORTUNITIES FOR
DRAMATIC INITIATIVES (E.G., DISPATCH OF NON-MILITARY
PERSONNEL, QUICK DISBURSEMENT OF FINANCIAL SUPPORT)
WERE LOST TO CAUTION IN THE BUREAUCRATIC, POLITICAL,
AND BUSINESS COMMUNITIES.

-- JAPAN'S CRISIS MANAGEMENT SYSTEM PROVED TOTALLY
INADEQUATE. EMERGENCY CABINET MEETINGS WERE HELD

REGULARLY WITH NO REAL AGENDA, SIMPLY TO GIVE THE
APPEARANCE OF ACTION. CABINET MEMBERS AND SENIOR
BUREAUCRATS WERE KEPT TIED UP ALL DAY IN STERILE DIET
SESSIONS AND THEN RETURNED TO THEIR OFFICES IN THE
EVENING TO REVIEW MATERIAL FOR NEXT DAY'S SESSIONS,

-- THE DIET DEBATE CONTRIBUTED ONLY MARGINALLY TO THE
POLICY PROCESS. THE OPPOSITION TRIVIALIZED THE ISSUES
BY FOCUSING ON FINE POINTS OF LAW, AND THE GOVERNMENT
STAYED LARGELY ON THE DEFENSIVE, SEEKING TO AVOID ANY
MISSTATEMENTS THAT COULD DISRUPT PROCEEDINGS, THEREBY
MISSING THE OPPORTUNITY TO USE THE DEBATE TO EDUCATE
THE PUBLIC ON THE FUNDAMENTAL INTERESTS AND PRINCIPLES
AT STAKE. MUCH OF THE RESPONSIBILITY BELONGS TO THE
RIGID PARLIAMENTARY PRACTICES BUILT UP OVER THE FORTY
YEARS OF SINGLE PARTY RULE AND TO THE BUREAUCRATIC
MENTALITY WITH WHICH THE GOJ, THE LDP, AND THE

OPPOSITION HAVE TRADITIONALLY APPROACHED ISSUES.

LESSONS LEARNED

7. IT IS TOO EARLY TO SAY WITH ANY CONFIDENCE WHAT
WILL BE THE LONG TERM IMPACT, IF ANY, OF THE GULF
CRISIS ON JAPAN, BUT WE OFFER THESE PRELIMINARY
CONCLUSIONS ON THE LESSONS JAPAN IS DRAWING FROM THE

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ALERT

PAGE 01 TOKYO 04532 04 OF 07 140631Z SS05257

INFO: X(01) EAP(01)

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ACTION SS-00

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 /001W

-----4CF311 140632Z /38

R 140627Z MAR 91
 FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
 TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5267
 INFO RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
 AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
 AMEMBASSY BEIJING
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 AMEMBASSY BONN
 AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
 AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
 USMISSION USHATO 7109
 COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB JA
 USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 04 OF 07 TOKYO 04532

EXDIS

DEPT PLEASE PASS TO COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB AND USCINCPAC

HONOLULU

CINCPAC ALSO FOR POLAD

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR
 TAGS: PREL, MARR, JA, IZ, US
 SUBJECT: THE GULF WAR; IMPACT ON JAPAN AND
 LAST SEVEN MONTHS:

