

RELEASED IN FULL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 KIGALI 03188 01 OF 04 300601Z
ACTION AF-01

INFO LOG-00 ACDA-17 AID-01 CIAE-00 C-01 OASY-00 DODE-00
DOEE-00 EB-01 EUR-01 HA-09 H-01 TEDE-00 INR-00
IO-19 L-03 ADS-00 NEA-01 NSAE-00 NSCE-00 OIC-02
OMB-01 PA-01 PM-02 PRS-01 P-01 SNP-00 SP-00
SS-00 TRSE-00 T-00 USIE-00 DTC-01 RPE-01 CORE-00
/065W

-----E82A6C 300602Z /38

P 271512Z AUG 93 ZDK CITE HCB 4038 AND ALL OTHERS
FM AMEMBASSY KIGALI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4550
INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY BRAZZAVILLE
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
AMEMBASSY DAKAR
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY TUNIS
AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE
USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GE
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 KIGALI 03188 01 OF 04 300601Z

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 KIGALI 03188

STATE FOR AF/C, AF/RA, AND IO/PEACEKEEPING
YAOUNDE AND LILONGWE FOR DATT

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL, AORC, MASS, UN, OAU, RW
SUBJECT: UM RECONNAISSANCE MISSION HEAD DISCUSSES
THOUGHTS ON UN INVOLVEMENT IN RWANDA

REFS: (A) KIGALI 3092, (B) STATE 250795,
(C) USUN 3985, (D) ADDIS ABABA 5645

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUMMARY. UN RECONNAISSANCE MISSION HEAD TOLD

REVIEW AUTHORITY: Charles Daris, Senior Reviewer

CHARGE HIS TEAM'S FINDINGS POINT TOWARD A WHOLLY UN, PHASED PEACEKEEPING OPERATION (PKO) WITH SEVERAL COMPONENTS, PEAKING IN SIZE DURING THE FORCE DISENGAGEMENT/DISARMAMENT/DEMobilIZATION PROCESS, THEN TAPERING OFF SIGNIFICANTLY. HE WORRIES THAT A FORCE SMALLER THAN THE "MINIMUM VIABLE" OR DELAYED IN ARRIVAL COULD JEOPARDIZE A POTENTIALLY SUCCESSFUL PKO. WHAT FORCES CAN BE MOVED IN WHEN TO ASSURE THE PROCESS STAYS ON TRACK IN THE "CRITICAL" WEEKS IMMEDIATELY AHEAD SO A GOVERNMENT CAN BE PUT IN PLACE IS A MAJOR PREOCCUPATION. HE ASKED THAT THE U.S. URGE BOTH SIDES TO REMAIN PATIENT AND CALM PENDING UN START-UP. END SUMMARY.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 KIGALI 03188 01 OF 04 300601Z

3. CHARGE MET 8/26 WITH BRIG. GEN. ROMERO DALLAIRE TO EXCHANGE VIEWS ON UN INVOLVEMENT IN A PEACEKEEPING OPERATION IN RWANDA. CHARGE CONVEYED U.S. POSITION AS OUTLINED REF B. THE GENERAL WAS RELUCTANT TO DISCUSS SPECIFICS OF HIS TEAM'S FINDINGS IN ORDER NOT TO PREEMPT HIS REPORT TO THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL OR COMPROMISE THE UNSYG'S DECISION-MAKING AUTHORITY. NEVERTHELESS, HE DISCUSSED BROAD OUTLINES OF HIS THINKING AT THIS STAGE AND EXPRESSED FEARS FOR THE OPERATION'S SUCCESS SHOULD THE UN SKIMP ON RESOURCES. ALSO PRESENT WERE ISEL RIVERO, UN POLITICAL DEPARTMENT, AND FLORENCE BARRILLON-POMES, SPECIAL ASSISTANT.

