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By DW / BKC NARA, Date 6/13/19

TELOON Amb. Debrynin - Secretary Kissinger October 13, 1973

K: Here is what we will do. the message which you have sent us....we will not go to the Security Council tonight even though the original idea was to go at 6:00. We will wait and make a decision on how to proceed until 9:00.

D: Morning?

K: 9:00 tomorow morning, which will be a whole day in the Middle East conflict. If you will have, if you could get me an answer from Moscow which is a little bit more specific.'

D: On what...put me in a very difficult position to do it publicly

K: But if you can give indications privately, you and I have handled crises before. We are interested in a result...cease-fire and status quo ante...estimate by Tuesday you will be asking us. It isn't a question, we are not asking for a favor. We are trying to prevent..exacerbation of our relationship... The situation in this country with public opinion and Congress...very serious consequences. If you tell us by Monday morning this thing will be over there will be no debate.

D: What?

K: If you tell us you believe by Monday, there is an effective cease-fire and status quo ante, don't worry, we don't want to do this by public affair. If you tell us something else, that of course, would be kept confidential as everything.

D: I understand.

K: In effect you to agree by tomorrow morning for public action, concerned practical action that will...

D: Really...tell Gromyko and Breshnev by Tuesday the situation will be..

K: Right now our reading on the situation that Arab attacked has been totally contained. They are now going to be pushed back, possibly will be appealated as Israeli mobilization is completed, after that we will ass what we lave, see we keye times before. We think if the master could be sowed up tomorrow...Arabs proved their point, schools accord the Canal and return to the status quo ante. Both

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K: I know your position.

D: It is not a public debate. I am telling you, for us to tell the Arabs very difficult. Don't hear from Moscow another difficulty, new facing question. Arabs d; ng what they feel necessary, lands accompanied by Israel. They definitely using this argument with us. Very difficult for us to tell them, look here you shouldn't do that.

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D: OUr course of action you would public. Security Council.

K: Defacto return to status quo ante, de factor return to cease-fire. Thave already told Egypt that I would make effort after Israeli election. Thave already told Gromyko I would make an effort. None of this I would do if...framework. We could compromise in..and going to looks. It isn't

D: I understand, military point, of view you know situation better than. It's not politically .. is a question.

K: These

D: Question to near asking them to let similar, if they have nothing..

K: We have, perhaps we can't let this war continue until the ...when the Israelis have pushed the Arabs out of every territory, but haven't started clobbering the Arabs. If we are losing, want the exact moment possibly Arabs can hold on for 24 hours. little to capture and we wait for a settlement. Anatoly, with all respect...we will face this problem in the next 48 hours one way or another, if we do nothing by Tuesday, Wednesday at the latest. Arabas will have been defeated.


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K: At that point what are we going to do?

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- H: I will approach them tonight. You can count on... I will approach them.
- D: Much better to personaly tell them, from us it will look as don't seen trying to sell them out.
- K: We will not go to Security Council tonight, give...a chance to think you...and we think try to get any message from Moscow at 9:00 tomorrow morning.

D: 9 or 10:00?

K: After noon there now.

D: 4:00 - they are setting in Savidabo .. what kind of discussion on weekend going on.

K: I can imagaine what kind of discussion going on at this hour. ..at 1:00 in the morning.

D: It will not be..

K: I understand..aroudn Savidabo people are very happy
D: Also trust Gromyko's ingenuity. If you have any ideas during course of night..I will call you.

K: Not at night. I sleep quietly. What you have to understand is we have no to us if it turns into propaganda battle..we will have the non-aligned and you and everyone else on Monday in the GA..will only..protection we have is to be extremely tough and, the facts of life..

D: I understand, for us to go..opening. Look, I don't know. You like us to give back territory which belongs to us.

K: Can't wait you understand. Effort going to be made for negotiation. Certainly now public point of original to start. We don't know what you are going to tell them. By Monday evening going to be thrown out of there anyway.

D: New strategy of using threat of..

K: Wuestion really is practical.

D: Practical prior of view. Give back territory that belongs to them..always belonged to them. I understand your dilemma.

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K: Hope I could us on this particular. . American line.

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
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K: Let's not let time slip by. I believe military situation will rapidly turn sour..

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K: Cairo [China?] [illegible] Russians really were in collusion with the US and Israel [illegible]. Retreat from territory we....

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