EXDIS

-- JAPAN NEEDS TO DO MORE THAN SEND MONEY. WHILE THE VALIDITY OF JAPAN'S POSTWAR COMMITMENT NOT TO SEND MILITARY FORCES ABROAD TO ENGAGE IN COMBAT HAS NOT BEEN SERIOUSLY QUESTIONED, THERE IS A WIDESPREAD FEELING HERE THAT JAPAN CAN NOT SIMPLY BUY FRIENDS WITH AID, AND FINANCE THOSE WHO ARE DOING THE DIRTY AND DANGEROUS WORK INVOLVED IN MAINTAINING INTERNATIONAL STABILITY. THERE IS NO CONSENSUS ON EXACTLY WHAT TASK JAPAN SHOULD BE PREPARED TO UNDERTAKE ABROAD, BUT FAVORITE SUGGESTIONS INCLUDE LOGISTICAL SUPPORT FOR U.N. PEACE KEEPING ACTIVITIES, PROVIDING MEDICAL TEAMS TO CRISIS AREAS, AND HELP IN MOVING REFUGEES FROM AREAS OF CONFLICT. AT THIS STAGE ONLY LIP SERVICE IS BEING PAYED TO THESE IDEAS, BUT THE UPCOMING DEBATE ON THE NEW PEACE COOPERATION LAW WILL BE AN OPPORTUNITY TO FLESH OUT SOME OF THESE PROPOSALS. MOFA OFFICIALS ARE LOOKING AT A U.N.-SUPERVISED CAMBODIAN SETTLEMENT AS THE NEXT OPPORTUNITY FOR GOJ INVOLVEMENT IN PKO ACTIVITIES.

-- JAPAN IS NOT A GREAT POWER OR HUNGRY TO BECOME ONE. DESERT SHIELD/STORM WAS A VIVID REMINDER THAT

FOR ALL ITS ECONOMIC PROGRESS, JAPAN IS NOT IN THE GREAT POWER LEAGUE. THE LEADERSHIP, DETERMINATION, DIPLOMATIC SKILL, AND MILITARY EFFICIENCY DISPLAYED BY THE U.S. STUNNED MANY JAPANESE WHO WERE BEGINNING TO EQUATE OUR ECONOMIC PROBLEMS WITH AN OVERALL DECLINE

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 OF AMERICAN STRENGTH AND WILL. THERE IS RENEWED RECOGNITION HERE THAT FOR THE FORSEEABLE FUTURE JAPAN CANNOT MATCH OUR ABILITIES IN ANY OF THESE AREAS NOR SHOULD IT TRY TO DO SO. WHILE WE STILL HEAR TALK OF JAPANESE ASPIRATIONS FOR A PERMANENT SEAT ON THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL, THESE VOICES ARE MORE HESITANT THAN A FEW MONTHS AGO.

-- JAPAN'S FOREIGN POLICY FORMULATION AND IMPLEMENTATION IS INADEQUATE. THERE IS A WIDESPREAD PERCEPTION THAT THE GOJ WAS CAUGHT OFF-GUARD BY THE GULF CRISIS, PROVED INCAPABLE OF DEVELOPING ITS OWN ANALYSIS OF THE SITUATION AS IT EVOLVED, AND CAME UP WITH NO POLICY RESPONSE OTHER THAN FOLLOWING THE U.S. LEAD. WHILE THIS POLICY PROVED TO BE THE CORRECT ONE IN LIGHT OF OUR SUCCESS, JAPANESE BUREAUCRATS, POLITICAL LEADERS, AND MEDIA COMMENTATORS ARE CHAGRINED AND FRUSTRATED BY THE GOJ'S CLEAR LACK OF INDEPENDENT FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS AND FORMULATION. THIS FRUSTRATION MAY BE MANIFESTED IN

AND INCREASED PRESSURE FOR "INDEPENDENT" FOREIGN POLICY INITIATIVES IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND OTHER AREAS (E.G., INDOCHINA).

-- THE JAPAN SOCIALIST PARTY DEMONSTRATED (AGAIN) ITS INABILITY TO PUT FORWARD POLICIES RELEVANT TO MODERN

JAPAN AND SAW ITS SUPPORT RATE DROP FROM 20% BEFORE THE CRISIS TO 10% AFTER. AT THE SAME TIME, THE LDP DEMONSTRATED ITS ABILITY TO PUT TOGETHER A WORKING COALITION WITH THE KOMETO AND DSP TO PASS THE \$9 BILLION CONTRIBUTION, PERHAPS ESTABLISHING THE PATTERN FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF JAPANESE POLITICS IN THE 1990S.

