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{U} THIS MESSAGE IS PART OF THE PRODUCTION EFFORT OF THE UNIFIED COMMANDS, THE MILITARY SERVICES, NSA, AND DIA. EVERY REASONABLE EFFORT IS MADE TO ENSURE THAT INIVIDUAL ARTICLES REPRESENT THE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY VIEW. }}} SERIAL: MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIGEST {MID} 150-4A SECTION 1 OF 3 /***********************************		
SUBJ: (U) THE UNITED NATIONS' CHALLENGES IN INDONESIA'S EAST TIMOR DOI: 3 AUG 99 {AS OF 1000 EST} TEXT: 1. (U) BECAUSE DIA'S FINISHED INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTS USE A STANDARDIZED INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY CLASSIFICATION MARKING SYSTEM. THAT IS NOT COMPATIBLE WITH TODAY'S MESSAGE-HANDLING SYSTEM, THIS MESSAGE SHOWS THE OVERALL CLASSIFICATION ABOVE IN A DIFFERENT FOR THAN THAT USED THROUGHOUT THE BODY OF THE MESSAGE. IN TERMS OF STANDARDIZED INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MARKING SYSTEM, THE OVERALL CLASSIFICATION FOR THIS MESSAGE IS SECRETI/X1. 2. (S) DESPITE PERSISTENT UNREST AND HOSTILITY BY PRO-INDONESIAN MILITIAS, THE UN MISSION IN EAST TIMOR STILL IS PREPARING FOR A UN-RUN REFERENDUM ON THE PROVINCE'S FUTURE. INDONESIA HAS STEPPE SECURITY MEASURES, ALTHOUGH SHORT OF NEUTRALIZING THE VIOLENCE-MILITIAS. JAKARTA'S DESIRE TO AVOID FURTHER HARM TO ITS INTERNATIONAS STANDING SUGGESTS IT WILL ACCOMMODATE UN DEMANDS, BUT INDONESIAN DIFFERENCES WITH THE UNITED NATIONS POINT TO LINGERING FRICTION. 3-(S)-UN PREPARATIONS. DESPITE SEVERAL DELAYS, THE UN MISSION IS MAKING PROGRESS IN PREPARATIONS FOR A POPULAR VOTE ENABLING EAST TIMORESE TO CHOOSE BROAD AUTONOMY WITHIN THE INDONESIAN STATE OF THE PROPERTY OF THE PROPE	RM THE - ED UP PRONE AL AN	

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SEPARATION UNDER TRANSITIONAL UN OVERSIGHT. RECENT SECURITY IMPROVEMENTS HAVE PERMITTED THE MISSION TO REGISTER MOST OF THE OVER 400,000 ELIGIBLE VOTERS, ALTHOUGH NOT WITHOUT MORE VIOLENCE FROM BOTH SIDES, PARTICULARLY INTIMIDATING ACTIONS BY THE PRO-INDONESIAN MILITIAS. ALSO OF CONCERN ARE A STILL-LARGE NUMBER OF VOTERS DISPLACED BY EARLIER MILITIA VIOLENCE. BECAUSE OF THIS SITUATION, THE UNITED NATIONS LAST WEEK AGAIN DELAYED THE VOTE UNTIL 30 AUGUST. 4. (8) SINCE ITS ARRIVAL, THE UN MISSION HAS CONFRONTED PERSISTENT INDONESIAN BREACHES OF THE 5 MAY UN ACCORD GOVERNING THE VOTE, INCLUDING CAMPAIGN AND FUNDING VIOLATIONS. THE PROAUTONOMY CAMPAIGN BEGAN WELL BEFORE THE UN SIGNING, VARYING FROM VIOLENT INTIMIDATION BY THE MILITIAS AND LOCAL OFFICIALS TO MORE RECENT GOVERNMENT RICE HANDOUTS TO GARNER SUPPORT. ALTHOUGH COOPERATING WITH THE UNITED NATIONS, INDONESIAN AUTHORITIES RESENT UN COMPLAINTS AND BELIEVE THE MISSION IS SUPPORTING THE PROINDEPENDENCE CAUSE. HOPEFUL OF VICTORY AND FEARFUL OF LOSING MOMENTUM, JAKARTA OPPOSES FURTHER UN DELAYS AND HAS SOUGHT TO DEFLECT BLAME FROM THE MILITIAS TO PROVOCATIONS BY THE OTHER SIDE.