4. PARAMETERS. THE GENERAL SAID HE WILL RECOMMEND TO THE UNSYG A PKO FOR RWANDA THAT IS "REASONABLE BUT RESPONSIBLE" GIVEN THE CONSTRAINTS ON THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AND THE NEEDS ON THE GROUND. HE WILL PRESENT OPTIONS TO THE UN/SYG WITH A CONVINCING ARGUMENT FOR WHAT HE DEEMS THE "MINIMUM VIABLE" OPERATION. BELOW THAT, HE SAID, THE UN WILL BE ON ITS OWN.

5. A WINNER. GEN. DALLAIRE SAID THE RWANDAN PKO COULD BE A WINNER IF IT IS APPROACHED PROPERLY AND AT A PACE THAT KEEPS THE RISK FACTOR LOW. IF FORCE ARRIVAL IS DELAYED, HE SAID, OR IF THE OPERATION IS SHORT-CHANGED ON RESOURCES, FAILURE COULD BE A REAL POSSIBILITY. HE SAID HE FOUND GOOD WILL ON BOTH SIDES TO MAKE THE PEACE PROCESS WORK. THAT THE CEASEFIRE WORKS WITH ONLY 50 NMOG OBSERVERS IS

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 KIGALI 03188 01 OF 04 300601Z
EVIDENCE OF THIS GOOD WILL.

6. RISKS EXIST. NEVERTHELESS, HE SAID, RISKS EXIST. HE EXPRESSED PARTICULAR PREOCCUPATION WITH RISKS IN THE INITIAL STAGE OF THE PROCESS WHICH HE CONSIDERS "CRITICAL". WHAT WILL HAPPEN, HE ASKED, WHEN THE UN FORCE FAILS TO ARRIVE BY SEPTEMBER 10, THE LOCALLY AGREED MILESTONE FOR PUTTING THE GOVERNMENT IN PLACE? HOW LONG WILL THE PATIENCE OF THE TWO SIDES LAST BEFORE ONE OR THE OTHER BREAKS THE PEACE? HE SAID HIS TEAM IS DOING A RISK ASSESSMENT TO DETERMINE WHAT RESOURCES ARE NEEDED AND WHEN IN ORDER TO ENSURE AGAINST COLLAPSE OF THE PROCESS

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 KIGALI 03188 02 OF 04 271529Z
ACTION AF-01

INFO LOG-00 ACDA-17 AID-01 CIAE-00 C-01 OASY-00 DODE-00
DOEE-00 EB-01 EUR-01 HA-09 H-01 TEDE-00 INR-00
IO-19 L-03 ADS-00 NEA-01 NSAE-00 NSCE-00 OIC-02
OMB-01 PA-01 PM-02 PRS-01 P-01 SNP-00 SP-00
SS-00 TRSE-00 T-00 USIE-00 DTC-01 RPE-01 CORE-00
/065W

-----E7BAE0 271600Z /38

P 271512Z AUG 93
FM AMEMBASSY KIGALI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4551
INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY ADDP
WMMBA PRIORITY 1366
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY BRAZZAVILLE
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
AMEMBASSY DAKAR
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA

AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 KIGALI 03188 02 OF 04 271529Z
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY TUNIS
AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE
USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 04 KIGALI 03188

STATE FOR AF/C, AF/RA, AND IO/PEACEKEEPING
YAOUNDE AND LILONGWE FOR DATT

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL, AORC, MASS, UN, OAU, RW
SUBJECT: UM RECONNAISSANCE MISSION HEAD DISCUSSES

BEFORE IT EVEN GETS STARTED. HE BELIEVES THAT
FINDING A WAY TO PUT THE GOVERNMENT IN PLACE EARLY
WILL BE CRUCIAL.

