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RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D), B6

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Printed By: Robert J. Clarke

ACTION EAP-01

INFO LOG-00 TEDE-00 ADS-00 ONY-00 SSO-00 SS-00 SAS-00
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FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5878

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 000544

OFFICIAL INFORMAL - FOR EAP/PIMBS D. HARTWICK FROM DCM M. OWENS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/03/09
TAGS: OGEN
SUBJECT: OFFICIAL INFORMAL JAKARTA TO PIMBS NO. 20

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1. CLASSIFIED BY MICHAEL P. OWENS, DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION.
REASON: 1.5 (D).

2. (C) UN PRESENCE IN EAST TIMOR

[REDACTED] HE SAYS THAT IN FACT HIS "HOME OFFICE" HAS BEEN GIVING THOUGHT TO EAST TIMOR RECENTLY. IT IS QUITE POSSIBLE THAT UNHCR INVOLVEMENT MAY BE TRIGGERED IN THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE BY AN OUTFLOW OF REFUGEES (I.E., FROM THE STATE OF EAST TIMOR TO THE STATE OF INDONESIA). MOREOVER, UNHCR DOES GIVE CONSIDERATION TO DISPLACED PERSONS WITHIN STATES AND UNHCR IS AWARE OF RELIABLE REPORTS OF SOME THOUSANDS OF DISPLACED AS A RESULT OF RECENT UNREST IN EAST TIMOR. SEPARATELY, WE HAVE ALSO TALKED WITH [REDACTED] WHO SHARES OUR CONCERN THAT FURTHER DETERIORATION OF THE SECURITY CONDITION AS WELL AS FOOD, WATER AND MEDICAL NEEDS COULD WARRANT CONSIDERATION OF AN INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION. [REDACTED] IS PARTICULARLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE WEEK-LONG CLOSING OF THE DILI CIVILIAN HOSPITAL (SINCE JANUARY 27.) [REDACTED] BELIEVES THE CLOSING WAS FOR POLITICAL AS WELL AS SECURITY REASONS. (THIS MATTER DID NOT ARISE IN POL'S DISCUSSION FEBRUARY 2 WITH [REDACTED]) OUR INTERLOCUTORS AND WE BELIEVE THAT THE PRESENCE OF INTERNATIONAL (UN AND OTHER) PRESENCE COULD HAVE A CALMING/REASSURING EFFECT. MOREOVER, IN THE EVENT THAT THERE IS A TRANSITION IN EAST TIMOR'S POLITICAL STATUS, THERE WOULD BE ADVANTAGE IN LAYING SOME OF THE GROUNDWORK FOR THE INEVITABLE NEW HUMANITARIAN AND OTHER ASSISTANCE REQUIREMENTS WHICH WILL FOLLOW.

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3. (C) INFORMAL INTERAGENCY ON EAST TIMOR

WE WOULD SUGGEST DISCUSSION OF THE FOLLOWING ISSUES:

-- WE ARE GETTING CONFLICTING SIGNALS ON HOW THE EAST TIMORESE WILL BE "CONSULTED" REGARDING THEIR ACCEPTANCE/REJECTION OF THE AUTONOMY OFFER. DEPLU SEEMS TO BE INDICATING THAT JUNE ELECTIONS FOR THE LOCAL ASSEMBLY IN EAST TIMOR COULD BE SEEN AS A SORT OF SELF-DETERMINATION EXERCISE (ALATAS STILL SEEMS DEAD SET AGAINST A REFERENDUM). OBVIOUSLY FOR THIS TO HAVE ANY VALIDITY XANANA AND THE VARIOUS EAST TIMORESE PARTIES WOULD HAVE TO PARTICIPATE IN A FREE AND FAIR PROCESS, A BIG ORDER GIVEN THE SHORT TIME FRAME. WE NEED TO PUSH THE GOI TO ESTABLISH, AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, A CLEAR PROCESS WHICH CAN BE APPROVED BY ALL THE MAJOR PLAYERS. IF THE UN PROCESS IS TO REMAIN RELEVANT, THE REAL EAST TIMORESE LEADERS WILL HAVE TO BE BROUGHT IN MORE DIRECTLY AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. AT THE END OF THE DAY, THE REALITY MAY SIMPLY BE