5.-(S)-CHANGED SECURITY DIRECTIVES. FACING RISING FOREIGN CRITICISM, ARMED FORCES COMMANDER WIRANTO HAS TAKEN MORE CONCERTED ACTION IN RECENT WEEKS TO AVOID FURTHER EMBARRASSING INCIDENTS. FOLLOWING GEN WIRANTO'S VISIT IN MID-JULY, JAKARTA BEGAN TO REPLACE LOCAL COMMANDERS CLOSE TO THE MILITIAS AND REPORTEDLY DIRECTED OFFICERS TO RESPOND TO UN NEEDS. THE RECENTLY AUGMENTED POLICE FORCE IS NOW MOVING INTO TROUBLED AREAS, ALTHOUGH SHORTCOMINGS AND LACK OF WILLPOWER IN CONFRONTING MILITARY-BACKED MILITIAS STILL UNDERMINE POLICE EFFECTIVENESS.

6:-(S) DESPITE THESE STEPPED-UP MEASURES, THE MILITIAS' IMPORTANCE TO THE PROAUTONOMY CAMPAIGN STILL MILITATES AGAINST MORE FORCEFUL MEASURES AGAINST THEM. ALTHOUGH NOW PRECLUDED FROM CAMPAIGNING, ARMY OFFICIALS REMAIN HEAVILY INVOLVED IN INFLUENCING THE VOTE BY TRYING TO UNIFY THE PROINTEGRATIONISTS AND MOBILIZING VOTER TURNOUT FOR AUTONOMY. NOTORIOUS MILITIA GROUPS CONTINUE TO OPERATE ABOVE THE LAW, DESPITE THE ARMED FORCES' ABILITY TO NEUTRALIZE THEM QUICKLY IF THEY CHOOSE.

7.-(S)-CHALLENGES AHEAD. THE UNITED NATIONS IS CALLING FOR FURTHER SPECIFIC MEASURES TO HALT MILITIA INTIMIDATION, SEVER MILITARY-TO-MILITIA TIES, AND OVERCOME THE REFUGEE PROBLEM BEFORE CERTIFYING THAT "FREE AND FAIR" CONDITIONS EXIST FOR BALLOTING. IT ALSO HAS URGED JAKARTA TO ESTABLISH SAFEGUARDS TO ALLOW INDEPENDENCE GROUPS TO CAMPAIGN AND TO AGREE ON CANTONMENT AREAS FOR THE ARMED FORCES, MILITIA, AND REBEL ELEMENTS BEFORE THE VOTE. MILITIA COERCION

PROBABLY WILL NARROW THE CONTEST, ALTHOUGH STRONG PROINDEPENDENCE SYMPATHIES PERSIST. A FAILURE TO MAKE ADEQUATE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS COULD AGAIN DELAY THE VOTE, BUT IN VIEW OF ITS MAJOR INVESTMENT, THE UNITED NATIONS APPEARS RECONCILED TO LESS THAN IDEAL CONDITIONS AS LONG AS A CREDIBLE OUTCOME REMAINS POSSIBLE.

8. (9) THREATS BY MILITANT MILITIA LEADERS TO VIOLENTLY REJECT A PROINDEPENDENCE VOTE ALSO HAVE PROMPTED A UN REVIEW OF POSTBALLOT SECURITY. THE UN POLICE AND ADVISORY PRESENCE WILL EXPAND, BUT THE INDONESIA MILITARY WILL RETAIN SECURITY RESPONSIBILITY UNTIL INDONESIA'S PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY VOTES TO ACCEPT THE BALLOT RESULTS IN OCTOBER. JAKARTA HAS PLEDGED NOT TO DEPART ABRUPTLY IF EAST TIMOR CHOOSES INDEPENDENCE AND EVEN HAS AGREED TO PROVIDE FURTHER TROOP AUGMENTATION UNTIL THE PROVINCE IS FORMALLY HANDED OVER TO THE UNITED NATIONS. NONETHELESS, THE GOVERNMENT NOW APPEARS DETERMINED TO SCALE BACK ITS COSTLY INVOLVEMENT AND REPORTEDLY IS PREPARING TO EVACUATE INDONESIAN AND FOREIGN NATIONALS AS A CONTINGENCY.