7. PHASED OPERATION. THE GENERAL TALKED ABOUT A
THREE-PHASE OPERATION WITH THE NUMBER OF ASSETS
PEAKING DURING THE DISENGAGEMENT/DISARMAMENT PROCESS
OF PHASE II. ALTHOUGH THE GENERAL WAS DELIBERATELY
VAGUE IN DESCRIBING HIS VISION, CHARGE UNDERSTOOD THE
FOLLOWING:

--PHASE I WOULD BEGIN SEPTEMBER 10 AND EXTEND UNTIL
SUFFICIENT UN ASSETS WERE DEPLOYED TO RWANDA TO
PERMIT THE DISENGAGEMENT PROCESS TO BEGIN. ONCE A UN
RESOLUTION AND BUDGET WERE APPROVED, A COMMANDER
COULD BE NAMED AND BE IN COUNTRY WITH AN ADVANCE
PARTY POSSIBLY WITHIN ABOUT TWO WEEKS. FORCES MIGHT
BE ABLE TO BE BORROWED FROM ANOTHER UN OPERATION IN
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 KIGALI 03188 02 OF 04 271529Z
ORDER TO MAKE IT POSSIBLE FOR THE GOVERNMENT TO BE
PUT IN PLACE. THIS, THE GENERAL BELIEVES IS THE
CRITICAL PHASE.

-- PHASE II WOULD BEGIN WHEN A UN FORCE REASONABLE
ENOUGH TO BEGIN THE DISENGAGEMENT PROCESS ARRIVED IN
COUNTRY. HE SAID THREE MONTHS WOULD BE THE MINIMUM

TIME NEEDED FOLLOWING PASSAGE OF A UN RESOLUTION FOR THE MAIN BODY OF A UN FORCE TO BE DEPLOYED TO RWANDA. THE NUMBER OF FORCES WOULD PEAK DURING THIS PHASE WHICH WOULD LAST UNTIL THE FORCE INTEGRATION WAS COMPLETE, ABOUT NINE MONTHS OUT.

-- PHASE III, BEGINNING ONCE FORCE INTEGRATION WAS COMPLETED, WOULD SEE FORCES REDUCED, POSSIBLY LEAVING ONLY AN OBSERVATION FORCE UNTIL THE END OF THE 22-MONTH TRANSITION PERIOD.

8. BEGINNING AND END. IN RESPONSE TO A QUERY, THE GENERAL SAID THAT THE END OF THE OPERATION WAS CLEAR: 22 MONTHS INTO THE PROCESS WHEN THE PEACE ACCORD CALLS FOR THE TRANSITION PERIOD TO END AND NATIONAL ELECTIONS TO BE HELD. THE GENERAL NOTED THAT HAVING "REASONABLE" ASSETS IN PLACE AT EACH POINT IN THE PROCESS WOULD MAKE IT POSSIBLE FOR THE UN--AND DONORS--TO PUSH THE RWANDANS HARD TO STICK TO THEIR PROPOSED TIMETABLE.

9. RELATION TO THE OAU/NMOG. ASKED WHAT THE ROLE OF THE OAU/NMOG WOULD BE, THE GENERAL SAID IT WOULD HOLD THE FORT UNTIL THE UN COULD COME IN. AFTER THE
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 KIGALI 03188 02 OF 04 271529Z
ARRIVAL OF THE UN, THERE WOULD BE NO FURTHER OAU COMMAND STRUCTURE. THE OAU TROOPS WOULD THEN BE WITHDRAWN OR FOLDED INTO THE UN OPERATION. HE HINTED AN ACCEPTANCE OF THE LONG-STANDING OAU PROPOSAL, FIRST SUGGESTED DURING THE ARUSHA TALKS, FOR OAU PERSONNEL TO BE SECONDED TO KEY POSITIONS OF A UN-LED PKO TO GAIN EXPERIENCE FOR FUTURE OAU PKOS. CHARGE PROBED WHETHER AN NMOG BATTALION (THINKING OF THE EGYPTIAN OFFER) MIGHT BE ABLE TO SERVE AS THE KIGALI FORCE THAT COULD ENABLE THE GOVERNMENT TO BE INSTALLED. HE SAID ANY SUCH FORCE WOULD HAVE TO BE UN-LED.
VA COMPONENTS OF THE OPERATION. CHARGE ASKED ABOUT THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE HUMANITARIAN ASPECT OF A UN

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 KIGALI 03188 03 OF 04 271531Z
ACTION AF-01