IMPACT ON U.S. - JAPAN RELATIONS

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ROUTINE

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ALERT

PAGE #1 TOKYO 04532 05 OF 07 140632Z SS05261
INFO: X(01) EAP(01)
----- 14/07212 A1 DRF (TOTAL COPIES: 002)

ACTION SS-00

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 - /001W
-----4CF321 140632Z /38

R 140627Z MAR 91
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5268
INFO RUEHBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
AMEMBASSY BEIJING
AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR
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AMEMBASSY ROME
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AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
USMISSION USNATO 7110
COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB JA
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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 05 OF 07 TOKYO 04532

EXDIS

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HONOLULU

CINCPAC ALSO FOR POLAD

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, MARR, JA, IZ, US

SUBJECT: THE GULF WAR: IMPACT ON JAPAN AND

8. THE IMPACT OF OUR SUCCESS IN THE GULF WAR ON U.S.-JAPAN RELATIONS HAS BEEN MIXED. ON THE POSITIVE SIDE, THE UNITED STATES PROVED TO BE THE "ONLY GAME IN TOWN," AND REAFFIRMED ITS WILLINGNESS AND ABILITY TO COME TO THE AID OF FRIENDS ABOARD, A GREAT REASSURANCE TO THE VAST MAJORITY OF JAPANESE WHO FIND COMFORT IN THE U.S. ORBIT, AND A USEFUL REMINDER TO THE FEW OTHERS WHO MAY HAVE BEEN LOOKING FOR STRATEGIC OPTIONS. ON THE NEGATIVE SIDE, THE "BASHING" FROM THE CONGRESS AND THE AMERICAN MEDIA OF THE LAST SEVEN MONTHS OVER JAPAN'S INADEQUATE RESPONSE TO THE GULF, WHILE VIEWED BY MANY JAPANESE AS JUSTIFIABLE CRITICISM, HAS ALSO FUELED RESENTMENT HERE. MANY BUREAUCRATS AND CONSERVATIVE POLITICAL LEADERS COMPLAINED ABOUT PERCEIVED U.S. INSENSITIVITY TO THE COMPLEXITIES OF JAPANESE DOMESTIC POLITICS, PARTICULARLY WITH THE UPPER HOUSE IN OPPOSITION HANDS, THAT MADE IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE GOJ TO MOVE QUICKLY. OTHERS, MOSTLY IN THE MEDIA AND OPPOSITION, COMPLAINED ABOUT AMERICAN "HIGHHANDINESS" IN UNDERTAKING UNILATERAL ACTION WITHOUT CONSULTATION WITH JAPAN AND THEN ASKING THE JAPANESE TAXPAYER TO PICK UP A LARGE PERCENTAGE OF THE TAB. THE BROAD INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR OUR EFFORT AS EMBODIED IN THE UNSC

RESOLUTIONS AND OUR SUCCESS HAS LARGELY MITIGATED THESE NEGATIVE ASPECTS, BUT THERE REMAIN CORNERS OF SOLDERING RESENTMENT, PARTICULARLY IN THE FOREIGN POLICY BUREAUCRACY.

TOKYO 04532 05 OF 07 140632Z SS05261
9. OF MORE IMPORTANCE IS THE GROWING TREMOR HERE THAT AMERICA'S WELCOME NEW SELF-CONFIDENCE MAY TURN TO ARROGANCE AND THAT THE UNITED STATES, UNCONSTRAINED BY THE NEED TO MAINTAIN ALLIANCES TO CONTAIN THE SOVIET UNION IN A "UNI-POLAR WORLD" AND FRIGHTENED BY JAPAN'S ECONOMIC CHALLENGE, WILL NOW "TURN ITS GUNS" TOWARD TOKYO. THE JAPANESE RECOGNIZE THAT ITS STILL LARGE TRADE IMBALANCE, BILATERAL PROBLEMS IN SUCH AREAS AS CONSTRUCTION AND SEMICONDUCTORS, ITS FAILURE TO EXERCISE LEADERSHIP AT THE URUGUAY ROUND, AND ITS CONTINUED COMPETITIVE EDGE IN A WIDE RANGE OF MANUFACTURED PRODUCTS INCLUDING AUTOMOBILES, PROVIDE AMPLE AMMUNITION. MANY OF OUR JAPANESE CONTACTS AND MANY IN THE MEDIA ALREADY SEE CLEAR SIGNS OF A SOURING OF THE AMERICAN MOOD TOWARD JAPAN IN THE BELITTLING BY THE CONGRESS AND THE AMERICAN PRESS OF JAPAN'S \$13 BILLION CONTRIBUTION TO THE GULF EFFORT; NEW U.S. PUBLIC OPINION POLLS SHOWING JAPAN AS THE MAJOR THREAT; AND THE ALLEGED LACK OF ATTENTION PAID TO JAPAN BY AMERICAN LEADERS DURING AND AFTER THE GULF WAR, INCLUDING REPORTS THAT THE PRESIDENT'S PLANNED VISIT TO TOKYO WILL NOW BE DELAYED UNTIL FALL.