9.-(S)-OWING TO MILITIA DOMINANCE IN VARIOUS AREAS, AN UPRISING COULD WELL PROVE SERIOUS AND EVEN THREATENING TO UN PERSONNEL, ESPECIALLY IF SECURITY FORCES FAIL TO REACT QUICKLY. AT LEAST SOME MILITIA LEADERS WILL TRY TO KEEP THEIR WESTERN STRONGHOLDS PART OF INDONESIA, BUT THEIR ABILITY TO WAGE A FULL-SCALE CIVIL WAR REMAINS DOUBTFUL. PROINTEGRATIONIST WARNINGS TO SOME DEGREE REFLECT POSTURING TO DISCOURAGE A PROINDEPENDENCE VOTE. HARD-CORE MILITANTS PROBABLY NUMBER ONLY A SMALL FRACTION OF THE MORE THAN 12,000 CLAIMED PARAMILITARY MEMBERS, AND MANY KEY INTEGRATIONIST LEADERS PRIVATELY HAVE EXPRESSED INTEREST IN A POWERSHARING ARRANGEMENT. STILL, PARTITIONING THE PROVINCE HAS SOME APPARENT SUPPORT IN THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT, WHICH IS RELUCTANT TO ABANDON ITS TIMORESE ALLIES. THE ARMED FORCES' POSTURE THUS WILL REMAIN IMPORTANT, BUT ULTIMATELY A PEACEFUL SOLUTION RESTS ON RECONCILIATION AMONG THE TIMORESE THEMSELVES. CATHOLIC CHURCH-SPONSORED TALKS ARE TO RECONVENE AFTER THE VOTE, ALTHOUGH A BREAKTHROUGH DOES NOT APPEAR IMMINENT. }}}}

10. (C) THE UN PRESENCE IN EAST TIMOR. SINCE ITS ARRIVAL IN MAY, THE UN MISSION GRADUALLY HAS MOVED INTO THE COUNTRYSIDE TO PREPARE FOR THE UPCOMING BALLOT. WITH APPROXIMATELY 1,000 FOREIGN PERSONNEL INVOLVED, THE MISSION HAS NEARLY COMPLETED VOTER REGISTRATION AND IS PREPARING FOR THE FORMAL CAMPAIGN FROM 11 TO 27 AUGUST. THE PRESENCE OF UN CIVILIAN POLICE AND MILITARY LIAISON OFFICERS IS CONSTRAINING THE ACTIVITIES OF LOCAL SECURITY AUTHORITIES AND MILITIA LEADERS. NONETHELESS, UN OFFICIALS STILL SEE THE NEED FOR SUSTAINED

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/****** BEGINNING OF SECTION 002 ******/

IMPROVEMENTS TO SHARPLY REDUCE THE PROFILE OF THE MILITIAS, SUSPEND MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN PRO-AUTONOMY ACTIVITIES, AND ARREST OR OTHERWISE PREVENT MILITIA PERSONNEL FROM ENGAGING IN FURTHER INTIMIDATION AND VIOLENCE.

11.(C).THE UNITED NATIONS, CONCERNED ABOUT UNREST, IS PREPARING A DETAILED PLAN TO INCREASE ITS SECURITY PRESENCE. THE RECOMMENDATION CALLS FOR SOME 450 CIVILIAN POLICE, 350 MILITARY OBSERVERS, AND A CIVIL AFFAIRS STAFF DURING THE POSTBALLOT PHASE. THE UNITED NATIONS ALSO HAS SUGGESTED A GRADUAL BUILDUP OF 6,000 TO 10,000 TROOPS IF INDONESIA FORMALLY RELINQUISHES THE TERRITORY. HOWEVER, CARRYING OUT THIS CONTINGENCY PLAN WOULD TAKE SEVERAL WEEKS AND WOULD REQUIRE APPROVAL FROM THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL. UNTIL THEN, THE UNITED NATIONS EXPECTS INDONESIAN SECURITY FORCES TO RETAIN PRIMARY LAW AND ORDER RESPONSIBILITY AFTER THE BALLOT.