INFO LOG-00 ACDA-17 AID-01 CIAE-00 C-01 OASY-00 DODE-00
DOEE-00 EB-01 EUR-01 HA-09 H-01 TEDE-00 INR-00
IO-19 L-03 ADS-00 NEA-01 NSAE-00 NSCE-00 OIC-02
OMB-01 PA-01 PM-02 PRS-01 P-01 SNP-00 SP-00
SS-00 TRSE-00 T-00 USIE-00 DTC-01 RPE-01 CORE-00
/065W

-----E7B757 271532Z /38

P 271512Z AUG 93
FM AMEMBASSY KIGALI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4552
INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY BRAZZAVILLE
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
AMEMBASSY DAKAR
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY TUNIS
AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE
USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GE
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 KIGALI 03188 03 OF 04 271531Z

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 04 KIGALI 03188

STATE FOR AF/C, AF/RA, AND IO/PEACEKEEPING
YAOUNDE AND LILONGWE FOR DATT

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL, AORC, MASS, UN, OAU, RW
SUBJECT: UM RECONNAISSANCE MISSION HEAD DISCUSSES

OPERATION TO THE MILITARY ASPECT. THE GENERAL SAID
THAT HE WOULD NOT BE PROPOSING AN ALL-SOLDIER
EXERCISE, BUT ONE WITH SEVERAL COMPONENTS. ALTHOUGH
HE DID NOT WANT TO BE SPECIFIC, CHARGE DEDUCED HE
ENVISIONS AT LEAST FOUR COMPONENTS: A FORCE TO

MANAGE THE DISENGAGEMENT/DISARMAMENT ACTIVITIES, MILITARY OBSERVERS FOR THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE TO BE ESTABLISHED BETWEEN THE TWO ASSEMBLY ZONES, A CIVILIAN POLICE COMPONENT, AND A HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANT COMPONENTS (REINSTALLATION OF DISPLACED/DEMOBILIZED SOLDIERS/RETURNING REFUGEES). HE STRESSED THAT HIS RECOMMENDATIONS WOULD BE FOR "REASONABLE AND RESPONSIBLE" LEVELS OF PHASED INVOLVEMENT IN ALL COMPONENTS. HE SAID THE HUMANITARIAN COMPONENT MIGHT CONSIST SOLELY OF A COORDINATOR AS THERE IS ALREADY A WELL-DEVELOPED UN-NGO-IGO NETWORK FOR DELIVERING AID TO THE DISPLACED. THE GENDARMERIE AND THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM ARE VIRTUALLY NON-EXISTENT, HE SAID, SO THERE WILL HAVE TO BE SOME ASSISTANCE IN BUILDING THE SECURITY CAPABILITY OF THE NEW GENDARMERIE.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 KIGALI 03188 03 OF 04 271531Z

11. IDENTIFICATION OF SITES. CHARGE ASKED IF HIS TEAM HAD IDENTIFIED SITES FOR CANTONMENT OF WEAPONS AND ASSEMBLY OF TROOPS. HE SAID THEY HAD BUT THEY WOULD BE PRESENTED AS RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE UN/SYG. AN ADVANCE PARTY WOULD BE ABLE TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE TWO SIDES ON THE PROPOSALS.

12. PHASE I CRITICAL. THE GENERAL REITERATED THAT, IN HIS VIEW, A RWANDA PEACEKEEPING OPERATION HAD A GOOD CHANCE OF SUCCEEDING. BUT IN ORDER FOR IT TO BE SUCCESSFUL, HE SAID, SOME RESOURCES MUST BE COMMITTED. HIS POLITICAL AIDE OBSERVED THAT THE ANGOLAN OPERATION FAILED BECAUSE IT HAD BEEN SHORT-CHANGED ON RESOURCES. THE GENERAL SAID PHASE I WILL BE ABSOLUTELY CRITICAL. A "MINIMUM VIABLE FORCE" WILL BE NEEDED DURING THIS PERIOD SO THAT THE GOVERNMENT CAN TAKE OFFICE AND SO THAT THE TWO SIDES CAN GET THROUGH THE PERIOD BEFORE A UN FORCE IS PRESENT WITHOUT HAVING THE THE PROCESS "CRASH".