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(B), 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 2 FEB 2024
DATE/CASE ID: 09 MAR 2007 200503302

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THAT NEITHER JAKARTA NOR THE EAST TIMORESE ARE PREPARED TO MAKE THE KIND OF COMPROMISES THAT WOULD GIVE AUTONOMY A CHANCE. MINDSETS IN DILI AND JAKARTA ARE HARDENING FAST. MANY OBSERVERS BELIEVE INDEPENDENCE IS A DONE DEAL.

-- THE SECURITY SITUATION ON THE GROUND IN EAST TIMOR IS MURKY BUT MOST AGREE (INCLUDING DEPLU, IT APPEARS, [REDACTED])

[REDACTED] REMARKS BEFORE THE HABIBIE MEETING TODAY) THAT ABRI'S ARMING OF CIVILIANS IS A MAJOR PROBLEM. AS YET WE HAVE NO REACTIONS FROM OUR DEMARCHES ON THIS ISSUE, ALTHOUGH WIRANTO'S DENIAL THAT ARMING OF RATIH ELEMENTS IS TAKING PLACE AT LEAST SHOWS THAT HE IS NOW AWARE OF THE CONCERN OVER THIS ISSUE. IT MAY ULTIMATELY BE HARDER TO CONVINCE ABRI TO STOP ARMING AND START DISARMING NOW THAT WIRANTO HAS TAKEN SO DISINGENUOUS A POSITION. XANANA HAS PROPOSED A CEASEFIRE ON THE PART OF THE GUERRILLAS ALONG WITH A MORATORIUM ON PRO-REFERENDUM DEMONSTRATIONS IN EXCHANGE FOR DISARMING THE CIVILIAN MILITIAS. THIS WOULD GIVE ABRI SOME FACE.

-- THE RECENT CONFLICTS HAVE CREATED A POTENTIAL HUMANITARIAN CRISIS. BASED ON THE EXPERIENCE OF THE ICRC, THE PRESENCE OF UNHCR AND/OR OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGENCIES COULD PLAY A POSITIVE ROLE IN REDUCING ABUSES. WE MAY NEED TO BEGIN THINKING ABOUT THE SHAPE OF AND PARTICIPANTS' IN AN INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION. QUIET CONSULTATIONS AND PLANNING SEEM TO BE IN ORDER AT THIS STAGE. GOI REACTION IS HARD TO ANTICIPATE: WHILE RESIDUAL RESISTANCE TO INTERNATIONAL INVOLVEMENT IN EAST TIMOR MAY BE A FACTOR, THE DESIRE TO END THE FINANCIAL OUTLAYS AND DESIRE TO BE SEEN TO BE DOING THE RIGHT THING MIGHT OVERRIDE THIS.

4. (U) FREE, FAIR AND CREDIBLE ELECTIONS

WE THINK THAT YOU HAVE MADE A VERY GOOD BEGINNING ON THE DIFFICULT QUESTION OF WHAT CONSTITUTES A FREE, FAIR AND CREDIBLE ELECTION. AT THIS EARLY STAGE, WE STILL HAVE NOT HAD A CHANCE TO COME UP WITH WHAT WE WOULD REGARD AS A COMPLETE ANSWER, BUT HERE ARE SOME ADDITIONAL THOUGHTS THAT MOST INDONESIANS WILL REGARD AS KEY, SOME OF WHICH ELABORATE UPON WHAT YOU HAVE ALREADY LISTED.