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12.-(S) THE MILITIAS. ALTHOUGH AN OVERALL COMMAND STRUCTURE EXISTS, THE EAST TIMORESE MILITIAS ARE LOOSELY JOINED IN CLAN-BASED GROUPS LED BY LOCAL FIGURES. SUCH PARAMILITARY UNITS TRADITIONALLY HAVE AUGMENTED REGULAR INDONESIAN COMBAT TROOPS IN THE PROVINCE. THE APPROXIMATELY 30 MILITIAS CLAIM OVER 12,000 MEMBERS. HOWEVER, HARDCORE ALLEGIANCE IS SUSPECT BECAUSE MANY MILITIA PERSONNEL WERE PRESSED INTO SERVICE EARLIER THIS YEAR.

13. (S) SEVERAL TYPES OF PARAMILITARY ORGANIZATIONS EXIST. OVER AT LEAST THE PAST DECADE, SPECIAL FORCES UNITS FORMED MILITIA TEAMS THAT REMAIN ASSOCIATED WITH THE LOCAL MILITARY COMMAND STRUCTURE. THESE OLDER GROUPS ARE SMALL, BUT THEY ARE BETTER TRAINED AND ARMED THAN THE MUCH LARGER, NEWER GROUPS.

14.-(3) THE NEW MILITIAS WERE MOBILIZED RAPIDLY LATE LAST YEAR TO COUNTER A RESURGENT PROINDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT. AS WITH THE OLDER MILITIAS, SPECIAL FORCES INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS HAVE PROVIDED GUIDANCE AND SOME MATERIAL SUPPORT. NONETHELESS, THE NEW MILITIAS FALL OUTSIDE THE LOCAL COMMAND STRUCTURE, HAVE FEW MODERN ARMS, AND HAVE ONLY RUDIMENTARY TRAINING. LED BY MILITANT COMMANDERS, THESE MILITIAS HAVE PROVED THE MOST VIOLENT AND DIFFICULT TO CONTROL. WITH THEIR STRONGHOLDS IN THE WESTERN DISTRICTS, SEVERAL NEW MILITIAS HAVE PERPETRATED MOST OF THE VIOLENCE IN RECENT MONTHS.

AITARAK REPORTEDLY CONSISTS OF MORE THAN 1,000 MEMBERS OPERATING IN DILI AND IS COMMANDED BY NOTORIOUS MILITIA LEADER EURICO GUTERRES. CONSIDERING ITS VIOLENT HISTORY AND GUTERRES'S THREATS, AITARAK WOULD POSE A MAJOR THREAT TO STABILITY IF AUTONOMY

WERE REJECTED.

BESI MERAH PUTIH, COMMANDED BY MANUEL SOUSSA, HAS AT LEAST 350 MEMBERS. THE GROUP, WHICH OPERATES IN THE LIQUICA AREA, HAS LED THE FORCEFUL DISPLACEMENT OF LARGE NUMBERS OF PROINDEPENDENCE VILLAGERS.

MAHIDI CLAIMS OVER 6,000 MEMBERS BASED IN AINARO AND IS LED BY CANCIO DE CARVALHO. LIKE THE OTHER GROUPS ABOVE, MAHIDI WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR NUMEROUS VIOLENT DEATHS AND ACTS OF INTIMIDATION AGAINST PROINDEPENDENCE SYMPATHIZERS. DAUDARUS MERAH PUTIH, WHICH LISTS 1,000 TO 3,000 MEMBERS, OPERATES IN THE MALIANA AND BOBONARO AREAS UNDER PAOLOS PEREIRA. DAUDARUS WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR AN ATTACK ON THE UN COMPOUND IN MALIANA.

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15. (C) PROSPECTS FOR A FAIR VOTE. ALTHOUGH THE NUMBER OF VIOLENT INCIDENTS IS DOWN, MILITIAS RETAIN WIDESPREAD CONTROL IN SEVERAL WESTERN DISTRICTS. ELEMENTS FROM BOTH SIDES STILL TURN TO INTIMIDATION, ISOLATED ASSAULTS, AND KIDNAPINGS, SEEMINGLY MOTIVATED BY REVENGE. GOVERNMENT POLLING DATA HAVE LED INDONESIAN OFFICIALS TO BELIEVE THE ELECTION RESULTS WILL BE CLOSE. THE UN MISSION PRIVATELY THINKS 85 TO 95 PERCENT OF THE PEOPLE WOULD REJECT AUTONOMY IN THE ABSENCE OF INTIMIDATION, AND IT FEARS A CLOSE VOTE WOULD INCREASE PRESSURE ON INDONESIA'S ASSEMBLY TO RECONSIDER EAST TIMOR INDEPENDENCE.