13. APPEAL FOR HELP. THE GENERAL APPEALED TO THE U.S. TO HELP KEEP THE TWO SIDES PATIENT AND CALM AND THE PROCESS ON TRACK PENDING THE ARRIVAL OF AN INTERNATIONAL FORCE. HE SAID THE UN/SYG IS PULLING OUT ALL THE STOPS TO MOVE QUICKLY ON THE RWANDAN ISSUE. BUT, HE SAID, THE UN JUST CANNOT MEET THE LOCALLY AGREED TIMETABLE. THE UN NEEDS HELP IN CONVINCING THE TWO SIDES OF THE UN'S GOOD FAITH AND IN KEEPING THINGS CALM IN THE INTERIM.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 KIGALI 03188 03 OF 04 271531Z

14. COMMENT. IT IS CLEAR FROM WHAT THE GENERAL SAID THAT THE RECOMMENDATIONS IN HIS REPORT WILL INCLUDE SPECIFIC NUMBERS ATTACHED TO SPECIFIC TIME FRAMES FOR AN OPERATION THAT WILL HAVE A CLEAR BEGINNING AND A CLEAR END. HIS WORRY IS LEGITIMATE: HOW LONG CAN THE TWO RWANDAN FORCES REMAIN DEPLOYED IN BATTLE POSITIONS ON OPPOSITE SIDES OF A NARROW DMZ WITHOUT HAVING SOMETHING GO AWAY? HOW LONG CAN A GOVERNMENT BE POISED TO TAKE OFFICE BEFORE POLITICAL MANIPULATION SETS IN TO DERAIL IT? EVEN THOUGH WE ARE CONVINCED THAT RWANDANS WANT THEIR PEACE PROCESS TO WORK, WE DO NOT BELIEVE THEY CAN REMAIN INDEFINITELY IN ANTICIPATORY LIMBO WITHOUT SOMETHING

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 KIGALI 03188 04 OF 04 271532Z
ACTION AF-01

INFO LOG-00 ACDA-17 AID-01 CIAE-00 C-01 OASY-00 DODE-00
DOEE-00 EB-01 EUR-01 HA-09 H-01 TEDE-00 INR-00
IO-19 L-03 ADS-00 NEA-01 NSAE-00 NSCE-00 OIC-02
OMB-01 PA-01 PM-02 PRS-01 P-01 SNP-00 SP-00
SS-00 TRSE-00 T-00 USIE-00 DTC-01 RPE-01 CORE-00
/065W

-----E7B76C 271533Z /38

P 271512Z AUG 93
FM AMEMBASSY KIGALI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4553
INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY BRAZZAVILLE
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
AMEMBASSY DAKAR
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA

AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY TUNIS
AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE
USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GE
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 KIGALI 03188 04 OF 04 271532Z

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 04 OF 04 KIGALI 03188

STATE FOR AF/C, AF/RA, AND IO/PEACEKEEPING
YAOUNDE AND LILONGWE FOR DATT

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL, AORC, MASS, UN, OAU, RW
SUBJECT: UM RECONNAISSANCE MISSION HEAD DISCUSSES

HAPPENING THAT COULD SERIOUSLY TEST THEIR RESOLVE.
TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE. THE GENERAL STRIKES US AS A
BRIGHT, NON-NONSENSE SORT OF GUY WHOSE
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR HELPING RWANDA HELP ITSELF SHOULD
BE GIVEN SERIOUS CONSIDERATION. HE STILL INTENDS TO
PRESENT HIS REPORT TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL FOLLOWING
THE LABOR DAY WEEKEND. END COMMENT.

LEADER

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

**NATIONAL
SECURITY
ARCHIVE**

This document is from the holdings of:

The National Security Archive

Suite 701, Gelman Library, The George Washington University

2130 H Street, NW, Washington, D.C., 20037

Phone: 202/994-7000, Fax: 202/994-7005, nsarchiv@gwu.edu