PRE-ELECTION

-- DOES ABRI REFRAIN FROM INTERFERING IN THE ELECTION? (E.G. MOBILIZING VOTERS FOR A PARTICULAR PARTY

* Missing section 2 *

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GOVERNMENT'S ABILITY TO HOLD EITHER NATIONAL OR PROVINCIAL ELECTIONS IN EAST TIMOR IS PROBLEMATIC.) THERE ARE OTHER IMPORTANT PROBLEMS: E.G., HOW TO PROVIDE FOR PRO-INDEPENDENCE PARTIES TO FORM, CAMPAIGN, AND PARTICIPATE IN THE ELECTIONS. THE INDONESIANS RECOGNIZE THE PROBLEM, BUT THEIR THINKING HAS NOT YET JELLED ON THE RIGHT SOLUTION.

-- PRESIDENT HABIBIE OUTLINED FOR A/S ROTH A TIME TABLE PROVIDING FOR SEPARATION OF EAST TIMOR FROM INDONESIA ON JANUARY 1, 2000 IF AUTONOMY IS REJECTED. FOREIGN MINISTER ALATAS TOLD A/S ROTH THAT HE HAD CAUTIONED THE PRESIDENT THAT SUCH A COMPRESSED TIME TABLE WAS UNREALISTIC. ALATAS RECOGNIZES THAT A TRANSITION PROCESS IS NEEDED, BUT CLEARLY THERE IS STILL NO INTERNAL INDONESIAN CONSENSUS ON THIS MATTER.

-- UN ROLE. THE INDONESIANS HAVE OPENLY ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE UNITED NATIONS MUST PLAY A ROLE IN ANY TRANSITION TO INDEPENDENCE FOR EAST TIMOR, INCLUDING BY HAVING A PRESENCE ON THE GROUND (E.G. PRESS REPORTS QUOTE ALATAS AS SAYING THAT THE UN SHOULD MAKE SURE THAT PRO-INDONESIAN EAST TIMORESE ARE NOT ATTACKED IF THE TERRITORY SECEDES). THEY HAVE NOT AS YET DISPLAYED ANY WILLINGNESS TO AGREE TO INTRODUCING A UN PRESENCE INTO EAST TIMOR TO HELP STABILIZE THE SITUATION THERE NOW, WHICH THEY REJECT AS INCOMPATIBLE WITH THEIR POSITION THAT EAST TIMOR IS STILL PART OF INDONESIA. THEY MAY DISPLAY MORE FLEXIBILITY ON THIS QUESTION OVER TIME, BUT FOR THE MOMENT THEY ARE STILL ADHERING TO THE POSITION THAT A UN PRESENCE CAN ONLY BE INTRODUCED AFTER AUTONOMY IS REJECTED.

7. (C) THESE ARE VITAL ISSUES. THE LACK OF CLARITY ON HOW TO APPROACH THEM ILLUSTRATES BOTH THE SUDDENNESS OF THE SHIFT IN INDONESIAN THINKING ON EAST TIMOR, AND THE COMPLEXITY OF THE PROBLEM.

8. (C) STABILIZING THE SITUATION ON THE GROUND: THE RECENT ABRI ARMING OF UNDISCIPLINED PRO-JAKARTA CIVILIAN ELEMENTS IN EAST TIMOR HAS WORSENED AN ALREADY BAD SECURITY SITUATION THERE AND ALARMED MODERATE LEADERS SUCH AS [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] HE FAVORED FORMATION OF A COUNCIL REPRESENTING ALL SHADES OF OPINION AIMED AT REACHING AGREEMENT TO HALT FIGHTING, DISARM CONTENTING FACTIONS, AND FACILITATE PEACEFUL DISCUSSION. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] IS THINKING ALONG SIMILAR LINES BY CALLING FOR EVERYBODY TO SIT AND TALK RATHER THAN TAKING UP ARMS.

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[REDACTED] CLEARLY, A TOP PRIORITY MUST BE TO FIND A MECHANISM TO CALM THE SITUATION IN EAST TIMOR AND GET THE ARMS AWAY FROM IRRESPONSIBLE ELEMENTS. OTHERWISE, POSSIBILITIES FOR PEACEFUL TRANSITION TO EITHER AUTONOMY OR SEPARATION WILL BE DEGRADED OR DESTROYED.