16.-(G)-CONCERTED MILITIA ACTIONS, SUCH AS FORCED BLOOD OATHS AND REPEATED THREATS, OVER THE PAST SEVERAL MONTHS MOST LIKELY HAVE CORRUPTED THE ELECTION PROCESS. HOWEVER, OTHER COUNTERVAILING FORCES REMAIN, INCLUDING A STILL-ACTIVE CLANDESTINE REBEL NETWORK AND ENCOURAGEMENT BY THE CATHOLIC CLERGY TO VOTE ONE'S CONSCIENCE. REBEL LEADER JOSE "XANANA" GUSMAO, ALTHOUGH CONCERNED ABOUT THE OUTCOME, BELIEVES THAT WITH EFFECTIVE UN OVERSIGHT, MOST EAST TIMORESE STILL WILL VOTE FOR INDEPENDENCE. WITH THE FORMAL CAMPAIGN SOON TO BEGIN, CONTINUED UN PROGRESS IN ENSURING FAIRNESS WILL BE IMPORTANT. UN REQUESTS INCLUDE MOVING THE SIDES INTO CANTONMENT AREAS AND ALLOWING THE PROINDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT - FORCED UNDERGROUND BY THE EARLIER MILITIA OFFENSIVE - TO CAMPAIGN OPENLY, AS CALLED FOR IN THE MAY ACCORD.

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17. (6) MILITARY POSTURE. THE INDONESIAN POLICE BEAR SOLE

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RESPONSIBILITY FOR MAINTAINING SECURITY IN EAST TIMOR, BUT THE ARMED FORCES RETAIN OVERALL POWER. UNTIL RECENTLY, MILITARY OFFICIALS SUPPORTED THE **MILITIA** BUILDUP AND ACCEPTED VIOLENT PARAMILITARY BEHAVIOR AS BEING NECESSARY TO CURB THE INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT AND COMPEL POLITICALLY UNSOPHISTICATED TIMORESE TO BACK AUTONOMY. ARMED FORCES COMMANDER WIRANTO PRESUMABLY EARLIER AGREED TO THIS APPROACH, ACCEPTING ONE-SIDED REPORTS FROM FIELD COMMANDERS THAT PLACED PRIMARY BLAME ON REBEL VIOLENCE.

18:-(S) OVER THE PAST 3 MONTHS, HEIGHTENED FOREIGN CRITICISM INCREASINGLY HAS COMPELLED WIRANTO TO EMPHASIZE REDUCING OVERT MILITIA VIOLENCE. MILITIA INCIDENTS AGAINST UN PERSONNEL LAST MONTH IN PARTICULAR APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN A DEFINING MOMENT. ALTHOUGH THE ARMY STILL TOLERATES SMALL-SCALE INCIDENTS, IT NOW DIRECTS MILITIA LEADERS NOT TO ATTACK UN PERSONNEL AND TO REFRAIN FROM OTHER ACTIONS THAT MIGHT PROMPT FURTHER ELECTION DELAYS OR PRESSURE FOR FOREIGN PEACEKEEPING TROOPS. EVEN SO, SOME VIOLENCE-PRONE GROUPS RETAIN AN AUTHORIZED CIVIL DEFENSE ROLE, AND THE ARMED FORCES ARE RELUCTANT TO INCUR MILITIA ANGER, OFTEN EXCUSING THEIR VIOLENCE AS BEING INHERENT TO TIMORESE CULTURE.

