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DOCUMENT PROCESSING RECORD

CONTROL NUMBER

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DATE RECEIVED

7 Mar 80

RETURN TO: OFFICE, CHAIRMAN, JCS-ROOM 2E865, THE PENTAGON

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

DJSM-494-80

DATE OF DOCUMENT

7 Mar 80

SUBJECT

NORAD False Events (U)

THE ABOVE-DESCRIBED DOCUMENT HAS BEEN RECEIVED IN THIS OFFICE. CIRCULATION OF THIS DOCUMENT WILL BE LIMITED TO INDIVIDUALS INDICATED BELOW. THE DOCUMENT WILL BE RETURNED TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE FOR RECORD PRIOR TO DISPATCH TO ANOTHER OFFICE, OR OTHER DISPOSITION. THIS FORM WILL NOT BE REMOVED FROM SUBJECT DOCUMENT.

NO3 NORAD

TO	NAME	INITIAL	REMARKS
	CHAIRMAN, JCS 00	<i>JR</i>	<p>7 March 1980</p> <p>1. ACTION.</p> <p>2. Staff forwards proposed informational memo to SECDEF on 5 & 6 March NORAD false events. The memorandum adds <u>nothing</u> to Dr. Perry's earlier report on the same subject (Red Signal). Further, Perry indicates that his report was <u>written in conjunction with the JCS.</u></p> <p>3. Recommendation:</p> <p>- Table draft Staff memo (it is poorly written to boot!).</p> <p>- Alternatively, call SECDEF to associate yourself with Perry's memo and have LTG Dickinson keep in touch with Dr. Dinneen's office in providing additional details, if required.</p>
<i>5</i>	EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT 02	<i>T</i>	
<i>4</i>	DEPUTY EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT 03	<i>Mc</i>	
<i>3</i>	THE ASSISTANT TO THE CHAIRMAN 01		
<i>2</i>	EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT 01A		
<i>6</i>	ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT 04	<i>G</i>	
	DEPUTY ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT 04A		
	CHAIRMAN'S STAFF GROUP AIR FORCE MEMBER 01B		
<i>1</i>	CHAIRMAN'S STAFF GROUP NAVY MEMBER 01C	<i>TD</i>	
	CHAIRMAN'S STAFF GROUP ARMY MEMBER 01E		
	LEGAL ADVISOR AND LEGISLATIVE ASSISTANT 01F		
	SPECIAL ASSISTANT 01G		
	SPECIAL ASSISTANT FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS 01H		
	ARMY AIDE 05		
	MARINE AIDE 05A		
	PROTOCOL 06		

*Done 10 March 80
RW*

*no memo needed now
FLYNN*

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.4

By P. O. M. Date 3/4/85

Declassified by the Joint Staff IAW JSI 5227.01
Date: 1/6/09

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OJCS SUMMARY SHEET

TO: CJCS	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	FOR USE BY ORIGINATING DIRECTORATE C3S-M-145 '80 7 MAR 1980	
THRU: DJS	THOR HANSON VICE ADMIRAL, USN DIRECTOR, JOINT STAFF	DJSM NO. 494-80	ODJS SUSPENSE DATE
SUBJECT: NORAD False Events (U)		DJSM DATE 07 MAR 1980	
		ACTION	
		APPROVAL	SIGNATURE
		INFORMATION	OTHER
		X	X

REMARKS

The attached memorandum to SecDef describes the events of 5 and 6 March 1980. Recommend approval and signature.

Attached also is a memo from Dr. Perry to SecDef concerning same topic.

This Form 9 is UNCLAS w/o atch

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ACTION OFFICER R. J. SALEWSKI Lt Col USAF SWS/C3S Ext 70168	COORDINATION/APPROVAL					
	OFFICE	NAME	EXTENSION	OFFICE	NAME	EXTENSION
	C3S	<i>Adkinson</i>		J-3	Gen Shutler	
DATE OF PREPARATION 7 Mar 80						

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Authority

NW40299



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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: False Events (U)

1. (S) As part of the verification testing of the non-operational PAVE PAWS west site, simulation tests were conducted on 5 March 1980. A NORAD general officer was present during the test. Between 1910Z and 1940Z, two successful simulation tests were conducted. At 1944Z, another simulation tape was started and one simulated target was mis-correlated as a real target. This is not considered as a valid input since the site is non-operational. At 1945Z, NORAD convened a Missile Display Conference. A System confidence and NORAD confidence of "NO" were passed. Simulation conduct procedures and confidence reporting procedures were followed exactly as specified by directives and checklists. This event has been turned over to the contractor for detailed analysis and corrective action.

2. (S) On 6 March 1980, 1700-2300Z, a class A simulation test between DSP-E, NMCC, SAC, and NORAD was conducted with a NORAD general officer monitoring the test. All participants and users were briefed and notified 72 hours in advance. Test override lights were placed on in NORAD CC. Voice conference loop was established with all users. At 1900Z, Data Distribution Center (DDC) personnel directed Overseas Ground Station (OGS) personnel to throw a switch. The operator in Australia placed it in the wrong position and allowed test data to be transmitted as real. Because of the precautions described above, all concerned were immediately made aware of the problem. Following established procedures, NORAD convened a Missile Display Conference at 1904Z and a system confidence and NORAD assessment of "NO" were passed.

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3. (S) In both cases, no reaction was taken by any military forces. The contractor will insert appropriate changes in software to preclude 5 March malfunction and procedural correction will be taken as a result of the 6 March test.

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NW46299

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THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

7 MAR 1980

RESEARCH AND
ENGINEERING

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: NORAD Events - INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

(S) In conjunction with the JCS we have conducted a preliminary investigation of the two NORAD events in which test data was inputted into the system as real data.

(S) In the first case (5 March), PAVE PAWS West was undergoing IOT&E verification with a General Officer monitoring at NORAD. PAVE PAWS computer correlated a simulated target as a real target. This information was transmitted to NORAD. It was immediately recognized as an error and a NORAD assessment of "NO" was transmitted.

(S) In the second case (6 March), DSP-E was involved in a test of the 427M system under the supervision of a General Officer. Because of an operator error at Buckley, the DSP station in Australia was incorrectly ordered to place a switch in a wrong position causing test data to be transmitted as real data. The error was recognized by the test team and a NORAD assessment of "NO" was transmitted.

(S) In both cases normal procedures and directives were followed. Missile Display Conferences (this is an internal conference) were initiated. No actions external to the NMCS system were taken.

(S) The good news is that the test procedures that have been established precluded any false alert. Also we can and will make procedural corrections and software changes to correct the two specific errors that occurred. However, I am still not convinced that we have done everything that can be done to prevent test data from being transmitted as real data. I have asked Gerry Dinneen to go to NORAD immediately (he is at Leavenworth today) to review the situation and recommend further corrective action. He will be at NORAD tomorrow and will give us a full report on the situation when he returns on Monday.

William J. Perry

cc: Lt Gen Dickinson, JCS

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