9. (C) NEED FOR A CREDIBLE PROCESS: [REDACTED] ALONG WITH MANY OTHERS, BELIEVES THAT NOW THAT INDEPENDENCE HAS BEEN HELD OUT AS AN OPTION, AUTONOMY WILL NOT BE GIVEN SERIOUS CONSIDERATION AS AN OPTION. THIS DOES NOT ALTER THE NEED FOR A CREDIBLE PROCESS OF DETERMINING THE PREFERENCES OF THE PEOPLE OF EAST TIMOR.

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THUS FAR, EARLY INDONESIAN REACTIONS TO THE GOVERNMENT'S SHIFT IN POLICY HAVE BEEN BROADLY SUPPORTIVE. AN EXCEPTION HAS BEEN [REDACTED] THE PDI-P, THE INDONESIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY - PERJUANGAN, WHICH IS GIVEN STRONG CHANCES OF MAKING A GOOD SHOWING IN THE

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ELECTIONS.

10. (C) MEGAWATI'S POSITION HAS BEEN THAT THE CURRENT GOVERNMENT LACKS SUFFICIENT LEGITIMACY TO MAKE SUCH A FAR-REACHING POLICY SHIFT INVOLVING INDONESIA'S TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY.

[REDACTED]

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11. (C) GENERAL WIRANTO HAS STATED [REDACTED] PUBLICLY [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] THAT THE MILITARY WILL DUTIFULLY SUPPORT THE GOVERNMENT'S DECISION, BUT MANY SUSPECT THE MILITARY'S SUPPORT IS LUKEWARM AT BEST. GIVEN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, THE POSSIBILITY OF A SHIFT IN INDONESIAN ATTITUDES CANNOT BE EXCLUDED, ESPECIALLY IF THE PROCESS OF DETERMINING EAST TIMORESE ATTITUDES IS PERFUNCTORY. FOR THAT REASON, IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT THE PROCESS HAVE INTEGRITY AND CREDIBILITY. THIS REQUIRES THAT THERE BE A MEANINGFUL AUTONOMY OPTION ON THE TABLE.

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12. (C) THE SENSITIVITY OF THIS ISSUE CANNOT BE OVEREMPHASIZED. BOTH ACEHNESE AND IRIANESE HAVE ACKNOWLEDGED TO US THAT INDEPENDENCE HOPES IN THOSE AREAS HAVE BEEN SPURRED BY DEVELOPMENTS RELATING TO EAST TIMOR. A BROAD AUTONOMY OPTION FOR EAST TIMOR COULD ALSO BECOME THE STARTING POINT FOR AUTONOMY DEMANDS BY OTHER PARTS OF INDONESIA. IF THE INDONESIANS FALTER IN THEIR EFFORTS TO HANDLE EAST TIMOR SEPARATELY FROM THE LARGER ISSUES INVOLVING THE INTEGRITY OF INDONESIA ITSELF, A COMPLEX SITUATION WILL BE RENDERED EVEN MORE DIFFICULT.

13. (C) INDONESIA AND PORTUGAL CLEARLY ARE STILL IN THE PROCESS OF RETHINKING THEIR APPROACHES IN THE WAKE OF THE SUDDEN GOI POLICY SHIFT. FOR THAT REASON, A CRITICAL GOAL OF THE MEETINGS BETWEEN ALATAS AND HIS PORTUGUESE COUNTERPART IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS SHOULD BE TO SMOOTH THE PROCESS OF READJUSTING THINKING ON BOTH SIDES SO THAT THE FOCUS CAN BE ON THE NEW OPPORTUNITIES AND NOT ON THE OLD DIFFERENCES. THERE IS NOW LIGHT AT THE END OF THE TUNNEL, BUT THERE ARE NUMEROUS PITFALLS ALONG THE WAY. ROY

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