/****** BEGINNING OF SECTION 003 ******/

19. (3) INDONESIAN MILITARY LEADERS PROBABLY WILL CONTINUE TO WORK WITH THE UN MISSION WITH SOME LIMITATIONS. THE LEADERS HAVE RESISTED WITHDRAWING GOVERNMENT FORCES TO CANTONMENT AREAS, FEARING THAT REBEL FORCES WOULD FILL THE RESULTING VACUUM. MILITARY OFFICIALS HAVE PLEDGED NOT TO DEPART ABRUPTLY AND REPORTEDLY INTEND TO BRING IN MORE TROOPS TO DEAL WITH POSTBALLOT VIOLENCE, POSSIBLY AS A WAY TO AVERT DEPLOYMENT OF AN INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING FORCE. PLANS ALSO CALL FOR THE EVACUATION OF ANY FOREIGNERS AND OTHER CIVILIANS CONSIDERED ENDANGERED. NONETHELESS, CONCERN ABOUT DETERIORATING SECURITY IN ACEH, THE OTHER TROUBLED PROVINCE, IS SPURRING PLANS FOR A TROOP DRAWDOWN IN TIMOR REGARDLESS OF THE OUTCOME OF THE VOTE. LOCAL TROOPS WOULD BE MOVED TO ADJOINING AREAS AS A BUFFER WITH ANY NEW STATE, BUT SOME COVERT SUPPORT FOR THE MILITIAS APPARENTLY WOULD CONTINUE. A CLOSE VOTE FOR INDEPENDENCE PRESUMABLY WOULD HEIGHTEN MILITARY INTEREST IN KEEPING PROINTEGRATION WESTERN DISTRICTS UNDER INDONESIAN CONTROL, AS PROPOSED BY INTEGRATIONISTS.

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20. (8) AUSTRALIAN-INDONESIAN TIES FLOUNDERING. AN INDONESIAN BACKLASH THAT HAS EMERGED IN RECENT WEEKS AGAINST FOREIGN PRESSURE INCREASINGLY HAS TARGETED AUSTRALIA AS THE MAIN CHAMPION OF UN OPERATIONS AND CRITIC OF MILITARY SUPPORT FOR THE TIMORESE MILITIAS.

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FRUSTRATED INDONESIAN OFFICIALS NOW COMPLAIN OF CANBERRA'S CONCERTED EFFORT TO GARNER A PROINDEPENDENCE VICTORY IN EAST TIMOR IN ORDER TO REPLACE INDONESIA AS THE PREEMINENT POWER IN THE TERRITORY. JAKARTA IS PARTICULARLY CONCERNED ABOUT AUSTRALIA'S READYING OF TWO ARMY BRIGADES, WHICH COULD WELL FORM THE INITIAL CONTINGENT OF ANY UNWANTED UN PEACEKEEPING FORCE. SENIOR MILITARY SPOKESMEN ALSO RECENTLY CHARGED CANBERRA WITH FAILING TO STEM ALLEGED ARMS SMUGGLING AND HAVE INTENSIFIED AIR AND NAVAL PATROLLING IN THE AREA. 21. (C) MILITIA LEADERS OFFERED MORE STRIDENT CRITICISM, AS WELL AS THREATS. CANBERRA HAS TRIED TO EMPHASIZE ITS NEUTRALITY BUT LAST WEEK POINTEDLY WARNED OF "ENORMOUS CONSEQUENCES" IF ITS NATIONALS WERE HARMED. ANTI-AUSTRALIAN FEELINGS COULD INTENSIFY FOLLOWING A PROINDEPENDENCE VOTE, IF JAKARTA SEEKS A SCAPEGOAT FOR ITS LOSS OF THE PROVINCE. NONETHELESS, MUTUAL RECOGNITION OF THE IMPORTANCE OF BILATERAL TIES WILL REMAIN A STRONG FACTOR TEMPERING ANY SHARP DOWNTURN IN RELATIONS.

SPECIAL FORCES 120 - 120
MISCELLANEOUS 590 - 590
TOTAL DEPLOYED 6,020 - 6,020
PERMANENT MILITARY PRESENCE
KOREM HQ, DILI 300 125 425
13 KODIM HQ AND SMALL MISCELLANEOUS UNITS 1,160 3,540 4,700
744 INF BN 470 145 615
745 INF BN 510 150 660
TOTAL PERMANENT 2,440 3,960 6,390
PARAMILITARY ELEMENTS

WANRA (TERRITORIAL) - 930 930 WANRA (13 SPECIAL FORCES TEAMS) - 1,200 1,200 CIVIL SERVICE PNS (TRAINED CIVILIANS) - 1,590 1,590 KAMRA (UNARMED POLICE AUXILIARY) - 1,000 1,000

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