PURSuing OUR INTERESTS

10. WE HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF JAPAN'S DEFENSIVENESS AND SENSE OF INADEQUACY ABOUT ITS PERFORMANCE

[REDACTED] BUT AN OVERLY CONFRONTATIONAL APPROACH RISKS PROVOKING AN UNPRODUCTIVE BACKLASH. TO BE MOST EFFECTIVE WE WILL NEED TO LAY OUT CLEAR OBJECTIVES AND AVOID INCHOATE

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ALERT

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INFO: X(01) EAP(01)

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ACTION SS-00

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 /001W

-----4CF331 140633Z /38

R 140627Z MAR 91
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
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COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB JA
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
HONOLULU

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, MARR, JA, IZ, US

SUBJECT: THE GULF WAR: IMPACT ON JAPAN AND
"DEMANDS" THAT COULD FEED THE GROWING PERCEPTION HERE
THAT THE U.S. IS MORE INTERESTED IN CATHARSIS THAN
ACHIEVING CONCRETE RESULTS.



11. WE ALSO NEED TO DEVOTE CLOSE ATTENTION TO TRYING
TO ENSURE GOJ FOREIGN POLICY INITIATIVES IN AREAS OF
MAJOR INTEREST TO US - [REDACTED]

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R 140627Z MAR 91
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DEPT PLEASE PASS TO COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB AND USCINCPAC

HONOLULU


CINCPAC ALSO FOR POLAD

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, MARR, JA, IZ, US

SUBJECT: THE GULF WAR: IMPACT ON JAPAN AND

EXDIS



WE DO NOT EXPECT ANY SURPRISES ON THE STRATEGIC LEVEL, SUCH AS A MAJOR CHANGE IN TERMS FOR NORMALIZATION WITH MOSCOW; BUT WE CAN EXPECT A TENDENCY FOR MORE INDEPENDENT INITIATIVES ON ASIAN ISSUES AND PERHAPS TOWARD THE MIDDLE EAST. OUR BEST STRATEGY IS TO BRING THE GOJ AS FULLY INTO THE TENT AS POSSIBLE THROUGH ENHANCED WORKING LEVEL EXCHANGES ON REGIONAL ISSUES AND REGULAR POLICY-LEVEL CONSULTATIONS.

12. IN SUM, WE HAVE A REAL OPPORTUNITY TO INFLUENCE THE DIRECTION OF JAPANESE FOREIGN POLICY AND TO POINT JAPAN'S FINANCIAL AND POLITICAL INFLUENCE IN DIRECTIONS SUPPORTIVE OF U.S. INTERESTS IF WE DEVOTE THE TIME NECESSARY FOR CONSULTATIONS AND IF WE GIVE THE GOJ SOME ROOM FOR MANEUVER WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO ACHIEVING SHARED OBJECTIVES. AT THE SAME TIME WE WILL RUN REAL RISKS OF PUSHING THE

JAPANESE OFF IN A MORE INDEPENDENT DIRECTION IF WE DO NOT GIVE THEM A FULL PLACE AT THE TABLE. WHETHER THEY DESERVE IT OR NOT ON THE BASIS OF THEIR CONTRIBUTIONS TO DATE.

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